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Advertising expenses have been deductible ever since the income tax was 
enacted in 1913.  Over the years, however, a number of analysts have questioned 
advertising’s tax status.  According to some, advertising creates intangible capital and 
should, therefore, be capitalized and amortized like other capital assets.  According to 
other analysts, advertising does more to reduce welfare than to augment it; therefore, 
the deduction should be completely denied.  Advertisers and their supporters, on the 
other hand, maintain that the deduction is entirely reasonable.  
This dissertation addresses some of the legal controversies involving the 
deduction and examines some of advertising’s economic psychological, sociological 
and ecological effects.  In Part I, Chapter 1 introduces the research question and 
debates the welfare implications of ad-induced economic growth.  Chapter 2 
considers whether advertising is, in fact, an “ordinary and necessary business 
expense” that is entitled to a tax deduction.  Although advocates for the deduction 
  
claim that it is both ordinary and necessary, some critics argue that the deduction is, 
in fact, a subsidy that shifts more of the tax burden to individual taxpayers. 
Part II is devoted to the economic effects of advertising.  Chapter 3 discusses 
advertising’s impact on demand for the output of an individual firm, a particular 
industry, and all industries combined.  Chapter 4 examines the effect of advertising 
on the competitive model; Chapter 5 evaluates advertising’s influence on innovation, 
employment, and savings; and Chapter 6 considers the economic impact of 
advertising on the media. 
The focus in Part III is on advertising’s influence on well-being.  Chapter 7 
examines ways that advertising affects the well-being of individuals and society.  
Chapter 8 surveys the impact of ad-induced materialistic values on the environment.  
Chapter 9 looks at a number of costs and benefits that are associated with advertising, 
discusses potential obstacles to changing advertising’s tax status, and offers 
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Ever since 1913, when the Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress the “power 
to lay and collect taxes on incomes,” businesses have deducted advertising expenses 
(Faber 1994; Teinowitz 2000).  Today, the relevant section of the Internal Revenue 
Code (i.e., § 1.162-1 Business Expenses) reads, in part:  
 
Business expenses deductible from gross income include the ordinary 
and necessary expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to 
the taxpayer’s trade or business. . . .  Among the items included in 
business expenses are management expenses, commissions . . . , labor, 
supplies, incidental repairs, operating expenses of automobiles used in 
the trade or business, traveling expenses while away from home solely 
in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . , advertising and other selling 
expenses, together with insurance premiums . . . , and rental for the use 
of business property.  (italics added) 
 
Clearly, the Code states that advertising is deductible.  Advertising is assumed 




ordinary and necessary, or is it, in fact, optional?  And if it is optional, should it be 
deductible?   
A logical argument in support of the deduction, based on the assumptions of 
mainstream economics, might follow a line similar to the following:   
 
• Governments should promote policies that enhance citizens’ welfare. 
• Economic growth enhances citizens’ welfare. 
• Therefore, governments should promote policies that fuel economic growth. 
 
• Advertising fuels economic growth. 
• Governments should enact policies that fuel economic growth. 
• Therefore, governments should enact policies that encourage advertising. 
 
At the end of that line of logic, one arrives at the following question: What can 







Chapter 1: Advertising and Growth 
 
In the United States, the federal government allows businesses to deduct 100 
percent of their advertising expenses from their gross income, before calculating their 
tax liability.  How much do businesses deduct annually?  Hundreds of billions of 



























































Source: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, Annual 
(ad-deduction data) and Coen 2006 (ad-spending data).  Data for 1981-1984 ad deductions have been 







Taken together, U.S. businesses spent well over a trillion dollars on 
advertising between 2000 and 2004.  Although correlation does not prove causation, 
it is interesting to note that GDP and advertising expenditures have followed nearly 
identical growth paths (r = 0.997), as Figure 1.2 indicates. 
  
 
 Figure 1.2 
 



























































































Source: (GDP data) Bureau of Economic Analysis and  (ad-spending data) Advertising Age Special 
Issue: “The Advertising Century,” prepared by Robert J. Coen. Data is given in millions of 1999 U.S. 
dollars. 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, and particularly since World War II, U.S. 
gross domestic product, personal consumption, advertising expenditures, and 




The advertising industry claims to have helped push the standard of living in 
the United States perpetually higher.  Judging by the tax deduction afforded to 
advertising and countenanced by the Congress, courts, and Internal Revenue Service, 
the government concurs with the industry.  Indeed, policymakers seem to consider 
advertising to be a public good.  
 
A Public Good? 
 
See, I understand: If you can create the demand for goods . . . , the economy grows. 
That's what you got to understand. 
—George W. Bush at a campaign rally, October 26, 2004 
 
Instead of us lurching back and forth, what I want to do is to create a climate for sustained economic 
growth. 
—Barack Obama interview, March 27, 2008 
 
 
Implicit in the statements of Bush and Obama is the assumption that economic 
growth is good—irrefutably good.  Identifying growth as the summum bonum of 
economic policy is nearly universal, not only among policymakers but also among the 
public at large.   
Borrowing some of the points noted above, a logical argument for allowing 





• Governments should promote policies that enhance citizens’ welfare. 
• Economic growth enhances citizens’ welfare. 
• Advertising fuels economic growth. 
• Allowing businesses to deduct advertising expenses encourages them to 
advertise. 
 
Assuming that all of those premises are true, one might logically conclude: 
• Governments should, therefore, allow businesses to deduct advertising 
expenses. 
 
But what if the unqualified premise, “economic growth enhances citizens’ 
welfare,” is false?  Clearly, false premises prove nothing; thus, the argument falls 
apart.  For the conclusion to be proven, each link in the chain of premises must be 
true (Kelley 1994, 119).  If, beyond some limit, growth tends to undermine citizens’ 
welfare and advertising fuels growth, then policies that encourage businesses to 
advertise—without reference to that limit—would seem to be unwarranted and 
unwise.  
 
More and More Without End? 
 
The avarice of mankind is insatiable; . . . men always want more and more without end; for it is of the 







According to Galbraith (1998), the proposition “that the urgency of wants 
does not diminish appreciably as more of them are satisfied” is “extremely important 
for the present value system of economists” (117).  Economics-textbook author 
Kuenne (2000) certainly ascribes to that value system.  He writes: “Within the 
consumer’s field of choice he or she is never satiated in goods. . . .  More of any one 
or more goods is always welcome” (9).  Another popular microeconomics textbook 
puts it this way: “For all feasible quantities of [two particular] commodities, the 
consumer is never satiated.  A bundle with more of either commodity is always 
preferred to a bundle with less. . . .  If some is good, more is better” (Katz and Rosen 
1998, 24).  It stands to reason, therefore, that if more is better, more must be 
produced, and the economy must grow.   
Thus, for the neoclassical economist, “welfare is increased through the ever-
greater provision of goods and services, as measured by their market value” (Daly 
and Farley 2004, 4).  But, one might wonder, how is increasing welfare through the 
ever-greater provision of goods and services possible?  If human desires are 
insatiable, then consuming more goods and services brings one no closer to satiety 
than consuming no more, just as pouring a ton of sand into a pit with no bottom gets 
one no closer to filling it than pouring in no sand at all. 
On the other hand, could the assumption that more is always better actually be 
false?  Consider the following example.  Suppose there are four citizens—ready, 
willing, and able to sit—in an economy that can produce only one chair.  Knowing 




make two assumptions: (1) that the four citizens will be better off in an economy that 
grows enough to produce three additional chairs and (2) that once ensconced in his or 
her chair, each person’s desire to sit will be satisfied.  In cases of finite needs such as 
this one, more seems to be better, and growing from a one-chair to a four-chair 
economy would seem to enhance citizens’ welfare. 
What about growing from a four-chair to an eight-chair economy?  Would 
doubling the number of chairs enhance citizens’ welfare?  With only one posterior per 
citizen to put in each chair, any number of chairs beyond four might be superfluous.  
On the other hand, with two chairs a citizen could put his or her feet up while sitting.  
Would more be better in this case?  The answer here is less clear.  Let’s suppose our 
nation has only eight trees and it takes one tree to make one chair.  To make eight 
chairs would require cutting down all eight trees.  Would eight chairs increase 
welfare?  Not if citizens would rather sit in the shade with their feet on the ground 
than sit in the sun with their feet on the chairs.  What about an intermediate economy, 
one that produces six chairs and leaves two shade trees standing?  Would two trees 
provide enough shade?  Who would get the foot-rest chairs if only two were 
produced?  What if the foot-rested individuals became corpulent, sedentary, and 
indolent, while the single-chaired folk became envious, conniving, and felonious?  
Would a six-chair be better than a four-chair economy in that case?  If the production 
and consumption of the additional chairs leads to individual misbehavior, social 
unrest, and environmental destruction, would the benefit associated with economic 




In general, whether or not economic expansion adds to welfare depends on a 
number of factors that we need not dwell on here. (Chapters 8 and 9 will discuss the 
impact of growth on welfare.)  The point, for now, is simply that once the economy 
has produced a sufficient number of chairs to satisfy each citizen’s basic need to sit, 
expanding the economy may do nothing to enhance citizens’ welfare; rather, further 




I suspect that many neoclassical economists (among others) would call my 
four-person, eight-tree economy an absurd abstraction.  In the real world, they would 
say, resources are far less limited, and enterprising individuals develop innovative 
technologies that stretch existing resources and (essentially) create new ones.  
Furthermore, a chair is only one of an uncountable number of goods.  In the real 
world, if a one-chaired woman desires a foot-rest chair, she can trade something she 
has (her labor, for instance) in order to get it.  Better yet, rather than trade for a foot-
rest chair, she can buy an ottoman.  According to neoclassical economists, people are 
always better off with more goods because with more they have the option of trading 
away something they have for something they would rather have.  Since economic 
growth enables people to obtain more goods and services—which they can keep or 
trade according to their preferences—economic growth is categorically good.  Hence, 
governments should enact policies that help the economy grow; and, if advertising 







Some growth-skeptics might respond that what is missing from the 
neoclassical-economists’ argument is the recognition that economic growth is an 
unreliable proxy for welfare.  In making their case, the skeptics would likely point to 
a number of recent empirical studies in which researchers find no direct relationship 
between economic growth and levels of self-reported “happiness,” “subjective well-
being,” or “satisfaction with life” (terms that, according to Graham and Felton (2005), 
economists often use interchangeably.)  Myers (2000) finds, for example, that while 
average personal income more than doubled between 1956 and 1998, the percentage 
of Americans who reported being “very happy” fell slightly, as Figure 1.3 shows, 







In a similar study (see Figure 1.4), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) found 
that the percentage of Americans who reported being “very happy” dropped from 
thirty-four to thirty percent between 1972 and 1998.  Over the same time-span, the 
number who reported being “pretty happy” climbed, from fifty-two to fifty-eight 
percent, while the number who reported being “not too happy” exhibited no trend.  
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A Weak Surrogate 
 
A number of studies consider the relationship between income and happiness 
across nations or subcultures within nations.  The 1990-1991 World Values Survey, 
for example, examines the relationship between per-capita gross national product 
(GNP) and subjective well-being for 50,000 people from forty different countries 
(Inglehart in Myers 2000).  Among its findings, the survey reveals that the residents 
of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, East Germany, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, and 
South Korea reported nearly the same average level of subjective well-being—
notwithstanding variances in per-capita GNP that ranged from approximately $2,000 
in Poland and Chile to about $27,000 in Japan.   
In the scatter-plot of Figure 1.5, dots representing countries appear to form 
two clouds: one cloud below and the other cloud above an imaginary dividing line of 
about $8,000 per capita.  (The results of more recent surveys of subjective well-being 
in various nations reveal similar patterns.)  As the scatter-plot shows, the group of 
countries on the right side of the $8,000 line exhibits higher levels of subjective well-
being in comparison to the group of countries on the left, but within those two 
groups—right and left—no relationship exists between well-being and per-capita 
GNP.  Using the U.S. poverty line for individuals in 1990, which was $6,280 (U. S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2004), as a rough guide, we might fairly 
conclude that $8,000 was enough to cover basic needs and satisfy some extraneous, 
but not extravagant, desires.  Thus, Figure 1.5 apparently indicates that increases in 
per-capita GNP fail to improve well-being in countries where people have more than 





Figure 1.5 : The Impact of Income on Subjective Well-Being 
 
Source: The data is from the World Bank and the 1990-1991 World Values Survey.  The scatter plot 
was originally published in Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (p. 62) by Richard Inglehart 
and was later reprinted in Myers (2000). 
 
 
In another study with similar results, Diener and Seligman (2004) found that 
members of the Forbes list of the 400 richest Americans, the Pennsylvania Amish, 
and the Inuit of northern Greenland tied for first place in self-reported life satisfaction 
















   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   






Source: Diener and Seligman (2004).  Authors’ note: “Respondents indicated their agreement with the 
statement ‘You are satisfied with your life.’  Using a scale from 1 (complete disagreement) to 7 
(complete agreement); 4 is a neutral rating.” 
 
 
Imagine for a moment the multi-million-dollar mansions of the Forbes-list 




amenities of electricity and running water.  From a material standpoint, a greater 
contrast is barely imaginable.  Nevertheless, the Inuit reported the same high level of 
life satisfaction as the richest Americans.  As Diener and Seligman conclude, “If the 
well-being findings simply mirrored those for income and money—with richer people 
invariably being much happier than poorer people—one would hardly need to 
measure well-being, or make policy to enhance it directly.  But income, a good 
surrogate historically when basic needs were unmet, is now a weak surrogate for 
well-being in wealthy nations.” 
Consideration of similar findings led Easterlin (1974) to note an apparent 
paradox concerning the relationship between wealth and happiness.  Graham (2005) 
describes that paradox as follows: “While most happiness studies find that within 
countries wealthier people are, on average, happier than poor ones, studies across 
countries and over time find very little, if any, relationship between increases in per 
capita income and average happiness levels” (45). 
Although the Easterlin paradox is widely cited, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) 
challenge its validity.  They find “a clear positive link between average levels of 
subjective well-being and GDP per capita across countries, and find no evidence of a 
satiation point beyond which wealthier countries have no further increases in 
subjective well-being.”  Nevertheless, they note that “many researchers have 
examined the trend in US happiness . . . and all have come to the same conclusion: 
the US has not gotten any happier over this time period [1972 through 2006] and has 
even experienced a mild decline in happiness.”  (See Figure 1.6.)  Their own analysis, 




series is thus a data point supporting the Easterlin paradox, [but] it should be regarded 
as an interesting exception warranting further scrutiny” (24). 
 
Figure 1.6: Average Happiness in the U.S. 
 
 
        
Source: Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) 
 
Given that consumption in the U.S. has risen substantially for decades (see 
Figure 1.7, below), while subjective well-being has stagnated and even declined, why 
do many people—including many policymakers—assume that increasing 
consumption will increase well-being?   
The answers are, no doubt, numerous.  Here are a few that seem plausible:   
• The notion that consuming more fails to increase welfare is counterintuitive.  
Consumption produces pleasure, or, if not pleasure, at least satisfaction.  
Although the pleasant sensation is fleeting in most instances, the initial utility 




• Amassing goods for future use may be an instinctual strategy that increases 
the probability of survival.  
• Many people evaluate their self-worth based on their ability to “keep up with 
the Joneses.”  They assume that their lives would be better if they could 
achieve or surpass the consumption of their peers.        
• Compared to the mind’s response to the intensity of hunger pangs and the 
pleasure of eating, its recognition of satiety is subtle, which may be why so 
many people overeat.  Tight clothing, a number on a scale, and an image in a 
mirror provide feedback; but that feedback is temporally, physiologically, and 
psychologically removed from the initial experience of pleasure. 
• Environmental signals of over-consumption by individuals are particularly 
subtle.  For example, when consumers become aware that the possessions they 
have accumulated are crowding their living space, many expand their living 
space rather than reduce their consumption.  Thus, they cope with the 
disutility of consuming too much by consuming more.   
• What is being lost as people devote more time, attention, and resources to the 
acquisition and consumption of more goods and services generally goes 
unnoticed.  Changes in the way people live tend to be slow and incremental.  
Those who draw attention to the downside of the changes are often called 
nostalgic or pessimistic; they are marginalized, and their views are dismissed.  
• A rising GDP is hailed widely by the media and trumpeted loudly by 
incumbent politicians as a reason for reelection and a cause for celebration.  




government officials that growth—and particularly consumption-induced 
growth—is good.   
• Finally, and most directly relevant to this dissertation, advertisers spend 
billions of dollars annually attempting to convince people to consume more.  







Source of data: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007).  The chart presents constant-dollar estimates.  It 
shows a sextupling of consumption between 1947 and 2004, although the population merely doubled 






Basic Human Needs 
 
Clearly, human well-being depends on the satisfaction of needs.  But what 
defines a need?  According to Kasser (2002), a “need is not just something a person 
desires or wants, but is something that is necessary to his or her survival, growth and 
optimal functioning” (24).  Human needs extend beyond the strictly biological.  As 
Schudson (1984) explains, “the creditable human being must have not only the things 
needed for a decent life, but something extra, something superfluous or sentimental or 
luxurious” (133).  Even in primitive and impoverished societies, he writes, “human 
needs and desires are culturally constituted and socially defined” (132). 
If, as Schudson (1984, 134) maintains, human “desires and pleasures spring 
from society” and are measured “by society and not by the objects which serve for 
their satisfaction,” then perhaps one reason that Inuits (as noted above) are as satisfied 
with their lives as Forbes magazine’s richest Americans—despite the stark difference 
in the monetary wealth and consumption levels of the two groups—is that the Inuit 
and the richest Americans both manage to satisfy their social as well as their survival 
needs.   
Advertising attempts to redefine human needs by implying that people need 
advertised products in order to be truly creditable human beings.  In the process, 






The Parallel Growth of Advertising and Materialism 
 
As Figure 1.8 illustrates, between 1900 and 2004, while population less than 
quadrupled, annual spending on advertising in the United States increased 26 times, 
going from $11 billion to $288 billion in constant 2007 dollars (Oregon State 
University 2007) or from $450 million to $263 billion (Coen 1999; 2006) in current 
dollars. 
While Figure 1.8 illustrates the growth of advertising in constant-dollar terms, 
it fails to indicate the impact of that growth on individuals and society.  In human 
terms, the increased exposure to commercial messages has transformed the tenor of 
daily life profoundly.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, 11 percent of 
Americans were illiterate (U.S, Department of Education n.d.) and more than 60 
percent of all Americans lived in rural areas (U. S. Census Bureau “Population” n.d.); 
thus, as Twitchell (1996) notes, for many people, weeks would often pass between ad 
sightings.  In contrast (see Chapter 2, below), the average American in the new 
millennium is exposed to several thousand ads every day, or about a million ads per 
individual per year (Twitchell 1996; Union of Concerned Scientists n.d.).  Once a 
novelty, ads have become ubiquitous.     
According to a growing number of social scientists, the omnipresence of 
commercial messages is having a number of sociological and psychological effects 
(see Chapter 7).  Advertising, psychologists say, plays a major role in the formation 
of materialistic attitudes.  As Kanner and Soule (2004) put it, “one meta-message that 




primarily in material goods and services.”  The effect of commercial messages, the 
authors explain, is cumulative.  When people live in an environment awash with ads, 
regardless of content, “the sheer volume of commercial messages promotes 
materialism” (57).  
 





Source of ad-spending figures: Robert J. Coen (1999, 2006).  Converted to constant 2007 dollars using 
“Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors 1774 to estimated 2018 to Convert to Dollars of 
2007.”   
 
Like most values, materialism becomes most deeply rooted when it is instilled 




the 1990s have transformed children’s programming and have allowed advertisers to 
make children a central focus of their attention.  According to Steyer (2002), “the past 
decade’s wave of media mergers has produced a complex web of business 
relationships that now defines America’s mass media and popular culture.  These 
relationships offer a huge opportunity for cross-promotion and the selling of products 
among different companies owned by the same powerful parent corporations.”  In 
Steyer’s view, these “all-purpose media corporations . . . look at kids as targets in this 
vast commercial empire they are conquering in the name of profit . . .” (13). 
Has this targeting of children been effective?  If the numerous psychological 
studies (to be discussed in Chapter 7) that link exposure to advertising to the 
development of materialistic values are valid, then perhaps the targeting has been 
effective—given that several surveys indicate that successive cohorts of young people 
hold increasingly materialistic values.   
To take one example, a study conducted by the Higher Education Research 
Institute (HERI) at UCLA asked more than 275,000 college freshmen questions about 
their values.  Between the 1967 and 2003, the number of entering college students 
who said that being very well off financially was “very important or essential” 
climbed dramatically.  As Figure 1.9 indicates, in 1970, when materialism among 
college freshmen was apparently at its nadir, only about 34 percent indicated that 
being very well off financially was essential.  By 2003, however, that number had 



































































































Source: UCLA Graduate School of Education and Information Studies: Higher Education Research 
Institute (2004) survey data. 
 
 
A 1998 poll by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal seems to indicate 
greater materialism in young people, as well.  In response to a series of questions 
about their personal values, younger cohorts were more likely than older cohorts to 
say that money was very important (Roper Center 1999).  As Figure 1.10 shows, the 
younger the group, the more its members said they valued money.  In fact, compared 
to the oldest group, the youngest group was almost two-and-a-half times more likely 
to think that having a lot of money was very important. 
Figure 1.10 seems to suggest a negative relationship between age and 




conclude, in addition, that the older a cohort is today the less its members cared about 
being wealthy when they were young.  But if, in fact, each generation is more 
materialistic (on average) than were previous generations, why is that the case?  
Certainly, more than one variable is at play.  Nonetheless, psychological studies (as 
subsequent chapters will show) find that advertising inculcates materialistic values.  
Since each generation is being exposed to a greater number of ads, each generation is 
being exposed to a greater number of messages that impart materialistic values than 
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Apparently, materialistic values, like most values, tend to be formed early in 
life and remain relatively stable.  That is not to say, however, that people who are 
middle-aged are no more materialistic now than they were when they were young.  
Statistics on consumption (see Figure 1.7) indicate that Americans have increased 
their consumption almost every year since 1947.  One might argue, of course, that 
increased consumption might merely reflect higher per capita incomes over time.  It 
should be noted, however, that instead of increasing their spending, Americans could 
have held their consumption constant—or even decreased their spending as their 




Until quite recently, over-consumption generally affected only the individual 
who over-consumed and, perhaps, his or her community to some degree.  Today, 
however, the consumption of goods and services by Americans comes increasingly at 
the expense of the rest of life on the planet—human and otherwise.  According to the 
environmental organization Redefining Progress (Creslog and Graeser 2001; Hoppe 
and Creslog 2002), more than five Earths would be required to allow the rest of 
humanity to match the American rate of consumption.  
For the most part, public policy has failed to grapple with over-consumption 
by individuals.  The problem is seemingly intractable: regulating private consumption 
is politically infeasible, and calling for voluntary restraint is generally ineffective.  




economic growth that they tend to panic when personal consumption falls.  
Nevertheless, consumption must fall, because the associated costs, from global 
warming and species extinction to obesity and diabetes, are rapidly mounting and 
must be confronted.  Public policies that encourage people to over-consume, even if 
that encouragement is indirect, are counterproductive and should be re-evaluated. 
Consider the tax deduction for advertising.  Advertising encourages people to 
consume.  In fact, the very purpose of advertising—its raison d’etre—is to motivate 
the consumption of products and services.  Since deductibility promotes advertising, 
and advertising engenders materialism, and materialism fuels over-consumption, and 
over-consumption (ex hypothesi) leads to disutilities (see Chapters 7 and 8), perhaps 
it is time to eliminate the advertising deduction.   
But that is, of course, just one side of the argument.  As we shall see, 
supporters of the advertising deduction offer a number of justifications for their 




Should advertising remain a tax-deductible business expense?  Subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation attempt to answer that question by examining some of the 
legal, economic, psychological, sociological, and ecological effects of advertising.  
Chapter 2 (in Part I) considers whether advertising is, in fact, an “ordinary and 




In Part II—The Economics of Advertising—Chapter 3 discusses advertising’s 
impact on demand; Chapter 4 examines the effect of advertising on the competitive 
model; Chapter 5 evaluates advertising’s influence on innovation, employment, and 
savings; and Chapter 6 considers the economic impact of advertising on the media. 
The focus in Part III is on advertising’s influence on well-being.  Chapter 7 
examines ways that advertising affects the well-being of individuals and society.  
Chapter 8 surveys the environmental impact inhering to ad-induced materialistic 
values and economic growth.  Chapter 9 looks at the costs and benefits associated 
with advertising, discusses potential obstacles to changing advertising’s tax status, 
and offers recommendations for policymakers.  




Chapter 2: An Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense? 
 
Advertising is currently deductible as an “ordinary and necessary business 
expense.”  According to Section 1.162-1(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, “Business 
expenses deductible from gross income include the ordinary and necessary 
expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to the taxpayer’s trade or business. 
. . .  Among the items included in business expenses are . . . advertising and other 
selling expenses . . .” (Internal Revenue Code § 1.162).  Nevertheless, advertising’s 
inclusion as a deductible business expense has sparked controversies ever since 1913, 
when the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution enabled Congress “to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.”  In the view of some 
observers, for example, the tax deduction for advertising expenditures amounts to a 
subsidy by the taxpayers.  As the Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee of the 105th Congress, Bill Archer, once remarked: “We have seen a Cato 
Institute report where they say they’re defining corporate welfare.  And one of the 
items that they claim is corporate welfare is the business expense of advertising. . . .  I 
mean, what is a legitimate business expense?  Obviously it’s like beauty.  It’s in the 
eye of the beholder” (House of Representatives 1997). 
Advertising’s advocates maintain that the deduction for ad expenditures, like 
the deductions for other business expenses, “merely reflects the true cost of producing 
taxable income” (Neuborne 1992).  This seems to be an inadequate justification for 
the deduction, however, since the Internal Revenue Service, backed by the courts, 




some business expenses that were once deductible are no longer.  Three-martini 
lunches, for example, are nondeductible now, even though somewhat inebriated, less 
inhibited prospects undoubtedly make better customers.  In some instances, 
expenditures for sales’ motivators have never been deductible.  Take skimpy clothing, 
for example.  As every marketer knows, sex sells.  For that reason, at the Sweet Spot 
Café, the Natte Latte, and the Bikini Espresso in the suburbs of Seattle, baristas wear 
bikinis.  “It’s not against the law,” said a spokesman for the Sheriff’s Department.  
“And the truth is, [they] are doing a land-office business” (qtd. in Verhovek 2007).  
It’s unlikely that the baristas or their employers are allowed a bikini deduction, 
however.  The IRS disallows deductions for articles of clothing that are suitable for 
ordinary wear—whether or not that clothing attracts paying customers (Cook 2004). 
 
Equivalent to salespeople? 
 
Advertising is salesmanship-on-paper. 




According to Advertising Age editorials, advertising is a “legitimate and fully 
deductible business expense,” equivalent to expenditures for “sales calls” (1995a), 
“sales staff salaries” (1993a), or a “company’s sales force” (1986).  Over the years, a 
number of observers have equated advertising with salesmanship.  Rosser Reeves 
(1986) writes: “Advertising is, actually, a simple phenomenon in terms of economics. 




merchant who cries aloud his wares” (145).  Similarly, Daniel Starch (1923) notes: 
“The simplest definition of advertising, and one that will probably meet the test of 
critical examination, is that advertising is selling in print” (5).  Indeed, the tax code 
itself equates advertising with selling expenses, as noted above. 
Businesses have deducted advertising expenses for as long as the federal 
government has collected taxes on income.  Much has changed, however, since 1913, 
when the income tax was enacted.  At that time, advertisements truly did function a 
lot like salesmen.  In fact, creating ads that functioned like salesmen was the aim of 
most ad agencies.  Influential, turn-of-the-century ad-man John E. Kennedy believed 
that “an ad should say in print precisely what a good salesman would say face-to-face 
to a customer” (Fox 1997, 50).  According to Kennedy, an advertisement should 
provide “a good, strong, clearly expressed Reason-why” to buy the advertised product 
(Kennedy c. 1910, 7).  As other ad men followed Kennedy’s lead, “Reason-Why” 
became the vogue in advertising.  Thus, the widespread use of an advertising style 
that emulated straightforward salesmanship coincided with the enactment of the 
income tax.  
In that pre-World-War-I era, ads seemed analogous to salesmen not only 
because ad men designed them to function like “salesmen on paper” but also because 
many Americans encountered advertisements only about as often as they encountered 
salesmen.  As Twitchell (1996) notes, “In 1915 a person could go entire weeks 
without observing an ad” (2).  Newspaper and magazine subscribers certainly 




population was limited to seeing outdoor signs and, on occasion, receiving a handbill 
or a circular.   
Prior to the 20th century, advertising was anything but an ordinary and 
necessary expense for most businesses.  According to Fox (1997), as recently as the 
late 1800s, advertising had been “considered an embarrassment. . . .  A firm risked its 
credit rating by advertising; banks might take it as a confession of financial 
weakness” (15).  But the stigma associated with advertising was about to lift. 
Beginning in the 1880s, a few innovative manufacturers began to use 
continuous-process machinery, which allowed them to manufacture packaged 
consumer goods cheaply and to sell those goods at low prices.  As Schudson (1984) 
notes: “The massive increase in output made possible by the new machinery led 
manufacturers to build large marketing and purchasing networks and to engage in 
widespread advertising” (164).  With the massive expansion in capacity made 
possible by the new machinery, these manufacturers used advertising to generate 
demand to match their newly achievable output.  “For firms where technology had 
solved production problems, advertising arose as part of a marketing effort to sell 
goods whose supply could be increased easily at little additional production cost” 
(167-168). 
Thus, when the income tax was enacted, a few manufacturers of packaged 
consumer goods had begun to advertise heavily, but most businesses advertised little 
or not at all.  In the aftermath of World War I, however, many businesses confronted 
an excess-profits tax and sought to spend those profits “in a manner that could be 




newspapers, double pages in magazines, with more illustrations and wider borders to 
fill the space.  In only two years, the total annual volume of advertising doubled, from 
$1.5 billion worth in 1918 to just under $3 billion in 1920” (Fox 1997, 77; italics in 
original).  The excess-profits tax thus provided an incentive for businesses to spend 
vast sums on advertising. 
Because businesses had money to burn in order to avoid taxes and media had 
pages to fill, a new theory of advertising soon supplanted Kennedy’s Spartan, 
“Reason-Why” style.  Known as “impressionistic copy” or “atmosphere advertising,” 
the new ad-style aimed to project an image of high quality and status, by featuring 
“opulent art and striking layouts,” as well as “dignified, elegant writing as a 
complement to its high visual tone” (Fox 1997, 70).  Commenting on the 
transformation, Inger Stole (1998) writes: “In the space of a relatively few years, as 
advertising veered from mere price and product information to an emphasis on 
appeals that were image-based, emotional, even deceptive, it became both a powerful 
and controversial business practice” (21). 
A case can be made, therefore, that the post-war transformation of advertising 
left it bearing little resemblance to ordinary salesmanship.  Businesses, nevertheless, 
continued to claim the deduction just as they had before the change in ad style.   
The growth-spurt in advertising expenditures following World War I—an 
unintended consequence of the excess-profits tax—has since settled into a pattern of 
steady ad growth.  In 1913, the year the income tax was enacted, American 
businesses spent just over one billion dollars (approximately 22 billion in 2007 




Not only are today’s ad expenditures not comparable to those of 1913, the 
technologies employed to research, produce, and transmit ads have stretched the 
analogy between face-to-face selling and advertising past the breaking point. 
Using technology to find the “buy button” 
Today’s market researchers employ ever more sophisticated scientific and 
medical instruments in a relentless quest for a sure-fire consumption trigger—what 
some marketers call a “buy button.”  To monitor the lengths of time that test subjects 
focus on various sections of an ad, for example, market researchers fit subjects with 
eye-tracking instruments; to quantify an ad’s ability to evoke emotions, 
neuroscientists measure subjects’ galvanic skin responses.   Nor do researchers limit 
their research to overt physical responses in their attempts to determine an ad’s effect.  
Current technologies allow researchers to probe deep within a subject’s brain.  By 
hooking-up subjects to electroencephalographs, for instance, neuroscientists have 
been able to identify cognitive functions in twelve separate parts of ad-viewers’ 
brains (Wells 2003).  By noting which parts of the brain “light up,” that is, where in 
the brain electrical activity spikes, researchers can determine when and how an ad 
attracts or repels a subject and “which parts of commercial messages, if any, are 
encoded in the experimental subjects’ long-term memories.”  Such encoding is of 
great interest to advertisers because, according to neuroscientist Richard Silberstein, 
“people who are more likely to purchase a product show significantly higher memory 
encoding than those who are less likely” (qtd. in Wells, n.p.).    
Over the past few years, a number of corporations, including Coca-Cola, 




resonance imaging in the search for brain activities that signal the decision to 
consume.  According to one psychiatrist/neurologist who has conducted brain-
imaging for DaimlerChrysler, using an MRI is “a little like mind reading” (Wells, 
n.p.).  A professor of organizational behavior has predicted that “in the not-too-distant 
future, firms will be able to tell precisely if an advertising campaign or product 
redesign triggers the brain activity and neurochemical release associated with 
memory and action” (Wells, n.p.).  Finding the means to trigger the neurochemical 
release associated with action would be a crucial advance in the ad industry’s ability 
to motivate consumption, because a potential consumer will not buy—no matter how 
well he or she remembers an advertised product—without an internal impulse to act.  
When advertisers can both encode into memory and spur to action, they will, perhaps, 
have found the long-sought “buy button.” 
In the meantime, advertisers use information about individuals’ behavior to 
inform the content of custom-tailored commercial messages.  Today’s interactive 
computer technology allows advertisers to collect personal information and target 
individuals with personalized ads.  Such “behavioral-targeting” systems employ 
computer algorithms to process personal information gleaned from information stored 
in numerous databases.  Increasingly, as consumers go onto the Internet or turn on 
their cell phones, they receive custom-tailored ads (Story 2007c).  Google, for 
example, electronically scans its e-mail subscribers’ inboxes and subsequently 
displays ads, on the subscribers’ computer screens, that seem relevant to the content 
of the users’ e-mail messages (Story 2007b).  Similarly, Pudding Media uses voice-




analysis software to figure out which ads might be relevant to the user; and then it 
delivers custom-tailored ads to the users’ computer screens, based on the content of 
their conversations (Story 2007b).  Internet social-networking companies, such as 
MySpace and Facebook, mine the information (or the “digital gold,” as one company 
executive put it) that users display on their personal profile pages.  “We are blessed 
with a phenomenal amount of information about the likes, dislikes and life’s passions 
of our users,” said the president of Fox Interactive Media, owner of MySpace (qtd in 
Stone 2007b, n.p.).  With grocery scanners compiling information about individuals’ 
purchases, Internet search engines collecting users’ web-surfing histories, online 
advertisers tracking and storing individuals’ visits to websites, and telephone and e-
mail providers eavesdropping on personal communications, advertisers have access to 
more than enough information about most Americans to create highly effective, 
personalized ads.  Until researchers locate the sure-fire buy-button within the human 
brain (if they ever do), “behavioral targeting” may be the best method in the 




Even the best method to motivate consumption is only effective if it can first 
engage consumers’ attention.  Because people spend their time engaged in many 
different activities, advertisers try to put their ads wherever human beings might go.  
“We never know where the consumer is going to be at any point in time, so we have 
to find a way to be everywhere,” an ad executive told a reporter for the New York 




According to Yankelovich, a market research firm, people who live in cities 
encounter approximately 5,000 ad messages per day (Story 2007a).  Estimates of all 
Americans’ daily ad exposure vary, by source, from several hundred (Consumer 
Reports Website 2002) to several thousand (Advertising Media Internet Center 2002).  
Whatever the precise number, advertising’s current ubiquity further differentiates it 
from the salesmanship-on-paper advertising of 1913.   
When the income tax first took effect, advertisers lacked the means to 
broadcast their messages to millions of people simultaneously.  In 1913, a few 
inventors had built experimental radios, but a decade would pass before American 
consumers brought radio receivers into their homes.  With the radios came spoken 
messages exhorting listeners to buy advertised goods.  Those messages multiplied the 
average Americans’ ad exposure by many times.  Several decades later, when 
consumers added televisions to their households, they further increased their ad 
exposure.  
Over the years, as technologies have offered new means to reach potential 
customers, advertisers have employed those means to carry their commercial 
messages to virtually any place a human being might go.  Consequently, as time has 
passed, more and more ads have appeared in more and more places.  But, as Comanor 
and Wilson (1974) note, because “the advertising of others creates ‘noise’ in the 
market, one must ‘shout’ louder to be heard . . .” (47).  Today, according to one 
marketing executive, “what all marketers are dealing with is an absolute sensory 




Attempting to transcend that overload, many advertisers put ads in unexpected 
places.  In some cases, everyday objects—adorned by ads—can be eye-catching.  
Table 2.1 lists some examples of mundane objects that some advertisers have used to 
carry their messages. 
 








Airport security-station trays 
Paper liners covering pediatricians’ exam tables 
Chinese food cartons 
Subway turnstiles 
Tray tables on US Airways 
Dry-cleaners’ hanging bags 
Pizza boxes 
Women’s room stall interiors 
Men’s room wall, next to urinal attached near ceiling 
Ice (full-size, melting car sculptures) 
Laser-etched eggs (with ads for programs) 
Sides of abandoned, inner-city buildings (as graffiti) 
Clothing (caps, coats, shirts, etc.) 
Telephone, “on-hold” messages 
Backs of grocery receipts 
Ticket stubs 
Back of neck permanent tattoo 




Little Einstein DVDs(1) 
Continental Airways(1) 
Geico auto insurance(1) 
Microsoft(1) 
Perry Ellis(1) 
Verizon(1); Continental Airlines(1) 
Crest Night Effects whitening gel(4) 











Sources: (1) Story (2007a); (2) NewsfromRussia.com (2005); (3) Jana (2001); (4) Petrecca (2006). 
 
 
The tactic, called “guerilla” advertising, often works—for a while, at least.  As 
time passes, however, the public becomes inured.  Thereafter, the once exotic, eye-
catching location seems banal.  Thus, ad agencies perpetually hunt for new ways to 
deliver commercial messages. The ad agency representing Nissan, for example, once 




Attached to each key ring was a tag that read: “If found, please do not return.  My 
generation Nissan Altima has Intelligent Key with push-button ignition, and I no 
longer need these” (Gilbert 2007).   
Beyond keys, entire cars sometimes carry commercial messages.  Procter & 
Gamble, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, and Verizon are among the companies that have 
advertised on privately owned cars, vans, trucks, SUVs, and buses (Newman 2007).  
Imprinted on adhesive vinyl, their ads are wrapped tightly around the vehicles, giving 
the appearance of permanent paint.  According to FreeCar Media, a Los Angeles ad 
agency, over a million people have volunteered to drive the rolling billboards.  When 
Proctor & Gamble or some other company wants to target a particular demographic 
group, the ad agency searches its database for a driver with the correct demographic 
profile.  A soccer mom might be matched to a car with an ad for new-and-improved 
Tide, for example.  In return for participating, drivers receive either stipends of up to 
$800 per month for allowing their vehicles to be ad wrapped or new, pre-wrapped 
vehicles.  Because Americans spend much of their time commuting, ads on vehicles 
can be effective.  According to one study, tens of thousands of motorists and 
pedestrians can be exposed to one ad-wrapped-vehicle’s message per day (Newman 
2007).   
Subway commuters make good ad targets, as well.  Recently, subway systems 
in a number of cities (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo, London, Washington, New 
York, and San Francisco) have installed ads on subway-tunnel walls.  Using the same 
persistence-of-vision phenomenon that television and movies employ, the ad’s still-




hour.  “The user experience is so cool and so innovative that [it] actually excites 
people,” the CEO of one subway-ad company said.  Even after the novelty wears off, 
commuters will probably tend to watch the ads because, as the same CEO explained, 
“people are looking out the window anyway to avoid eye contact” (Terdiman 2007).  
Although many San Franciscans may have enjoyed the novelty of ads in 
subway tunnels, they complained when the California Milk Processing Board put 
“Got Milk?” ads at some area bus stops.  Why?  Because the billboards emitted the 
aroma of chocolate-chip cookies.  Ultimately, citizen outrage forced removal of the 
aromatic ads (Story 2007a). 
The reaction to the cookie-aroma ads in San Francisco was mild, however, 
compared to the brouhaha that occurred when a television cartoon, “Aqua Teen 
Hunger Force,” debuted an outdoor ad campaign in Boston.  As part of the campaign, 
marketers surreptitiously installed circuit boards, with light-emitting diodes arranged 
to depict one of the cartoon’s characters on the front, in highly trafficked locations.  
The strange, illuminated devices panicked some area residents.  Concerned that 
terrorists might have planted the devices, city officials sprang into action.  Calling on 
the F.B.I., Coast Guard, and Department of Homeland Security for assistance, they 
closed subway stations, bridges, the northbound lane of an interstate highway, and 
even a section of the Charles River, while explosive experts examined and removed 
the “hoax” devices hanging nearby.  “It is outrageous, in a post-9/11 world, that a 
company would use this type of marketing scheme,” said Boston’s mayor, Thomas 




Advertisers have diverted their expenditures toward non-traditional ad media 
as consumers have become desensitized and less vulnerable to the influence of 
television advertising.  While TV is still a powerful ad medium, its ability to motivate 
consumption has waned somewhat, due, in part, to the increased sophistication of 
today’s viewers and to the proliferation of communication technologies that compete 
for viewers’ time.  Devices that allow viewers to eliminate the audio portion of an ad 
or to skip a commercial entirely have further degraded television as an ad medium.  
Thus, TV advertisers have begun to divert some of their expenditures away from 
thirty-second commercials that are segregated from the program content and, instead, 
pay networks to exhibit their products as props or background elements within the TV 
program, itself.  Beyond mere placement, advertisers and their surrogates collaborate 
with writers, producers, and network ad departments to work mentions of their 
products into the scripts of television programs.  According to Nielsen Media 
Research, advertisers paid for more than 100,000 products placements in the 2004-
2005 TV season (Manly 2005).   
Meanwhile, television networks have begun to place ads for their own 
programs not on television but on the surfaces of mundane, unexpected objects, to 
draw public attention and generate word-of-mouth publicity.  In addition to putting 
ads on eggs and postage stamps, CBS put ads for its programs on the insides of 
elevator doors, to engage a short-term, captive audience that invariably faces the 
door.  The network even plowed the name of one program, Jericho, into a Kansas 




KFC took ad viewing beyond the stratosphere and into outer space when it 
assembled an 87,500 square-foot image of Colonel Sanders, its founder, in the 
Nevada desert in order to gain publicity for its new logo.  Although the outer-space 
audience has been limited (as far as we know) to a handful of astronauts and 
cosmonauts, the expenditure was not wasted.  After GeoEye’s IKONOS satellite 
captured the Colonel’s image and beamed it back to Earth, news media gave the new 
KFC logo free publicity, by broadcasting the satellite photo along with a story about 
the gigantic logo’s creation (Business Wire 2006). 
While some people undoubtedly thought that blanketing a vast expanse of 
private property with a KFC logo was a clever idea, probably the only ones who 
thought stretching a giant logo across the sky would be similarly appreciated were the 
members of a Georgia marketing firm who proposed the idea.  In the early 1990s, the 
firm had plans to offer ad space on mile-long sheets of mylar, which would have been 
carried into space by rocket and released into low-Earth orbit.  Dismayed at the 
prospect, Congressman Edward Markey introduced the Space Advertising Prohibition 
Act of 1993, to prevent orbiting billboards from “beam[ing] down the logo of Coke or 
G.M. or the Marlboro man, [and] turning our morning and evening skies, often a 
source of inspiration and comfort, into the moral equivalent of the side of a bus” 
(Congressional Record 1993, E1732).  
The 106th Congress enacted a modified version of Markey’s bill.  Given the 
popular agreement that some places (the skies, for example) are unsuitable for ads, 
one might expect that other places—public schools, for example—might be declared 




U.S., advertisements are becoming quite prevalent in schools, as desperate school 
districts accept ad placements in exchange for cash and equipment.   
As James Steyer (2002) notes, marketers realize that “they can get more bang 
for their advertising buck,” in schools.  “Relatively few marketing messages 
[compete] for the youngsters’ attention, [thus] consumer messages can be much more 
potent and effective” (114-115).  In addition to being excellent showcases for ads, 
schools contain captive audiences, for about seven hours per day and five days per 
week.  “Companies desperately want to get into high schools,” said one sports-
marketing representative, “because they know they are getting a captive audience 
with disposable income that is about to make decisions of lifelong preference, like 
Coke versus Pepsi” (Pennington 2004). 
With advertisers eager to supply cash and equipment, chronically under-
funded school boards are cutting deals.  Many schools now show Channel One’s 
programs and advertising, and receive computers and video equipment in exchange 
for class time.  As schools sell flat surfaces throughout school buildings and grounds 
to companies to be used for ad space, “more and more children are seeing their 
schools turned into massive ads and billboards for snacks, soft drinks, and consumer 
products” (Steyer, 115).  Advertisements appear on the sides of school buses, tickets 
to school sporting events, end-zone billboards, gymnasiums’ inner and outer walls, 
scoreboards, and locker-room walls, among other places.  One school board president 
told a reporter: “I’m looking into selling advertising on the children’s basketball 




Off the schoolyard, marketers recruit children to act as product consultants 
and peer-to-peer marketers. “Companies enlist children to market to each other at 
school, in chat rooms, on playgrounds, even inside their homes,” Juliet Schor writes 
(2004, 22).  Many children are eager to be recruited, because they receive product 
samples and gain status among their peers in exchange for providing information 
about youth trends and promoting the advertisers’ brands.  
The Internet is a particularly powerful means for children to promote products 
to their friends.  According to Alissa Quart (2003), “intense peer-to-peer promotion 
has emerged and flowered online . . .” (39).  Why do children forward advertisements 
(or links to ads) to their friends via e-mail?  Generally, like adults, they send ads to 
their e-mail contacts because they think the ads are funny, creative, beautiful, or 
clever, and they think that their friends and relatives will enjoy seeing the ads.   
In the trade, this Internet-assisted, word-of-mouth method of promotion is 
called “viral advertising.”  Because it is inexpensive and effective, viral advertising 
has become an important marketing method in a short stretch of time.  “Viral 
marketing appeals because it’s so cheap,” one marketing director explained.  “Instead 
of buying ad space, the distribution is done for you by customers who communicate 
your messages by word of mouth on the Internet” (Financial Times 2001).  
In a twist on the viral-ad theme, a number of major advertisers (e.g., Heinz 
Ketchup, Sprint, Jeep, Dove, and Pepsi) have invited the public to create ads for their 
brands, offering prizes to the creators of the best entries.  As ad-industry observer 




television with the old-fashioned gimmick of a sweepstakes to select a new 
advertising jingle.”   
Beyond facilitating Internet advertising, computers have been a boon to the 
creation of innovative commercials in a number of ways.  The ease with which 
computers manipulate digital photography, for example, enables ad creators to make 
babies, birds, cats, dogs—anything—speak.  Not only does the technology allow 
gorillas to promote Bud Light and lions to endorse Taco Bell, it also enables 
performers who have been dead for decades, such as Louis Armstrong, Humphrey 
Bogart, and James Cagney, to appear in new ads. 
Table 2.2 lists some examples of ads that digital information technology has 
made possible.  
 








Digital video projected onto sides of buildings 
Interactive animation projected onto walls  
Digital video projected onto sidewalks  
Interactive floors (burgers bounce with footsteps) 
Interactive sign (sneakers fly when people walk by) 
Video games (featuring Big Macs, etc.) 
Video games (featuring vehicles) 
Video games (featuring Army and Marines) 
Flat screens in taxis, buses, airports, subways, elevators 
Animated digital billboards along highways 
Digital billboards in stores, gyms, gas stations, etc. 
Small-screens on iPods, cell phones, and laptops 
  
 
Unilever (Axe cologne) and Toyota(1)  
Adobe(6) 




MiniCooper(3) and Chrysler (Jeep)(5) 






Sources: (1) Story (2007a); (2) Ashdown (2003); (3) O’Dwyer’s PR Services Report (2004); (4) 





And if all the means for displaying and distributing ads already mentioned 
were not enough, ever-alert advertisers have found another ready means in cellular 
phones.  Not long ago a novelty, the now ubiquitous cell is on the brink of becoming 
a major advertising medium.  Many cell-phone service providers already send banner 
and display ads to their subscribers’ picture phones.  Soon, some will show Honda 
ads along with four-to-six-minute “minisodes” of old television programs, such as 
“Charlie’s Angels” and “Fantasy Island” (Elliott 2007).  Because cell-phone use 
generates data that can be helpful in targeting commercials to specific users, many 
advertisers are eager to subsidize cell phone use; and because cell-phone companies 
want more customers in order to generate greater revenues, cell-phone companies are 
eager to accept advertising and to reward customers for viewing ads. Thus, some 
phone companies offer additional services to ad viewers at no additional cost; others 
reduce phone-service rates.  One company plans to give college students free cell 
phones and a forty percent discount on their calling plans—if the students agree to 
watch at least four ads per day (Story 2007d). 
In sum, ads today confront us at every turn.  From a refrigerator shelf where a 
dozen eggshells sport the CBS Eye to the Nevada desert where 65,000 one-foot-by-
one-foot tiles are hooked together to form a fried-chicken-franchise logo, ads are 
everywhere.  According to the editor-in-chief of Advertising Age, Rance Crain, 
“Advertisers will not be satisfied until they put their mark on every blade of grass” 





Interest Group Influence on Corporate Tax Rates 
 
Although advertising was quite similar to face-to-face salesmanship in 1913 
when the income tax was enacted, equating one with the other today seems far-
fetched.  All the same, advertising remains fully deductible.  Why?  In part because, 
as Jonathan Rauch explains, “adopting government measures to help industry has 
always been easy, getting rid of them next to impossible” (Rauch 1994, 56).  Once an 
interest group (in this case advertisers, media, and the advertising industry) receives a 
tax benefit, the group’s members will fight hard to retain it.  Given that the cost of the 
group’s benefit is dispersed across the multitude of taxpayers, any individual’s share 
of the cost is too small for it to be in his or her interest to fight for repeal; nor will 
taxpayers organize a group to fight the benefit, because, as Mancur Olson (1965) 
explains, each potential group member recognizes that the cost of organizing the 
group will be greater than the benefit of membership. 
John Wright (1996) explains the persistence of tax benefits for particularistic 
groups this way: 
There will be little or no interest group opposition to policies that 
disperse the costs of particularistic benefits across the entire 
population without regard to group membership.  Any group that 
opposes another group’s particularistic benefit can at best hope only to 
reduce the tax bill for all individuals in the population.  However, 
since a lower tax bill for the population as a whole is itself a collective, 




outcome, or equivalently, against another group’s particularistic 
benefit. (177)  
When the income tax was established, rather than the creation of a system that 
would allow groups to claim particularistic benefits, the motive was the establishment 
of a more equitable tax system.  The Populists, who had championed the income tax, 
wanted a system that would determine how much a person owed the government by 
how much he could afford, and, as they saw it, income provided the best indication of 
a person’s ability to pay.  “From the start, however, Congress made exceptions to that 
basic principle, allowing special treatment for income that was used for certain 
purposes or that came from certain sources” (Birnbaum and Murray 1987, 6-7).  
Advertising was one such exception.   
As a general proposition, tax breaks distort economic decision-making, by 
providing investors an incentive to direct funds to tax-favored expenditures.  
According to Robert Shapiro (1993) of the Progressive Policy Institute, “Industries 
that don’t receive special treatment have to compete at a disadvantage, because those 
that do enjoy an artificially elevated rate of return that attracts private investment 
away from those left to operate on their own” (31).  In addition, those who receive tax 
breaks “claim scarce resources that otherwise could go to public investment, deficit 
reduction, or tax relief” (32). 
If it were not for the tax breaks they receive, corporations would pay a much 
larger share of government revenues.  In 2006, the tax rate for corporations with 
earnings under $335,000 was between 15 percent and 34 percent of their taxable 




was between 34 and 35 percent.  The tax rate for corporations with higher earnings 
and for all “qualified personal service corporations” was 35 percent (Internal Revenue 
Service 2006).  Ultimately, however, most corporations pay a much lower rate than 
the statutory maximum (Friedman 2003).  As Lawrence Summers (2007) notes: “The 
United States currently has . . . one of the highest corporate tax rates in the OECD 
[the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development], but nonetheless 
manages, despite a record level of corporate profitability, in having the fourth lowest 
corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP in the OECD” (8).   
According to a report by the Government Accountability Office, between 
1996 and 2000, 94 percent of all U.S. corporations paid less than five percent of their 
income in taxes, and more than 60 percent paid no tax at all (MSN 2007).  Between 
1998 and 2005, the proportion of corporations paying no income tax escalated to two 
out of every three (Browning 2008).  A study of 275 profitable Fortune 500 
corporations by Citizens for Tax Justice finds that “eighty-two of America’s largest 
and most profitable corporations paid no federal income tax in at least one year 
during the first three years of the George W. Bush administration,” and “twenty-eight 
corporations enjoyed negative federal income tax rates over the entire 2001-03 
period” (Citizens for Tax Justice 2004).  The average effective tax rate, averaged 
across the entire group of 275, fell from 21.4 percent in 2001 to 17.2 percent in 2002 
and 2003.  With revenues from corporate taxes being so low, more of the tax burden 
necessarily falls on individuals.  According to IRS data, in 2003 corporations paid 





The list of eighty-two corporations that paid “zero tax or less in at least one 
year, 2001-2003,” compiled by the Citizens for Tax Justice (McIntyre and Nguyen 
2004), and the list of the top fifty advertisers, compiled by Advertising Age (2006) for 
2004 and 2005, share a number of common elements.  As Table 2.3 shows, a number 
of America’s largest ad spenders paid no federal income tax.   
 
































































Source for tax info: McIntyre, Robert S., and T. D. Coo Nguyen.  2004.  “Corporate Income Taxes in 
the Bush Years.”  Citizens for Tax Justice & the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.  Source 






Furthermore, a comparison of top corporate tax-break recipients with top 
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Source for tax info: McIntyre, Robert S., and T. D. Coo Nguyen.  2004. Source for advertising 
information: Advertising Age (2006). 
 
While advertising is just one of a number of different tax breaks that 
corporations can exploit, it is worth noting, nevertheless, that some of the nation’s 




A similar revelation motivated tax-reform legislation in the mid-1980s.  At 
that time, Robert McIntyre (who co-authored the 2004 Citizens for Tax Justice study) 
had reviewed the annual reports of 250 of the nation’s largest corporations.  
Publication of his discovery that 128 of them had paid no income tax ignited a 
national furor.  Throughout the country, newspapers carried his findings on their front 
pages.  Politicians cited his report during television appearances.  At a rally in New 
Jersey, a labor leader told the crowd that the package of General Electric light bulbs 
he had in his hands cost more than GE had contributed to the cost of running the 
government.  “It’s a scandal when members of the Fortune 500 pay less in taxes than 
the people who wax their floors or type their letters,” McIntyre said (Birnbaum and 
Murray 1987, 12).  
The furor surrounding the release of McIntyre’s study ultimately led to the 
elimination of many corporate tax deductions, with the passage of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986.  Nearly twenty years later, when McIntyre’s organization, Citizens for 
Tax Justice, released its 2004 report, corporate interests and their supporters 
attempted to discredit it.  The Heritage Foundation’s Norbert Michel, for example, 
criticized the study’s methodology: “The report fails to disclose that corporations’ tax 
return data are not publicly available, a fact that makes CTJ’s analysis imprecise at 
best.  Because of this shortcoming and other errors, CTJ’s conclusion that ‘loophole 
seeking-corporations’ aren’t paying their fair share of taxes falls flat” (Michel 2004).  
In response, McIntyre pointed out that CTJ had gotten “the tax data straight out of 
corporate annual reports,” and added that “Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation 




Although McIntyre’s 1984 report had also drawn intense criticism from 
corporations, that criticism had come too late to influence public opinion.  As 
Birnbaum and Murray explain in their book about the Tax Reform Act of 1986, “Bob 
McIntyre’s one-man report would turn out to be more influential than all the 
firepower the corporate lobbyists could muster” (13). 
As it happened, when McIntyre’s report was published, the Reagan 
administration was facing intense criticism over a ballooning budget deficit and, 
consequently, searching for ways to boost revenues.  The administration’s fiscal 
ideology limited the available options, because its principles restricted the 
government to finding ways to augment its coffers without raising taxes.  Disallowing 
unreasonable (and unpopular) deductions seemed to promise a solution to that 
dilemma.  Thus, the White House began to examine the legitimacy of various 
corporate tax breaks.  As a result, the Treasury Department sent a proposal (see 
Chapter 9 concerning the proposal’s disputed authorship) to the Senate Finance 
Committee to reduce the deductibility of advertising expenditures.   
Although the Senate ultimately omitted that proposal from the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, it has entertained discussions about limiting the deduction from time to 
time since then.  Senator John McCain, for example, included a proposal to reduce 
the advertising deduction, as part of a 43-point program aimed at eliminating 
“loopholes, subsidies and set-asides” (Teinowitz 2000).  Targeting only the 
pharmaceutical industry, Senator Stabenow proposed a restriction on the amount drug 
makers would be allowed to deduct for advertising.  “American taxpayers should not 




pharmacy counter,” she argued (Elliott 2002).  Senator Bradley introduced legislation 
to eliminate the deduction tobacco companies can take for advertising, claiming that 
“there is no constitutional right to receive a federal subsidy” (Colford 1993b).  
Similarly, Senator Byrd maintained that disallowing the deductibility of alcohol ads 
“would simply end the American taxpayers’ subsidization of alcohol advertising” 
(Hymel 2000). 
Working behind the scenes, the Congressional Budget Office has discussed 
the merits of reducing the ad-expense deduction as a strategy for reducing the deficit 
in several of its annual reports, and the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation 
has included the proposal in a list of revenue-raising options.   
Executive branch officials have weighed in, as well.  Richard Darman (budget 
director for President George H. W. Bush) and Robert Reich (Labor Secretary for 
President Clinton) each proposed limiting the deduction as a deficit-reduction 
measure or, as Reich put it, as a means of cutting “corporate welfare,” and “Aid to 
Dependent Corporations” (Teinowitz 1995).   
In addition to executive- and legislative-branch proposals, at least one think 
tank, the Progressive Policy Institute, and one non-profit organization, the Center for 
the Study of Commercialism, have proposed reducing or eliminating the deduction.  
Thus, even though the Treasury Department’s proposal was unsuccessful in 1986, its 
core notion, that advertising’s deductibility should be reconsidered, captured the 
imagination of some participants in the policymaking process.  The enduring interest 
in such proposals seems to indicate that although the deduction is allowed, more than 





A subsidy for advertisers? 
 
For many of those who question its legitimacy, the deduction is the equivalent 
of a subsidy, and from an economic standpoint, the deduction does seem to act like a 









In the graph above, P represents the equilibrium price and Q represents the 
equilibrium quantity for advertising.  Pd represents the effective price that advertisers 
pay to media for space or time to showcase their advertisements, given that 
advertisers are allowed to claim a tax deduction for advertising.  Pd' represents the 
actual price advertisers pay to the media.  In other words, the media can charge Pd', 
because advertisers are able to claim a deduction equal to the difference between Pd' 
and Pd.  Given the deduction, Qd is the quantity of media space/time that advertisers 
demand. 
As the graph shows, the deduction increases the quantity of advertising 
demanded by media consumers (i.e., advertisers), lowers their costs, and raises 
producers’ (i.e., media suppliers’) revenues.  Although the deduction increases 
consumers’ surplus (area PBCPd) and producers’ surplus (PBAPd'), the government’s 
cost, represented by the rectangle Pd'ACPd, is greater than the combined surplus gains.  
The excess cost, or deadweight loss, is represented by triangle ABC.  
 
An equitable deduction? 
 
Regardless of views to the contrary, the ad lobby insists that advertising is not 
a subsidy but rather an ordinary and necessary business expense, clearly eligible for a 
full deduction.  Bristling at the notion that the deduction constitutes corporate 
welfare, an Advertising Age editorial derides, as a “goofy idea,” the “assumption that 




business expense, pure and simple; every bit as legitimate as the cost of raw 
materials, rent, payroll, shipping, etc.” (Advertising Age 1993b).  
In response to a request from the president of the Association of National 
Advertisers, New York University School of Law Professor Burt Neuborne wrote a 
letter supporting the ad-lobby’s argument that a tax deduction is not a subsidy.  “The 
legislation [to eliminate the deduction for tobacco advertising] appears to assume that 
the federal government is morally entitled to tax any and all of the property of its 
citizens,” Neuborne writes.  “However, Americans start not with an assumption that 
everything potentially belongs to the tax collector (with decisions not to tax treated 
like discretionary subsidies), but with the opposite assumption that government must 
justify its decision to tax” (Neuborne 1992).  When government allows firms to 
deduct advertising expenditures, it does so in recognition of “the fact [that] an income 
tax cannot be legitimately imposed on anything other than net economic gain.”  Thus, 
Neuborne concludes, “an income tax deduction, like the deduction for advertising, 
that merely reflects the true cost of producing taxable income is not the equivalent of 
a government subsidy.”  
Despite the forcefulness of Neuborne’s argument, a number of academics, 
policymakers, jurists, and other observers disagree with his conclusion.  More than a 
few economists, for example, have looked at the deduction for ad expenses as a 
subsidy.  And while some have merely provided ammunition for the proponents of a 
change in the tax status of advertising, other economists have labeled the deduction a 
subsidy outright.  Juliet Schor, for example, notes that advertising “expenditures are 




(1998, 165).  Comanor and Wilson (1974) maintain that the “current income-tax 
provisions that permit advertising expenditures to be expensed rather than 
depreciated” subsidize advertisers.  In the authors’ view, the deduction has “served to 
augment the heavy volume of advertising . . . and “need[s] to be reconsidered in the 
light of the major findings of [their] study.  Furthermore,” they continue, “public 
actions may be needed that move in the opposite direction” (252-253).   
Corden (1961) concurs.  He writes: “It can be argued with considerable 
conviction that by treating advertising as a current cost rather than as an investment, 
[the tax code] is providing an interest-free loan to the advertisers.  The result is a 
distortion of business endeavour [sic] in a socially disadvantageous way” (32).  
Corden seems to consider advertising expenditures to be investments in the creation 
of intangible capital and the deduction to be a subsidy to advertisers. 
As detailed in Chapter 4, the literature reveals a number of other economists 
who conclude that advertising creates intangible capital.  Among them are: 
Braithwaite (1928), Borden (1942), Stigler (1958), Corden (1961), Nerlove and 
Arrow (1962), Telser (1962), Palda (1964), Doyle (1968), Peles (1971), Bloch 
(1974), Lambin (1976), Dhalla (1978), Telser (1978), Hirschey (1982), Ayanian 
(1983), Hirschey and Weygandt (1985), Summers (1987), Baye, Jansen, and Lee 
(1992), Shapiro (1993), Congressional Budget Office (1997), Kamber (2002), 
Bagwell (2003), and Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2006).  On the other hand, some 
economists, including Clarke (1976), Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980), 




and Leone (1995), maintain that advertising generally loses its ability to influence 
sales within one year.  
If advertising tends to create intangible capital, but, for tax purposes, 
advertising is considered to be a current expense, then advertising expenditures 
receive favorable tax treatment in comparison to tangible-capital expenditures, which 
must be amortized or depreciated over a number of years. 
A number of tax experts maintain that the current law does give advertising 
and some other intangible assets an advantage over tangible assets.  According to 
Mundstock (1987a), in almost all cases, “immediate deduction (100% first year 
depreciation) provides earlier, and, therefore, more valuable in present value terms, 
tax deductions, resulting in a larger present value after-tax cash flow” (1194).  The 
Congressional Budget Office (1997) apparently agrees.  In a review of options for 
increasing federal revenues, the CBO notes:  
The sooner the deductions, the lower the effective tax rate at which 
income earned from using the asset is taxed. . . .  Currently, businesses 
may deduct advertising expenses in the year they are incurred.  The 
benefits of advertising, however, may extend beyond the current year 
because advertising can create brand recognition or otherwise increase 
the demand for a business’s products or services in later years.  If 
advertising creates a durable asset, the immediate deduction allowed 
by current law favors such investments over investments in other 
durable assets. (Congressional Budget Office 1997, under Section 20, 




For the sake of government revenues, the difference between deduction and 
amortization of ad expenditures can be considerable.  The Joint Committee on 
Taxation calculated that the government would receive an additional $28 billion in 
revenues, over five years, if advertisers were required to amortize 20 percent of their 
ad expenses (for 1998 through 2002) and allowed an immediate deduction for the 
remaining 80 percent (Congressional Budget Office, 1997).  According to a 1988 
proposal, amortizing 40 percent of annual ad expenses over four years could raise 
government revenues $40 billion per year (Bernstein 1988).  
Given that government analysts predict tax revenues would be higher if 
advertising expenditures were capitalized and amortized and that many economists 
have determined that advertising does create intangible capital, why does the tax code 
mandate deduction rather than capitalization and amortization of ad expenditures? 
The answer is that advertising’s tax status was determined early on by what 
was, in essence, a historical accident.  In the beginning, the tax code was ambiguous 
in regard to the deduction or capitalization of advertising expenses.  Adams (1918) 
described taxpayers’ behavior during the first few years of income tax collection this 
way: 
Some corporations have so handled advertising and similar costs that 
they stand on the books as capital assets, designated ‘good will,’ 
‘trade-marks,’ and the like.  Many other corporations, having brands or 
similar intangible assets of great value, have written off as current 
expense the advertising and similar expenditures made to develop or 




will for a very large sum and within the next few years have written it 
entirely off their books.  Other corporations carry the original 
expenditure as a capital asset (157). 
One year after Adams’ description of early taxpayer behavior, Thulin (1919) 
wrote: “The subject of intangible property under the federal tax laws is somewhat 
misunderstood” (294).  The problem, in Thulin’s view, was the existence of two types 
of intangible property.  One “on which no depreciation or depletion can be taken in 
computing the income subject to taxation.”  Advertising generally belonged in that 
category.  For the other type, “depreciation or depletion can be taken in computing 
income subject to taxation” (294; italics in the original).  When advertising is 
classified as a goodwill expenditure, the character of that expenditure “from the point 
of view of federal tax laws is dual; when made [such expenditures] are charges to 
income if so desired, or charges which may be capitalized, if so desired” (301). 
Under current law, taxpayers rarely, if ever, have the ability to choose 
between deducting and capitalizing ad expenses.  George Mundstock, a University of 
Miami professor of law, describes “two historical flukes [that] contributed to the 
development of current law.”  One involves a 1919 regulation that strictly limited the 
depreciation of intangible capital.  Under its provisions, capitalizing intangible 
expenditures would lead “to the harsh result of effectively no deduction” (Mundstock, 
1987a, 1233).  According to Mundstock, that potential result “certainly influenced the 
courts to allow an immediate deduction” (1233).  The other historical accident 
involves an excess-profits tax, levied in the wake of World War I.  As Mundstock 




by either capitalizing their pre-war ad expenditures and depreciating them at the 
excess-profit tax-rate or by “treating advertising as ‘invested capital’ so as to reduce 
the amount of excess profits subject to high rates of tax” (1232).    
To counter these tax-avoidance tactics, “the I.R.S. developed an anti-
capitalization bias,” which “pushed the courts in an anti-capitalization, anti-
investment direction” (Mundstock 1987a, 1233).  In the appeal of Northwestern Yeast 
Co. v. Commissioner (1926) for example, the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals 
acknowledged that “some part of the cost of a campaign or system of promotion may 
be of permanent significance and may be regarded as a capital investment rather than 
a deductible expense.”  Nevertheless, the court held that “the disallowance of the 
entire expenditure and of any portion thereof as invested capital is proper.”  In doing 
so, the Court accepted the Commissioner’s contention “that there can be no allocation 
to capital except to the extent actually proven, and since it is clear from the evidence 
that some uncertain part of the amount, however slight, is not capital, no allowance 
can be made.  Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (United States Board of Tax Appeals 
1926).  In Colonial Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner (1927) and C. Howard Hunt Pen 
Co. v. Commissioner (1928), the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals reached similar 
judgments.   
Although the I.R.S. argued successfully against capitalization of ad expenses 
before the courts on the ground that differentiating between current and capital 
expenditures was infeasible, it eventually came to regret its position.  As Mundstock 
(1987a) explains, once the excess-profits tax was no longer a factor, “the I.R.S. was 




In RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Commissioner (1998) for example, the I.R.S. argued 
that advertising expenditures for graphic and package designs, which RJR deducted, 
should have been capitalized, because they were intended to provide long-term 
benefits.  In finding for RJR, the Tax Court noted that advertising expenditures 
generally provide short- and long-term benefits and that no court had ever 
distinguished between long-term, campaign expenditures and short-term, execution 
expenditures.   
The underlying, statutory authority for advertising-expense deductions is 
found in Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.  According to the Supreme 
Court, “to qualify as an allowable deduction under §162(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.S. § 162(a), an item must (1) be paid or incurred during the 
taxable year, (2) be for carrying on any trade or business, (3) be an expense, (4) be a 
necessary expense, and (5) be an ordinary expense” (Commissioner v. Lincoln 1971).  
Thus, advertising expenditures must conform to those five requirements in order to 
qualify for a deduction.  But while determining whether an advertising expenditure 
conforms to the first three requirements is reasonably straightforward, making that 
determination about the final two is more difficult. 
For that reason, the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the terms 
“ordinary” and “necessary.”  In Commissioner v. Tellier (1965), for example, Justice 
Stewart noted that the primary function of the term “ordinary” in Section 162(a) of 
the tax code “is to clarify the distinction between those expenses that are currently 
deductible and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures, which, if 




“necessary,” according to the Court in Welch v. Helvering (1933) implies that the 
expense is “appropriate and helpful” to the taxpayer’s business.  Citing Welch, 
Mattingly (1993) notes that the term “necessary” requires that the expense be a 
normal means for ensuring the “effective and efficient operation of the taxpayer’s 
business.” 
Even with the Court’s clarification, however, advertising’s status as an 
ordinary and necessary business expense remains controversial.  Professor Neuborne 
maintains, for example, that “allowing taxpayers to deduct advertising expenses in 
calculating taxable income is not an act of legislative grace; rather it is an obligation 
inherent in our conception of limited government and equitable income taxation” 
(Neuborne 1992).  However, in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering (1934), White v. 
United States (1938), Deputy v. Du Pont (1940), Interstate Transit Lines v. 
Commisssioner (1943), City Ice Delivery Co. v. United States (1949), Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Million Co. (1974), and 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1992), the Supreme Court 
expressly states that a deduction is an act of legislative grace and maintains that 
capitalization is the rule, and deduction is the exception.  
Some would argue that advertising is literally unnecessary.  While it might be 
“appropriate and helpful,” advertising hardly ensures the “effective and efficient 
operation of the taxpayer’s business.”  Consider a restaurant, for example.  Normal 
expenses to ensure its operation include expenditures for food, tables, chairs, 
silverware, ovens, refrigerators, utilities, and wait staff.  Although advertising might 




because many restaurants do quite well by mere word of mouth.  In addition, as noted 
at the top of the chapter, increasing sales is an insufficient justification for a 
deduction.  A restaurant would probably increase sales if its attractive, young 
waitresses wore bikinis; all the same, it is unlikely that the I.R.S. would allow a bikini 
deduction.    
More often debated than the argument that advertising is a “necessary” 
expense, however, is the claim that it is an “ordinary” expense.  As noted above, an 
ordinary expenditure, by the Court’s definition, must not be a capital outlay.  
According to many economists, academics, jurists, and other tax observers, however, 
advertising creates goodwill, and goodwill is an intangible capital asset.  Thus, 
expenditures for advertising are not “ordinary”; they are expenditures devoted to the 
creation of intangible capital. 
Intangible assets have been defined as “the value of a firm in excess of the 
value of tangible assets” (Gravelle and Taylor 1991; qtd. in Bokinsky 1994).  From 
the beginning, most intangibles have been allowed a depreciation allowance.  A 1927 
Treasury regulation, however, singled out goodwill as ineligible for depreciation of 
any such expenses.  At the same time, however, the regulation reaffirmed the 
legitimacy of amortizing intangible assets.  That 1927 regulation, according to 
Bokinsky, “set the stage for sixty-six years of litigation in which taxpayers struggled 
to attribute purchase price to intangible assets other than goodwill” (217).  With 
goodwill nondeductible, the incentive to maintain advertising’s ordinary-and-




In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan (1971), the Supreme Court 
reiterated earlier rulings in which it found that expenses must be “ordinary,” and not 
“in the nature of capital expenditures,” to be deductible.  In particular, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Lincoln that expenditures must be capitalized if they create or enhance 
“a separate and distinct additional asset” (354).  Mundstock (1987a) notes that the 
transactional approach adopted by the Court in Lincoln allows businesses to deduct 
many intangible-capital expenditures due to “the difficulty in linking a given 
expenditure” to the intangible asset (1231).  Advertising, for example, enhances the 
goodwill associated with a trademark.  Even though the trademark is a separate and 
distinct asset, the advertising that enhances the asset is deductible, because tying the 
ad expenditure to the efficacy of the trademark is problematical. 
The Court attempted to clarify the capitalization rule it issued in Lincoln with 
its decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner (1992).  Whereas Lincoln held that 
an expenditure must be capitalized if it creates or enhances a separate and distinct 
asset, the Court ruled in INDOPCO that the creation of a separate and distinct asset is 
sufficient but not necessary for capitalization to be required.  The only necessary 
requirement for capitalization is that the expenditure provides more than incidental 
future benefits.  According to Mattingly (1993), the INDOPCO decision created 
“uncertainty in the characterization of what were traditionally deductible business 
expenditures” (815).   
A number of observers soon noted that the INDOPCO ruling jeopardized 
advertising’s tax status.  Writing in Tax Lawyer, Faber (1994) remarks: “If one were 




conclude that advertising expenses should be capitalized.  They clearly are intended 
to produce a future benefit, especially when introducing a new product” (n.p.).  In the 
Journal of Accountancy, Maples (1999) notes confusion among accountants: “Tax 
and accounting authorities acknowledge that it is difficult for CPAs to establish 
criteria about when a company should capitalize advertising costs. . . .  Some 
advertising undoubtedly creates for a company significant benefits that extend beyond 
the current tax year, so the crucial issue CPAs face is not whether long-term benefits 
exist but how to measure them” (n.p.). 
In the wake of INDOPCO, the Internal Revenue Service (1992) attempted to 
alleviate the confusion that the Court’s decision had created, by issuing Revenue 
Ruling 92-80.  The ruling, in part, reads: 
The Indopco decision does not affect the treatment of advertising costs 
under section 162(a) of the Code.  These costs are generally deductible 
under that section even though advertising may have some future 
effect on business activities. . . .  Only in the unusual circumstance 
where advertising is directed towards obtaining future benefits 
significantly beyond those traditionally associated with ordinary 
product advertising or with institutional or goodwill advertising, must 
the costs of that advertising be capitalized (Internal Revenue Service 
1992; under “Law and Analysis,” n.p.).  
An “unusual circumstance” cited by the ruling, in which the taxpayer was 
required to capitalize advertising, was the case of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. 




advertising campaign that sought to deter public opposition to a proposed nuclear 
power plant must be capitalized.  Noting that the benefits of that campaign were 
entirely directed at reaping future benefits, the Court ruled that the utility erred in 
claiming a current deduction.    
A year after the I.R.S. issued Revenue Ruling 92-80, Congress enacted 
Section 197 of the tax code to reduce confusion about the tax status of intangible 
assets.  Prior to enactment of the section, the code discriminated among intangibles, 
disallowing the amortization of some and allowing the amortization of others.  As 
Bokinsky (1994) notes, regulations that the Treasury Department promulgated in 
1927, which disallowed amortization of goodwill, had led to decades of litigation.  
Section 197, which includes goodwill, standardizes the amortization of intangibles 
over a fifteen-year period.  Nevertheless, the section excludes self-created intangibles, 
such as advertising, from the amortization requirement.  
Section 197 gives more favorable tax treatment to goodwill created by 
advertising than to “purchased” goodwill, because ad expenses remain deductible 
while purchased goodwill must be capitalized and amortized over fifteen years.  It is 
worth noting, however, that a corporation can compound its tax savings by selling the 
goodwill it has created through advertising (which the corporation has already been 
allowed to deduct) to a subsidiary corporation (which is sometimes called a “blocker” 
corporation, because it is created in order to block taxes).  The subsidiary corporation 
can, in turn, amortize the “purchased” goodwill over fifteen years.  By following this 





Clearly, self-created intangible capital receives preferential treatment in 
comparison to tangible capital.  As Mundstock (1987a) explains, expenditures for 
tangible capital—machines, for example—must be depreciated, while advertising 
expenses can be deducted immediately.  “The effect,” he writes, “is an implicit 
preference for the intangible capital created by deductible expenditures . . .” (1199). 
As Bokinsky (1994) explains, “most practitioners and academics agree that 
‘the tax treatment of these internally developed intangible assets is bewildering’” 
(246).  Nevertheless, Congressional records, detailing the legislative history of 
Section 197, indicate that both the House and Senate “believed that there [was] no 
need at [that] time to change the Federal income tax treatment of self-created 
intangible assets, such as goodwill that is created through advertising and other 
similar expenditures” (House of Representatives 1993).  
Congress also passed up an opportunity in 1986 to make advertising 
expenditures better conform to the consensus tax-criteria of simplicity, equity, and 
neutrality.  At that time, Congress reevaluated a wide range of deductions claimed by 
businesses, questioning whether the expenditures deducted were truly ordinary and 
necessary.  That reevaluation culminated in passage of Section 263A of the tax code, 
which mandated capitalization of many previously deductible expenditures.  “Section 
263A of the Internal Revenue Code provides that producers of real or tangible 
personal property must capitalize the direct costs and a proper share of the indirect 
costs of such property” (Internal Revenue Code § 263A 1988).      
The Senate Finance Committee had recommended subjecting advertising to 




recommendation.  And even though the Treasury Department prepared an estimate of 
the increased revenues that would likely accompany partial capitalization of 
advertising expenses, Section 263A specifically excluded advertising (Hymel 2000).   
Remarking that “Congress could have included advertising in both of these 
tax provisions [Section 197 and 263A], but did not,” Hymel speculates that the 
exclusion of advertising “illustrates a political process dominated by special interests.  
The advertising industry,” she argues, “is well organized and has successfully lobbied 
their way out of inclusion” (436-437).   
 
An ordinary and necessary expense?   
  
After the Supreme Court issued a decision in INDOPCO that put the 
deduction for advertising expenditures in doubt, the I.R.S. quickly issued a “comfort 
ruling” (i.e., Revenue Ruling 92-80) to maintain the status quo.  As Faber (1994) 
notes, “the Ruling does not indicate why advertising expenses should be deductible, 
other than that they always have been” (n.p.). 
Fundamentally, advertising expenditures have been deductible because they 
have been thought to be ordinary-and-necessary business expenses.  Upon reflection, 
however, advertising seems unlike the ordinary-and-necessary expense that it was 
when the income tax was enacted in 1913.  The dollars expended, technologies 
employed, and quantities displayed differentiate advertising today from face-to-face 
selling to such an extent that advertising’s inclusion, with selling, as an ordinary-and-




In addition, advertising is not literally necessary (except, perhaps for mail-
order businesses) and is often not ordinary—not, at least, as the Supreme Court 
defines the term.  By that definition, advertising cannot be classified as an ordinary 
expense if it creates a capital asset; and, according to many economists (see Chapter 
4), academics, policymakers, and jurists, advertising often does just that.  
Capitalization and amortization of ad expenditures would remove the favorable 
treatment that the tax code currently bestows upon advertising and improve the code’s 
correspondence to the tax-policy goals of simplicity, equity, and neutrality. 
But would requiring the capitalization and amortization of advertising 
expenses be the optimal policy?  If advertising reduces welfare, should the tax code 
go beyond mere neutrality and completely disallow the deduction?  In consideration 
of those questions, Part III addresses some of the utilities and disutilities associated 
with advertising.  First, however, Part II examines the economics of advertising in 













On several occasions since the mid-1980s, legislators and executive-branch 
officials, both Democrats and Republicans, have suggested revising the income-tax 
code to reduce or eliminate the deductibility of advertising expenses.  The advertising 
industry, in response, has maintained that firms would advertise less if the deduction 
were reduced; and, if businesses advertised less, the economy would be harmed.  The 
following are typical comments made by ad-industry advocates, printed in the trade 
journal Advertising Age, over a span of nearly two decades. 
• A March 24, 2003, editorial suggested that “advertising is about jobs and 
economic growth as well as selling product” (26). 
• On January 17, 2000, Jeff Perlman, senior vice president for the American 
Advertising Federation, called advertising “the economic engine that 




• A February 10, 1997, editorial referred to “the critical role advertising 
plays in stimulating sales and economic growth” (20). 
• A May 22, 1995, editorial argued, “business considers advertising 
essential.  With profits to reinvest, seasoned business managers are putting 
dollars earned from the current strong economy back into more and more 
advertising to keep up sales momentum” (18).  
• On September 27, 1993, Charles D. Peebler, Jr., president and CEO of the 
advertising giant Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon & Eckhardt asserted that 
advertising is “one of the strongest economic stimuli known. . . .  It is, in 
fundamental terms, a fuel that is essential to power our continuing advance 
as an industrialized nation and prosperous society.”  Advertising provides 
an informational service that is “intrinsic to this nation’s very way of 
doing business.”  According to Peebler, advertising expands consumers’ 
range of choices, intensifies competition between firms, and drives prices 
lower.  In addition, advertising is “one of the nation’s most valuable 
exportable commodities,” and it “is endlessly renewable” (21).   
• Professor of Management John Calfee (formerly of the Federal Trade 
Commission, where he worked on advertising regulation) maintained, in a 
March 15, 1993 editorial, that “advertising is an integral part of that 
astonishingly productive and self-correcting mechanism known as the 
competitive market, or more simply, capitalism.”  Advertising, Calfee 
explained, matches consumers to the product they desire.  American 




home, and market leadership around the world.”  In addition, advertising 
“is one of our greatest comparative advantages” (24). 
• A July 9, 1990, editorial asserted that advertising is “American industry’s 
most efficient selling tool.”  It is “critical to the competitive marketplace 
that benefits all consumers,” and is, therefore, “an essential business 
expense” (22; italics in the original). 
• As reported on November 21, 1988, the Council for Commercial Freedom 
(representing approximately twenty ad-related trade associations) argued 
that a nationwide reduction in advertising (caused by the loss of full 
deductibility) would probably have many adverse effects, including: 
higher prices for consumer goods, unemployment in major media centers 
(e.g., New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles), reduced outlets in media for 
diverse viewpoints, hardship for small and minority media, and 
diminished competitiveness for American companies in the global 
marketplace.  
• According to Wally Snyder, senior vice-president of the American 
Advertising Federation, many “things go into the mix of why a consumer 
purchase is made, but a big part of it is advertising” (March 3, 1986, 17). 
 
Clearly, from the perspective of the ad lobby, advertising provides unalloyed 
economic benefits.  But what do economists say?  Does advertising improve the 
economy, as its apologists claim?  Is it a boon to the economic welfare of the nation 




Over the years, a number of economists have considered advertising’s impact 
on economic welfare, and a few, such as Kaldor, Corden, Doyle, Simon, and Bagwell, 
have surveyed and summarized that literature.  Table II lists some of the authors’ 
findings. 
Stripped of redundancy, the pro/con summaries offer a variety of arguments 
concerning advertising’s impact on economic welfare.  According to its proponents, 
advertising: enables economies of scale in production and distribution; reduces 
business-cycle fluctuations; provides important market information (and thereby 
lowers search costs); improves product quality; is entertaining; improves labor 
relations; makes consumers’ shopping decisions easier; subsidizes media (and thereby 
promotes media freedom); stimulates innovation and progress; lowers prices; 
disperses economic power; fuels consumption and economic growth; increases 
consumers’ wants and enjoyments; enables social cohesion; facilitates the market 
entry of new firms; promotes competition; and confers a prestigious image to 
purchasers of certain products.  According to advertising’s critics, on the other hand, 
advertising: exacerbates business-cycle fluctuations; raises prices; raises costs; raises 
prices in comparison to costs (and thereby inflates profits); slows economic growth; 
facilitates market power; encourages wasteful spending; promotes consumer 
dissatisfaction; imperils the autonomy of the media; misleads and misinforms 
consumers; concentrates industry unnecessarily; discourages competition; raises 
barriers to entry; differentiates products artificially; offends public sensibilities; warps 






Table II.1: Authors’ Summaries of Claims in the Literature 
















































Advertising enables firms to attain 
economies of scale; it stabilizes the 
economic system by reducing 
fluctuations in the business cycle; it 
improves labor relations; it enhances 
consumer satisfaction by providing 
entertaining ads and making shopping 
choices simpler; and it subsidizes the 
media and thereby promotes media 







Advertising provides an information 
service for consumers, improves product 
quality, facilitates economies of scale, 
stimulates progress, and subsidizes 
communications media.  
 
Advertising enables firms to achieve 
economies of mass production and 
distribution; it subsidizes 
communications media and thereby 
lowers their price; and it improves 
product quality by stimulating 
innovations and improvements.   
 
Advertising lowers prices; supplies 
efficiency-increasing information to 
consumers and businesses; subsidizes 
communication media; disperses 
economic power; boosts consumption 
and economic growth; increases 
consumer’s wants and thus their 
enjoyment of life; and supports 
pluralism by enabling social cohesion 
without resort to coercion. 
 
Advertising provides valuable market 
information, lowers search costs, 
facilitates entry, promotes competition, 
and contributes toward a prestigious 




Advertising engenders market power 
and strengthens monopolies; it slows 
economic growth by increasing prices 
in comparison to costs; it encourages 
wasteful spending; it destabilizes the 
economy by exacerbating business-
cycle fluctuations; it engenders 
distorted values and results in perpetual 
dissatisfaction as the experience of 
consumption falls short of ad-induced 
expectations; it influences consumers to 
distribute their expenditures 
inefficiently; and it imperils the public’s 
right to a free and independent press by 
providing a large portion of the income 
of the communications media. 
 
Advertising supplies inadequate 
information, concentrates industry 
unnecessarily, and wastes energy and 
resources—human and otherwise. 
 
 
Most advertising is misleading, 
uninformative, or both; it is anti-
competitive; and it unnecessarily 




Advertising raises prices, misinforms 
consumers; discourages competition 
and thus concentrates economic power; 
wastes economic resources; exacerbates 
the business cycle; persuades 
consumers to make silly or harmful 
purchases; offends public sensibilities; 
warps values and corrupts character; 
and lies and cheats.   
 
 
Advertising is anti-competitive, 
provides biased information, 
differentiates products artificially, 






Chapter 3:  Advertising and Consumption 
 
As a central justification for full deductibility, ad proponents argue that 
advertising fuels economic growth.  In the relevant literature, studies of advertising’s 
impact on demand generally fall within three categories: (1) demand for a particular 
advertiser’s output, (2) demand for the output of all firms within a particular industry, 
and (3) demand for aggregate output across all industries.  
 
Demand for a particular advertiser’s output 
 
 
Early twentieth-century retailer John Wanamaker is widely quoted as having 
said: “I know half the money I spend on advertising is wasted, but I can never find 
out which half” (University of Texas, n.d.).  Wanamaker is not alone in his confusion 
about the effectiveness of advertising.   According to a 2005 survey conducted by the 
Association of National Advertisers, nearly three-quarters of the respondents said 
they were uncertain to what extent advertising campaigns affect their sales (Elliott 
2005).  Nevertheless, if firms that advertise are profit-seekers, they must assume that 
advertising enhances revenue.  Solow (1968) puts it this way: “No one who believes, 
as I do, that profit is an important business motive could argue that advertising has no 
influence on the willingness of consumers to buy a given product at a given price.  
After all, how could I then account for the fact that profit-seeking corporations 
regularly spend billions of dollars on advertising?” (48)   
The confusion concerning advertising’s impact on demand is exacerbated by 




determine future ad budgets.  Thus, (as we shall see) some studies indicate that 
consumption leads to advertising, others find that advertising leads to consumption, 
and still others conclude that each leads to the other.   
Early students of the economics of advertising seem to take as given the 
notion that advertising increases consumers’ demand for a particular advertiser’s 
output.  Their theories concerning the mechanism by which advertising affects 
demand vary somewhat, however.  Noting that the “demand curve is raised by 
advertisement,” Braithwaite (1928) argues that the effective mechanism is persuasion 
(23).  Chamberlin (1933) differs slightly, suggesting that advertising shifts the 
demand curve for the advertised product to the right by informing potential customers 
of the product’s existence, its quality, and its potential utility.  According to 
Chamberlin, firms advertise in order to make their brand name familiar to the public, 
with the expectation that consumers will ask for the brand by name, rather than 
purchase an unfamiliar, unadvertised product.  Chamberlin suggests that advertising 
generates demand by altering tastes and preferences through persuasion, but he 
acknowledges advertising’s informational role, as well.  “Advertising,” he writes, 
“increases a seller’s market by spreading information (or misinformation) on the basis 
of which buyers’ choices as to the means of satisfying their wants are altered.  This is 
equivalent, of course, to a change either in the shape or in the location of the demand 
curves for their products” (118). 
While Borden (1942) agrees with Chamberlin and Braithwaite that advertising 
increases demand for the output of individual firms, he argues that the extent of 




an enterprise operates” (844).  According to Borden, a firm’s advertising is more 
likely to be effective when:  
• sales in the industry to which the advertiser belongs are expanding;  
• the advertiser’s products are easily differentiated from those of its rivals;  
• the product has hidden qualities that advertisers can exploit to indicate 
quality (as opposed to explicit qualities that consumers can easily observe 
and appreciate);  
• the advertiser can appeal to powerful emotions to motivate consumers to 
purchase its product; or  
• the firm has the means to spend substantial sums on advertising.   
A number of theoretical and empirical studies reveal a positive association 
between firms’ expenditures on advertising and consumers’ demand for the 
advertised products.  Kaldor (1950-1951), for example, finds that, as a general rule, 
advertising shifts the demand curve for advertised products up and out.  Adding that 
advertising may induce consumers to try a product for the first time, Nerlove and 
Arrow (1962) agree with Kaldor that advertising tends to produce an upward-and-
outward shift of the product’s demand curve.  Becker and Murphy (1993) describe 
advertising’s impact on demand curves in similar terms. 
In a study of twenty-five product markets across seventy-eight countries, 
Lambin (1976) finds that advertising has a “positive and statistically significant 
effect” on brands’ sales (90).  “Firms do succeed in creating, by means of advertising, 
a preferential demand for their brands,” he writes (94).  The author observes that the 




case, he cites sixty published studies and discusses, in particular, research by Nerlove 
and Waugh (1961), Telser (1962), Palda (1964), Hoofnagle (1965), Bass (1969), and 
Schultz (1971) as representative examples.  Similarly, Taylor and Weiserbs (1972) 
explain that economists generally agree that advertising has the capacity to shift out 
the demand curves of individual, advertised products.    
In a study conducted for the Association of National Advertisers, the New 
England Consulting Group (Levin 1993) finds “a strong, positive relationship 
between advertising and incremental sales” for six of eleven tested brands, from 
companies such as General Motors, AT&T, and Procter & Gamble.  The researchers 
observe a similar relationship between advertising and cumulative sales for nine of 
the eleven brands.  In a separate study of thirty-three brands, the same researchers 
report that the market leaders are generally the firms that spend the most on 
advertising. 
In a more recent study, using “advanced statistical techniques,” Kamber 
(2002) finds that firms’ sales tended to grow at stronger rates, in the years following 
the recession of 1990-1991, if they maintained or increased their advertising 
expenditures during the recession than if they did not.  According to Kamber, sales-
growth rates among companies that did so were substantially higher than those that 
cut back their ad expenditures, independent of variables such as total sales, previous 
sales-growth rates, firm size, stock valuation and price volatility, and total sales.  His 
results, he notes, confirm the results of earlier, less-sophisticated studies of the impact 




While most studies, as Lambin reports, suggest that a brand’s advertising 
correlates positively with its sales, in some cases, the strength of the correlation 
proves to be unimpressive.  Aaker, Carman, and Jacobson (1982) find a “very weak” 
feedback relationship between advertising and sales in a time-series analysis of 
demand for six cereal brands, for example.  Tellis (1988a) also finds that 
advertising’s influence on brand choice can be weak.  In a study of demand for toilet 
tissue (involving 251 households in a test city, scanner data for purchases of ten 
different brands over a one-year period, and television-meter records of household 
exposure to brand advertising), Tellis finds that either a product’s price or a 
consumer’s previous experience with a product is a better predictor of demand for a 
particular brand than is advertising. 
Observing a somewhat ambiguous relationship between advertising and 
demand, some analysts question the assumption that increased advertising leads to 
increased sales, suggesting the possibility that the direction of causality could be the 
converse, with increased sales leading to increased advertising.  As Schmalensee 
(1972) explains, numerous empirical studies find that sales typically influence 
advertising expenditures because most firms set their current advertising expenditures 
as a percentage of their past sales.  For that reason, he argues, “it is almost always 
impossible to estimate the impact of advertising on sales volume” (43).  Nevertheless, 
he concludes that the advertising expenditures of individual firms probably influence 
their own sales.   
Like Schmalensee, Amadi (2004) offers ambiguous results that do little to 




relationship between growth rates in advertising and consumption expenditures, the 
relationship seems to vary significantly across individual firms.  For example, 
Granger causality tests reveal that sales strongly explain advertising expenditures for 
six firms, advertising expenditures appear to cause sales growth for five firms, and 
causation runs both ways—from advertising to sales and from sales to advertising—
for four firms.  
Jung and Seldon (1995) also address the ambiguity.  While noting that a 
number of studies conducted during the preceding decades conclude that consumption 
leads to advertising, Jung and Seldon begin with the intuition that profit-maximizing 
firms advertise because they assume that advertising will increase their sales and 
profits.  Ultimately, however, the researchers observe two-way causality; that is, they 
find that advertising influences demand and demand influences advertising. 
At least one study explains the impact of advertising on demand for the output 
of individual firms with reference to the firm’s size.  According to Yang (1964), the 
advertising expenditures of small- and medium-sized companies tend to fluctuate 
more in response to business cycles than do the expenditures of large firms.  This 
result implies that demand informs the ad spending of small- and medium-sized firms 
more than it does the ad expenditures of large firms.  In another twist, Dean (1951) 
argues that the extent to which individual firms’ advertising expenditures vary with 
the business cycle depends on the income elasticity of the particular product. 
According to Bagwell (2003), difficulties in determining the direction of 
causality between advertising levels and product sales arise in some cases because 




others, Bagwell explains that the positive relationship between demand and ad 
expenditures may be due to increased advertising expenditures by firms in response to 
increased sales, rather than—or in addition to—increased commodity sales in 
response to increased advertising.  To produce valid results, therefore, empirical 
studies must control for the endogeneity of advertising and sales, Bagwell maintains. 
So, all things considered, does advertising affect demand for a particular 
advertiser’s output?  Since most firms set their current advertising expenditures as a 
percentage of their past sales, untangling the precise impact of advertising on sales 
volume is “almost always impossible” (Schmalensee 1972, 43).   Nevertheless, on 
balance, the literature does seem to indicate that advertising increases demand for at 
least some advertisers’ services or products. 
 
Demand for the output of all firms within a particular industry  
 
According to Marshall (1919), advertising can play either a constructive or a 
combative economic role.  When it plays a constructive role it is economically useful, 
because it helps consumers learn about the existence of commodities, where to find 
them, what the commodities do, and how well they do what they do.  When 
advertising plays a combative role it is economically wasteful, because it merely 
serves to redistribute customers away from low-intensity advertisers (or non-
advertisers) toward high-intensity advertisers.   
Differing from Marshall, a number of economists describe advertising as 




aggregate sales of an entire industry—advertising often tends to create a combative, 
zero-sum game among firms, with some firms winning by taking sales away from 
their competitors.  Pigou (1932), for example, suggests that advertising can play such 
a role.  He writes:  
It may happen that the expenditures on advertisement made by 
competing monopolists simply neutralize one another, and leave the 
industrial position exactly as it would have been if neither had 
expended anything.  For clearly, if each of two rivals makes equal 
efforts to attract the favour [sic] of the public away from the other, the 
total result is the same as it would have been if neither had made any 
effort at all.  (pgEW: Part II, Chapter 9 in paragraph II.IX.22)  
Similarly, a 1967 report by the Economists Advisory Group concludes that 
advertising may fail to influence market demand even when it affects the profits and 
sales of individual companies.   
Reviewing the literature, Schmalensee (1972) notes that many of advertising’s 
critics maintain that advertising is essentially an economically wasteful competition 
for market shares.  Taken to an extreme, Schmalensee explains, this criticism implies 
that oligopolistic industries should slash their ad expenditures, because, if they did, 
sales would be unaffected, “and society would be better off” (6).     
Studies by Borden (1942), Kaldor (1950-1951), Simon (1970), Metwally 
(1975, 1976), Lambin (1976), and Metwally and Tamaschke (1981) among others, 
find that advertising tends to be combative.  Lambin, summing up his extensive 




sign of own and competitive advertising coefficients indicate a tendency toward 
reciprocal cancellation of effects in the market as a whole” (109; italics in the 
original).  Similarly, Baye, Jansen, and Lee (1992) find that advertising at the firm 
level fails to increase industry demand.  To illustrate their point, the authors quote the 
words of a spokesman for Kellogg’s cereals who once remarked: “For the past several 
years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellows [sic] hide” 
(1093).  
Corden (1961) also suggests that the sales of one firm within an industry may 
increase with advertising at the expense of the sales of another firm within that same 
industry.  If both firms advertise, then sales of both may increase, but, potentially, at 
the expense of the sales of firms that manufacture substitute products.  In Corden’s 
words, “It is quite possible, for example, that, in some industries or sections of the 
market, the advertising of competing firms or products just offset each other, so that 
finally the pattern of sales is just the same as if there had been no advertising—the 
only difference being that a lot of money is spent on advertising” (15-16).  Although 
Comanor and Wilson (1974), in an extensive study, find that advertising is not 
completely self-canceling, they note that Marris and Solow agree that when the 
advertising messages of competing firms directly offset each other “the economic 
effect of these messages is nil . . .” (250-251).  Indeed, Solow (1968) concludes that 
while specific firms generally benefit by advertising, their gain comes at the expense 
of their market rivals.  Baye et al. (1992) agree.  
Bagwell (2003) refers to the combative, self-canceling role of advertising as a 




excessive advertising may occur, since a firm privately benefits from the sale that an 
additional ad may generate, even when this sale is ‘stolen’ from another firm and 
offers no or modest social benefit” (83).  Dixit and Norman (1978) emphasize the 
combative role of advertising and go further than Bagwell, concluding that 
advertising may be excessive—even if it reduces prices—due to this business-stealing 
externality. 
Empirical studies of specific industries offer conflicting results concerning 
advertising’s combativeness.  In a study of low-tar-cigarette advertising, Roberts and 
Samuelson (1988) find that since advertising expands the size of the market, it is not 
combative.  Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1992), however, report that in the cola 
market, advertising is primarily combative, and Slade (1995) finds that although 
advertising has a positive impact on the size of the saltine-cracker market, its role is 
largely combative.  
Some studies cite a difference in the impact of advertising that depends on the 
size and reputation of the specific market under investigation.  According to Reekie 
and Allen (1983), for example,“only at the level of the large, well-established 
aggregated market (e.g., automobiles, liquor, cigarettes) does advertising appear to 
have consistently little impact on overall market size” (106).   Put another way, Reekie 
and Allen’s results indicate that advertising’s impact is more than zero-sum in many 
industries.   
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) reach a similar conclusion.  Their results indicate 
that advertising may induce consumers to try an industry’s product for the first time, 




Borden (1942) also finds that the impact of advertising can be more than zero-sum.  
His results suggest that advertising accelerates expansion in the demand for an 
industry’s product when economic conditions are favorable and retards contraction 
when conditions are poor.   
In a study of the tobacco industry, Bardsley and Olekahns (1999) find that 
advertising has a minor, positive influence on consumption.  Leeflang and Reuijl 
(1985), in a separate study of the industry, conclude that advertising has a positive 
influence on tobacco sales, which wanes over time.  Examining the auto industry, 
Thomas, Shane and Weigelt (1998) report finding a positive relationship between 
current advertising expenditures and future sales.   
Analyzing the sales and advertising data for eleven different brands, the New 
England Consulting Group (Levin 1993) finds that a firm’s advertising does more to 
fuel its sales than to steal market-share from its competitors.  Studies by a number of 
other economists (e.g., Bagwell 2005) find that advertising’s impact on primary 
demand defies simple categorization because the impact tends to vary from one 
industry to another.  
Thus, the literature fails to reveal a consensus concerning the impact of 
advertising on demand for the output of all firms within an industry.  While many 
studies find that advertising tends to create a zero-sum game among competing firms, 
other studies indicate that advertising increases industry-wide demand, and others 






Demand for output across all industries 
 
Much of the economic literature concerning advertising’s macroeconomic 
effects examines how ad expenditures relate to business-cycle fluctuations and 
aggregate consumption.  Early studies seem to assume that advertising is an 
independent variable and examine its influence on dependent macro-variables.  More 
recent studies generally drop that assumption and treat advertising as a dependent or 
an endogenous variable.  
 
Advertising and the business cycle 
 
In one early study, Borden (1942) concludes that advertising encourages 
investment and affects “real national income.”  While he finds that advertising tends 
to accelerate demand expansion and offers the promise of demand- and profit-
stability, he notes that, in practice, advertising expenditures tend to vary directly with 
the business cycle.  “As a stimulant of demand for products and services advertising 
has been most extensively used in boom times and most lightly used in depressions.  
When thus employed it has tended to accentuate the swings of demand” (865).  Still, 
it “cannot be classed as an important causal factor in cyclical fluctuations. . . .  None 
of the students of cyclical fluctuations have named advertising as an important causal 
factor,” Borden writes (865).   
More than two decades later, Simon (1970) joins that group, expressing his 




however, does find a tight relationship between fluctuations in sales and fluctuations 
in advertising expenditures during swings of the business cycle. 
Investigating the relationship between advertising and business cycles using 
annual data, Blank (1962) finds little cyclic variability.  When he examines the 
relationship using quarterly data, however, he notes a significant response in 
advertising to fluctuations in general business activity.  He finds, in fact, that 
advertising’s expansions and contractions exceed those of the gross national product.   
In examining the impact of advertising on the business cycle, a number of 
economists, including Corden (1961), seem eager to discover that decreasing the 
quantity of ads during periods of inflation and increasing their number in periods of 
high unemployment helps to stabilize the economy.  Corden finds, however, that 
advertising actually tends to intensify business-cycle fluctuations.  He attributes this 
tendency to the way advertisers set their budgets.  Rather than adjust advertising 
expenditures to reduce market fluctuations, a high proportion of advertisers merely 
base the level of their future advertising expenditures on sales data from the recent 
past.  
In a study of the Dutch economy, Deleersnyder (2003) finds that aggregate-
level changes in demand for advertising fail to predict business-cycle volatility.  
Rather, the converse appears to be true: fluctuations in the aggregate economy predict 
changes in the demand for advertising.  According to Deleersnyder, contractions and 
expansions in aggregate demand for advertising, during the decades under study, 




Over all, the literature seems to indicate that since many advertisers base their 
future expenditures on past sales, business-cycle swings probably cause more 
fluctuations in ad levels than fluctuations in ad levels cause business-cycle swings. 
 
Advertising and aggregate consumption 
 
A great deal of the economic literature examines the relationship between 
advertising and aggregate consumption.  Numerous studies, in effect, ask the 
question: Does advertising lead to consumption or does consumption lead to 
advertising? 
Simon (1970) attempts to answer that question by evaluating quasi-
experimental and time-series studies, as well as historical consumption-function 
evidence, but he finds the studies flawed or unpersuasive.  According to Simon, 
establishing the relationship between advertising and consumption is fraught with 
difficulties due to: “the repetition of purchases of many commodities; the intertwining 
of the effect of promotion with the effects of education, the mass media, and other 
cultural forces; the existence of the group values we call ‘the standard of living’; the 
possibility of moonlighting as a response to [advertising]; and temporary saving to 
buy durables” (205).  Simon reports, however, that his case study of a January white-
sale provides an example in which advertising does seem to induce consumption.  He 
notes, as well, that “business men and economists have few doubts that advertising 
increases consumption for the economy as a whole.  In fact,” Simon continues, “the 
opinion of our profession seems almost unanimous” (193).  As an example of the 




“The advertising industry has certainly had a bad influence on many aspects of our 
lives . . . but it has also served to maintain consumption at a higher level than it 
otherwise would have been.  Advertising is not the best way to get a high-
consumption, low-savings economy, but it is a way” (qtd. in Simon, 193). 
Taylor and Weiserbs (1972) report that while economists generally agree that 
advertising shifts the demand curve for individual goods upward and outward, they 
disagree when the discussion turns to advertising’s impact on the aggregate 
consumption function.  Addressing this controversy with their own study, Taylor and 
Weiserbs find that advertising does, in fact, affect aggregate consumption: As 
advertising goes up, consumption also goes up, and saving goes down.  The authors 
acknowledge, however, that the extent of advertising’s affect on aggregate 
consumption remains unresolved, despite their results.  It is possible, they note, that a 
bidirectional relationship exists between advertising and consumption or that 
advertising serves as a proxy for some other variable. 
Reflecting on the advertising-consumption controversy, Solow (1968) 
wonders how anyone, who believes that profit is a major motivator of business 
activity, can be aware of the expenditure of billions of dollars on advertising by 
profit-seeking firms and yet be unwilling to acknowledge advertising’s influence on 
consumers’ propensity to spend.  Nevertheless, he remains unconvinced that 
advertising affects consumer demand in the aggregate, since, in his view, advertising 
tends to be a zero-sum game. 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) posit that advertising’s influence on spending 




“virtually no instance” of a negative impact on consumption from advertising.  In 
fact, their results indicate that relative price is less frequently significant than 
advertising in predicting consumption levels.  The evidence, they say, calls into 
question the argument that advertising’s influence on consumption tends to cancel out 
at the national level.  
In their examination of the relationship between advertising and personal-
consumption expenditures, Jacobson and Nicosia (1981) find that the extent of the 
relationship between advertising and aggregate consumption is determined, in part, by 
the period under analysis.  Instantaneous causality, they report, is the most significant 
relationship.  Also statistically significant, though weaker in effect, is evidence of 
feedback between advertising and consumption for periods of one year or more.  In 
addition, the authors find that a within-one-year relationship between the variables 
might exist, but are unable to determine the direction of the interaction.  They note, 
however, that the level of consumption in one year seems to affect advertising in the 
next year.  This is due, they suppose, to advertisers basing their future advertising 
expenditures on past sales.  One surprising result, which they find in a few cases, is a 
negative relationship between advertising in one year and consumption in the next.  In 
the authors’ view, that relationship might be due to “some kind of budget effect” (37).  
Noting that evidence of instantaneous causality is strong, the authors suspect that 
consumers make purchases in the initial year and thus have less to spend on the 
advertised product in the following year.  
Reekie and Allen (1983) utilize a cross-sectional analysis of twenty-four 




of that analysis, they conclude that advertising can stimulate switching between 
brands and, at the same time, increase aggregate demand.  In addition, they observe 
that the results of studies concerning the impact of advertising on demand seem to 
depend on the level of aggregation that researchers choose to study.   
Didow and Franke (1984) report evidence for a “positive contemporaneous 
relationship between advertising and consumption” that other economists report (e.g., 
Jacobson and Nicosia 1981; Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee 1980; Parsons, 
Schultz, and Pilon 1979; Taylor and Weiserbs 1972).  However, contrary to the 
findings of several of those earlier studies (e.g., Ashley et al. 1980; Jacobson and 
Nicosia 1981; Parsons, Schultz, and Pilon 1979; Schmalensee 1972), Didow and 
Franke observe no changes in current consumption that induce changes in the future 
demand for advertising.  
Taking a different approach to the question of the relationship between 
advertising and aggregate demand, Godshaw and Pancoast (1987) estimate the 
influence on consumption of a reduction in advertising.  Their results indicate that the 
demand for goods and services would be sharply reduced if advertising were 
curtailed.   
Two more recent studies indicate that increasing advertising leads to higher 
aggregate demand.  Hamada (1999), for one, emphasizes the power of advertising to 
stimulate consumption; and, in an ad-industry sponsored study, Raimondi and Klein 





For Corden (1961), assessing “the effects which advertising has on the 
efficient functioning of our economy is an extremely difficult matter.  We can make 
use of all the available facts and figures, but basically we enter the realm of 
hypothesis,” he writes (9).  Acknowledging that advertising probably leads to 
increases in spending on intensively advertised, nonessential goods, the question for 
Corden (1961) is whether aggregate consumer-spending increases as a result of 
advertising.  Ultimately, Corden concludes, “advertising cannot be justified on the 
grounds that it increases total spending” (13). 
Approximately two decades later, Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee (1980) 
report their inability to reject the null hypothesis that aggregate advertising does not 
cause aggregate consumption.  They say that their results suggest the possibility, in 
fact, that consumption may cause advertising.  In addition, the authors note that 
although they are unable to determine the direction of causation, “an instantaneous or 
very short-term” relationship between the two variables, advertising and 
consumption, may exist.   
Two decades after Ashley et al. (in a study of the determinants of advertising 
expenditures in New Zealand), O’Donovan, Rae, and Grimes (2000) find that while 
consumption does cause changes in advertising expenditures, advertising does not 
cause changes in aggregate consumption, over the long run.  In an even more recent 
study, Chang and Chan-Olmsted (2005) report finding only one variable (in seven 
regression models) that predicts advertising expenditures with any statistical 




Jung and Seldon (1995) observe a bi-directional relationship between 
advertising and consumption.  Noting that their results differ from those of Ashley, 
Granger, and Schmalensee (1980) and Schmalensee (1972), who report evidence to 
show that consumption may cause advertising, or Verdon, McConnell, and Roesler 
(1968), Ekelund and Gramm (1969), and Chowdhury (1994), who fail to find any 
clear relationship between the two variables, or Taylor and Weiserbs (1972), who find 
that advertising does, in fact, influence the aggregate consumption function, Jung and 
Seldon (1995) conclude that the relationship is bi-directional: Advertising causes 
consumption, and consumption causes advertising.   
Setting aside the question of the direction of causation, Seldon and Jung 
(1995) find that the size of advertising’s impact on aggregate demand is uncertain.  
Also investigating the size of advertising’s impact, Picard (2001) finds that the 
relationship between advertising expenditures and gross domestic product varies from 
one country to another and from one medium to another.  
Metwally and Tamaschke (1981) find a bi-directional relationship between the 
propensity to consume and the intensity of advertising.  While their “statistical results 
suggest that the intensity of aggregate advertising is an important determinant of the 
propensity to consume and vice versa,” the authors maintain that a substantial 
proportion of advertising has no influence on consumption; it merely reallocates 
firms’ market shares (283).  In addition, the authors offer a couple of explanations for 
the finding that increases in consumption lead to increases in advertising 
expenditures.  New firms, the authors say, may be attracted to the market by reports 




place in the market through advertising.  Another possible explanation, according to 
the authors, is that increasing consumption spurs existing firms to advertise in order 
to maintain or expand their share of the market.  
In sum, the body of studies seems to be fraught with problems involving 
endogenous and intervening variables.  Quarles and Jeffres (1983), for example, 
apparently miss an intervening variable when they maintain that rising income leads 
to consumption and consumption leads to advertising and then end their analysis 
there—if Braithwaite (1928), Brack and Cowling (1983), Reekie and Allen (1983), 
Fraser and Paton (2003), and Courard-Hauri (2005) are correct.  In the view of the 
latter group, advertising leads to the desire to consume more, which leads to the 
desire to increase income, which leads to more hours worked; more hours worked 
leads to increased income, and increased income enables greater consumption.  If, on 
the other hand, firms base their future advertising expenditures on past sales, which is 
apparently a common practice, Braithwaite, Brack and Cowling, and the rest 
apparently fail to notice that consumption also leads to advertising, as Quarles and 
Jeffres maintain.  Causation, in other words, seems not to be unidirectional—or even 
bidirectional—but tends to be circular, when all relevant variables are included.   
 
Advertising’s influence at firm, industry, and aggregate levels 
 
 
Needless to say, the influence of advertising on demand is controversial and 
unresolved.  Since many firms base their future ad expenditures on past sales, 




problematic.  As Michael Schudson (1984), sociologist and professor of 
communications, writes: 
The advertising agencies and the media can argue the point either way. 
If they are trying to convince an advertiser to increase the media 
budget, they can cite examples of devastatingly successful advertising 
campaigns.  But if they are defending themselves before the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) or a civic organization decrying television 
advertising to children, they trot out the data that demonstrate that 
advertising has slight or no effect on product sales.  (15-16) 
Still, businesses expend billions of dollars on advertising annually, because 
they believe that ads increase demand.  In the words of Andy Tarshis, of the A.C. 
Nielsen Company: “We find that advertising works the way the grass grows.  You 







Chapter 4:  Advertising and the Competitive Model 
 
Three explanations for advertising’s impact on consumer behavior 
 
 
According to Simon (1970), the great economists of the nineteenth century 
“paid little or no attention to advertising.  And for good reason, because mass 
advertising clearly had little economic or social importance before the twentieth 
century” (xi).  Bagwell (2003), however, explains the matter somewhat differently.  
As he sees it, economists showed little or no interest in advertising until the twentieth 
century because, for the most part, the economic research of the nineteenth century 
focused on developing the theory of perfect competition, “and this theory does not 
immediately suggest a role for advertising” (2).  Pigou (1932) puts the matter this 
way: “Competitive advertisement [is] directed to the sole purpose of transferring the 
demand for a given commodity from one source of supply to another.”  In a footnote 
he continues: “Under simple competition, there is no purpose in this advertisement, 
because, ex hypothesi, the market will take, at the market price, as much as any one 
small seller wants to sell” (n.p.).  Since the theory of simple competition also assumes 
that consumers have perfect information about the attributes and prices of market 
products and fixed preferences, advertising would seem to be incapable of influencing 
consumer spending.  
Experience has shown, however, that advertising does influence consumer 
spending.  Over the years, economists have suggested a variety of reasons why this 




that have emerged among economists to explain advertising’s impact on consumer 
behavior.  One perspective, which dominates the literature of the first half of the 
twentieth century and retains some influence today, posits that advertising affects 
behavior via persuasion.  According to some economists (Braithwaite 1928; Robinson 
1933; Bain 1956; and Comanor and Wilson 1974, for example), advertising changes 
tastes and creates brand loyalty by artificially differentiating products.  It also tends to 
erect barriers to entry, concentrates markets, raises prices, and inflates profits.  In 
sum, according to proponents of this perspective, advertising has a substantial, anti-
competitive impact on the economy, and its value to consumers is questionable. 
With the rise of the Chicago School of economic thought in the middle of the 
twentieth century, the view that advertising works through persuasion began to fade, 
however, and a second perspective came to dominate the economics-of-advertising 
literature.  According to the proponents of this view (e.g., Ozga 1960; Stigler 1961; 
Telser 1964; and P. Nelson 1974), advertising influences consumers by providing 
information about available commodities.  It thus corrects a discrepancy in the 
assumption of perfect market information (i.e., the real-world fact of uninformed or 
under-informed consumers) by supplying information about the availability, price, 
and quality of certain market products.  Because advertising is expensive, it “can in 
effect offer a financial ‘hostage’ that provides an effective assurance of future product 
quality”; and, for that reason, “even advertising that is altogether empty of content . . . 
may still ‘signal’ important information” (R. Nelson 2001, 214).   Thus, the advocates 




and indirectly, and the information advertising provides lowers consumers’ search 
costs.  
In contrast to the economists who focus on advertising’s persuasive effects, 
proponents of the informative perspective maintain that advertising tends to lower, 
rather than erect, barriers to entry.  Advertising, they argue, supplies aspiring market 
entrants with a way to announce their existence and describe the attributes of their 
products.  By increasing price competition, advertising tends to reduce product prices, 
as well.  In sum, from the perspective of those who see advertising’s economic role as 
primarily informative, advertising tends to promote—not restrict—competition. 
According to a third perspective offered by Stigler and Becker (1977), Nichols 
(1985), and Becker and Murphy (1993), for example, advertising influences 
consumer behavior by acting as a complement to the advertised commodity.  In 
contrast to proponents of the persuasive perspective, economists who share this third 
view accept the conventional assumption that consumers’ preferences are fixed—not 
altered by persuasive advertising.  Furthermore, they reject the view of the proponents 
of the informative perspective, who maintain that advertising always supplies useful 
information—either directly or indirectly.  As this third group sees it, advertising may 
be informative, but then again, it need not be.  In their view, advertising should enter 
consumers’ utility functions as a good or a bad.  Either way, it enters directly as a 






Competition facilitated or impaired? 
 
Throughout the economics-of-advertising literature, the impact of advertising 
on competition is a common subject of inquiry.  Opinions concerning that impact 
vary.  As previously noted, many of the economists who wrote about the issue in the 
first half of the twentieth century considered advertising to be deleterious to the 
operation of a perfectly competitive market.  According to Braithwaite (1928), for 
example, the basis of advertising’s success lies in its ability to limit competition.  She 
explains that producers would have nothing to gain by advertising in a perfectly 
competitive market, since, ex hypothesi: (1) the demand curve is fixed, and (2) firms 
are selling everything they can produce at the market price.  Although she 
acknowledges that the assumptions concerning perfect competition are never 
completely realized, in Braithwaite’s view, “where advertisement is largely used, they 
cease to correspond, even remotely, to the facts” (28).  For one thing, she explains, 
non-advertisers face resistance from potential buyers and difficulty finding outlets for 
their commodities due to the effectiveness of their rivals’ advertising.  For another, 
advertisements can alter the marginal utility of goods and shift the demand curve 
outward.   
 
Advertising homogeneous goods 
 
According to Braithwaite, firms use advertising to create a reputation and 
thereby differentiate their products.  “Reputation restricts competition between goods 




the advertised commodity to such an extent that he ignores the prices and merits of 
other similar commodities,” she writes.  Successful advertisers secure a partial 
monopoly, which would be impossible to secure if they sold their goods in bulk, since 
retailers and wholesalers buy bulk goods in the least expensive market.  Overall, 
Braithwaite concludes, advertising establishes “reputation monopolies” for the 
products it promotes and thereby substitutes competition that is harmful to consumers 
(i.e., competition through advertising) for competition that is beneficial to consumers 
(i.e., competition through price or quality).   
In accord with Braithwaite, Robinson (1933) finds advertising inconsistent 
with perfect competition.  She writes: “If a very small reduction in price by one 
competitor would secure an indefinitely large increase in sales, it would be folly to 
spend money on advertisement” (167). 
Similarly, Chamberlin (1933) notes that assumptions concerning the nature of 
pure competition deny an economic role for advertising.  Under pure competition, 
products are homogeneous, there are many competing firms, and no single supplier 
has the ability to control market supply or price.  In fact, that no firm has any measure 
of control over the supply of a particular commodity—and thus its price—is a 
prerequisite for pure competition, Chamberlin explains.  Advertising is incompatible 
with perfect competition since a producer will not advertise if he is unable to 
distinguish his goods from the goods supplied by rival firms.  He will not advertise, 
Chamberlin explains, because, if he did, “he would be forced to increase or diminish 
their sales pari passu with his own,” and any return to the advertiser “would be a 




Put another way, placing an ad for a homogeneous good presents a collective-
action problem, because such an ad is a public good (i.e., one that cannot feasibly be 
denied to any member of a group if any other member benefits from it).  Unless 
producers of homogeneous products receive a special benefit or are forced to pay for 
an ad campaign, they will refrain from advertising.  If, on the other hand, they 
overcome the collective action problem somehow and do advertise, their ads will 
distort the competitive market.   
Consider, as an example, ads for surplus agricultural products.  In keeping 
with Chamberlin’s prediction, individual family farmers rarely advertise their 
homogeneous agricultural products.  Given the ostensible public interest in generating 
demand for such goods, however, the U.S. government sometimes requires farmers to 
pay for ad campaigns to promote their common products.  Under the Beef Promotion 
Research Act of 1985, for instance, the Department of Agriculture collected $1 per 
head of cattle from ranchers to support the “Beef: It’s What’s for Dinner” campaign.  
The Department also forced farmers and ranchers to contribute to ad campaigns for 
pork (“The Other White Meat”), milk (“Got Milk?”), cotton (“The Fabric of Our 
Lives”), and California peaches (“Remember the Taste”), among other products 
(Cooper 2004). 
The Supreme Court has generally upheld the government’s right to force 
cooperation in such ad campaigns, rejecting (in one case) the argument that the 
mandatory ads violate constitutional protections regarding coerced speech (Richey 
2005).  Nevertheless, the government provides an advantage to the particular 




problem.  More to the point of the current discussion, however, the government-
mandated ad campaigns undermine the competitive market for homogeneous goods. 
 
Chamberlin and the theory of monopolistic competition 
 
According to Chamberlin (1933), when producers of homogeneous goods 
band together to advertise their common product, their cooperation creates 
“conditions of monopolistic competition,” with “the whole body of sellers acting as 
one in competing for their market with sellers of other goods” (127-128).  Such was 
the case with beef, peach, and cotton ads, as mentioned above.  Similarly, when a 
single supplier of a homogeneous good uses advertising to differentiate that good 
from identical substitutes (e.g., Morton Salt from generic salt), that supplier’s ads can 
create conditions of monopolistic competition, as well. 
As Chamberlin explains, the central goal of advertising is to persuade 
consumers to prefer the advertiser’s product to those of his rivals by means of 
differentiation.  He writes: “Anything which makes buyers prefer one seller to 
another . . . differentiates the thing purchased to that degree, for what is bought is 
really a bundle of utilities, of which these things are a part” (8).  When advertising 
differentiates goods, they are, by definition, no longer homogeneous.  The difference 
between similar products, Chamberlin writes, “may be real or fancied, so long as it is 
of any importance whatever to buyers, and leads to a preference for one variety of the 
product over another” (56).  By advertising his products, a seller differentiates them 
from those of his rivals, and “where there is any degree of differentiation whatever, 




tempered, however, since it is “subject to the competition of more or less imperfect 
substitutes, [and] we may speak . . . of the forces at work as those of ‘monopolistic 
competition’” (9). 
Bagwell (2003) explains that in developing the theory of monopolistic 
competition, Chamberlin was attempting to formally integrate advertising into 
economic theory.  According to Bagwell, Chamberlin had a “conviction that 
advertising was a necessary part of [his] hybrid theory” (7; italics in the original).   
As Chamberlin explains it, “advertising would be without purpose under 
conditions of pure competition, where any producer can sell as much as he pleases 
without it” (73).  Under conditions of monopolistic competition, however, buyers and 
sellers are paired, “not by chance and at random (as under pure competition), but 
according to their preferences” (56).  
 
Is advertising pro- or anti-competitive? 
 
Corden (1961) concludes that advertising is anticompetitive.  Adding 
authority to his argument, he notes that the U.S. Supreme Court once “recognized that 
advertising may be, not an aspect of competition, but an instrument of monopoly—‘a 
powerful offensive and defensive weapon against new competition’” (19). 
According to the Economists Advisory Group (1967), perfect competition and 
monopoly are concepts that incorporate “a number of simplifying assumptions which 
[are] obviously unrealistic in a descriptive sense” (27).  In line with Braithwaite, 
Chamberlin, Robinson, Bain, and others, the Group explains that the perfect-




and that consumers’ preferences are given.  In reality, however, consumers’ 
knowledge of the market—and even of their own preferences—is faulty and 
incomplete.  In addition, contrary to the traditional assumption of homogeneous 
commodities, many firms differentiate their goods from the similar goods of their 
rivals with trademarks or distinctive packaging and publicize that differentiation 
through advertising.  Although the theory of perfect competition assumes that 
competition takes place on the basis of price alone, in actual practice, competition via 
advertising is common.  Since advertising has no place in the model of perfect 
competition, the Economists Advisory Group concludes that monopolistic 
competition appears, in general, to be a more realistic economic model. 
Telser (1964) observes that many early students of the economics of 
advertising conclude that advertising is anti-competitive.  Although he takes an 
opposing view, himself (see below), Telser quotes Henry Simons, noted economist of 
the early twentieth century, who writes: “A major barrier to really competitive 
enterprise and efficient service to consumers is to be found in advertising” (537). 
Bain (1956) finds empirical support for the hypothesis that advertising tends 
to be anti-competitive, in an analysis of cross-sectional data.  Advertising propagates 
product differentiation, he explains, by persuading the consumer that the advertised 
product is more desirable, prestigious, or higher in quality than similar (or virtually 
identical) goods offered by rivals.  By differentiating the commodity in this way, 
advertising enables the firm to set its price—at least to some extent—independently 




In more recent empirical studies, Gallet and Euzent (1998) find that 
advertising in the brewing industry is anti-competitive, and Tremblay and Martins-
Filho (2001), utilizing a game-theoretic model, find that firms create “real and 
perceived distance between products,” through vertical differentiation and persuasive 
advertising (3).  According to the authors, once firms have distanced their product 
from other similar products, they are able to dampen competition. 
While the view that advertising restricts competition is prevalent, it is far from 
universal.  Telser (1964) may have been one of the first economists to suggest that 
advertising may, in fact, promote competition.  Stigler and Becker (1977) agree with 
Telser and dispute the view, common to a number of earlier economists (as noted 
above), that advertising is incompatible with perfect competition.  
Several more recent empirical studies also suggest that advertising is pro-
competitive.  In a cross-sectional marketing study of 1,100 businesses, for example, 
Carpenter (1987) finds that intense promotional expenditures are related to small 
profit margins.  According to Carpenter, this result “implies that intense promotion 
does not reduce the intensity of competition by building brand loyalty and barriers to 
the entry of new brands, which would lead to high margins” (218).  Rather, his 
finding suggests to Carpenter that intense promotion is associated with intense 
competition. 
Arrow, Stigler, Landes, and Rosenfeld (1990) maintain that the hostility 
prevalent in the early literature devoted to the economics of advertising is due to the 
belief that advertising impedes competition, but that more recent studies, such as 




(1988) indicate that advertising is actually pro-competitive.  According to Arrow et 
al., the belief common to early economists—that advertising is an instrument for the 
suppression of competition—“was based (at least implicitly) upon a view of markets 
that assumed everyone knew everything from birth” about the availability, prices, and 
qualities of goods.  “But we do not live in such a world” (3).  In the world in which 
we do live, advertising helps keep the economy functioning smoothly by providing 
market information to consumers in a cost-effective manner.  It reduces the prices of 
goods, and it lowers barriers to entry for new products and firms.  “In short,” Arrow 
et al. write, “advertising is a powerful tool of competition” (3).   
Standing in between the advocates of anti- and pro-competitive positions are 
those, like Borden (1942) who contend that the impact is neither one; rather, the 
impact of advertising on competition is ambiguous.  According to the Economists 
Advisory Group (1967), advertising is “as much a weapon of competition as of 
restriction” (2).  And Comanor and Wilson (1974), in an early recognition of 
advertising’s heterogeneous effects, conclude that advertising’s impact on 
competition varies by industry.  
 
 
Consumers’ preferences affected? 
 
As Bagwell (2003) explains, according to the conventional assumptions of the 




to respond to advertisements.  Noticing that consumers do respond to ads, however, a 
number of economists consider the impact of advertising on those preferences.   
As Bagwell (2003) explains, during the first half of the 20th century, the view 
that “advertising alters consumers’ tastes and creates spurious product differentiation 
and brand loyalty” dominated the economic literature (3).  According to Braithwaite 
(1928), for example, advertising shifts the demand curve for advertised goods 
outward.  In the process, it distorts consumers’ actual preferences, which the pre-
advertising demand curve accurately reflects.  Consumers’ post-advertising 
evaluations of goods can be “less correct than those which would otherwise have 
obtained,” Braithwaite writes (26).  When this occurs, the goods and services that are 
produced fail to satisfy the public’s actual needs; thus, economic resources are wasted 
and social welfare declines.   
Robinson (1933) also suggests that advertising alters consumers’ preferences.  
Kaldor (1950-1951), however, maintains that sweeping statements cannot be made 
about the impact of advertising on the structure of consumers’ preferences among 
different commodities (i.e., on general demand).  Citing Chamberlin, Bain (1956) 
notes that advertising differentiates products and affects “buyers’ preferences for one 
or some of a variety of very similar substitute products” (114).  Galbraith (1967, 
1998) and Packard (1957) go further, arguing that advertising not only changes 
consumers’ tastes for particular goods; it actually alters the manner by which 
consumers’ tastes are formed. 
According to Nerlove and Arrow (1962), advertising expenditures may “alter 




function as well as shift it” (129).  The authors note, however, that ad-induced 
changes in tastes and preferences are unlikely to be permanent; rather, consumers’ 
preferences have a tendency to return, over time, to their earlier patterns.  Still, 
Nerlove and Arrow conclude that the impact of an advertising campaign does “tend to 
persist for a considerable period following the campaign” (130). 
Although Yang (1964) finds that advertising is largely responsible for 
changing consumers’ tastes and shifting the consumption function upward year-after-
year, Solow (1967) and Simon (1970) are skeptical about the claim that advertising 
alters tastes and preferences.  Comanor and Wilson (1974) stand with Yang, 
declaring: “That advertising has an impact on the underlying structure of tastes is 
difficult to deny” (249). 
Schmalensee (1972) agrees.  As he sees it, one major reason why traditional 
economic tools fail in the case of advertising is that—by its very nature—advertising 
“tends to induce changes in tastes, making the issue then whether or not such taste 
changes add to welfare” (6). 
Stigler and Becker (1977) maintain that the issue Schmalensee raises is off the 
mark, however.  “On the traditional view,” they write, “an explanation of economic 
phenomena that reaches a difference in tastes between people or times is the terminus 
of the argument” (76).  As Stigler and Becker see it, economists need never encounter 
such an impasse if they look for changes in incomes or prices to explain changes in 
behavior.  The influence of advertising can be explained, in their view, “by a 




qualification ‘tastes remaining the same’” (76).  Advertising, they conclude, changes 
behavior by influencing prices and incomes, not preferences. 
Similarly, Telser (1978) argues that preferences are unaltered by advertising.  
“Preferences are not given; they depend on the stock of knowledge,” he writes.  Due 
to the high costs associated with acquiring knowledge, consumers generally repeat 
favorable experiences and avoid unfavorable ones.  Inertia tends to characterize their 
buying habits.  Although advertising can help a firm overcome consumer inertia and 
increase the propensity of a first-time purchase, it cannot change consumers’ 
preferences or induce consumers to make subsequent purchases of products that they 
find unacceptable.  
Becker and Murphy (1993) tend to agree.  While they acknowledge that 
persuasive advertising creates wants, they maintain that ads do not change tastes.  As 
they see it, “there is no reason to claim that advertisements change tastes just because 
they affect the demand for other goods” (942).  Rather, advertisements are simply 
“one of the goods that enter the fixed preferences of consumers” (941).  
Subsequent research offers some different perspectives concerning 
advertising’s influence on preferences.  In a marketing study, for example, Van 
Osselaer and Alba (2000) find that when consumers learn about a product’s “quality” 
from an ad before they actually try the product, “brand cues may ‘block’ the learning 
of quality-determining attribute cues” (14).  As a result, consumers’ preferences may 
be influenced more by advertising for a product than by actual experience with the 




Looking beyond consumers’ preferences among products, Fraser and Paton 
(2003) find support for the hypothesis (offered by Braithwaite, among others) that 
advertising is shifting workers’ preferences toward consumption and away from 
leisure.  Striking a similar chord, Courard-Hauri (2005) finds that consumers have 
imperfect access to their own utility functions.  Although their “choices may 
approximate utility maximization . . . the correspondence is unlikely to be exact,” he 
writes (1).  Advertising may exploit this ignorance of internal preferences, such that 
people “overengage in income-producing work and underengage in other activities” 
(12).  
Daly and Farley (2004) also maintain that advertising tends to alter 
preferences in favor of consumption over nonmarket activities.  “While many 
economists argue that preferences are innate,” they write, “businesses are betting 
[billions every year] that preferences are heavily influenced by advertising” (412).  
Since advertising that is designed to induce a preference for nonmarket goods is 
virtually nonexistent, “to the extent that advertising alters preferences, it 
systematically does so in favor of market goods over nonmarket goods” (413).   
The extent to which advertising alters preferences is critical, since the concept 
of preferences is central to economic theory.  As Daly and Farley explain, according 
to neo-classical economics, individuals are “best able to determine what provides 
utility.”  Since measuring utility directly has been problematic, “economists have 
taken to using revealed preferences as a proxy.  Preferences are revealed by people’s 
objectively measurable choices in the market.  In the market economy, preferences 




money,” they write (241).  By altering our preferences toward advertised products, 
without providing the financial means to satisfy those wants, the authors conclude, 
“advertising directly diminishes our welfare,” and tends to constitute a “public bad” 
(413).  
Summing up, the bulk of the literature seems to indicate that advertising 
changes tastes and preferences by differentiating products with words and images that 
tend to engender brand loyalty.  In the words of legendary adman David Ogilvy: 
“Give people a taste of Old Crow, and tell them it’s Old Crow.  Then give them 
another taste of Old Crow, but tell them it’s Jack Daniel’s.  Ask them which they 
prefer.  They’ll think the two drinks are quite different.  They are tasting images” 
(Ogilvy 1985, 15; italics in the original).  Advertising generates the images that 
alter—and perhaps even dictate—preferences. 
 
 
Advertising as a complementary commodity 
 
According to some economists, advertising is a complementary commodity 
that is supplied jointly with the product it promotes.  Some contend that the 
complementary nature of advertising promotes consumer welfare, and they suggest 
that an ad improves welfare whether it is informative or persuasive.  When 
advertising complements the product by providing information about it, consumers 




but trumpets the prestige value of a product, according to the proponents, consumers 
value the additional prestige that complements the product.   
Although the subject is little discussed in the early literature, Simon (1970) 
notes that Barnes (1913) suggests that ads complement the product to which they are 
attached.  Braithwaite (1928) also notes the complementary nature of advertising.  
She writes: “Consumers who, by advertisement, are induced to increase their 
purchases of advertised goods, do so because the marginal utility of the commodity 
has been raised for them, or we may say that with the original commodity they choose 
to buy this new immaterial commodity—reputation” (21). 
While Kaldor (1950-1951) conceives of advertising as a subsidized 
commodity that complements the advertised product, he seems to be skeptical that its 
complementary nature has a positive impact on consumer welfare.  Since the cost of 
an ad is included in the price of the good or service it complements, he explains, 
consumers have no way to indicate their willingness to pay for ads; rather, they must 
pay for the ad if they buy the product.  “Under a system of joint pricing (where the 
whole bundle of goods and services is sold together for a lump sum) the buyer has no 
means of selecting some of the services and refusing to take others”—even though he 
might “prefer to go without them, if the commodity could also be obtained without 
these services, at an appropriately lower price” (23).  In a purely competitive system, 
prices would be separate, since “if one seller refused to price distinct services or 
‘improvements’ separately, there would always be some others who did so” (23).  
Kaldor allows, however, that in some cases advertising does seem to add to the utility 




advertising appeals, . . . undoubtedly add[s] to the value . . . to the particular buyer . . . 
and in this sense improves the final ‘product,’” Kaldor writes (23).  
According to Corden (1961), the reputation with which advertising 
complements an advertised product may be purely psychological.  He notes that some 
strong ad advocates agree with him on that point but go further, contending that an 
inhering “psychological reputation” increases a good’s value.  If buying an advertised 
good gives the consumer a psychological boost that a physically identical, 
unadvertised good fails to supply, then the advertised good is clearly worth more, the 
advocates claim.  According to Corden, however, the “trouble with this logic is that it 
justifies any kind of commercial fraud, provided only the customer does not know she 
has been defrauded” (15).   
Stigler and Becker (1977) note that consumers place a higher value on 
intensively advertised products due to the advertising that complements the product.  
According to the authors, the complementary advertising makes buyers believe they 
get more for their money—whether or not they actually do.  
Going a step further, Becker and Murphy (1993) evaluate the impact of 
advertising on welfare by formally assimilating advertising theory into the theory of 
complements.  “In consumer theory,” they write, “goods that favorably affect the 
demand for other goods are usually treated as complements to those other goods, not 
as shifters of utility functions” (942).  Becker and Murphy enter advertising into a 
utility function as a complement to the good such that U = U(x, y, A).  The marginal 
utility of an ad may be positive or negative, they explain.  When the ad is experienced 




entertainment or information as indirect compensation to consumers for the utility-
lowering effect of the ad.  Even with the indirect compensation, Becker and Murphy 
explain, “many advertisements lower utility and yet raise demand for the advertised 
goods” (962). 
According to Comanor and Wilson (1974), however, the argument that firms 
supply advertisements and products jointly, as complements, is undercut by a couple 
of conceptual difficulties.  One difficulty is that most of the people who receive the 
advertising messages never buy the advertised product, and some of the individuals 
who do buy the product never see the ads.  Another difficulty, according to Comanor 
and Wilson, is that the advertised products and the advertising messages are not parts 
of the same production process; thus, their provision, “in the standard economic 
sense,” does not represent joint supply.  
Comanor and Wilson seem to present a minority view, however.  Most of the 
economists who address the issue maintain that an advertisement is a jointly supplied 
complement to the product it promotes.  According to some economists (e.g., Nichols 
1985; Bagwell 2005), moreover, when advertisements provide prestige as a 
complement to the advertised good, a monopolist may provide a socially inadequate 
amount of advertising—even when advertising increases the good’s price.  
Apparently, these proponents assume that advertising increases social welfare when it 
conveys an aura of high status to owners of certain goods.  Recent research, 
concerning the impact of materialistic values on the happiness of individuals (and 





Goods or bads? 
 
According to some economists, whether an advertisement is a good or a bad 
depends upon the judgment of the person who receives it.  Becker and Murphy 
(1993), maintain that ads count as goods in utility functions if consumers are willing 
to pay for them.  If, on the other hand, consumers must be compensated in order to 
accept the advertisements, the ads count as bads.  Similarly, Baye, Jansen, and Lee 
(1992) find that advertisements can either raise or lower utility levels and can, 
therefore, be counted as both goods and bads.   
Reaching a related conclusion, Telser (1978) finds that an ad can be a good 
for some of the people who receive it and yet be a bad for other people.  Since ads 
reduce the welfare of some recipients, “the implicit market clearing price for the 
advertising messages is negative,” he writes, and everyone who receives them is 
given remuneration, in the form of information or entertainment.  Advertisers would 
be unwilling to provide such remuneration if all ad recipients treated ads as bads, 
however.  “That [some] recipients act as if the advertising is a good is shown by their 
purchases of the advertised product,” Telser explains (88).  As Comanor and Wilson 
(1974) see it, however, “the fact that advertising has a clear effect on consumer 
decisions does not imply that consumers require or prefer the volume of messages 
received” (247; italics in the original).  Even if consumers do purchase advertised 
goods, in other words, the ads themselves may reduce overall utility. 
According to Schmalensee (1972), some ads reduce welfare because they are 
offensive or annoying.  Although the objectionable aspect of ads “may be regarded as 




solutions, short of necessarily arbitrary censorship, other than establishing standards 
of truthfulness” (4).  Such standards are inadequate, however, since ads can be 
truthful and still be offensive or annoying.  
The impact of television commercials on welfare has been the focus of a 
number of studies.  Anderson and Coate (2005), for example, note the existence of a 
nuisance cost that inheres to television commercials.   According to Barnett et al. 
(1966), television commercials “are negative economic goods to the viewer, which he 
must ‘consume’ in order to obtain the entertainment program” (467).  Not 
surprisingly, Danaher (1995) notes that television-program ratings fall during 
commercial breaks.  Yorke and Kitchen (1985) find that members of a sample 
population use either the fast-forward or the pause button on a VCR to eliminate 
commercial breaks in “practically all instances” (24); and using a game-theoretic 
model, Wilbur (2004) finds that television viewers avoid commercials by using ad-
avoidance technology whenever possible.  
According to Kaldor (1950-1951), advertising belongs to a category of 
services that are “not provided in response to market demand” (5; italics in the 
original).  In order to determine whether or not such a service adds to or detracts from 
welfare, Kaldor suggests, one should ask if there is a real need for the service, if the 
service satisfies that need, and if the size of the expenditure to satisfy the need is 
justifiable.  In his view, the need for market information is real, but advertising 




 In sum, while opinions about advertising’s impact on welfare vary somewhat, 
the overwhelming bulk of the empirical literature seems to indicate that for most 
people an advertisement is a bad rather than a good. 
 
Wasting economic resources or improving market performance?  
 
According to some economists, advertising tends to waste economic 
resources.  This view seems to have been especially prevalent among the early 
students of the economics of advertising.  Marshall (1919), for one, maintains that 
advertising sometimes plays a wasteful, business-stealing role.  Pigou (1932) agrees.  
In his view, the ad expenditures of competing firms may cancel each other out.  If 
they do, each firm’s expenditures are for naught, and the resources devoted to 
advertising are wasted.  Braithwaite (1928) finds most advertising wasteful for a 
different reason: It distorts consumers’ true preferences and creates false demand.  
Borden also considers ad-induced distortion of demand to be a source of 
economic inefficiencies.  Investigating whether advertising causes waste in 
distribution, Borden (1942) finds that in some cases economies of scale associated 
with advertising more than offset ad expenditures.  In other cases, he finds no 
evidence that ad expenditures are offset, however.  “The high costs persist,” he 
writes, “because effective price competition has been prevented by the existence of 
other strong appeals which have affected consumers’ valuations” (875).  Similarly, 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) find that advertising is likely to induce inefficiencies, 




consumer preferences.  They write: “To some extent, excess advertising represents 
resources that are wasted in that there is no effective demand for the output that is 
produced” (241).  
Robinson (1933), Kaldor (1950-1951), Bain (1956), Galbraith (1967), Solow 
(1968), and Daly and Farley (2004), among others, suggest that advertising is (at 
least) sometimes economically wasteful and impairs market performance.  Corden 
(1961) suggests that if advertising expenditures are, in fact, an economic waste, then, 
of course, the amount spent is enormous.  If, however, advertising is essential to the 
distribution process, then ad expenditures, representing only a small part of all 
distribution costs, are relatively minor.  According to Corden, while many economists 
doubt the economic value of about half of all ad expenditures, few economists dispute 
the worth of most classified ads, financial ads, trade-and-technical-journal ads, and 
other non-commercial ads.  In Corden’s view, however, “even if the economic effects 
of this half are not necessarily adverse, [advertising] is unlikely to be worth the cost” 
(38).  
Acknowledging that many economists find advertising to be a waste of 
resources, Telser (1966) summarizes the critics’ argument and then attempts to refute 
it.  According to Telser, the critics maintain that if firms could charge a positive price 
for their ads, they would.  Firms supply ads without charging for them; thus, 
“advertisers may believe that the amount of advertising that would be demanded at a 
positive price is less than the amount they should provide to maximize their profits” 
(457).  So, firms provide ads, they profit, and they transfer their ad expenditures—in 




supplied exceeds the quantity demanded, consumers “have more advertising foisted 
off on them than they would be willing to purchase in a separate market for 
advertising services.”  All of this “implies a departure from marginal cost pricing and 
a consequent waste of resources” (457).  Or so the argument goes, Telser explains.  
He disagrees, however.  In his view, perpetually changing market conditions generate 
a continuous demand for the information that advertising supplies.  “The turnover of 
customers, the ease of obtaining direct information about goods, the frequency of 
purchase, the expense of trial purchases, and the satisfaction with existing goods—all 
play a role in the supply and demand for advertising messages” Telser writes (466).  
A number of other economists maintain, along with Telser (1964, 1966) that 
advertising tends to improve market performance.  Among those who defend 
advertising in this way are: P. Nelson (1974), R. Nelson (1976), Demsetz (1979), 
Lynk (1981), Arrow, Stigler, Landes, and Rosenfeld (1990), and Raimondi and Klein 
(as reported by O’Malley 2004). 
Without taking sides, Schmalensee (1972) finds the mere task of analyzing the 
market performance of advertising with normal economic tools problematic, given 
that “advertising by its nature tends to induce changes in tastes” (6).  
Thus, while some economists maintain that advertising supplies information 
to consumers and therefore improves market performance, others argue that the 
biased information that many ads supply is a waste of resources.  Furthermore, in 
many cases, consumers of ads have no use for the information that the ads supply.  
(The information in ads for PoliGrip, a denture adhesive, is wasted on children, for 




mutual cancellation of the effectiveness of each advertiser’s message by its rivals.  In 
addition, some economists maintain that since advertising tends to alter consumers’ 
preferences and a market’s ability to satisfy consumers’ preferences defines its 
efficiency, advertising undermines consumer sovereignty. 
 
Advertising and consumer sovereignty  
 
A number of economists address the impact of advertising on consumer 
sovereignty. While some economists argue that advertising’s association with profits 
shows that it promotes consumer sovereignty, Kaldor (1950-1951) maintains: 
“Profitability is a test of consumers’ preferences only in a purely competitive system 
where the price-mechanism accurately registers the pull of competing attractions” (4).  
Since advertising differentiates products and restricts competition, profitability fails 
to indicate consumers’ true preferences.   Furthermore, Kaldor continues, when firms 
supply ads, it is not “in response to consumers’ demand,” nor do firms base their ad 
expenditures on the preferences that consumers register via the price-mechanism; 
rather, “purely extraneous considerations” determine the quantity of ads that firms 
supply (4; italics in the original).  Given their lack of control over advertising, 
consumers can hardly be thought to be sovereign.   
Galbraith (1958) goes farther.  He argues that advertising actually undermines 
consumer sovereignty by generating artificial demand.  “First you make the good, 
then you make the market,” he writes.  And how do you make the market?  By 




with accepted economic thought.  In that, nothing was so fundamental as the concept 
of consumer sovereignty—the according of final economic authority to those the 
economic system serves” (ix).  
In the past, Galbraith explains, economic theory sought to meet consumers’ 
needs for the essentials of existence with a sense of urgency.  In the modern affluent 
society, however, advertising creates wants in individuals whose needs are already 
satisfied.  “The fact that wants can be synthesized by advertising, catalyzed by 
salesmanship, and shaped by the discreet manipulations of the persuaders shows that 
they are not very urgent.  A man who is hungry need never be told of his need for 
food.  If he is inspired by his appetite, he is immune to the influence of [ad men]” 
(129). 
According to Galbraith, that earlier sense of urgency to provide the essentials 
is now applied “to a world where increased output satisfies the craving for . . . the 
entire modern range of sensuous, edifying and lethal desires” (115).  Given that 
advertising is responsible for generating many of those desires, they cannot be urgent, 
since, to be urgent, desires must originate within the individual.  Thus, Galbraith 
insists, advertising runs counter to the principle of consumer sovereignty.  He writes: 
Consumer wants can have bizarre, frivolous or even immoral origins, 
and an admirable case can still be made for a society that seeks to 
satisfy them.  But the case cannot stand if it is the process of satisfying 
wants that creates the wants.  For then the individual who urges the 




position of the onlooker who applauds the efforts of the squirrel to 
keep abreast of the wheel that is propelled by his own efforts (125). 
Incorporated in the productive process are the means (i.e., advertisements) to 
create consumer demand, Galbraith explains.  And if the same production process that 
satisfies wants contrives them as well, “the whole case for the urgency of production, 
based on the urgency of wants, falls to the ground” (124). 
Zinkin (1967), however, criticizes Galbraith’s conclusions.  In response to 
Galbraith’s assertion of ad-created demand, Zinkin writes: “Whether one considers 
that the firm creates the demand, or responds to it, depends upon how one defines the 
word ‘create’” (5).  In one sense, the word “create” can be used to describe the 
generation of demand that “was not there before in that form” (5).  In that limited 
sense, firms “very often do create demands,” Zinkin writes (5).  No one could want an 
automobile before it was invented, for example.  In another sense, however, the word 
“create” is sometimes used incorrectly to describe the generation of an artificial want.  
In reality, however, “the new want is nearly always an old want but satisfied in a new 
way,” (5).  The automobile, he explains, fulfills a demand for transport that has 
always existed, though not in that particular form.  Thus, in Zinkin’s view, it “is 
normally not true” that advertising “creates” demand in this second sense (5). 
Galbraith notwithstanding, the consumer is sovereign, Zinkin maintains.  
“Firms, however big, however impressive their advertising, do not have the capacity 
to impose their products upon the consumer.  Firms which misjudge the consumer’s 




bankruptcy stares every firm in the face.”  For while the “consumer may be 
sovereign,” Zinkin explains, “she is not therefore arbitrary” (7). 
Demsetz (1968) also criticizes Galbraith’s views.  He disputes, for one thing, 
what he says is the “first line of attack in Galbraith’s thesis”; that is, “the demise of 
consumer sovereignty and the creation of an imbalance in modern life unfavorable to 
leisure and art” (807).  “Once Galbraith’s view of a monolithic business world is 
challenged,” Demsetz writes, “it becomes apparent that considerable market forces 
also exist to further leisure and the aesthetic qualities of life” (809).   
Demsetz allows that advertising may influence wants.  “No doubt wants are 
modified by Madison Avenue,” he writes, but they are also “modified by 
Washington, by university faculties, and by churches.”  As he sees it, “the formation 
of wants is a complex process,” involving many influential inputs (810).  Thus, 
Demsetz concludes, Galbraith is mistaken in charging advertising with abrogating 
consumer sovereignty.  
Solow (1967) also disagrees with Galbraith.  He writes: “In the folklore, [the 
consumer] is sovereign; the economic machinery holds its breath while the consumer 
decides, in view of market prices, how much bread to buy, and how many apples.  In 
Galbraith’s counterfable, . . . the consumer is managed by Madison Avenue into 
buying what the system requires him to buy” (104).  Thus, Solow continues, “the 
issue is whether the art of salesmanship has succeeded in freeing the large corporation 
from the need to meet a market test, giving it ‘decisive influence over the revenue it 
receives’” (105), or, in other words, whether advertising has succeeded in substituting 




Solow criticizes Galbraith for making assertions without presenting statistical 
evidence to back them up.  While acknowledging that the issue is a difficult one to 
resolve, especially “if you insist on evidence,” Solow supposes “that much 
advertising serves only to cancel other advertising, and is therefore merely wasteful” 
(105).  For Solow, like Demsetz, Galbraith’s concern about advertising’s impact on 
consumer sovereignty is unfounded.  
Intervening in the “Solow-Galbraith controversy,” Marris (1968) notes that 
Solow criticizes Galbraith for making assertions without providing any statistical 
evidence to support them.  According to Marris, however, “the leading exponents of 
the new, [statistical] methods [such as Solow] have chosen largely to confine 
themselves within the framework of the traditional assumptions,” and that framework 
tends “to preclude answering many of the questions”—such as the influence of 
advertising—that Galbraith raises.  “When the question [of advertising] arises it is 
customary to say that the traditional framework, now endowed with statistical flesh, 
provides a reasonable explanation of observed behavior, so that it is probably 
unnecessary to worry about Madison Avenue.”  If pressed further, the advocates of 
this school “usually themselves resort to assertions: specifically, they assert that the 
effects of large-scale advertising largely cancel themselves out, leaving the broad 
pattern of consumer expenditure undisturbed.”  According to Marris, Solow 
“followed this line of argument almost precisely” in his critique of Galbraith (38). 
Differing from Galbraith somewhat, however, Marris concludes that 
“consumer tastes develop as a complicated interaction of personal influence” and 




producers’ overall influence, however, Marris agrees with Galbraith once again; for, 
as Marris sees it, producer-influenced, consumers’ sovereignty is an oxymoron.  
“Once we accept this kind of picture,” Marris argues, “the notion of ‘consumers’ 
sovereignty’ becomes vague, to say the least, and we are provided with a virtually 
complete justification for a wide range of political action to impose social value 
judgments in the direction of consumption patterns” (40). 
Offering a different perspective, Lerner (1972) describes consumer 
sovereignty in terms of Pareto optimality.  He writes: “The basic idea of consumer 
sovereignty is really very simple: arrange for everybody to have what he prefers 
whenever this does not involve any extra sacrifice for anybody else” (258).  In his 
view, consumer sovereignty is “far from completely achieved even where appropriate 
institutions have been fully developed.  Where the approximation to consumer 
sovereignty is left to perfect competition, we do not reach it if the competition is not 
perfect” (259).  As he sees it, however, claims that advertising manipulates 
preferences and undermines consumer sovereignty are exaggerated. 
Exaggerated or not, Doyle (1968) notes that a common complaint among 
economists about advertising is that it “misinforms consumers about products and 
detracts from consumer sovereignty considerations” (570).  Similarly, Richard Caves 
(1974) refers to “the nervousness long felt by economists about ‘consumer 
sovereignty’ as the immutable hook from which dangles our justification for the 
allocation of resources produced by capitalistic markets” (xiii).   
Quarles and Jeffres (1983) deny that economists have reasons for such 




Galbraith’s view of advertising as a high priest of materialism with the persuasive 
force to alter the spending and savings habits of people and nations” (13).   
Attempting to clarify the concept and significance of consumer sovereignty, 
Lowery (1998) writes: “The traits that are perhaps most important to advocates of 
market institutions are those associated with the concept of consumer sovereignty” 
(139).  Citing Rothenberg, he explains that economists use that concept in two, 
somewhat different ways.  When used in a descriptive sense, the term “consumer 
sovereignty” signifies that consumers’ preferences ultimately direct the production 
and distribution of goods and services.  The descriptive use of the term, Lowery 
explains, is central because it “subsumes or implies many other expected outcomes of 
market exchange.  It is the constraint of consumer sovereignty, for example, that 
generates incentives to innovate and orchestrates coordination of supply and demand” 
(139). 
In a second sense, however, the concept of consumer sovereignty has “a 
normative meaning rooted in the utilitarian vision of the good life” (139-140).  
Consumer sovereignty in this second sense, Lowery explains, evaluates an economy’s 
performance in terms of its ability to fulfill consumers’ wants.  Seen as a normative 
principle, consumer sovereignty also establishes want-fulfillment as the criterion by 
which the social desirability of public policies and institutional structures should be 
judged.   
“Under ideal conditions, then, markets both provide consumer sovereignty 
and are justified by it” (140).  Consumer sovereignty can be compromised, however, 




external manipulation.  As Lowery notes, Galbraith (1998) makes ad-manipulated 
preferences the core of his critique of advertising, and a study by Smith and Meier 
(1995), regarding school vouchers, observes preference manipulation by advertising 
“in a manner that fully parallels Galbraith’s argument” (Lowery 1998, 152).  
Public choice scholars seem to recommend a laissez-faire solution to the 
problem of ad-manipulated preferences, arguing “that markets provide their own cure 
through competitive advertising” (152).  For public choice scholars, therefore, the 
answer to bad advertising is more advertising.   In Lowery’s view, “the efficacy of 
this solution often seems to be founded more on faith than on evidence.”  
Nevertheless, he finds this solution somewhat plausible when actual competition 
exists, “as opposed to cases where the market is merely contestable” (153).  “But,” he 
writes, “consumer sovereignty may still be compromised if there are too few 
competitors, if preferences are ill-informed or are biased by manipulation” (165).  
According to a number of economists, advertising may facilitate such market 
conditions and may, thereby, compromise consumer sovereignty. 
Daly and Farley (2004) describe the self-perpetuating nature of advertising, by 
which consumer sovereignty is subsumed.  They write: “There are many Pareto 
optima, one for each distribution of income, set of technologies, and set of wants or 
preferences”; however, advertising can make a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources 
problematic.  According to the authors, if advertising creates wants and alters 
preferences, such that firms manufacture both the need for the product and the 
product itself, “then production begins to look like a treadmill.  If we produce the 




motion toward the satisfaction of pre-existing needs.”  Producer sovereignty replaces 
consumer sovereignty, and “the moral earnestness of production, as well as the 
concept of Pareto optimal allocation of resources in the service of such production, 
suffers a loss” (135). 
In sum, although no clear consensus exists among economists concerning 
advertising’s impact on consumer sovereignty, the literature indicates that many 
economists think that its impact is detrimental.  
 
Advertising’s role in providing market information 
 
There is no way for the American economic system to function without advertising. There is no other 
way to communicate enough information about enough products to enough people with enough speed. 
—John O'Toole (1981) 
 
The cost of an independent information service about commodities—quite disregarding the great 
improvements in the quality and the quantity of information which it would bring about—could only 
amount to a fraction of the present cost of advertising to the community. 
—Nicholas Kaldor (1950-1951, 7). 
 
While economists generally agree that advertising supplies information, 
opinions differ as to whether the information it supplies is useful to consumers.  The 
disagreement appears early in the literature.  Marshall (1919), for example, maintains 
that some advertising plays a constructive role by informing the public about the 
existence of a product or service, its price and quality, and where it is sold.  Pigou 




of the existence of articles adapted to their tastes. . . .  Without it many useful articles, 
such as new machines, or useful services, such as that of life insurance, might not be 
brought at all to the notice of potential purchasers who have a real need for them” 
(n.p.).  Braithwaite (1928), however, disagrees.  In her view, since advertising fails to 
supply accurate, detailed facts, it fails to provide guidance for consumers as they 
attempt to assess the relative utility among like commodities, among different 
commodities, or between commodities and leisure.    
            Chamberlin (1933) suggests that advertising spreads both information and 
misinformation about products and services.  Ads that misinform or target consumers’ 
vulnerabilities are manipulative, not informative, Chamberlin contends.  Borden 
(1942) goes further.  In his view, advertisements are typically devoid of detailed, 
factual information.  Advertisers fail to provide useful information, according to 
Borden, because they believe that highly informative ads fail to stimulate large 
increases in consumption, whereas persuasive ads (presumably) do.  
Kaldor (1950-1951) maintains that most advertising provides little or no 
information and that the information it does provide tends to be biased.  While he 
notes that obtaining information about products and services is important to 
consumers’ welfare and he acknowledges that advertising may occasionally provide 
such information, Kaldor finds that advertising is an inefficient, inaccurate, and 
expensive means of information dissemination.  “We find that the cost of providing 
this highly inadequate and defective information-service is exorbitantly high,” he 
writes (6).  Advertisements fail to mention alternative suppliers, generally accentuate 




consumer behavior “by forcing a small amount of information through its sheer 
prominence to the foreground of consciousness” (5).  To be useful, information 
should be objective.  Since a firm’s advertising lacks financial independence from the 
advertised good, it also lacks objectivity, Kaldor maintains.  In his view, consumers 
may actually have access to less information—at a higher cost—with advertising than 
they would have without it, because “its development has indirectly led to the 
suppression of other channels of information about commodities” (6).  An 
independent source of information for consumers would provide more and better 
information at a fraction of advertising’s cost to society, Kaldor concludes. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, as economists of the Chicago school rose to 
prominence, advertising’s informative role began to receive more attention and 
appreciation.  Although early members of the school, such as Henry Simons, had 
been highly critical of advertising’s influence on the economy, later members, such as 
George Stigler, Gary Becker, Harold Demsetz, and Lester Telser offered a number of 
economic justifications for advertising, including the role advertising plays in 
providing market information.  In general, proponents of advertising’s informative 
role explain that search costs can result in market inefficiencies if they discourage 
consumption.  Advertising, they claim, reduces search costs by providing low-cost 
information concerning a good’s price, quality, and availability.  
Stigler (1961) stresses the informative role of advertising in his oft-cited 
article: “The Economics of Information.”  As Stigler sees it, the traditional economic 
model, which assumes that market information is perfect, “rarely obtains in the real 




Since the model rarely obtains, consumers need information about the availability, 
price, and quality of products.  Advertising “is clearly an immensely powerful 
instrument for the elimination of ignorance,” Stigler writes (220).  Because it 
provides market information, advertising’s impact on prices “is equivalent to that of 
the introduction of a very large amount of search by a large portion of potential 
buyers” (224).   
According to Stigler, price dispersion exists, in part, because the high cost of 
collecting and analyzing information about goods discourages consumers from 
searching for market information.  When consumers are ignorant about the range of 
market prices for a good, suppliers are less inclined to compete on price.  Advertising 
reduces search costs; as a result, consumers are better informed, and firms are forced 
to price their goods competitively. 
Corden (1961) is less sanguine about advertising’s informative role, however.  
While he acknowledges that advertising informs consumers about the existence of 
some goods and plays a large role in launching many genuinely innovative products 
onto the market, Corden wonders “whether advertising provides an adequate 
information service at reasonable cost” (13; italics in the original).  Ultimately, he 
agrees with critics who maintain that the information advertising supplies “does not 
help the consumer to make an intelligent choice” (13).  
Corden draws no distinction between “informative” and “persuasive” 
advertising.  Noting that a number of earlier analysts had drawn that distinction, he 




the name of the product, while even the most informative advertisements have 
persuasion as their aim” (14). 
Although much of the information in ads is puffery, Corden explains, the ads 
are persuasive, nonetheless.  “The net result of all this is that consumers often 
purchase expensive products when they could buy exactly the same basic product, but 
unadvertised and cheaper” (14).  An example he cites is aspirin.  Although the active 
ingredients are identical, the divergence in prices between generic aspirin and 
advertised brands is generally great.  “If buyers were well informed,” Corden writes, 
“not a single bottle or packet of the expensive brands would be sold, and the cost of 
living—or the cost of a headache—would immediately go down” (14). 
In accord with Kaldor, Corden notes that advertising may actually inhibit the 
supply of product information.  Newspapers, he notes, review books and films, but 
avoid giving like scrutiny to the ordinary commercial products that they advertise.  If 
consumers received accurate information about products from consumer services 
rather than the biased messages they get from advertisers, the public would be more 
aware of differences in price and quality.  As a result, “price and product competition 
rather than advertising would be the instrument by which industries achieved the 
degree of concentration needed to attain the benefits of mass-production” (26).  In his 
view, compared to most advertising, a publicly operated consumer advice service 
would provide more useful, less biased information and provide it at a lower cost.   
Telser (1964), on the other hand, finds some empirical support for the view 
that advertising supplies useful information about goods and services to consumers.  




finds that the benefits consumers derive from the information ads supply “outweigh 
the price-increasing effects of advertising” (349).  
Philip Nelson (1974) contends that advertising supplies valuable market 
information, as well.  He argues, in fact, that “the major features of the behavior of 
advertising can be explained by advertising’s information function” (729).  The 
character of that information depends, however, on whether “search qualities” or 
“experience qualities” predominate in the advertised good.  Search qualities, he 
writes, are qualities that consumers can evaluate before they purchase a product.  
Experience qualities, on the other hand, cannot be evaluated until after consumers 
purchase and use the product.  While the information provided by advertisements for 
search goods (i.e., those that can be characterized as having mostly search qualities) 
tends to be factual, in the case of experience goods, “the most important information 
conveyed by advertising is simply that the brand advertises” (729).   
As Nelson sees it, such indirect information is useful to consumers because, 
for one thing, it signals that the firm doing the advertising is efficient.  Efficient firms 
benefit more from demand expansion than do inefficient firms, Nelson explains.  
Since advertising increases demand, efficient firms are more likely to advertise 
heavily.  They are also more likely to lower prices and improve quality, since doing 
so may also increase demand.  Thus, Nelson concludes, intensive advertising signals 
efficiency, telling consumers where they can get a good deal, and it provides useful 
market information, whether that information is direct or indirect.  
Comanor and Wilson (1974) are less enthusiastic about advertising’s 




order to make welfare-enhancing purchases, advertising, as a source of product 
information, is far from objective.  On balance, however, the authors conclude that 
social welfare would not necessarily improve if advertising were substantially 
reduced while all else remained unchanged.  They write: “Given consumer ignorance 
and the inadequacies of investment in the provision of public information, advertising 
may represent a useful solution to the twin problems of providing information to 
consumers and financing the provision of public entertainment and information 
through the media” (248).  Still, they argue, market information could be supplied at a 
lower cost to society, improving economic efficiency and increasing social welfare.  
In their view, consumers’ demand for objective information about market goods must 
exceed their demand for advertising, which, “by its very nature represents a biased 
form of information” (247).  Given the higher demand for objectivity over puffery, 
consumer welfare would be increased if the resources now devoted to advertising 
were, instead, devoted to the supply of more objective information.   
Robert Nelson (1976) maintains that advertising supplies useful information, 
even if that information is sometimes indirect.  By his analysis, consumers behave 
rationally, ceteris paribus, when they purchase advertised goods—whether or not 
they believe that the informational content of advertising is truthful.  Nelson explains 
that since advertising campaigns are expensive, only firms that expect to be in 
business long enough to make the investment worthwhile will engage in advertising.  
In order to remain in business for an extended period, firms must offer a satisfactory 




assurance that it supplies an acceptable product, and that assurance—regardless of the 
ad’s substantive content—is sufficient to make the ad useful to consumers. 
Stigler and Becker (1977) contend that by providing product information, 
advertising increases the utility consumers obtain from a commodity.  In the authors’ 
words, a “consumer may indirectly receive utility from a market good, yet the utility 
depends not only on the quantity of the good but also the consumer’s knowledge of 
its true or alleged properties” (84).  
Lynk (1981) finds another reason to suppose that advertising provides useful 
market information.  The results of his study indicate that the information about 
goods and sellers that advertising provides does more to increase the market share of 
small brands than of large brands.  Market ignorance, he concludes, has the converse 
effect.  Thus, according to Lynk, advertising expands the range of consumers’ 
choices. 
Hoch and Ha (1986) implicitly question whether or not the information 
advertising provides actually adds to consumers’ welfare, however.  The results of 
their study indicate that consumers tend to accept advertisers claims without requiring 
truly convincing evidence.  So long as the information supplied by the ad does not 
blatantly contradict the evidence of their experience, consumers generally accept the 
ad’s representation of the product and search no farther for additional information.  
According to the authors, “if an advertiser makes a claim and the consumer discovers 
through product testing that the claim is valid, . . . the consumer may not really care 




inform consumers about a particular product, it may inhibit their gathering sufficient 
information to make an optimal choice among products. 
Arrow, Stigler, Landes, and Rosenfeld (1990), in an ad-industry sponsored 
study, argue that one of advertising’s greatest virtues is its ability to provide 
information to consumers efficiently.  As an example of that virtue, the authors cite a 
study by Ippolito and Mathios (1990) in which the researchers found that consumers 
switched to high-fiber cereals once the government lifted a ban that had prohibited 
ads from promoting the health benefits associated with eating fiber-rich foods.  
Advertising, Ippolito and Mathios report, “was an important source of information 
once the ban was lifted” (459).  Although information about the health benefits of 
high-fiber cereals had been available for several years before the government lifted 
the ad ban, that information “had limited impact on fiber cereal choices in the years 
prior to the advertising” (459).  Ippolito and Mathios conclude that advertising 
lowered “the costs of acquiring information for broad segments of the population” 
(459).   
No doubt their conclusion is correct.  Still, the Ippolito-Mathios study brings 
to mind several questions.  First, if, instead of advertisements, an unbiased source had 
promulgated information about the cereals’ benefits, would the public have been 
informed less or more efficiently?  Given that many people insist they are skeptical of 
claims made by advertisers, the resources devoted to ads touting the benefits of high-
fiber cereals to such people were probably wasted.  Government-funded public 




the same monetary and creative resources were devoted to supplying those 
announcements as were devoted to the advertisements. 
Second, while the Ippolito-Mathios study seems to show that ads lowered the 
cost of spreading welfare-enhancing information about fiber-rich cereals, in other 
instances, might ads spread welfare-reducing information just as efficiently?  In a 
nation plagued by increasing rates of obesity (and attendant diseases), do messages 
that shout “EAT JUNK FOOD!” provide welfare-enhancing information?  In the 
absence of such ads, might people eat less junk food?  Might they, to take a salient 
example, choose breakfast cereals based on cost, taste, and nutritional value rather 
than because a football star or cartoon character promotes the product?  If so, would 
they not be better off? 
Apparently, such questions were beyond the scope of the Arrow (et al.) study.  
Rather, the emphasis was on the efficiency of advertising in reducing consumer 
ignorance.  According to Arrow et al., “for many products, advertising is by far the 
most efficient way to reduce consumer ignorance. . . .  Advertising is a particularly 
efficient way of economizing on consumers’ search costs because it has aspects of a 
public good. . . .  In contrast,” the authors continue, “if each consumer has to search 
for prices (or qualities) individually, the total cost will be proportional to the number 
of consumers searching” (10-11). 
As Arrow and his colleagues see it, there are other reasons to praise 
advertising’s informational role beyond its ability to lower search costs.  For one 
thing, a single firm’s advertising can provide consumers with information that helps 




industry.  As a specific example, the authors explain that when the pioneering firm, 
Amana, introduced microwave ovens, it used advertisements to inform the public 
about the ovens’ innovative features.  Those ads helped create consumer demand for 
microwave ovens in general; subsequently, other firms captured some of that ad-
generated demand.  Thus, Amana shared the benefits of its advertising with an entire 
industry that it had founded.  Because such cases occur, the authors conclude that 
firms will sometimes “have too little incentive from the viewpoint of society to 
engage in advertising” (18-19; italics in the original). 
Arrow and his colleagues suggest that some of the ads that critics consider 
wasteful actually provide useful information to consumers.  Echoing conclusions by 
P. Nelson (1974) and R. Nelson (1976), Arrow et al. maintain that ads for experience 
goods provide quality assurance—regardless of the ads’ substance.  “It is not the 
content of the advertising message, but the fact that a seller chooses to advertise that 
provides information about products with experience qualities; i.e., the mere fact that 
the advertising exists signals that the advertiser believes his product is a ‘good buy’ 
and thus worth advertising” (15; italics in the original).  Using as an example 
introductory ads for Diet Coke that featured a number of Hollywood stars but no 
substantive information, the authors explain: “Because the advertisement is flashy, 
people are more likely to notice it and seek out the product” (17).  So even though the 
ad lacks “hard” information, it “benefits consumers by bringing to their attention the 
news that a new product they may enjoy has been introduced” (17).  Some critics of 




value and that manufacturing, promoting, storing, and distributing Diet Coke (like 
other junk-food products) wastes resources and creates pollution.   
Some individuals, particularly those with a libertarian bent, might argue, 
however, that if people want to consume junk food they should be free to consume 
junk food and that advertisers should be free to inform them about the existence, 
availability, quality, or price of junk food.  The results of experimental studies, 
including those of Hoch and Ha (1986), Hoyer and Brown (1990), and Van Osselaer 
and Alba (2000), however, indicate that advertising does more than merely inform; it 
also influences consumer choice by engendering preferences for advertised brands, 
regardless of their quality.  
Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar (1997) provide theoretical support for the 
position that the information in advertising can be influential even when the product 
being considered belongs to a category (e.g., automobiles) in which potential 
customers are expected to search for objective sources of information.  According to 
the authors, advertising can influence the order of search by developing “top-of-
mind” awareness in the public, and “being high in the order of search may well 
determine the ultimate choice” (275).  Like a number of earlier studies, the Moorthy 
study seems to indicate that advertising may tend to limit the extent to which 
consumers are actually informed.  
According to R. Nelson (2001), however, some ads clearly do inform 
consumers.  While he acknowledges the “long tradition within economics of scornful 
treatment of the practice of advertising—commonly seen as ‘manipulating’ 




advertising in newspapers and other places is useful in spreading information about 
prices and the availability of products and brands” (214).  
Bagwell (2003) also notes the usefulness of the information that ads provide.  
He suggests, in fact, that advertising is undersupplied when it provides information to 
consumers who would otherwise have been uninformed.  Since the advertiser is 
unable to appropriate the entire ad-created consumer surplus in such circumstances, 
the ad’s benefit to society exceeds its benefit to the firm; thus, the firm undersupplies 
advertising.  When two or more separate firms’ ads reach a consumer, however, 
social welfare remains unchanged if the ads merely redistribute sales among firms, 
and advertising may, in that circumstance, be oversupplied.   
Lawrence Klein summarizes the argument of those who defend advertising’s 
informative role: “Advertising fulfills the critical role of informing and educating 
consumers about the many choices available to them in the marketplace” (qtd. in 
Michigan Production Alliance 2004).  
In sum, a review of the literature reveals an obvious lack of consensus 
concerning advertising’s informative role.  One economic camp insists that 
advertising plays a vital role by providing useful market information; another argues, 
just as forcefully, that advertising misinforms far more than it informs and that it 
wastes valuable economic resources.  A third camp, meanwhile, contends that since 
some ads inform and others misinform, it is hard to determine whether the 
information advertising supplies is, on balance, truly useful to consumers; and a 
fourth maintains that people might make freer, better informed choices if they 







Pashigian and Bowen (1994) report that the information advertising provides 
has become more valuable as women have entered the workforce in greater numbers, 
and the opportunity cost of shopping has increased.  According to the authors, 
shoppers are increasingly relying on brand names in an attempt to save time and 
reduce search costs.  As Schudson (1984) explains, advertising “takes on greater 
importance—and greater value for the consumer—in a time-scarce society. . . .  
Advertisers simultaneously close the information gap by providing information and 
exploit the information gap that remains by using noninformational persuasion” 
(200).  Linder notes that “one actually wants to be influenced by advertising to get an 
instant feeling that one has a perfectly good reason to buy this or that commodity, the 
true properties of which one knows dismally little about” (qtd. in Schudson 1984, 
200-201).  Because ads offer “a perfectly good reason to buy,” many busy people 
lower search costs by purchasing advertised products.  It seems worth noting, 
however, that advertised goods typically cost more than generic ones; thus, people 
must work more (i.e., become even busier) in order to be able to buy them.   
It should be noted, in addition, that while advertising may lower opportunity 
costs associated with shopping, advertising inflicts opportunity costs associated with 
ad exposure.  Consuming the information that advertising supplies is time consuming.  




anyone’s guess, but it must be substantial: According to the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (n.d.), the average American is exposed to over 3,000 ads per day.  
Barnes (2001) discusses the opportunity cost of captured attention in this way: 
The problem . . . is a scarcity unrecognized by markets.  Though 
demand for our attention inexorably rises, our supply of attention is 
inherently limited.  It’s constrained by two factors that are 
quintessentially scarce: time and brain capacity.  There are only 
twenty-four hours in a day, and we sleep for a third of them.  Even 
when we’re awake, there’s only so much sensory input our brains can 
handle.  The more our brains are filled with commercial stimuli, the 
less room we have for love, gratitude, and contentment (114-115).  
In addition to diverting attention away from other pursuits, ads sometimes 
offend or annoy.  Exposure to a firm’s ad campaign can be a bit like listening to an 
old friend or a relative tell a story—that you had no interest in hearing the first time—
over and over again.  The amount consumers are willing to pay for devices that allow 
them to skip ads (e.g., video I-pods, digital video recorders, video cassette recorders, 
and remote controls with mute buttons) provides a partial indication of the 
opportunity cost of advertising. 
 
Advertising’s impact on product quality 
  
Some early analysts of the economics of advertising, such as Fogg-Meade 




guaranteeing effect to advertising.  Shaw, for example, contends that advertising 
provides incentives for firms to supply high-quality products and thereby establish 
solid reputations for their brands.  Knowing that the quality of an advertised brand 
will be the same every time they buy it—no matter where or from whom they buy 
it—increases consumers’ welfare, some ad proponents maintain.   
Braithwaite (1928) concurs on that specific point.  She refutes, however, the 
claim of those who argue that since “it is not worth a manufacturer’s while to stake 
his name and spend his money on advertising an article of poor quality,” advertised 
goods must be of high quality (36).  In the first place, she maintains, advertising 
sometimes creates good reputations for inferior goods.  Unless or until the public 
learns the truth, the manufacturers of these inferior goods are able to accrue 
considerable profits.  Second, in many cases, consumers can detect only gross quality 
differences; yet, the legitimacy of the argument made by advertising’s proponents 
depends on consumers being competent judges of quality over the long run.  Third, 
consumers can purchase unbranded goods at a retail outlet and depend on the 
retailer’s desire to maintain its good name as a guarantee of quality, just as ad 
defenders suggest that consumers rely on advertisers to protect their brands’ 
reputations.  Thus, Braithwaite concludes: “For these reasons, I think that reputation 
does not offer to consumers advantages commensurate with the subjective valuations 
put upon it, nor advantages sufficient to outweigh the harmful effects of 
advertisement” (37). 
Borden’s (1942) views seem to represent those Braithwaite opposes.  




goodwill for the brand.  If a firm were to sully its brand’s reputation by failing to 
maintain consistently high quality, it would deplete the goodwill that it had 
accumulated over time by advertising.  Depleting its investment in goodwill would 
represent a loss to the firm.  According to Borden, advertising also encourages firms 
to improve the quality of their products, because advertising facilitates public 
adoption of such improvements.  Simon (1970), however, is unconvinced on that 
score.  As Simon sees it, product improvement is an insufficient justification for 
many of the most intensively advertised products.  “Aspirin will remain aspirin, no 
matter how much is spent on advertising,” he writes (274).   
Corden (1961) notes that some economists argue that since a central purpose 
of advertising is to help consumers remember their products’ names, the promise of 
monetary gain motivates advertisers to maintain good reputations for their brands.  In 
order to maintain those reputations, advertisers must supply high quality products 
consistently.  As Corden sees it, however, that argument is unconvincing, since less 
expensive means can provide the same benefits.  Retailers, for example, can (and 
many do) ensure the quality and consistency of all the products they sell—regardless 
of whether the products are branded—in order to maintain their stores’ reputations.  
In addition, Corden explains, many suppliers of unbranded goods are motivated by 
the promise of monetary gain to maintain their reputations for high quality.  
In an argument similar to the one Borden advances, Philip Nelson (1974) 
maintains that advertising tends to ensure quality, because it helps consumers 
remember products by their brand names.  Once consumers try a product, he explains, 




only the name but also the quality of an advertised product at purchase-time, firms 
that offer high-quality brands have more reason to advertise than firms that supply 
low-quality merchandise. 
Analyzing the relationship between advertising and quality from a different 
perspective, Comanor and Wilson (1974) suggest that consumers tend to perceive an 
association between the two and rely on that association to minimize risk.  In the 
Comanor-Wilson view, advertising may strongly influence consumers’ selections 
among products when the consumers lack direct information about quality differences 
among alternative products.  “In choosing a well-known, highly advertised, but 
expensive brand over an unknown, little-advertised, but low-priced product,” 
Comanor and Wilson write, “the consumer may simply be doing his best to cope with 
his lack of objective information concerning relative product quality . . .” (25).  
Relying on advertising in this way “may represent a reasonable method of minimizing 
risk, [since] consumers may regard advertising as an implied warranty regarding 
product performance” (25).  
Robert Nelson (1976) suggests that widespread advertising provides some 
assurance of quality, since a firm that advertises must stay in business long enough to 
recoup its ad expenditures, and in order to do that, it must offer products of 
acceptable quality.  According to practitioners of the new institutional economics, 
Nelson (2001) explains, “even advertising that is altogether empty of content (as is 
often the case for, say, television ads) may still ‘signal’ important information” (214).  
Since advertising is expensive, a “true fly-by-night firm would never be able to afford 




expensive outlet.  It would lose its customers before it would be able to sell enough 
goods to recover such a large investment cost” (214). Thus, a firm that advertises 
must offer products that are of sufficient quality to generate repeat customers.  As 
Nelson sees it, by “throwing away” substantial sums on advertising, firms signal to 
the public that they intend to stay in business, and they assure consumers that the 
quality of their products will remain high. 
Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1976), however, find “little or no correlation” between 
advertising expenditures and quality in their sample of nationally advertised brands.  
In their view, the quality difference between highly advertised brands and their non-
advertised counterparts might be too small to justify the higher prices consumers are 
required to pay for advertised goods.  Summing up, the authors conclude that no 
sweeping generalizations should be made about the association between advertising 
expenditures and quality.  “Advertised products,” they write, “are apparently of better 
quality than non-advertised goods for some products, when rated by certain criteria, 
in some years” (46).  Overall, however, “advertising is not well correlated with 
product quality,” Rotfeld and Rotzoll report (46). 
Based on the results of his study, Schmalensee (1978) suggests a reason for 
the lack of correlation: Manufacturers of low-quality goods can increase their relative 
market shares through intensive advertising.  So long as their marginal costs are lower 
than the marginal costs of high-quality firms, they may be able to benefit 
disproportionately by expanding demand.  “For some parameter values,” he writes, 
“the lowest-quality brands have the largest equilibrium market shares, advertising 




that better brands spend more on advertising” (485).  If advertising persuades 
consumers to believe that advertising intensity directly correlates with quality, in 
other words, low-quality firms have a clear incentive to advertise heavily. 
According to Telser (1978), however, advertising does provide quality 
assurance. Since advertising can only increase a consumer’s propensity to make an 
initial purchase, repeat sales depend on the consumer’s experience with the product, 
Telser explains.  If the quality of the product is unacceptable, the first purchase will 
be the last, and the investment in advertising will be for naught.  For that reason, he 
concludes, manufacturers subject their highly advertised products to careful quality 
control. 
For the most part, more recent studies find, at best, a tenuous relationship 
between advertising and quality.  Milgrom and Roberts (1986), for example, find that 
advertising intensity may signal quality, but only when price alone fails to 
differentiate the product sufficiently.  In their words, “inclusion of the pricing 
decision upsets the intuition that a high-quality producer will have a higher marginal 
benefit from attracting an initial sale and that this would provide the basis for the 
high-quality firm’s being willing to advertise more.”  Making an argument similar to 
Schmalensee’s, Milgrom and Roberts note that since high-quality firms tend to have 
higher costs, if price and quality are held constant and advertising generates 
additional sales, the marginal benefit of those additional sales is greater for the low-
cost, low-quality firm than for the high-cost, high-quality firm.  
In a controlled experiment, Hoch and Ha (1986) examine advertising’s 




consumers’ evaluations of product quality are unaffected by advertising and depend 
solely on physical evidence only when the evidence concerning the products’ quality 
is unambiguous.  When there is any ambiguity in the physical evidence, however, 
advertising has “dramatic effects on perceptions of quality” (221). 
Carpenter (1987) reports that his study of a cross-section of 1,100 firms 
indicates that price signals quality, but advertising intensity does not.  In Carpenter’s 
words, the “net result of [the] sample is no systematic relationship between quality 
and promotional intensity” (218).  Reaching a similar conclusion, Tellis and Fornell 
(1988) find that the effect of the relationship between levels of advertising and quality 
is too small—even if positive—to provide any useful guidance for consumers.  
In an examination of consumer behavior, Hoyer and Brown (1990) find that 
test subjects tend to rely on known brands as a “choice heuristic” when asked to 
sample a set of like products and then select the one they prefer.  In a controlled 
experiment, the subjects who lacked brand awareness tended to select the highest 
quality brand after sampling the set, while the subjects who were familiar with one of 
the brands in the set tended to choose that brand—even when other sampled products 
were actually higher in quality.  The authors conclude that “the presence of a known 
brand in a choice set may have some negative effects on the consumer’s ability to 
detect differences in product quality across brands” (147).  Thus, in the Hoyer-Brown 
study, rather than providing a shortcut method for consumers to infer the actual 
quality of a product, advertising appears to interfere with consumers’ perceptions of 




Horstmann and McDonald (1994) fail to find a positive relationship between 
advertising and quality.  Observing that consumers who enjoy a product in the first 
period may find the same product unsatisfactory in the second period, the authors 
conclude that advertising provides no signal of new product quality and imperfectly 
signals the quality of established products.  Caves and Greene (1996), after 
calculating correlations between advertising expenditures, prices, and quality ratings 
(as evaluated by Consumer Reports) for almost 200 products, also conclude that 
advertising fails to serve as a signal of quality.  
Thomas, Shane, and Weigelt (1998) buck the trend of conclusions concerning 
the relationship between advertising and quality, however.  In their study of the 
automobile industry, they find that car manufacturers use intensive advertising in 
order to signal high quality.  As they explain it, since it is impossible for potential 
buyers to evaluate all aspects of an automobile’s quality before purchase, carmakers 
attempt to signal intangible or unobservable attributes by spending “large 
unrecoverable sums on advertising” (429).  According to the authors, the results of 
their study are consistent with those of signaling-game modelers, who find that 
makers of high-quality products increase their profits by, ostensibly, squandering 
money on advertising.  Rather than being squandered, however, the firm considers its 
advertising expenditure an investment that pays off in higher profits.  
Sethuraman and Cole (1999) find that among survey respondents the most 
important factor explaining the premiums that consumers are willing to pay for 




difference in quality.  Respondents believe that the quality of advertised brands is 
higher.   
Setting aside what respondents believe, Van Osselaer and Alba (2000) cast 
doubt on the actual existence of a positive association between quality and advertised 
brands.  In a series of experiments with results similar to those of Hoyer and Brown 
(1990), Van Osselaer and Alba find that once test subjects associate a product’s brand 
name with quality, they tend to inhibit additional sensory information concerning a 
product’s actual attributes and overall quality.  “Stated simply,” the authors explain, 
“brand cues may ‘block’ the learning of quality-determining attribute cues” (14).  
 Zhao’s (2000) results also cast doubt on the hypothesized relationship 
between advertising and quality.  Applying game theory, Zhao finds that the 
correlation between advertising expenditures and product quality tends to be negative.  
Compared to high-quality firms, low-quality firms generally spend more on 
advertising in the separating equilibrium.  Zhao notes, however, that in some cases 
high-quality firms use high-intensity advertising to flaunt their prosperity, hoping that 
consumers will equate firms that squander money with firms that offer high-quality 
products.  This strategy may backfire, however.  According to Zhao, if consumers 
associate high advertising levels with high quality products, there is a strong incentive 
for low-quality firms to increase their ad expenditures.  “Given that [the low-quality 
firm’s] marginal cost is lower than the high-quality firm’s, its profit margin will be 
much larger in mimicry than in revealing its true quality [and] even greater than the 




Zhao notes that a number of earlier studies interpret a firm’s willingness to 
squander money on excessive advertising as evidence of the firm’s intention to signal 
high quality.  His results indicate that “burning money” alone is an insufficient 
quality signal, however.  In his view, the wiser strategy for high-quality firms is to 
advertise modestly, at least initially, and allow the price of the good to signal its 
quality, since mimicry in advertising is a common tactic of low-quality firms. 
Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001) use a game-theoretic model to analyze the 
positive relationship between advertising and product quality that some previous 
studies report.  According to their model, advertising neither signals quality nor does 
it induce a firm that introduces a high quality product to maintain its initial quality 
level.   
Whatever the relationship between advertising and quality, The Economist 
(2001) maintains that consumers benefit by relying on advertised brand names, 
because brands lift “the curtain of anonymity” and make the advertiser “accountable 
for the quality of its product” (Bagwell 2003, 97).  So, while advertising may fail to 
provide valid signals of quality, it can still help consumers by increasing firms’ 
visibility and thus their accountability.  Robert Nelson (1976) makes a similar point. 
Reviewing the “huge theoretical literature” that focuses on the association 
between advertising and product quality, Bagwell (2003) finds some instances of a 
positive relationship and some instances of no relationship.  He concludes that the 
“main empirical implication is that no systematic correlation between advertising and 
quality is expected, since the relationship reflects market circumstances and the 




evidence reported in the studies mentioned above leans heavily toward the conclusion 
that advertising intensity fails to relate directly to product quality. 
 
An intangible asset?   
 
Related to the question of whether advertising helps firms create reputations 
for product quality is the question of whether advertising is an investment in goodwill 
for the advertiser.  A number of studies, questioning the long-term impact of 
advertising on sales and profits, ask the following question: Are advertising 
expenditures a type of capital investment?   
Some economists, such as Braithwaite (1928), note that advertising can create 
an enduring reputation for the products it promotes.  Borden (1942) suggests that 
advertising can turn a firm’s product into a widely recognized brand; and, by so 
doing, it can create a “goodwill asset” for the firm.  According to Corden (1961), 
most advertising expenditures may fairly be considered a kind of capital 
investment—an “investment in the intangible asset of goodwill” (32).  Doyle’s (1968) 
review of the literature leads him to the same conclusion. 
Stigler (1958) writes: “long continued advertising may have a cumulative 
impact” (66).  Subsequently, Palda (1964), using Koyck’s distributed-lag model, 
reports finding empirical evidence of advertising’s lagged effects—effects about 
which others, such as Stigler, had hypothesized.  
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) note the similarities between investments in 




addition, explanations for advertising’s diminished effectiveness over time.  They 
point out, for one thing, that in the wake of one firm’s advertising campaign, other 
firms advertise as well, and, by doing so, draw away customers from the first firm 
that advertised.  In addition, the authors explain that a successful advertising 
campaign may reorder individuals’ preferences in the short run, but be unable to 
affect a permanent change.  Preferences, they say, have a tendency to revert to their 
habitual state.  Nevertheless, the authors conclude that the impact of an advertising 
campaign tends to persist, but to a steadily weaker extent over time.  
As Comanor and Wilson (1974) see it, treating advertising like a capital asset 
“implicitly assumes that all the advertising by firms in the industry generates only 
positive asset values which are added up to obtain the net goodwill stock” (171); 
however, this ignores the fact that advertising by rivals—and even the advertising of 
other industries—may create “negative goodwill.”  According to the authors, “only 
the entry-barrier effects of advertising create an unambiguously positive intangible 
asset that is not at least partly offset by the activities of rivals or firms in other 
industries” (173).   
In addition, Comanor and Wilson maintain that expenditures on advertising 
and capital differ in two critical ways.  For one thing, unlike ad expenditures, many 
capital expenditures precede the onset of the revenue they generate.  The gestation lag 
that tends to characterize capital expenditures is small or nonexistent for advertising.  
For another thing, a percentage of a firm’s current advertising expenditures can be 
considered necessary for maintaining the goodwill that earlier expenditures created.  




portion of advertising devoted to maintaining goodwill should likewise be treated as a 
current expense.   
Dhalla (1978), however, argues that “advertising is essentially an investment 
and not an operating expense” (88).  Utilizing a distributed lag model to measure the 
effects of advertising at the brand and industry levels, he finds that the marginal 
advertising dollar sometimes fails to contribute to profit when only the immediate 
effects of ads are considered, but that advertising is profitable in all of the tested 
cases—so long as advertising’s carryover effects are included in the model.  Rather 
than being created as a lump sum, Dhalla concludes, sales revenue induced by 
advertising “flows like a stream over time” (88).  
Telser (1978) writes: “One cannot understand advertising without recognizing 
how it works as a capital asset” (89).  While other writers tend merely to designate 
advertising’s carryover effects (sometimes using words such as “reputation” or 
“goodwill”) as capital assets, Telser explains, in addition, how advertising capital 
accumulates.  As he sees it, advertising informs consumers about products, and 
consumers respond to ads by buying and trying some of those advertised products.  
When consumers try the products, they learn which ones satisfy their preferences; 
thus, advertising adds to their knowledge of the marketplace.  Telser concludes that 
since advertising increases knowledge, and knowledge is a form of capital, 
advertising should be considered a capital asset.    
Mundstock (1987b) reports that a “substantial body of economics literature” 
finds an economic similarity between expenditures on advertising and expenditures 




the future income of the firm, while contributing to its current earnings.  Compared to 
other depreciable assets, however, the value of advertising is intangible, Mundstock 
explains. 
Summers (1987) concurs, noting that investments in advertising differ from 
tangible investments in that “much of advertising cancels itself out, as firms compete 
with one another for a pool of customers” (15).  Despite that difference, advertising 
should be treated like a tangible, capital investment for tax purposes, according to 
Summers, because current tax policy favors intangible-ad investments over 
productivity-enhancing expenditures.  
Sid Bernstein (1988), long-time president of Advertising Age, takes up the 
issue in an editorial.  He writes: “The fact is that good advertising does have an 
extended life.  Those fantastic prices currently being offered for top-rated brands are 
ample proof of that” (16). 
According to Arrow, Stigler, Landes, and Rosenfeld (1990), however, the 
durability of advertising is very difficult to measure, because, for one thing, 
advertising is an extremely heterogeneous product, and, for another, no good, testable 
models are available to economists to help them explain the way advertising 
influences sales.  Citing a survey article by Clarke (1976), who finds that depreciation 
rates vary widely, Arrow and his colleagues suggest that the diverse results of 
empirical studies may be due to poorly designed economic models.  The empirical 
studies that find advertising is durable, the authors argue, “suffer from serious 




Nevertheless, Arrow et al. report that studies by Ayanian (1983), Bloch 
(1974), Hirschey (1982), and Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) all find that advertising 
is quite durable.  Bagwell (2003) notes that Lambin (1976), Peles (1971), and Telser 
(1962) find that the goodwill advertising creates can affect sales for years.  Based on 
their review of the empirical literature, Corrado et al. (2006) estimate that about 60 
percent of total advertising expenditures pay for ads that have long-lasting effects and 
that the advertising capital that those ads create depreciates about 60 percent 
annually.  Similarly, Kamber (2002) finds that although ad expenditures made in one 
year (in the case under study, a recessionary year) have an impact on sales in 
subsequent years, the impact is greatest in the initial year.   
On the other hand, Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) find that advertising’s effects 
are short-lived.  Likewise, Bagwell (2003) reports that Leone (1995), Boyd and 
Seldon (1990), Seldon and Doroodian (1989), Ashley, Granger and Schmalensee 
(1980), and Clarke (1976) all conclude that advertising’s impact on sales depreciates, 
to a great extent, within a year.  For his own part, Bagwell (2003) notes that past 
advertising can create ‘goodwill” that influences future sales.  While often brief, 
advertising’s goodwill effect can vary in length.  Thus, in Bagwell’s view, untangling 
the impact of current advertising expenditures from past expenditures can be 
problematic. 
The Congressional Budget Office (1997) seems to find untangling the impact 
problematic for much the same reason.  Although the CBO recognizes that 
advertising can provide income beyond the current year by creating goodwill, it notes 




To reduce the confusion, several studies attempt to estimate the length of 
advertising’s carry-over effect.  Baye, Jansen, and Lee (1992), for example, find that 
ads presented five years earlier have approximately one-sixth the positive impact of 
current ads on current consumption.  Looking at a three-year time span, Lodish et al. 
(1995) find, in a cross-sectional study, that second- and third-year sales double the 
impact of the first-year sales of a successful campaign.  According to the authors, if 
the ad campaign fails during its first year, however, its impact on future sales is 
negligible.  Seldon and Jung (1995) find “that advertising effects linger for nine 
years” (209).  At the microeconomic level, however, the authors suggest that 
advertising’s impact depreciates quite rapidly, due to counter-advertising by 
competitors.   Also, in a recent study of the carry-over effect, Corrado, Sichel, and 
Hulten (2006) estimate that the depreciation rate for advertising capital is 
approximately sixty percent per year. 
In sum, most economists agree that advertising creates intangible capital.  
Opinions vary over the length of advertising’s goodwill effect, however.  As Chapter 
9 reveals, even more contentious is the suggestion of some economists and 
policymakers that ad capital should be taxed just as other forms of capital are taxed.   
 
Facilitating or impeding entry? 
 
According to Taylor and Weiserbs (1972), there is a general consensus among 
economists that advertising is an important barrier to entry for new firms, and, indeed, 




deterrent effect.  Robinson (1933), for example, argues that the consequences of 
advertising are strongly anti-competitive, due to its tendency to deter entry.  
According to Kaldor (1950-1951), advertising raises barriers to entry that lead to 
greater concentration in industry.  Analyzing cross-sectional data, Bain (1956) finds 
that product differentiation creates barriers to entry and that advertising differentiates 
products by engendering consumer fidelity to the advertised brand.  Still, he allows, 
other factors may present greater obstacles to entry than those that advertising erects. 
Braithwaite (1928) suggests that incumbent firms develop reputations through 
their advertisements that act as entry barriers for potential market participants.  In her 
view, when incumbent firms initially entered the market, they merely needed to create 
reputations for their products.  Aspiring firms, on the other hand, are required not 
only to create reputations but also to draw customers away from the well-known, 
incumbent firm.  That extra requirement imposes an additional barrier for firms 
endeavoring to enter the market. 
Although the early literature seems to indicate a general agreement among 
economists that advertising erects barriers to entry, some economists, primarily 
members of the Chicago School, began to present contradictory evidence in the 
1960s, which frayed that early consensus.   According to their studies, rather than 
restricting entry, advertising sometimes facilitates it by enabling new firms to 
disseminate information about the existence, quality, and price of their products.  
Telser (1964), for one, expounds that view, concluding that advertising frequently 
provides a means of entry.  While the Economists Advisory Group (1967) offers no 




nevertheless reports finding no decisive evidence that advertising creates barriers to 
new firms aspiring to enter a market.  In accord with the Economists Advisory Group, 
Schmalensee (1972) reports finding no evidence for the assertion that the advertising 
expenditures of some firms create entry barriers for others.  
Doyle (1968) concludes that while advertising does raise entry barriers in 
some industries it would be a mistake to assume that it does so across the board.  
Instead, due to the heterogeneity of advertising, the issue should, in his view, be 
considered “on an industry-by-industry basis rather than by searching for global 
solutions” (596). 
Lambin (1976) harks back to Braithwaite, however, explaining that firms 
create goodwill by advertising and that the goodwill their ads create may lead to 
purchasing inertia in consumers.  Since new firms must somehow overcome 
consumer inertia, advertising may present a barrier to market entry.  According to 
Lambin, his empirical results “clearly show that a substantial degree of inertia exists 
in the sample [advertising-intensive] markets,” and that this “is prima facie evidence 
that advertising helps erect entry barriers” (115).  Nevertheless, after finding no 
statistical relationship between advertising intensity and brand inertia, Lambin 
attributes purchasing inertia to some other cause; he concludes, in fact, that 
advertising is positively related to market-share instability.  As Lambin sees it, this 
result offers empirical support to those economists who claim that advertising is a 
destabilizing force, one that motivates consumers to overcome their inertia and try 




Taking a step back, Comanor and Wilson (1974) explain that advertising 
creates no barriers to entry unless potential entrants face higher advertising 
expenditures to secure a place in the market than incumbent firms initially 
encountered.  They note, however, that aspiring entrants often do find that they must 
exceed the advertising expenditures of established firms in order to attract customers.  
For one thing, potential entrants may encounter barriers to entry if economies of scale 
apply to established-firms’ advertising.  As the authors explain, such economies may 
occur if a firm’s ads become increasingly effective as their expenditures go up or if 
the media carrying the firm’s ads give quantity discounts.  Furthermore, the entrant 
may encounter a barrier if it is required to pay more to finance its advertising than the 
already established firm has to pay.  Such may be the case, according to the authors, 
because entrenched firms typically have “lower average costs of capital than new 
entrants to a market” (61).  In some cases, an incumbent will engage in extremely 
intense advertising to outspend the potential entrant, drown out its commercial 
messages, and raise a high barrier to entry.  Comanor and Wilson refer to this as the 
“noise effect.”  (Hilke and Nelson, in a 1984 study, offer evidence that Maxwell 
House attempted to deter Folger’s entry into the coffee market by utilizing this 
strategy.)   Overall, Comanor and Wilson argue that their study of cross-sectional data 
provides empirical support for the conclusion “that heavy advertising creates a 
significant barrier to new competition in a number of important industries” (245). 
Smiley (1988) and Bunch and Smiley (1992) also find evidence of entry 
barriers due to advertising.  In both studies, the authors conclude that firms use 




entrance of new firms.  In a related finding, Bagwell and Ramey (1988) report that 
low-cost incumbents may deter entry and reap higher profits by over-investing in 
advertising.     
Mundstock describes a different sort of barrier to entry associated with 
advertising.  According to Mundstock (2007, personal correspondence), substantial 
portions “of most new businesses’ start-up expenditures” are devoted to advertising; 
however, “Section 195 of the [U.S. Tax] Code disallows the deduction of ‘start-up 
expenditures.’  Thus, while not aimed at advertising, an important effect of Section 
195 is to disallow advertising deductions of new firms.”  In Mundstock’s (1987b) 
view, since incumbent firms can deduct advertising expenditures from their income 
taxes, while start-up firms cannot, “new businesses bear an extra tax burden 
competing with established firms” (1; italics in the original).  This additional expense 
for new businesses represents a barrier to entry.   
Metwally and Tamaschke (1981) offer an indirect reason to explain why 
advertising may sometimes facilitate market entry.  As they see it, advertising 
increases consumption, and the higher, ad-induced level of consumption may signal 
the existence of an open, easy-to-enter market environment to potential entrants.  
In studies of specific markets, Eckard (1991) (cigarettes) and Sass and 
Saurman (1995) (beer) find that restrictions on advertising are associated with entry 
barriers or market-share stability.  In both cases, however, the products seem to fall 
into a special class; i.e., products that can be addictive.  With other products, a major 
goal of advertising is to establish brand loyalty so that people will stick with the 




addictive products, however, people tend to be particularly brand loyal (Shum 2004).  
Thus, a major goal of cigarette advertising, according to the tobacco industry, is to 
persuade users of rivals’ products to switch brands (Joossens 2000).  While that goal 
may be common to most advertising, it takes on particular importance for goods like 
cigarettes and alcohol (Casswell and Zhang 1998; Myers and Roberts 1991).  When 
products are, or can be, addictive, people who use them tend to be accustomed to 
receiving their “fix” in a certain package, with a particular taste, look, feel, etc.  For 
that reason, users of addictive products tend to resist ads for other brands, and 
advertisers must overcome their resistance through persuasion.  Tareyton cigarettes 
capitalized on that resistance, from 1963 through 1981, with the highly successful 
“I’d rather fight than switch!” campaign.  By implying that Tareytons were so 
satisfying that people who tried them once would never consider switching to another 
brand, the slogan motivated smokers of other brands to switch to Tareytons.  At the 
same time, it appealed to the brand loyalty of the existing pool of Tareyton smokers.   
In a study of beer-industry advertising, Seldon, Jewell, and O’Brien (2000) 
suggest that intense advertising fails to explain barriers to entry.  Kadiyali (1996), on 
the other hand, finds that Kodak used high-intensity advertising and limit pricing to 
maintain entry barriers (and a monopoly position) for many years in the photographic 
film industry. 
Summing up the relevant literature, Bagwell (2003) writes: “In total, the direct 
evidence of the association between advertising and entry is somewhat mixed.  
Advertising may be used to raise the cost of entry, but it also may be the means of 




subtle and seems to vary across industries” (47).  In addition, the author notes, 
endogeneity and measurement problems make drawing broad inferences about the 
relationship between advertising and entry problematic in any case.   Nevertheless, 
the bulk of the studies seem to indicate that advertising tends to erect barriers to entry 
in at least some industries.  
 
Advertising and market power 
 
A common area of interest among students of the economics of advertising 
concerns the extent of an association between market power and advertising.   
In the minds of many of the early students, the association seems to be 
confirmed.  Robinson (1933), for example, maintains that advertising generates and 
sustains market power.  In its absence, she suggests, price competition would provide 
market discipline. Bain (1956) finds that advertising can be “a source of high and 
very high barriers” (282), which can enable established advertisers to earn monopoly 
profits.  For the same reason, Nicholls (1951) finds that advertising expenditures are 
responsible for high aggregate profits for incumbent firms (in the American cigarette 
industry). 
Telser (1964) suggests two reasons to suspect a relationship between 
advertising and market power.  First, since firms that do have some monopoly power 
can rely on getting most of the ad-stimulated sales, they are more likely to advertise 
than firms without it.  Second, firms can gain a measure of market power by 




the results of his empirical study provide no support for the charge that advertising is 
anti-competitive.  If “advertising succeeds in sheltering a firm’s products from 
competitive inroads,” Telser reasons, “this should be reflected in more stable market 
shares of the more advertised goods” (547).  The results of his study indicate that the 
opposite is true. 
Nevertheless, Simon (1970) reports that the literature generally concludes that 
advertising, combined with industry concentration, results in market power and 
above-average profits.  Economists generally regard market power as undesirable, 
Simon explains, because firms that have it: (1) tend to earn high profits by charging 
high prices; (2) may be less motivated to innovate and improve efficiency; and (3) 
may have disproportionate social power.  By Simon’s analysis, however, the available 
data fail to indicate whether the elimination of advertising would result in more or 
less market power. “Every sort of effect would probably appear in some industry,” he 
writes. 
Doyle (1968) expresses some uncertainty about the association between 
advertising and market power, as well, noting that firms are often unable to estimate 
the required level of advertising expenditures to maximize profits over the long-term, 
due to their inability to isolate advertising’s impact on profits from the “welter of 
other factors” that influence sales and profits (595).  
For many of the more recent students of the economics of advertising, a 
relationship between advertising and market power is assumed, but the direction of 
causality is ambiguous.  Schmalensee (1972), for example, considers advertising to be 




advertising—rather than the other way around—if firms devote part of their profits to 
advertising.  Thus, treating advertising as if it were an independent variable can lead 
to spurious results, Schmalensee explains.  
Comanor and Wilson (1974) attempt to respond to the concern about 
endogeneity (expressed by Schmalensee, among others) by extending their analysis to 
control for a number of factors.  In the authors’ view, the hypothesis that firms in ad-
intensive industries have the ability to increase price-cost margins and, thereby, reap 
greater profits than firms in less ad-dependent industries is consistent with the 
empirical evidence.  The results of their research, based on cross-sectional data, 
indicate the existence of an association between advertising and high profits in some 
industries.  In their view, the profit increase is due to advertising’s ability to exploit 
the gains of product differentiation effectively.  “Our primary finding,” the authors 
write, “is that heavy advertising leads to increased profits” (130).  
Several economic inefficiencies inhere to ad-induced market power, Comanor 
and Wilson note.  One is the technical inefficiency that occurs when actual average 
costs exceed minimal average costs; the second is the dead-weight loss that arises 
when prices are higher than marginal costs; the third derives from the income that 
consumers transfer to the firms that have market power.   Over all, the authors note, 
advertising is likely to induce inefficiencies because it leads to resources being 
allocated in a manner other than in accordance with consumer preferences.  The 
authors “conclude that the costs of market power in the consumer goods industries are 
significant and that advertising itself directly and indirectly accounts for a substantial 




Philip Nelson (1974) seems to undermine the notion that advertising leads to 
market power and high profits, however.  In his view, the firms that advertise most 
intensively tend to be the ones that are most efficient.  Thus, their efficiency—not 
their advertising—explains their high profits. 
More recent studies, looking merely at the extent of the association between 
advertising and market power, and not at causation, offer inconsistent results. 
Erickson and Jacobson (1992), for example, investigating whether advertising enables 
firms to reap “supranormal” profits, report finding substantially smaller stock market 
and accounting returns in their study than had been found by earlier researchers. 
In a study conducted for the Association of National Advertisers, the New 
England Consulting Group (Levin 1993) finds that although advertising increases 
firms’ sales reliably, it fails to boost firms’ profits consistently.  Examining same-year 
as well as ten-year effects, the authors report finding a strong relationship between 
five of the ten advertised brands they tested and increasing profits, however.  
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) report that their model predicts that intensive 
advertising by established firms is related to reduced entry rates and high profitability 
levels.  Rather than explaining the profits as being the result of “advertising-induced 
brand loyalty” (as some economists have), the authors suggest, in accord with Philip 
Nelson, that incumbent firms advertise more and are more profitable because they are 
more efficient.  
Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001), on the other hand, find that firms create 
brand loyalty through persuasive advertising, which, along with vertical 




products” (3).  Once they have created that distance, according to the authors, firms 
are able to dampen price competition and increase market power.   
In a study of the impact of advertising across four media (newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television), however, Notta and Oustapassidis (2001) find that 
television is the only medium that significantly increases profitability.  In addition, 
the authors note that the profit increases associated with television occur only in the 
case of high-intensity, consumer-goods advertising.   Andras and Srinivasan (2003) 
find, meanwhile, that high advertising intensity is both positively and significantly 
associated with the profit margins of consumer product organizations.  
Summarizing the empirical literature, Bagwell (2003) finds evidence of a 
positive association between advertising and profitability for producers of consumer 
goods.  The strongest association, he notes, is for convenience items.  For producer 
goods, the relationship between advertising and profitability is positive, but less 
strong.  For retailers, the association between advertising and profitability seems to 
break down, however.  In fact, some studies predict an inverse relationship between 
retailers’ profit margins and manufacturers’ advertising intensity.  According to 
Bagwell, this negative relationship may be explained, in part, by a temptation among 
manufacturers to raise the wholesale price of heavily advertised products or by the 
practice among some retailers of using heavily advertised products as loss leaders.  
In sum, although the extent (and even the existence) of an association between 
advertising and profitability seems to depend on a number of factors, the bulk of the 






Advertising’s impact on prices 
 
“Does advertising raise or lower prices?” is a question that many economists 
attempt to answer.  Braithwaite (1928), one of the first to address the question, 
concludes that advertising tends to raise prices, because it artificially differentiates 
products and concentrates markets.   
Chamberlin (1933), another early student of the economics of advertising, 
explains that advertising may lead to either higher or lower prices.  Since producing 
and disseminating advertisements adds to the firm’s costs, firms often raise the prices 
of their advertised products to recoup those costs.  Advertising can lead to lower 
prices, however, if it expands demand for a firm’s goods to such an extent that it 
enables the firm to attain economies of scale.  If that occurs, the firm’s costs of 
production or distribution may fall more than advertising raises them, and the firm 
may offer lower prices.   
According to Chamberlin, advertising can also raise or lower prices by 
affecting the elasticity of demand for a firm’s output.  When persuasive advertising 
creates wants and engenders brand loyalty, the absolute value of the elasticity of 
demand for the advertised good tends to fall, and the price of the good tends to rise.  
The converse impact on elasticity and price tends to occur when ads provide factual 
market information that enables consumers to compare competing products.  
Informational advertising about a firm’s output, in other words, tends to increase the 




concludes: “The effect of advertising in any particular case depends upon the facts of 
the case” (167).   
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) confirm Chamberlin’s conclusion.  Their formal 
theory suggests that advertising’s price impact depends on the extent to which 
advertising affects both economies of scale and elasticity of demand. 
Taking a different approach, Borden (1942) examines whether advertising 
frees firms from engaging in price competition.  He concludes that strong forces 
within the economic structure “counterbalance any tendency for competition to turn 
solely to non-price forms and for sellers to be free from price competition” (862).  
Nevertheless, firms that are able to differentiate their products through advertising 
sometimes choose that course rather than compete by lowering prices.  In addition, 
manufacturers of many advertised brands assume they can maintain steady prices 
during economic downturns without losing sales because their ads have made demand 
for their products relatively inelastic.  Ultimately, such inconsistent results lead 
Borden to conclude that advertising’s impact on price varies from industry to industry 
and brand to brand. 
According to Kaldor (1950-1951), advertising can affect prices directly and 
indirectly.  The direct effect is to raise prices, because advertising is priced jointly 
along with the product.  Since no separate market for advertising exists, consumers 
must buy the product’s ad, if they buy the product.  When advertising concentrates 
markets, it can have the indirect effect of raising or lowering prices.  It tends to raise 




economies of scale result from the industrial concentration, however, surviving firms 
have the option of passing along the savings to their customers.   
Corden (1961) seems to side with advertising’s critics in doubting that 
advertising-induced concentration of industries leads to lower prices in the final 
analysis.  According to Corden, the costs of advertising can overwhelm the economy-
of-scale savings, in which case, as far as consumers are concerned, ad-induced 
industrial concentration provides no benefit.  As Corden sees it, some firms 
intentionally use advertising to attain market security and set their prices higher.  
Corden thus concludes that, on balance, advertising tends to raise prices.   
In separate studies using cross-sectional data, Bain (1956) and Comanor and 
Wilson (1974) determine that advertising engenders brand loyalty, which allows 
advertisers to charge high prices without encouraging new firms to enter.  
Agreeing with ad critics, the Economists Advisory Group (1967) concludes 
that prices of advertised products tend, in general, to be higher, even though 
competition with unadvertised products provides some market discipline.  Doyle 
(1968) goes further, suggesting that advertising can raise prices so much it can 
actually spur inflation. 
The view that advertising raises prices is far from universal, however.  
According to Ozga (1960), Stigler (1961), and P. Nelson (1974), high prices are the 
result of consumer ignorance.  By providing market information, advertising 
enhances market performance and, in fact, lowers prices. 
Supporters of advertising frequently reference a study by Benham (1972) as 




examines the impact of advertising on the price of eyeglasses.  He finds that eyeglass 
prices are lower in states that allow eyeglass advertising than in those that do not.  
According to Benham, although eyeglass prices are lowest in states that allow price 
advertising, they are lower even in states that allow only non-price advertising than in 
states that allow no advertising at all.  Benham concludes that his results “are 
consistent with the hypothesis that, in the market examined, advertising improves 
consumers’ knowledge and that the benefits derived from this knowledge outweigh 
the price-increasing effects of advertising” (349). 
Although Benham recognizes that prices of eyeglasses might be a special 
case, some advocates for advertising apply his results to advertising in general.  The 
validity of doing so seems dubious, however.  For one thing, the population of 
eyeglass wearers varies little with eyeglass price.  As Benham notes, demand for 
eyeglasses is inelastic.  Thus, when optometrists advertise, the size of the eyeglass 
market remains relatively stable, and those who advertise tend to steal business from 
those who do not.  Given this business-stealing externality, non-advertising 
optometrists might lower their prices in order to retain patients and protect their 
market shares. 
In addition, prior to the onset of eyeglass advertising, patients probably 
selected optometrists, as they did doctors and dentists, on the basis of reputation, 
proximity, or both.  When patients focused on the optometrist, he or she was, in 
effect, a monopoly provider of a good with inelastic demand.  Since quality of service 
is difficult to convey through advertising, optometrists’ ads tended (then, as they do 




consumer’s focus from the service (optometry) to the product (eyeglasses), 
optometric services became more homogeneous.  Less central themselves, 
optometrists differentiated their practices from those of their rivals by advertising, 
lowering their prices, or both.  
Do the results of studies of advertising’s impact on the prices of eyeglasses 
apply to its impact on the prices of other goods?  That hardly seems likely.  As the 
above discussion attempts to show, eyeglasses are probably a special case.  The 
results may not even apply to the eyeglass industry any longer, since the price-
lowering effect may have been associated with the impact of the introduction of 
advertising on the prices of eyeglasses.  Given that the introduction of eyeglass 
advertising took place decades ago, the price-lowering effect may have long since 
dissipated.  
Nevertheless, a number of studies, other than Benham’s, find that advertising 
tends to lower prices.  Lambin (1976), for example, suggests that firms may respond 
to competitors’ “advertising assaults” by adjusting their own advertising, product 
quality, or price.  “Thus,” he concludes, “advertising may in some cases stimulate, 
rather than inhibit, price and product quality competition” (163). 
Stigler and Becker (1977) are confident that advertising lowers perceived 
prices.  As advertising intensity increases, the authors explain, “the household is 
made to believe—correctly or incorrectly—that it gets a greater output of the 
commodity from a given input of the advertised product” (84).  Thus a particular 
good at a given price seems to be a better deal if it is advertised than it would seem to 




words, because the advertisement persuades the consumer that the good delivers 
greater output, whether or not it truly does.  As Stigler and Becker see it, advertising 
seems to lower the prices of goods from the consumers’ standpoint, because 
consumers believe that they get more for their money when they buy an advertised 
product. 
According to Carpenter (1987), not only can advertising lower perceived 
prices, it can also lower actual prices.  Advertised products, he finds, tend to have low 
price-cost margins, since advertisers engage in intense price competition.  
Arrow, Stigler, Landes, and Rosenfeld (1990) maintain that advertising lowers 
prices, as well.  In their ad-industry-commissioned study, the economists discuss a 
1974 experiment in which consumers in one city—but not in a second—received 
information (in publications or in the mail) about food prices.  During the 
experimental period, food prices were lower in the informed city than they were in 
the uninformed city.  After the experiment ended, the prices in the informed city 
returned to their previous, pre-experiment levels.  According to Arrow et al., this 
study provides evidence that advertising tends to lower prices.  Given the seemingly 
artificial nature of the experiment, the authors’ conclusion seems debatable, however. 
Bagwell (2003) notes that because advertising is an alternative source of pre-
purchase information to point-of-sale services, high-intensity brand advertising by 
manufacturers allows retail stores to cut back on sales personnel.  High-intensity 
advertising also stimulates high-level demand, which encourages retail firms to invest 




of the capital investments and personnel reductions, the firm’s costs tend to fall, and 
the resulting savings can be passed on to consumers.   
Reviewing the body of literature, Bagwell (2003) notes that a number of 
empirical studies (e.g., Borden 1942; Telser 1964; Backman 1967; Nickell and 
Metcalf 1978; Scherer and Ross 1990; and Tremblay and Tremblay 1995) find that 
ads persuade consumers to pay more for advertised brands than for similar, but less-
advertised goods.  According to Bagwell, however, consumers’ willingness to pay 
more for advertised brands might be explained not by the ad’s ability to persuade 
consumers falsely of the product’s superiority but by the higher quality or the 
assumed prestige that inheres to the product. 
Some studies, Bagwell notes, find that heavily advertised brands actually sell 
for less in retail markets than other, less-advertised goods.  Bagwell suggests that in 
such cases, the brands might be serving as loss leaders.  Since certain brands are 
highly identifiable, they can operate as benchmarks for consumers to compare prices 
across retailers.  When the prices of these highly advertised brands are low, 
consumers assume, rightly or wrongly, that other prices will be low, as well.  Thus, 
consumers pay less for the loss leaders, but whether they actually save money on their 
overall purchases is an open question. 
In sum, the studies fail to indicate definitively whether advertising raises or 
lowers prices.  As with many other questions about the economic impact of 






Impact on the elasticity of demand for an advertised product   
 
Does advertising increase or decrease the elasticity of demand for an 
advertised product?  The answer to that question is: It depends.  Nerlove and Arrow 
(1962) find that advertising can increase elasticity by broadening the market for a 
product, or it can reduce elasticity by engendering brand loyalty.  Chamberlin (1933) 
finds that advertising can increase or decrease the elasticity of demand for a product, 
as well.   
In a study of short- and long-term advertising effectiveness, involving 128 
econometric models, Assmus, Farley, and Lehmann (1984) find that the elasticity of 
demand for advertised goods varies across settings and products.  Specifically, the 
authors find that elasticities are lower in the United States than they are in Europe and 
that elasticities are higher for advertised foods than for other products.  In addition, 
they note that when models incorporate the carryover (i.e., goodwill) effects of ads, 
short-term elasticities are significantly lower than when carryover effects are ignored; 
furthermore, long-term elasticities are even lower than short-term elasticities when 
carryover effects are incorporated.   
Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985) also find that advertising tends to reduce the 
elasticity of demand for advertised products.  Analyzing panel data derived from 
consumer diaries, the researchers conclude that as advertising increases, demand for 
the brands that the subject families purchase regularly becomes less elastic.  
Evaluating the relevant literature, Bagwell (2003) explains that although some 
studies find a relationship between advertising and inelastic demand, the assumption 




advertisers may be “attracted to markets in which consumers are poorly informed” or 
may choose to “operate in markets with inelastic demands”  (26). 
 
Comparing average price elasticity to average advertising elasticity 
 
In addition to studies that examine advertising’s impact on the elasticity of 
demand for a product, some studies consider whether demand is more responsive to 
changes in price or changes in advertising.  Such studies compare average price 
elasticity to average advertising elasticity (defined by Broadbent (1989) “as the 
percent increase in sales when advertising is increased by 1 percent”). 
Tellis (1988b), for example, considers whether markets are more responsive to 
changes in advertising intensity or to changes in price using estimates of average 
elasticity as his basis of comparison.  In a meta-analysis of 367 econometric models, 
he finds an average price-elasticity estimate of -1.76.  Comparing that figure to 0.22, 
an estimate of the average advertising elasticity by Assmus, Farley, and Lehmann 
(1984), Tellis concludes that the benefit of price cuts to consumers exceeds the 
benefit of additional advertising and that markets are less responsive to changes in 
advertising intensity than to changes in price. 
Broadbent (1989) agrees with Tellis that the average advertising elasticity 
(0.22) is much lower in absolute value than the average price elasticity (-1.76).  In his 
view, however, increasing the intensity of advertising sometimes contributes more to 
increasing demand than does lowering the price.  While cutting prices increases sales 




the intensity of advertising is more effective than cutting prices.  Thus, Broadbent 
implies agreement with Chamberlin, Nerlove and Arrow, Assmus et al., 
Krishnamurthi and Raj, among others, who find that advertising may reduce the 
elasticity of demand for the particular, advertised product.   
 
Advertising and industrial concentration 
 
According to Corden (1961), the essential, economic case made by 
advertising’s early proponents is that advertising concentrates industries and thereby 
helps to bring about the benefits associated with mass production and distribution. 
Accepting the common view as axiomatic, Kaldor (1950-1951) explains why 
the industry-concentration process set in motion by advertising tends to lead to an 
oligopolistic, rather than a monopolistic, market structure.  According to Kaldor, 
when the ad investments of one firm are greater than those of its competitors, “the 
‘pulling power’ of the larger expenditure must overshadow the smaller ones” (13).  
Consequently, the big ad-spenders’ sales forge ahead, while the smaller advertisers’ 
sales lag behind.  In markets that had previously been constituted by firms of 
approximately the same size, the new market leaders “are bound to increase their 
lead, as the additional sales enable them to increase their outlay still further” (13).  
The market structure becomes more concentrated, as large advertisers increasingly 
dominate the industry.  At some point, however, “the market becomes ‘saturated’ 
with advertising” (14).  When additional outlays yield only rapidly diminishing 




rivals by increasing their ad expenditures.  “Hence,” Kaldor explains, “the ultimate 
effect of this concentration process is much more likely to be some form of 
‘oligopoly’ . . . than monopoly” (14).  
In an explication much like Kaldor’s, Corden (1961) describes advertising’s 
role in structuring markets as a transformational process that begins with a 
competitive market, proceeds through a period of ad-induced industrial concentration, 
and culminates in an oligopolistic market structure.  He suggests that if, say, fifty 
firms in an industry all initially advertise, the ones that advertise more intensively or 
more effectively increase their market-share.  As these firms expand, “they find that 
their costs fall, enabling them to expand even further either by lowering prices or, 
more likely, by advertising even more” (16).  Since, in Corden’s view, advertising 
yields its own economies of scale, the more these market leaders advertise, the more 
effective their advertising becomes.  Over time, more and more of the firms in the 
original group of fifty drop out of the market, as they find that they are unable to 
compete with their big-ad-spending rivals.  “The process will go on,” Corden writes, 
“until there are a few large firms left, competing against each other not by price cuts 
but by advertising” (16). 
Other studies offer a line of conclusions that seems to zigzag across time.  
Examining twenty industries, Bain (1956) finds that advertising tends to concentrate 
industries indirectly by instilling brand loyalty.  Telser (1964) finds a weak, 
unimpressive relationship between advertising and concentration in a study involving 
forty-two groups of consumer products.  The Economists Advisory Group (1967) fails 




reviewing the relevant literature, Doyle (1968) goes one way and then turns back—
first finding that some studies confirm a positive relationship in certain industries 
between advertising and oligopoly and then noting that evidence of an association 
between advertising and concentration seems to be lacking for industries, overall.  
Simon (1970) simply says that evidence of stable or decreasing concentration among 
brands “suggests that whether or not advertising has an important role in increasing 
concentration is itself not too important a question” (235).   
Comanor and Wilson (1974) consider advertising’s impact on concentration 
and reach a surprising conclusion.  While some of the early students of the economics 
of advertising (e.g., Pigou, 1932; Chamberlin, 1933) express doubts about the 
efficacy—even the reasonableness—of advertising homogeneous products (as noted 
above), Comanor and Wilson explain that advertising may be used in order to 
concentrate such markets.  They begin by positing that advertising exhibits some of 
the attributes of a public good, in that one firm’s advertising may help or hurt the 
sales of its competitors.  Whether it helps or hurts depends, primarily, on whether the 
goods being advertised are homogeneous or heterogeneous.  In the case of 
homogeneous products, one firm’s advertising creates positive externalities for the 
advertisers’ competitors, and the entire industry benefits from the ads of any single 
supplier.  Since the advertiser reaps only a small portion of the derived benefit, profit-
seeking suppliers of homogeneous goods should be expected to advertise little, if at 
all.  However, if certain firms within an industry find ways to concentrate the 
market—by branding their goods and advertising, for instance—the firms that capture 




and Wilson conclude, “for relatively homogeneous products, we should expect a 
positive relation between concentration and the level of advertising” (144).  This 
implies that a single firm (or small group of firms) can use advertising to concentrate 
and thereby dominate a homogenous market.  Take, for example, Sunkist Oranges, 
Morton’s Salt, or C&H Sugar.  These firms distinguish products—which are 
essentially identical to those of their competitors—by advertising, and the benefit 
derived from their ads accrues nearly exclusively to the firms themselves, rather than 
to the industries of which they are a part.  As a result of their advertising, the firms 
come to dominate their industries, and their respective markets become more highly 
concentrated.   
In the case of multi-firm, heterogeneous-product markets, the benefits of 
advertising tend to accrue to the advertiser alone.  As Comanor and Wilson explain, 
the firm ignores the negative (business-stealing) externalities that inhere to its 
advertising when it determines the level of its ad expenditures.  In the face of 
increasing market concentration, however, a firm may or may not increase its 
advertising.  Some factors tend to discourage advertising.  When a market is 
concentrated to the point of oligopoly, for instance, a firm’s anticipation of how its 
competitors will react if it increases its advertising may deter it from making 
additional advertising expenditures.  If, on the other hand, greater concentration in a 
market leads to higher price-cost margins, then firms will tend to engage in higher 
levels of advertising.  In the case of oligopolies, where price competition is 
problematic, firms may depend on advertising as their primary arena for combat.  




might lead to increased advertising activities as rivals respond competitively to each 
other’s advertising” (145).  Past that point—that is, the point at which the market 
concentrates into a completely collusive oligopoly or into an absolute monopoly—
advertising expenditures should decline.  Thus, the authors’ results indicate that 
ambiguity characterizes the overall relationship between concentration and 
advertising.  
Some later studies find instances of a predictable relationship between 
advertising and concentration.  Metwally and Tamaschke (1981), for example, report 
that their “simultaneous-equation aggregate and disaggregate analyses suggest that 
advertising intensity is an important determinant of market concentration and vice 
versa” (283).  And Bagwell and Ramey’s (1994) retail-market model indicates that 
advertising tends to produce a concentrated structure.  
In sum, many economists argue that advertising tends to concentrate markets; 
some, however, maintain that it does not.  Economists in the latter camp (e.g., Telser, 
1964) suggest that advertising allows prospective market entrants to inform the public 
of their existence, which facilitates entry and promotes market expansion.  Many of 
the advocates of the opposing view contend, however, that advertising tends to 
concentrate markets by artificially differentiating the advertiser’s product from those 
of other firms in the industry.  Reviewing the economic literature overall, Bagwell 
(2003) concludes that the “relationship between advertising and concentration is 






Impact on economies of scale 
 
By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the Industrial Revolution well in 
its stride, significant technological innovations in communications and transportation 
inspired manufacturers to develop more efficient methods for the production and 
distribution of their goods.  Enabled by these innovations, many manufacturers 
attained economies of scale and recognized that they could boost their profits—if they 
could stimulate demand sufficiently to match buyers to their increased output.  
Subsequently, many firms adopted advertising as a demand-stimulating tool (Cross 
2000; Schudson 1984).   
Many of the early observers of advertising’s economic impact assumed that 
advertising leads to economies of scale in production.  As Pigou (1932), for example, 
explains, “some advertisement serves to develop an entirely new set of wants on the 
part of consumers,” and the development of those wants “on a large scale at the same 
time enables the commodity that satisfies them to be produced on a large scale and, 
therefore, cheaply” (n.p.).  Braithwaite (1928) concurs.  She writes: “In practice it 
appears that considerable price reductions have in many cases resulted from the 
increased output which advertisement has made possible.  Indeed it is probably true to 
say that advertisement has played a great part in facilitating . . . economies of 
standardization and mass production” (27).  In concert with Pigou and Braithwaite, 
Chamberlin (1933) maintains that advertising enables firms to attain economies of 
scale in production due to its positive impact on demand.   
Some economists examining the evidence dispute the assumed existence of a 




(1942), for example, argues that establishing a causal link between advertising and 
reduced costs of production is impossible.  In his view, although advertising has 
facilitated economies of scale in some industries by generating high-volume demand, 
its use is neither necessary nor sufficient.  Some industries, he explains, have been 
able to generate ample demand to produce economies of scale in their manufacturing 
operations without advertising.  Other industries have failed to attain production 
economies even though they advertise heavily.  In addition, Borden notes, the cost of 
advertising sometimes exceeds the savings associated with large-scale production 
economies when they do occur.  Thus, in his view, the causal link between 
advertising and reduced costs of production is unproven.     
Extending Borden’s line of thought, Kaldor (1950-1951) explains that if there 
were no advertising, firms would be “driven to compete on the basis of price, and 
price-competition would [bring] about the same result, in a more beneficial way to the 
consumer” (14).  Still, Kaldor acknowledges, advertising can lead to concentrated 
markets, which can, in turn, lead to economies of scale, if the firms that survive the 
concentration process invest in cost-saving technologies.  In such cases, advertising 
may, in fact, benefit consumers, even if price-competition would benefit them more.  
When concentration within industries fails to eventuate in economies of scale, 
however, the advertising-induced concentration “is definitely harmful,” because it 
raises the prices paid by consumers, restricts the entry of market newcomers, and 
increases the market power of the advertisers.  
According to Corden (1961), the “essential case in favour [sic] of 




strong, remaining firms to achieve economies of mass production and distribution.  
The proponents of this argument contend that the cost-savings associated with ad-
facilitated economies of scale are not “swallowed up” by advertising expenses; rather, 
they are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. 
As Corden sees it, however, the pro-advertising argument should be 
challenged.  For one thing (as Kaldor also explained), the requisite concentration 
could be achieved through price competition, instead of advertising.  For another, a 
public or private product-information service could provide more accurate and 
reliable information than consumers receive from advertising; and, if the public were 
sufficiently informed, competition based not on advertising but on price and quality 
could concentrate industries sufficiently to enable economies of scale.  Furthermore, 
“in some of the most heavily advertised fields of industry firms have not thought it 
necessary to concentrate production in a single plant,” Corden writes (17).   
Drawing on a study by Nicholls (1951) of the extent to which advertising 
concentrates the U.S. cigarette industry, Corden notes that none of the major firms 
locate all of their production facilities in one big plant to take advantage of economies 
of scale.  Above a certain sales volume, the Nicholls study concludes, advertising 
alone yields higher returns for cigarette manufacturers. This suggests to Corden that 
the extent of concentration may exceed what is required to achieve economies of 
scale in production (17).  (On the other hand, economies in distribution may provide 
an additional explanation for the dispersed production, Corden admits.) 
According to Doyle (1968), the argument that advertising enables economies 




generally accepted that high advertising is associated with product differentiation and 
rapid obsolescence of products.  To the extent that in practice advertising is a causal 
factor in this situation, the economies-of-scale argument is reversed—advertising 
prevents standardization and the benefits of scale economies” (583-584).  
Furthermore, he explains, “even where advertising does produce cost savings, its 
effects on prices are not unambiguous [but] will depend to a large extent on the 
number of firms in the industry and the degree of price competition” (584-585).  
Echoing Corden, Doyle notes that some studies (e.g., Bain 1956; Nicholls 1951) find 
that in a number of industries the optimal firm size for advertising purposes greatly 
exceeds the optimal firm size for production purposes.  “Where this is the case the 
dangers of oligopoly may be increased without any benefit of increased productive 
efficiency,” he maintains (584). 
On the other hand, in a more recent study of retail markets, Bagwell and 
Ramey (1994) find that advertising tends to produce a concentrated structure that 
utilizes economies of scale to lower consumer prices. 
 
Economies of scale in another sense  
 
The literature reveals two different senses by which economists associate 
economies of scale with advertising.  In the early literature, when economists discuss 
the association, they are generally referring to an indirect process by which 
advertising concentrates industries, and the surviving firms invest their profits in 




economies of scale.  In the previous section, that is the sense in which the term 
“economies of scale” is used. 
A related sense of the term is one that is used in a number of studies that seek 
to determine whether or not economies of scale in advertising exist.  These studies 
investigate, in other words, whether advertising, itself, is subject to economies or 
diseconomies of scale.  As Bagwell (2005) explains, although “scale economies are 
normally defined with reference to a proportional increase in all inputs, . . . under 
some circumstances, . . . the costs of advertising and production are plausibly 
separable . . .” (34; italics in the original).  Since economies of scale in advertising 
can lead to economies of scale in production or distribution if firms invest ad-inflated 
profits in cost-saving technologies, the distinction between the two senses of the term 
can be fuzzy.  To clarify, in one sense, advertising may lead to economies of scale in 
production or distribution (indirectly) by concentrating industries.  In a second sense, 
an advertising campaign can become more effective as expenditures increase, and, in 
that way, increasing expenditures can lead to scale economies in advertising. 
 Chamberlin (1933) may have been the first to discuss economies of scale in 
this second sense.  In his view, increasing returns to scale in advertising are likely to 
exist.  For one thing, a firm may not know, initially, which advertising medium will 
most effectively promote its products.  If, with experience, the firm shifts to more and 
more effective media, it may experience increasing returns as its advertising 
increases.  In addition, exposure to increasing quantities of a firm’s advertisements 
may make consumers more responsive to the suggestions the ad makes.  At some 




way to diminishing returns.  The primary reason that Chamberlin provides for 
diminishing returns might be called the low-hanging-fruit effect; that is, advertising 
exploits the most susceptible consumers first.  Subsequently, as advertising 
expenditures grow, they meet increasing sales resistance. 
Kaldor (1950-1951) offers a similar assessment.  As he explains it, advertising 
sometimes saturates a market.  When it does, further expenditures “yield rapidly 
diminishing returns” (14).  Ozga (1960) concurs.  Distinguishing his work from 
Chamberlin’s, he explains that, according to his model, diminishing returns are due to 
the fact that a firm’s advertising effort is increasingly wasted as more and more 
people who have already seen an ad and are familiar with its content are exposed to 
the ad over and over again. 
Corden (1961) sees the matter differently.  In his view, successful advertisers’ 
businesses expand at the expense of non-advertisers and less-successful advertisers.  
Their subsequent success allows them to advertise even more.  “And the more they 
advertise the more effective [their advertising] gets, for advertising yields economies 
of large scale,” he writes (16).  Simon (1970), on the other hand, argues that “there is 
not one single piece of strong evidence to support the general belief that increasing 
returns exist in advertising” (21).  In his view, although firms that advertise multiple 
goods may experience increasing returns, for individual brands the “efficiency of 
advertising always decreases” (22).  Schmalensee (1972) agrees, explaining that 
expanding the number of ad observers without increasing the number of repeat 




considerations . . . any firm must eventually encounter diminishing returns to 
advertising messages” (244).   
In their analysis of advertising expenditures, however, Comanor and Wilson 
(1974) find a pattern that appears to be consistent with the existence of economies of 
scale in advertising.  The results of their empirical analyses, they write, “suggest that 
there are net advantages to large firms—beyond those attributable to economies of 
large-scale plants—in industries in which product differentiation via advertising is an 
important dimension of industry structure” (234). 
Nevertheless, Lambin (1976) finds “strong evidence that decreasing returns 
to the advertising factor is the general rule” (95; italics in the original).  In his view, 
once advertising expenditures surpass a threshold level, their efficiency “always 
decreases.”  Lambin, like Chamberlin, suggests that advertising’s effectiveness seems 
to be subject to a low-hanging-fruit effect.  “In most market situations,” he writes, 
“the pool of readily susceptible buyers is quickly exhausted” (97-98). 
Simon and Arndt (1980), after reviewing more than one hundred studies, 
conclude that advertising’s response function exhibits diminishing returns.  
Regardless of the category of advertised product, advertising media, geographical 
area, or researchers’ methodologies, the conclusions of all the studies are 
substantially the same: Decreasing returns to scale characterize advertising.  In 
addition, Simon and Arndt find no reliable cases in which advertising manifests 
increasing returns to scale.  Going further, Seldon, Jewell, and O’Brien (2000) find 
evidence of diseconomies of scale for advertising in their examination of more than 




In sum, the literature reveals two different senses by which economists 
associate economies of scale with advertising: (1) Advertising can concentrate 
industries, leading to reduced costs of production or distribution; and (2) advertising 
can be more effective as ad expenditures rise.  In the first sense, although many early 
students of the economics of advertising suggest that advertising leads (indirectly, via 
concentration of industries) to economies of scale in production or distribution, a 
number of later researchers dispute the assumed relationship or argue that less 
wasteful methods of achieving scale economies are both possible and preferable.  In 
the second sense, studies generally indicate that—past a certain point—the 
effectiveness of a firm’s advertising tends to decrease as its expenditures increase. 
 
Advertising and selling costs 
 
Advertising is a valuable economic factor because it is the cheapest way of selling goods, particularly 
if the goods are worthless. 
—Sinclair Lewis 
 
The debate concerning advertising as a selling cost seems to have been waged, 
for the most part, among the earlier students of the economics of advertising.  Selling 
costs, Braithwaite (1928) writes, “are made up of the expenses of all middlemen and 
of those expenses which the producer incurs, over and above the cost of manufacture, 
in the process of selling goods” (16).  According to Braithwaite (1928), selling 
costs—true selling costs—are as much part of a product’s final price as are any of the 




in her view.  “Advertisement cost,” Braithwaite writes, “represents expenditure by the 
seller, not in putting the goods on the market, but in inducing the buyer to accept 
them” (17).  Being arbitrarily added to production costs, “the sums spent on 
advertisement are not on a par with other costs, and cannot be considered as part of 
the ordinary cost of production of the commodity,” Braithwaite writes.   
Chamberlin’s (1933) conception of selling costs differs from Braithwaite’s.  
He writes: “Selling costs are defined as costs incurred in order to alter the position or 
shape of the demand curve for a product” (117).  Thus, Chamberlin categorizes 
advertising as a selling cost for the very reason that Braithwaite rejects that 
categorization; that is, for Chamberlin, advertising is a selling cost because firms 
incur advertising expenditures in order to change their demand curves.  Whereas 
production costs are “made to adapt the product to the demand,” selling costs are 
“made to adapt the demand to the product,” Chamberlin explains (125).  
In Kaldor’s view (1950-1951), the distinction between production and selling 
costs is “merely the consequence of the (tacit) insistence of economists on looking 
upon a ‘product’ as a single, indivisible whole,” rather than “a basket containing a 
bundle of commodities” (22).  Kaldor quotes Knight, who writes: “In fact, the 
advertising, puffing, or salesmanship necessary to create a demand for a commodity 
is causally indistinguishable from a utility inherent in the commodity itself” (qtd. in 
Kaldor, 22).  Kaldor maintains, however, that consumers have no way of refusing 
advertising when they purchase the rest of the commodity-bundle. 
According to Comanor and Wilson (1974), the selling costs incurred through 




consumers by certain industries that are heavy advertisers can be as high as 16 
percent of the industry’s value added” (xii).  
Meanwhile, advocates extol advertising for lowering sales costs.  Moskin 
(1973), for example, argues that mass-media advertising sells what firms produce in 
the cheapest and most efficient manner.  He quotes part of a speech by the chairman 
of PepsiCo, Donald Kendall, to the Federal Trade Commission:  
There is literally no way to count how many salesmen at the front door 
it would take to reach the number of people who see and hear a 
television commercial. . . .  But even if such a massive sales force 
could be assembled, the costs of their salaries or commissions would 
raise product prices astronomically.  The use of media advertising . . . 
represents a conscious choice as to the most effective and efficient 
way to generate consumer demand.  Where the product provides a 
wanted consumer benefit, advertising is a highly efficient way to 
generate a mass market for this product, lowering the costs of 
production and distribution (13). 
Similarly, in an American Enterprise Institute Round Table report, Tom Dillon, 
chairman of a major advertising agency, argues that, rather than raising prices, 
advertising tends to lower them by reducing selling costs.  
An important fact that tends to be forgotten is that there is a marketing 
cost of some sort in getting a product from the loading dock to the 
consumer.  It can be spent on various promotional devices other than 




.  The reason a manufacturer uses advertising . . . is that he believes it 
reduces his costs in moving his products from the loading dock to the 
consumer.  The product does the consumer no good on the loading 
dock.  It has to be in the consumer’s house (qtd. in J. Daly 1976, 5). 
Borden (1942), however, dismisses the “sweeping generalization,” of 
advertising proponents who maintain that high advertising expenditures lead to low 
selling costs.  Examining advertising’s impact on distribution costs, Borden finds that 
where intensive competition among advertisers exists, advertising increases 
distribution costs.  According to Borden, firms use advertising to sell “certain 
volumes of merchandise at certain prices,” not to minimize selling costs (853).   
In sum, the literature reflects disagreement concerning advertising’s impact on 
selling costs.  In part, the ambiguity of the term “selling cost” may hinder a 
consensus.  Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that ad proponents lack clear evidence 
to substantiate their assertion that advertising lowers the cost of selling goods. 
 
Influence on the size of the firm 
 
A number of studies suggest a positive association between advertising and 
firm size. Corden (1961), for example, notes that only the largest firms can afford the 
enormous initial advertising expenditures that launching a new product requires.   
Comanor and Wilson (1974) explain that advertising “may influence the 
relation between large firms and small by affecting both relative costs and relative 




associate high product quality with high advertising expenditures, heavy advertisers 
are able to command a higher price for their goods, and light advertisers often must 
lower their prices in order to attract buyers for their “substandard” goods.  
Concerning costs, Comanor and Wilson report that the results of three sets of 
regressions indicate advantages for the largest firms that differentiate their products 
through advertising.  In sum, the authors conclude: “in a number of industries 
advertising appears to create major advantages for large firms relative to their smaller 
competitors” (239).  
According to Philip Nelson (1974), firm efficiency may explain the 
association between advertising and size.  Because efficient firms derive greater 
benefit from demand expansion than do their inefficient rivals, they tend to advertise 
more and, consequently, grow larger.  
Robert Nelson (1976) notes that firms can convey important information 
about the quality of their products via advertising.  Small firms, Nelson explains, find 
it prohibitively expensive and ultimately wasteful to advertise to broad audiences 
comprised of individuals who are not potential customers; thus, large firms are much 
more likely to engage in large-scale advertising.  Given their access to broad 
audiences, “large firms will have major advantages over small firms in the speed at 
which they can establish product quality assurance,” Nelson writes (287). 
Bagwell and Ramey (1994) credit advertising for being at least partially 
responsible for the recent proliferation of “big-box” stores.  Their formal model 
predicts that heavy retail advertising can lead to markets comprised of small numbers 




suggests that it explains, in part, the success of “retail juggernauts,” such as Home 
Depot, Wal-Mart, IKEA, and Circuit City. 
Bagwell (2003) explains that brand advertising by manufacturers and point-
of-sale service by retailers substitute for each other as suppliers of pre-purchase 
information about products.  When people get pre-purchase information from ads, 
they need less information from retailers. Thus, Bagwell concludes, “greater 
manufacturer advertising is associated with the emergence of large-scale retailers that 
offer modest service and low prices” (49). 
In sum, the literature seems to suggest that advertising tends to produce 
market structures in which large firms dominate.  As some of the studies indicate, 
large firms can engage in more intensive and widespread advertising than can small 
firms.  The higher level of advertising then stimulates greater demand for the 
advertisers’ product, which tends to set in motion a positive-feedback loop—more 
advertising leads to greater demand, which leads to more advertising, and that, in 
turn, leads to greater demand—increasing the large firm’s advantage.  
 
“Big-box” stores and the trade deficit 
 
According to Bagwell and Ramey (1994), as noted above, advertising may be 
an essential factor in the emergence and proliferation of “big-box” stores (e.g., Wal-
Mart and Home Depot).  As they explain it, stores that engage in intensive advertising 
tend to communicate a successful image to consumers.  As a result, consumers may 




advertising supplies pre-purchase information, retailers can concentrate “more on 
price and less on service” (49).  With low prices, the stores reap high sales.  With 
high sales, the stores have the wherewithal to employ economic factors that reduce 
costs and lead to increased consolidation.  These factors include: economies of scale, 
bulk purchasing, efficiency-enhancing technologies (e.g., bar-code scanners), and 
efficiency-enhancing methods of distribution, internal organization, and logistics.  
“These factors are reinforced,” Scheelings and Wright (2006) explain, “by changes in 
consumer purchasing behavior; consumers now prefer to do most of their shopping in 
single locations for convenience” (n.p.).  
Why has the purchasing behavior of consumers changed?  Pashigian and 
Bowen (1994) point to one factor: working women.  According to the authors, 
working women increasingly rely on advertised brands.  Why?  Because the 
opportunity cost of shopping has increased.  The personal service that women once 
enjoyed is now a luxury that they can no longer afford.  For time-constrained 
consumers, interacting with salespeople and running from shop to shop in search of 
bargains can be burdensome.  One-stop shopping for advertised brands at self-service, 
big-box stores, on the other hand, saves time and reduces search costs.  Combine the 
time constraints of harried shoppers with advertised promises of low prices on name 
brands, and the appeal of the “big box” is clear.  
Nevertheless, competition policy specialists, among others, raise concerns 
about the market power that big-box chains wield over their input suppliers.  The big-
box chains tend to be monopsonies or oligopsonies, impairing competition through 




write, “buyer power allows buyers to force sellers to reduce the price below the price 
that would result in a competitive equilibrium” (n.p.).   
Lande (2004) explains that the impact of buyer power on consumers can be 
either positive or negative.  On the upside, the monopsonist (or oligopsonist) can pass 
input savings along to the consumer.  On the downside, however, buyer power can 
harm consumers, according to Lande, if: 
1. the discounts that the large buyer extracts from input suppliers 
eventually put its rivals at such a disadvantage they are driven to 
bankruptcy, resulting in restricted consumer choice (or, alternatively, 
in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy, the disadvantage forces rivals to 
externalize more of their costs to the detriment of the public and the 
environment—a point Lande fails to mention);  
2. the large buyer (or buyers) achieves market power as a supplier, as 
well, and subsequently raises the prices it charges consumers; 
3. the power-wielding buyer forces input sellers to raise the prices they 
charge the buyer’s rivals, leading to higher prices for consumers; 
4. the buyers are sheltered from tough competition to such an extent that 
they become less efficient, and, as a result, their costs rise; 
5. wary investors avoid the industry, which leads to long-run consumer 
losses. 
Regardless of the downside, Lande notes, “the conventional wisdom is that buyer-




Antitrust policy apparently reflects the conventional wisdom.  As Scheelings 
and Wright (2006) explain, consideration of monopsony, from an antitrust standpoint, 
“need only be concerned with the welfare of the final consumer.  The end-customer 
only cares about the quality, quantity, and price of the final product.  What transpires 
upstream in the process of producing the final product is irrelevant to the consumer of 
the final good” (n.p.).  
Scheelings and Wright, citing Salop, note that U.S. courts and federal 
agencies focus consistently on the price effects of buyer power and adhere to a 
consumer-welfare standard.  By so doing, they reject legal “arguments that conduct 
which harms competitors while benefiting consumers, even when the former 
outweighs the latter in some quantitative sense, violates the antitrust laws” (n.p.). 
 
Big-box stores and consumer welfare 
 
But is price the sole determinant of consumer welfare?  According to the 
courts and federal agencies, apparently, it is.  A LexisNexis search of newspaper 
articles (using keywords: “Wal-Mart” and “protest”), however, reveals hundreds of 
instances in which people evince alternative concepts of consumer welfare.  The 
stories reveal concerns about the impact of the big-box chain, Wal-Mart, on existing 
local businesses, the natural environment, traffic congestion, area noise levels, and so 
forth.  In Tarpon Springs, Florida, for example, when workers unearthed gopher 
tortoises at the site of a proposed Wal-Mart, local activists protested Wal-Mart’s 
environmental impact, carrying signs that read: “Wal-Mart is an environmental 




(Reeves 2007).  In Glen Carbon, Missouri, concerns that a Wal-Mart expansion could 
affect local businesses, increase traffic congestion, cause drainage problems, and, 
potentially increase local crime led area residents to form: “Glen-Ed Citizens for Fair 
Growth.”  Reporting the story, Terry Hillig, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, writes: 
“It’s not clear whether opponents of a proposed Wal-Mart expansion constitute a 
majority of village residents here, but if they’re a minority, they’ve been a vocal one” 
(Hillig 2007).   
Nor are concerns about negative externalities associated with big-box chains 
confined to the United States.  According to a report in the New York Times, 
demonstrators in New Delhi, India, marched on government buildings, carried signs 
that read: “Save Small Retailers,” and shouted: “Go back Wal-Mart!” (Reuters 
2007b) 
Of course, not everyone is a small retailer, but everyone is a consumer, and 
according to Ben Stein, “Wal-Mart is about as good a friend as the consumer ever 
had. . . .  When a Wal-Mart opens in a town, . . . it’s as if everyone in the town [gets] 
a raise.  That’s because the stuff at Wal-Mart is so much cheaper than that same 
merchandise [is] elsewhere” (Stein).   Stein is not alone; big-box stores have many 
boosters.  Nevertheless, the prices of their goods fail to reflect the environmental 
damage that the production, distribution, and consumption of those goods cause; thus, 
the low prices that big-box stores advertise facilitate a massive misallocation of 





Advertising, big boxes, and trade deficits 
 
In order to deliver on its promise of low prices, Wal-Mart uses buyer power to 
drive hard bargains with its suppliers.  As Jon Lehman, a former Wal-Mart store 
manager, told Hedrick Smith of Frontline: 
Well, it’s very one-sided.  There is no negotiation. . . .  They know 
every fact and figure that these manufacturers have.  They know their 
books.  They know their costs.  They know their business practices. . . 
.  Wal-Mart calls the shots.  “If you want to do business with us, if you 
want to stay in business, then you’re going to do it our way.”  And it’s 
all about driving down the cost of goods (Smith 2004).  
Driving down costs can also mean driving U.S. manufacturers overseas.  
According to Duke sociology professor Gary Gereffi, “Wal-Mart basically tells its 
suppliers, ‘We need to get those products at 30 percent lower price.  You need to 
move to Asia, you need to move to China because that will meet our bottom-line 
price figures’” (Smith 2004).  
By wielding buyer power, Wal-Mart maintains low prices.  Those low 
advertised prices keep more than 100 million Americans flocking to Wal-Mart stores 
every week.  Similar, if smaller, crowds flock to other big-box stores in search of low 
prices.  Attached to those low prices, however, are assorted externalized costs.  As 
former U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich writes: “The fact is, today’s economy 
offers us a Faustian bargain: it can give consumers deals largely because it hammers 




The U.S. balance of trade is also being hammered.  Since prices for goods 
manufactured overseas tend to be significantly lower than prices for similar goods 
made in the United States, big-box chains, focusing on the bottom line, buy a high 
percentage of their merchandise overseas.  Many analysts suggest that overseas 
purchases by big-box chains provide a partial explanation for the massive U.S. trade 
imbalance (see Figure 4.1).  With the exception of 2007, the trade deficit has hit a 






Source of data: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division  
  
According to the Congressional Budget Office, a major cause of the growing 
U.S. trade deficit can be traced to “a long decline in saving as a share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) that began in the mid-1950s and accelerated in the 1980s . . 




economists, including Corden (1961), Comanor and Wilson (1974), Taylor and 
Weiserbs (1972), and Jung and Seldon (1995), suggest the existence of an inverse 
relationship between advertising expenditures and savings rates.  Thus, advertising 
may affect the trade deficit in two (probably interacting) ways: (1) by impacting 
savings (e.g., America borrows from other nations to finance the trade deficit) and (2) 
by fostering the emergence and viability of big-box chains.  
It is worth noting that Americans’ consumption exceeded their incomes in 
2005 and 2006.  In those two years, the savings rates were -0.4 percent and -1.0 
percent, respectively.  According to government records, the last time savings rates 
were negative was during the two worst years of the Depression, 1932 and 1933 
(Huntley 2007).  
Low prices would seem to offer an opportunity to reduce spending.  Given the 
low prices that big-box stores offer, it should be possible for Americans to increase 
their savings to some extent.  Why, then, is the U.S. savings’ rate negative?  While a 
number of factors are certainly involved, one counter-intuitive cause might be the low 
prices, themselves.  If, for example, people expect to pay $20 for a pair of sandals, 
and they find a pair at Wal-Mart for $12 that they want, they might indulge 
themselves and buy two pairs instead of one.  Although they end up spending more 
than they had originally planned, they go home happy, because they believe they’ve 
gotten a real bargain—two pairs of sandals for just a bit more than they would have 
paid for one.  Alternatively, they might treat themselves to a different product with 
the $8 they “saved” on the sandals, and that product might cost more than $8.  As 




indulgences are often spur-of-the-moment purchases, a dynamite sale or special offer 
is overwhelmingly compelling to get consumers to open their wallets and buy” (47-
48). 
In sum, advertising seems to be facilitating an economy in which: big-box 
chains replace small, independent retailers; goods made by foreign workers replace 
goods made by domestic workers; the trade deficit grows; and low prices encourage 
people to buy more and save less.  Perhaps it is time to ask ourselves if this is the kind 
of economy we truly want.  
 
The heterogeneity of advertising’s economic effects 
 
As the previous sections demonstrate, no single word better describes the 
economics of advertising than heterogeneous.  The inconsistency in the results of 
empirical studies brings to mind the famous Harry Truman quip: “I’m tired of 
economists who say, ‘On the one hand . . . and then on the other hand.’  Send me a 
one-armed economist!”  Given the heterogeneity of advertising’s effects, a modern-
day Truman seeking advice might complain about economists with as many arms as 
the Hindu goddess Durga.  Factors influencing advertising’s economic impact are far 
too numerous to enumerate, but they include the following: 
• The advertising of rival firms.  The impact of one firm’s ads can be 
augmented or diminished by the ads of its rivals.  While a negative 
externality (i.e., business stealing) inheres to most ads, in some cases one 




equivalents—to such an extent that it generates a positive externality (i.e., 
increased demand) for its rivals. 
• The appropriateness of the medium chosen for a particular ad. Ads will 
be most effective when the medium chosen suits the product.  A jazz 
concert advertised on an FM jazz station, for example, will probably be 
more effective than a jazz concert advertised on a talk-radio program or in 
a gardening magazine.  (Generally speaking, however, TV is the most 
effective advertising medium.)  
• The content of the ad itself.  The content of ads (i.e., the words, images, 
music, etc.) vary in their ability to motivate audiences to buy the goods the 
ads promote.   
• The popularity of the content of the media “frame.”   It seems reasonable 
to expect that the audience viewing an ad aired during the Super Bowl will 
be larger than the audience for the same ad aired during a documentary 
about the genocide in Darfur, for example. 
• The intensity of the advertising.  Below a certain threshold of intensity, 
advertising may have little effect.  Over that threshold, an ad campaign 
may benefit from increasing returns to scale, until diminishing returns take 
hold. 
• Whether media act as substitutes or complements, if the ad campaign 
utilizes more than one medium.  If the ads on the chosen media 
complement each other, they will be more effective than if the media 




• The type of good advertised.  Is it a search or an experience good?  A 
homogeneous or heterogeneous good?  A luxury, necessity, or 
convenience good?  An ad’s effectiveness depends, to some extent, on the 
type of good that is advertised.  
• The scope of the advertising.  The effectiveness of ads that are broadcast 
may be different from those that are narrowcast, for example.  
• The demographic group the ads target.  Some demographic groups are 
larger or have a greater propensity to consume than others.  Advertising 
aimed at large, high-consuming demographic groups tends to have a 
greater influence on sales than ads that target other groups. 
All of the above factors, and more, can affect the datasets utilized in empirical 
studies and, consequently, influence the studies’ conclusions about advertising’s 
economic impact.  In addition to the variability of datasets, differences in 
methodology can also increase the disparity of results in the economics-of-advertising 
literature.  Given this heterogeneity, few generalizations about the economics of 
advertising stand up to scrutiny.    
But beyond differences in datasets and methodology, researchers’ ideological 
views can influence their results.  As Meadows et al. (2004) note, “it is crucial to 
remember that every book, every computer model, every public statement is shaped at 
least as much by the worldview of its authors as by any ‘objective’ data or analysis” 
(4).  Cohen (1995) agrees.  As he sees it, “any prediction about human affairs 




assumptions about the world attract them to some bits of data and repel them from 
others.   
Making a pair of observations that apply as well to the economics of 
advertising as they do to the object of his study (i.e., the carrying capacity of the 
planet), Cohen writes: “The diversity of the estimates suggests that the people who 
made them were trying to measure different concepts or had different data at their 
disposal or made different assumptions when data were lacking” (216).  
“Notwithstanding their cloak of quantification, many of the published estimates . . . 
[might be] less dispassionate analyses than they are political instruments, intended to 





Chapter 5: Advertising’s Impact on Innovation, Employment, 
and Savings 
 
Advertising and innovation 
 
A number of supporters of advertising’s economic role argue that advertising 
facilitates product innovations and improvements.  Alfred J. Seaman, once president 
of a New York ad agency, claims that the benefit of advertising’s influence on 
product improvement and innovation for consumers is a “very big one!” 
The desire to sell more—and that means in part having a more 
persuasive advertising story—spurs the manufacturer on to build a 
better product.  In this upward spiral of improving products, 
breakthroughs are few and far between. . . .  Products improve little by 
little. . . .  Our job [as advertisers] is to make those small margins of 
superiority meaningful to the consumer—and thus make the race for 
better products even swifter” (qtd. in Moskin 1973, 16).   
While less enthusiastic, Pigou (1932) seems to agree that advertising spurs 
innovation.  In his view, were it not for advertising, many new and useful products 
and services might never come to the attention of consumers who truly need them.  
Some ads, Pigou maintains, serve “to develop an entirely new set of wants on the part 
of consumers, the satisfaction of which involves a real addition to social well-being” 
(n.p.).  Borden (1942) also supports advertising for this reason.  As he sees it, 




of advertising promotes new and improved products, and, by so doing, expands the 
economic frontier.  Borden writes: 
As a result of the process of constantly offering new differentiations, 
enterprise has placed on the market improved products which better 
fill consumers’ desires and needs than did previous products.  This 
product improvement has been rapid and striking in the case of 
relatively new products, such as . . . refrigerators.  But even for 
merchandise long on the market, the improvement has been substantial 
over a period of time; this is true, for example, of products such as 
gasoline. . . .  Always the improvements of one manufacturer which 
have proved desirable have had to be matched by competitors  (868). 
Reviewing the literature, Bagwell (2005) cites a number of studies that offer 
support for the claim that advertising facilitates product innovations.  Among those he 
lists are Telser (1962), Ferguson (1967), Alemson (1970), Hirschey (1981), and 
McDonald (1986).  In addition, Bagwell notes that Backman (1967), Lambin (1976), 
Farris and Buzzell (1979), Leffler (1981), and Eckard (1991) find a positive 
correlation between advertising intensity and product innovations for some industries 
and product classes, and Porter (1978) observes that the rate of innovations to a firm’s 
product line “is strongly and positively associated” with the amount it advertises on 
network TV (45).  Bagwell cautions, however, that care should be taken in 
interpreting these results.  In a footnote, he writes: “The interpretation of a positive 




such innovations might reflect entry (a new product from a new firm) or entry 
deterrence (product proliferation by an established firm)” (46).  
Corden (1961) reports that in the view of some ad supporters only large firms 
can make the enormous expenditures that are generally required to research and 
develop innovative products; thus, advertising indirectly helps to promote product 
innovation by facilitating a market structure that favors large firms.  For his own part, 
however, Corden disagrees.  In his view, “advertising may actually hinder progress,” 
because “progress has become dependent on the activities of a relative handful of 
large firms, and the introduction of new ideas and the development of new products 
depends upon large firms adopting these ideas” (20).  Furthermore, Corden questions 
the supposition that advertising fosters technical progress.  Due to advertising, 
“progress tends to take the special form of developing products with properties that 
lend themselves to large-scale selling campaigns” (22).  Innovations that fail to fit 
that special form face high barriers to development and entry, Corden explains.  
Corden quotes Lord Heyworth, then Chairman of Unilever, who argues that 
advertising facilitates innovation “by making people receptive to the idea of change” 
(20).  According to Heyworth, advertising helps consumers overcome their natural 
inertia and brings “people to see that the old ways are not necessarily the best ways” 
(20).  To illustrate his point, Heyworth asks rhetorically, “But for the first Lord 
Leverhulme’s passionate belief in advertising, [how] much longer would it have taken 
to get beyond the anonymous bulk of the long unwrapped bars that were the normal 
form of soap until he burst upon the scene . . . ?” (qtd. in Corden, 20).  (One is left to 




would have suffered if the momentous innovation of wrapped soap-bars had 
somehow failed to occur.) 
For his own part, Corden maintains that the supposed association between 
advertising and economic progress requires some qualification.  “For it must be 
remembered,” he writes, that advertising is designed to entrench firmly in consumers’ 
tastes existing products and the names of existing brands” (20).  In addition, 
advertising tends to create goodwill for the advertised product, which provides 
“security of markets” and enables firms to set the prices of their advertised goods 
higher than their marginal costs and higher than their competitors’ prices.  Thus, 
Corden concludes, goodwill presents a great hurdle for new entrants and new 
products.  “In fact,” he writes, “one can say that while advertising of new products 
contributes to progress, advertising of existing products holds it up” (20). 
Some supporters of advertising argue that advertising promotes technical 
progress by reducing market uncertainties.  Borden (1942), for example, writes: 
“Advertising and aggressive selling . . . have promised the stability of demand and of 
profit to an enterprise which is attractive to investment” (870).  As Doyle (1968) sees 
it, however, “stability would not appear either theoretically or empirically a sufficient 
cause of innovation” (596). 
In sum, economists’ opinions about advertising’s impact on product 
innovations and improvements vary.  As with many other issues concerning the 
economics of advertising, ad proponents and critics seem to rationalize their 





Innovations and human welfare 
Arrow et al. (1990) credit advertising with facilitating the acceptance and 
dispersal of many innovative products and product improvements. Providing 
microwave ovens as an example, they contend that when one firm advertises an 
innovation, it helps create a market that rival manufacturers may choose to enter and 
exploit.  According to the authors, consumer welfare improves due to the introduction 
of the product and the subsequent, price-lowering competition; thus, nothing should 
be done to dampen incentives to advertise innovative products.   
Clearly, the authors presume that a microwave in every kitchen improves 
social welfare.  But does it?  Now that many Americans have not only microwave 
ovens but also a myriad of other innovations that advertising has promoted over the 
past few decades, are they any happier than they were before such products had a 
place in their homes?   
According to a number of happiness studies, they are not.  As Barry Schwartz 
(2004) writes:  
In the last forty years, the . . . percentage of homes with dishwashers 
has increased from 9 percent to 50 percent.  The percentage of homes 
with clothes dryers has increased from 20 percent to 70 percent.  The 
percentage of homes with air-conditioning has increased from 15 
percent to 73 percent.  Does this mean we have more happy people?  




Thus, the question arises: If the innovations that advertising facilitates fail to improve 
the overall quality of people’s lives, should advertising be celebrated for facilitating 
the adoption of those innovations? 
For ad supporters and technology enthusiasts, the answer is definitely yes.  As 
they see it, innovations are unmixed blessings in many, if not most, instances.  For 
one thing, innovative products improve people’s lives—they must or people would 
not buy them.  Thus, the speculation that innovative products fail to improve people’s 
lives must be wrong.  For another thing, the production, distribution, and sale of 
innovative products create new markets, fuel economic growth, and generate new 
jobs, and each of those outcomes increases human welfare.   
On the other hand, such analysis seems to ignore the personal, social, and 
environmental costs that are often associated with the production, use, and disposal of 
goods.  Since such negative externalities are generally ignored, the prices that 
consumers pay generally fail to reflect the goods’ true costs.  This is particularly true 
in the case of newly introduced goods, because, in most cases, time must pass before 
all of the associated costs become apparent.  Enabled by artificially low prices, 
however, ad-assisted dispersal of innovative products across American society is 
extensive.  If, as many economists recommend, the prices of goods were adjusted 
(with a tax added, for example) to reflect actual costs, for some people the adjusted 
prices would be prohibitively high.  People who purchased goods before the price 
adjustment might be unable to replace the items when necessary.  Some children who 
grew up using the items might be unable to buy them when they moved out of their 




being of affected individuals.  According to Kahneman et al. (1991), once a good 
becomes part of a person’s endowment, giving it up entails a loss; and, as Schwartz 
(2004) notes, several studies find that the psychological impact of such a loss is more 
than twice as harmful as an equivalent gain is good.  Thus, before advertising is 
applauded for expediting the acceptance and dispersal of innovative goods, the harm 
that psychologists, such as Schwartz, Kahnemann, and others, tell us is associated 
with losing a good that one once owned should be taken into account. 
 
Advertising and catastrophic innovations 
 
While the psychological harms just described are conjectural, some costs 
associated with ad-promoted innovations are concrete.  For example, advertising has 
facilitated the widespread use of innovative products that, over time, have proven to 
be catastrophically harmful.  Prior to the discovery of their negative effects, however, 
some analysts credited advertising for helping to promote the acceptance and 
dispersion of these ostensible boons to humanity.  Borden (1942), for example, 
credits advertising for spurring firms to differentiate their products.  “As a result of 
the process of constantly offering new differentiations,” he writes, “enterprise has 
placed on the market improved products which better fill consumers’ desires and 
needs than did previous products” (868).  Two of the improved products that Borden 
specifically mentions, as noted above, are refrigerators and gasoline.  Writing in 
1942, he could not have known that the improvements he touted—
chlorofluorocarbon, a safer coolant for refrigerators, and tetraethyl lead, a “no-knock” 




impair human health.  (High lead levels in blood have produced a variety of health 
problems; chlorofluorocarbons have thinned the ozone layer, which has led to 
increased rates of skin cancer, among other problems.)  While these innovations 
seemed to be wondrous achievements in the short run, ultimately their side effects 
have been disastrous. 
Nor has the introduction of products with potentially catastrophic side effects 
been confined to Borden’s time.  Ads for the painkiller Vioxx provide a more recent 
example.  After several years of intensive advertising campaigns and soaring sales, 
studies found that Vioxx increased the risk of heart attack and stroke significantly.  
The precise extent to which advertising contributed to the drug’s popularity is a 
matter of speculation; however, studies of consumer demand by Rosenthal et al. 
(2002), Iizuka and Jin (2002), and Wosinska (2002) suggest that direct-to-consumer 
advertising of prescription drugs is having a large market-expanding effect.  In 
addition, Iizuka (2004) finds that direct-to-consumer advertising in the U.S. has 
“skyrocketed” since the relaxation in 1997 of regulations limiting such ads.  Taken 
together, these findings suggest that heavy advertising did lead to widespread use of 
Vioxx, and the results of that use have, in some cases, been tragic. 
Thus, the benefits associated with advertising’s role as a facilitator of 
innovation are hardly unalloyed.  Rather than accurately heralding technological 
progress as its advocates claim, advertising seems often to supply biased and 
misleading information by spotlighting the benefits of new and improved products 
while ignoring many, if not all, of the costs.  In addition, advertising generally speeds 




advertising deserves credit for facilitating innovation, it should also be held 
responsible, in part, for the problems inherent in the production, use, and disposal of 
innovative products.  
 
Advertising’s influence on employment 
 
According to the ad industry, advertising is a major job creator.  Is the 
industry correct?  Surprisingly few studies have examined advertising’s impact on 
employment.  Some of those that do have been sponsored by the ad industry, making 
their results suspect.    
Providing some independent support for ad-industry claims, however, are a 
pair of empirical studies in which researchers find that advertising and unemployment 
are inversely related.  Chowdhury (1994) finds “strong uni-directional causality” 
between the level of advertising and the rate of unemployment, and Hamada (1999) 
finds that advertising in Japan increases the demand for labor.  Explaining his results, 
Hamada notes that advertising increases demand; consequently, firms hire additional 
labor to satisfy that demand.  Advertising may also help maintain employment rates 
during economic downturns, Hamada notes.    
In a 2004 Global Insight study of the impact of advertising expenditures on 
economic activity and job creation (commissioned by lobbyists for the Advertising 
Coalition), Raimondi and Klein predicted that advertising would be responsible for 




the authors, advertising would create nearly half of the jobs directly and generate the 
rest indirectly. 
Godshaw and Pancoast (1987) consider the impact on unemployment of a tax 
on advertising, in an ad-industry sponsored study.  They conclude that such a tax 
would cause the quantity of advertising to fall, which would lead, in turn, to a 
decrease in sales and an increase in unemployment. The authors assert, in fact, that an 
ad tax in Florida would result in an immediate loss of 10,400 jobs and a loss of 
46,000 jobs within two years.  The increase in unemployment over time would be due 
to a multiplier process, whereby early job losses would lead to additional losses in 
other industries in later periods.  In addition, Godshaw and Pancoast note, a study by 
Aker and Myers (1975) indicates that a reduction in advertising can lead to higher 
selling costs by other means.  What Godshaw and Pancoast fail to note, however, is 
that those other means would certainly utilize employees, and the jobs created might 
exceed the jobs that would be lost due to the reduction in advertising.  
The Multinational Monitor (1990) notes the potential impact of a ban on 
tobacco and liquor advertising on employment.  According to the article, “the biggest 
names in the tobacco, liquor and advertising industries claim that 16,100 media jobs 
will be lost” if ads for their products “are banned from print media” (n.p.)   
Two years later, when the U.S. Senate considered legislation to reduce the 
tobacco industry’s tax deduction for advertising, a marketing manager for Fruit of the 
Loom stressed his view of advertising’s impact on employment in a letter to Senator 
Mitch McConnell, as recorded in the Congressional Record (1992). “Advertising 









Whenever policymakers have proposed changing advertising’s tax status, 
many ad-industry advocates have promoted advertising’s ostensible role as a job 
creator.  In response to a proposal in Congress to reduce advertising’s tax deduction, 
for example, John Kamp, senior vice president for the American Association of 
Advertising Agencies, urged the trade organizations’ members to tell Congress that 
“advertising drives the economy, creates jobs, and stabilizes the tax base” (Fisher 
1994, 41).  At the same time, Dan Jaffe, executive vice president of the Association 
of National Advertisers, told members of his organization that the mere fact of 
Congress raising the possibility of reducing the deduction “is highly troubling. . . .  
It’s important to scream very loud” (41).   
William Diefenderfer, a lobbyist for the Leadership Council on Advertising 
Issues, advised media companies, major advertisers, and ad agencies to stress to 
Congress and the White House the increased unemployment that would accompany a 
reduction in advertising.  Offering what seems to be a specific example of the 
strategy, Wally Snyder, president of the American Advertising Federation, told 
Advertising Age (Colford 1994b): 
We put a lot of effort into educating [then Chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee] Rostenkowski on the value of 




recent years in his district in Chicago with people from Quaker Oats [a 
major advertiser] and Leo Burnett [one of the world’s largest ad 
agencies] and others.  At one of them, Clark Hines from Quaker 
looked out a window and pointed out the Tribune Building and Leo 
Burnett and Quaker and noted that they all employed a lot of people in 
Chicago because of advertising.  That, I think, brought the message 
home to [Rostenkowski] (58). 
To persuade policymakers that advertising is a job creator, coalitions 
comprised of advertising trade associations, major advertisers, and media 
corporations have hired economists to conduct studies to verify ad-industry claims.  
One such study was so obviously biased it proved useless for that purpose.  
According to the director of the Advertising Tax Coalition, Jim Davidson (2005, 
personal communication), a 1987 study, which had been hastily prepared in response 
to a proposed Florida ad tax, was “so totally biased it was laughed at by economists.”  
For that reason, Davidson explained, he has subsequently hired Nobel Prize winning 
economists (such as George Stigler, Kenneth Arrow, and Lawrence Klein) to perform 
studies, because “they have reputations to protect and no reason to slant their reports 
in favor of the ad industry.”  If, when completed, the results of such studies oppose 
his clients’ interests, “they bury them,” Davidson said.  Thus, Global Insight’s 
prediction that advertising would be responsible for precisely 21,117,903 jobs in 2005 
(O’Malley 2004) and Godshaw and Pancoast’s (1987) prediction that over 46,000 
Florida jobs would be lost in less than two years if a tax on advertising were enacted 




But even if Global Insight’s predictions are accurate, there seems to be no way 
to verify them, since they are proprietary and unavailable to the public (Pundit 2005, 
personal correspondence).  And no comparable, independent study seems to exist.  
Nevertheless, the Global Insight study purports to define “the relationship between 
the amount spent on advertising by businesses throughout the economy and the 
impact those expenditures have on economic activity and job creation in all states, 
metropolitan areas and congressional districts in the United States” (Association of 
National Advertisers 2004).  It seems reasonable to suppose that senators and House 
members would be intensely interested in—and, one might suspect, influenced by—
statistics showing economic activity and job creation in their states and congressional 
districts.  Given the circumstances surrounding the statistics’ creation and the lack of 
independent verification of those statistics, the impartiality of the studies is open to 
doubt, however.  Relying on ad-lobby funded studies to inform policymakers about 
advertising’s impact on employment seems to be a good way to promote the interests 
of the ad lobby.  Whether or not that reliance also promotes the common good is 
another question. 
 
Job creation and resource allocation 
 
Kaldor (1950-1951) is skeptical of the claim that advertising increases 
employment.  But whether or not advertising stimulates employment is not the critical 
issue for Kaldor; rather, he wonders whether advertising is a better or worse means of 
generating jobs than other possible methods.  As he sees it, when effective demand, 




the ordinary rules of welfare economics are, in a sense, reversed: here 
‘waste’ is economical and economy is wasteful.  In such an economy, 
a higher output of any particular commodity or service will not mean a 
lower, but usually a higher output of other things; the marginal social 
cost of one commodity or service, therefore, is not positive, but zero or 
even negative. . . .  On these assumptions no expenditure can be 
wasteful. . . .  In order, therefore, to arrive at a balanced judgment on 
the social benefits derived from advertising (or of anything else) the 
employment effects must be kept rigidly separate from the others; as 
regards the former, the question to be investigated is whether 
advertising is an appropriate and socially beneficial method for curing 
unemployment; while as regards the latter, the same criteria must be 
employed as are appropriate in an economy where the general level of 
production is determined by the scarcity of available resources (10; 
italics in the original).  
Thus, Kaldor is critical of those who claim that advertising creates jobs, 
because they fail to recognize that resources are finite.  If resources were truly 
unlimited, creating jobs by generating demand for goods through advertising might be 
“an appropriate and socially beneficial method for curing unemployment.”  
Recognizing that available resources are, in fact, finite, however, Kaldor questions 
whether generating demand via advertising—and producing more-and-more goods in 
order to create more-and-more jobs—ultimately leads to wise uses of scarce 




To take a relatively uncontroversial example, consider cigarette advertising.  
If advertising increases demand for cigarettes and higher demand for cigarettes leads 
to higher demand for workers, do the newly created jobs justify cigarette advertising?  
While tobacco is a renewable resource, many of the resources that go into cigarette 
production and distribution are scarce.  Also scarce are the resources devoted to the 
health care of smokers—not to mention the scarcity of moments in the lives of 
individuals that are lost as a result of smoking.  To take another, possibly more 
controversial example, consider sport utility vehicles.  Keeping in mind that SUVs 
leave substantial plumes of carbon dioxide in their wake, and the scientific consensus 
is that such emissions fuel global warming, does it make sense to create jobs by 
generating demand for SUVs through advertising? 
At the macroeconomic level, advertising contributes to GNP growth by 
fueling consumption.  It thereby feeds the illusion that the economic pie can be made 
forever larger.  As Daly (1993) explains, the same illusion underlies neoclassical 
economics.  In his words, “continual growth in both capacity (stock) and income 
(flow) is a central part of the neoclassical growth paradigm.  But in a finite world 
continual growth is impossible” (15).  And that is the rub, because, according to the 
neoclassical paradigm, perpetual “growth of GNP is necessary to maintain full 
employment” (15).  Since resources are finite, their scarcity should be considered 
before advertising is touted as a job creator, and policies for job creation should be 





Advertising, employment, and the business cycle 
 
If, as many observers agree, firms generally set their ad expenditures as a 
percentage of recent sales, then, when those sales have been high, advertisers increase 
their future ad budgets, and when those sales have been low, they reduce their 
upcoming ad expenditures.  This fluctuating pattern may explain why Borden (1942), 
Kaldor (1950-1951), and Yang (1964) find that advertising tends to amplify economic 
fluctuations.  According to Kaldor, advertising may be responsible for increasing the 
ranks of the short-term unemployed, even if it does raise the average employment 
rate. “Hence,” Kaldor writes, “any beneficial effect on the average level of 
employment would have to be set against the increased instability of employment” 
(11).  Given, also, that intensive advertising failed to prevent mass unemployment 
during the Great Depression, Kaldor concludes: “As a possible method of ensuring an 
adequate and steady demand for labour [sic], advertising comes out pretty badly” 
(11).  
Kaldor’s point is worth noting.  As studies of life satisfaction show, 
unemployment reduces happiness levels substantially and, even after returning to 
work, some residual unhappiness lingers.  If advertising increases employment 
instability, as Kaldor suggests, the addition to welfare associated with increased 
employment must be set against the diminishment of welfare that happiness 
researchers (e.g., Layard 2005; Graham and Pettinato 2002a; Clark et al. 2001; Di 





In comments similar to Kaldor’s, Corden (1961) notes that some apologists 
maintain that advertising, over time, increases the average employment rate by 
generating sufficient demand to ensure that the output of mass-production is sold.  
According to these ad proponents, even if advertising intensifies business-cycle 
fluctuations and increases short-term unemployment, it still increases welfare, 
because it facilitates full employment in the long run.  Corden, however, has no 
sympathy for that argument.  In his view, the “necessity to maintain full employment 
would be adequate justification for advertising only if there were no other way of 
creating demand for goods” (11).  As he sees it, however, that is not the case.  
Governments can step in with a wide range of monetary and fiscal policies to 
stimulate aggregate demand.  They can, for example, cut taxes to increase consumer 
spending, or they can lower interest rates and thereby encourage private capital 
formation, or they can increase spending on public infrastructure.  “It is not necessary 
to urge consumers to buy more soap or cigarettes,” he writes (11).  “In fact,” Corden 
continues, “the argument that advertising raises consumer spending and so increases 
employment can be stood on its head to provide a powerful criticism of the economic 
effects of advertising” (12).  For one thing, he argues, advertising stimulates demand; 
thus, its effects must be pernicious in times of inflation.  In addition, increased 
consumer spending must come at the expense of public works, and government 
projects also provide employment. 
Corden speculates that disallowing a tax deduction for advertising might 
reduce employment in industries that are directly associated with advertising, such as 




demand through advertising, such as manufacturers of toiletries and patent medicines.  
To avoid hardship among the affected workers and industries, Corden suggests 
reducing the deduction gradually and creating government jobs for displaced labor. 
 
Working more; relaxing less 
 
Examining another aspect of advertising’s impact on employment, 
Braithwaite (1928) explains that “all advertisement is competitive, either between 
commodities or between commodities and leisure” (24).  In her view, advertising has 
increased consumers’ wants to such an extent that it has tipped the balance between 
the utility of commodities and the disutility of work, by constantly promoting the 
attributes of goods. 
Decades later, Fraser and Paton (2003) find that work hours in industrialized 
countries remained relatively constant—even though wages rose exponentially—
during the second half of the twentieth century.  The authors attribute the constancy 
of work hours to steadily increasing societal preferences for consumption over 
leisure.  According to Fraser and Paton, causality runs only one way, from advertising 
to hours worked, and the positive relationship between advertising and work hours is 
true for both men and women.  
Similarly, Brack and Cowling (1983) confirm Braithwaite’s (1928) 
speculation that advertising tips the balance between work and leisure in favor of 
work.  Analyzing a thirty-year span, Brack and Cowling find a negative relationship 




note that although aggregate income grew exponentially in the three decades 
following World War II, an expected, corresponding gain in leisure failed to occur.  
Summing up the conventional wisdom about work and leisure in the post-war 
period, Blakelock writes in 1960: 
As industrialization of our society has increased, the number of work 
hours per week has declined.  Every indication is that this trend will 
continue, shorter working hours being an alternative to technological 
unemployment resulting from increasing automation.  As a 
concomitant to the decrease in the hours of work, . . . there is 
automatically an increase in the hours of leisure (446).   
Thus, the post-war expectation was that people would soon have too much, 
not too little leisure (Blakelock, 1960; and Hendee, 1971).  According to Ngai (2006), 
however, the average weekly hours of work for the U.S. working-age population 
(ages 15-64) has actually shown a substantial increase since 1960, rising from 
approximately 24 to 28 hours. 
The discrepancy between the post-war predictions of increased leisure in 
coming decades and the post-war findings that work-hours in the U.S. have, instead, 
increased is certainly worth noting.  Are increasing advertising levels in the post-war 
period responsible for this discrepancy?  Perhaps.  According to Brack and Cowling, 
advertising encourages workers to favor consumption over leisure by arousing desires 
for the goods that ads promote.  Reekie and Allen’s (1983) cross-sectional analysis of 
twenty-four countries also offers empirical support for the notion that advertising 




On a related topic, Courard-Hauri (2005) finds that workers reduce their well-
being by spending too much time on the job and too little time engaged in other 
activities.  In his view, individuals’ access to their internal utility functions is 
imperfect, leading them to “negatively affective overconsumption” (1).  According to 
the author, advertising may exploit consumers’ transient desires for the products they 
see promoted, and it may thus exacerbate their tendencies to overconsume.  In order 
to increase their capability to consume (and overconsume), they generate more 
income by working long hours. 
In sum, while the inclusion of many variables is probably necessary to provide 
a full explanation, the combined work of Braithwaite, Brack and Cowling, Reekie and 
Allen, Fraser and Paton, and Courard-Hauri (among others) seems to indicate that 
advertising has played a role in shifting the balance of preferences between work and 
leisure by perpetually emphasizing the utility of consumption. 
 
Leisure as consumption (or consumption as leisure) 
 
Offering a different perspective, Demsetz (1968) claims that advertising 
promotes not only goods but leisure, as well.  “Who,” he asks, “can claim that the 
promotional campaigns of travel agencies, hotels, airlines, and makers of boats and 
camping equipment have not whetted his appetite for more leisure time?”  Certainly, 
Demsetz makes a valid point.  What he fails to note, however, is that advertising 
promotes leisure as a consumption activity.  Consuming goods (such as travel-agency 
services, hotel rooms, airline tickets, speedboats, water skis, tents, sleeping bags, etc.) 




that people sit on their front porches and chat with their neighbors?)  The enjoyment 
of the forms of leisure that ads promote takes money, and getting that money 
generally takes work.  As Layard (2005) explains, if people “work harder, they can 
indeed consume more but only at the sacrifice of something—their family life or their 
tennis or whatever” (152).  They can consume more, in other words, if they sacrifice 
leisure.  Whereas engaging in many forms of leisure (e.g., conversing with families 
and friends, participating in community activities, observing nature) requires not 
hours at work but time away from work, advertising promotes the sorts of leisure 
activities that require working more hours to acquire the funds to buy the recreational 
goods and services that ads promote. 
 
How advertising impacts savings 
 
How does advertising affect the amount consumers save?  As Kaldor (1950-
1951) explains, devising a statistical method to reveal the amount that consumers 
would save if there were less advertising is impossible; nevertheless, a number of 
studies find a negative relationship between advertising and saving.  That relationship 
appears to be particularly strong when consumers have access to credit, and as 
Corden (1961) notes, various forms of credit are generally available to low- and 
middle-income people to enable them to spend beyond their incomes.   
Not everyone agrees that advertising affects savings, however.  For his part, 
Schmalensee (1972) maintains that advertising “cannot influence the decision to 




relationship, Solow (1968) writes: “It is open to legitimate doubt that advertising has 
any detectable effect at all on the sum total of consumer spending or, in other words, 
on the choice between spending and saving” (48).   
Taylor and Weiserbs (1972) disagree with Solow, however.  The results of 
their study provide evidence that advertising may influence the way consumers 
allocate their incomes when making choices between spending and saving.  
Specifically, they find that as advertising goes up, consumption goes up, and saving 
goes down.  Similarly, Jung and Seldon (1995) suggest that ads induce consumers to 
increase the amount that they currently consume at the expense of the amount they 
can consume in the future (i.e., at the expense of their savings). 
Jacobson and Nicosia (1981) investigate the impact of the past year’s ad 
expenditures on the current year’s savings.  Their results indicate that when 
advertising expenditures increase in the previous year, consumption in that year also 
increases, but consumption in the next year decreases; and when the past-year’s 
consumption increases, consumers have less money to spend or save in the current 
year.  Thus, the authors find a statistically significant, negative relationship between 
the past-year’s advertising expenditures and the current-year’s consumption, which, 
according to the authors, may be evidence of a “budget effect.”  
Quarles and Jeffres (1983) take an international approach.  Drawing on annual 
data from fifty-three nations, the researchers find that disposable income “severely” 
constrains consumption; thus, advertising can do little to increase spending at the 
expense of savings.  The authors note, however, that their analysis describes spending 




behavior within individual nations.  Acknowledging an additional limitation on their 
analysis, the authors explain that they are unable to deny the possibility that some ads, 
in some contexts, might overcome the constraints imposed by limited disposable 
income, even though those constraints hold for aggregate spending across fifty-three 
nations.   
Focusing on savings in the U.S., Summers (1987) advocates reducing the tax 
deduction for advertising expenditures in order to reduce consumers’ exposure to 
advertising and, thereby, inhibit consumer spending and increase consumer saving.  
Over all, the literature seems to indicate that advertising does affect 
households’ decisions concerning spending and saving.  It influences those decisions 
by encouraging people to gratify their desires to consume in the present rather than to 
save for the future.  According to some studies, when credit is unavailable the 
relationship between advertising and savings is likely to be negative, and when credit 









Most economic observers presume that advertising subsidizes media, and 
many ad proponents justify advertising for that reason.  Some attempt to explain why 
it is in the advertiser’s self-interest to provide this subsidy.  In general, their 
explanations acknowledge that advertising is a “bad,” which consumers must be paid 
to accept.  As the common explanation goes, firms subsidize communications media 
in order to expose consumers to advertisements.  As a result of the subsidy, the 
medium showcasing the ad is able to offer information or entertainment at a lower 
price.  Due to the medium’s subsidy-enabled affordability, more consumers are able 
to enjoy its content and, at the same time, be exposed to the advertising messages that 
it contains than would have been the case without the subsidy. 
Kaldor (1950-1951) explains that the expectation of higher demand for the 
advertised goods and services provides the economic motivation for the subsidy.  
Advertising, Kaldor argues, “is not supplied in response to consumers’ demand,” nor 
is the amount of the advertising expenditure determined by consumers’ preferences, 
“as registered through the price mechanism, but by purely extraneous considerations” 
(4).   
According to Comanor and Wilson (1974), “the relevant price for most 
[advertising] messages is negative, since consumers are paid to consume them” (14).  




consumers to compensate them for accepting ads could be much higher than the cost 
of the media subsidy.  So, rather than pay consumers to accept ads directly, 
advertisers subsidize media content and, in that way, compensate consumers 
indirectly.  By lacing their ads throughout the medium’s content, firms make it 
difficult for consumers to enjoy that content without being exposed to ads.  According 
to Comanor and Wilson, the ads “are in effect forced on the consumer of the 
medium” (15).  Firms are thus seen to serve their self-interest by subsidizing media. 
 Telser (1978) seems to agree.  As he sees it, advertisers provide entertainment 
or information to compensate those who receive their messages, because “the implicit 
market clearing price for . . . advertising messages is negative” (88).  According to 
Telser, advertisers are willing to pay for the media content because some consumers 
will purchase the product after observing the ad.  
 
Should advertising subsidize media? 
 
Some economists question whether advertising should subsidize media.  
Corden (1961), for example, notes that a common defense of advertising is that it 
“possibly provides the economic basis for the survival of a large number of 
independent newspapers and magazines” by supplying subsidies (13).  In the absence 
of advertising, the argument goes, many papers would be unable to survive without 
raising their prices.  “But why has the press to be subsidized at all?” Corden asks (22; 
italics in the original).  If other businesses are able to raise the prices of their products 
as necessary to survive, why are newspapers and magazines unable to set their prices 




Corden (1961) discusses the impact of reducing the ad subsidy on 
concentration in the newspaper industry.  As he sees it, if the subsidy to media were 
reduced or eliminated, newspaper prices would have to rise, and the demand for 
newspaper copies would undoubtedly fall.  He speculates, however, that the number 
of separate publications might not decline if advertising subsidies fell for all 
newspapers—high- as well as low-circulation.  According to Corden, when small or 
new publications receive subsidies from advertisers, their numbers increase.  When 
large, existing papers receive subsidies, however, the effect of the subsidies is to 
strengthen the position of the already strong against weak rivals and potential 
entrants.  “Advertising,” Corden writes, “helps to make the newspaper industry Big 
Business” (24).   
Doyle (1968) contends that the current supply of media is unlikely to 
represent an optimal allocation of resources, since the media must be subsidized in 
order to sustain demand at the current level.  In an argument similar to Corden’s, 
Doyle maintains that if consumers were willing to pay the true cost of media, then no 
subsidies would be required to sustain sales.  For Doyle, the argument that ads 
subsidize communications media fails to provide a cogent defense for advertising.  It 
is an especially weak argument if advertising has detrimental social effects, he argues.  
Although the supply of media services would, no doubt, be reduced by a severe 
cutback in advertising, Doyle seems to doubt that social welfare would suffer as a 
result.  As he sees it, “unless consumers are willing to pay an economic price for 
[media services], there is no reason to believe that the present supply produces an 




According to Simon (1970), advertising’s support for media “is not a 
justification of advertising [since there] are many other possible economic 
arrangements . . . that would be no more costly to society in the long run” (276; italics 
in the original).  
 
Media revenues: ad subsidies vs. sales 
 
Although most economists take as given the supposition that advertising 
subsidizes media, the Economists Advisory Group (1967) rejects that belief.  
According to the Group, advertisers and media trade in the market for advertising 
space in order to maximize private—not social—benefits; thus, in their view, the 
common representation of advertising as a subsidy to media is “quite incorrect.”   
Despite the analysis of the Economists Advisory Group, most observers agree 
that advertising subsidizes information media.  Corden (1961) compares the 
contributions to total revenues made by advertising to those made by sales for 
newspapers and magazines.  In the case of one large, representative newspaper, he 
finds that advertising accounts for 39 percent of total revenues.  Corden speculates 
that “some of the large-circulation national papers could have survived completely 
without advertising and without having to raise their prices” for a time after World 
War II.  He acknowledges, nevertheless, that some publications are highly dependent 
on the subsidies provided by classified advertising (4).  
More than four decades after the publication of Corden’s article, Evans and 




revenues—and probably all of their gross margins—from advertisers.”  Often, the 
prices readers pay for print media are “something close to or below the marginal cost 
of printing and distribution” (8).  In fact, Evans and Schmalensee maintain, some 
media, such as broadcast television and radio, yellow-page directories, certain 
newspapers, and most web portals, are entirely subsidized by advertising.    
 
Advertisers’ media costs 
 
A number of studies address advertisers’ media costs.  In the case of a 
newspaper’s costs, advertising’s share is proportional to its share of newsprint space.  
According to Corden (1961) newsprint “is usually a very important part of a 
newspaper’s expenses” (5).  In fact, newsprint (along with ink) accounts for almost 
half of the expenditures of the large, representative paper in Cordon’s 1961 study.  
The marginal cost of newspaper advertising remains high today.  For that 
reason, some print advertisers are turning to the Internet.  Media analyst John Morton 
comments that online advertising requires no infrastructure (e.g., printing presses and 
delivery trucks).  In fact, he adds, “some studies have indicated that 40 cents . . . of 
advertising revenue on a Web site for a newspaper can be more profitable, actually, 
than $1 on the newsprint side” (NewsHour 2006).   On a related point, Dupont (1997) 
notes that the marginal cost of additional content in Internet “e-zines” is essentially 
zero, since they require no ink, paper, or postage. 
Simon (1970) explains that when additional media outlets for ads become 




paribus.  When the cost of a factor of production falls, total output typically 
increases.  Thus, according to Simon, all else remaining the same, an increase in 
media outlets lowers ad prices and increases their number.  
Brown (2000) discusses the effect of an increase in television outlets on 
advertising costs.  He explains that the digitization of broadcast signals is narrowing 
the bandwidth required for television and radio and therefore expanding the carrying 
capacity of the broadcast frequency spectrum.  As a result, channel scarcity is being 
virtually eliminated.  Brown’s model suggests that as the number of channels 
increases, the average audience size will decrease.  With programs drawing smaller 
audiences, average ad cost per audience member will rise, and revenues per program 
as well as profits per channel will fall.  Therefore, although digitization has the 
potential to generate a sizeable increase in the number of broadcast channels, Brown 
concludes that market forces may prevent that from occurring.   
Addressing a different aspect of the media-cost issue, Bagwell (2003) 
suggests that advertisers’ profits may rise with rising ad costs.  As he explains it, the 
effect on advertising of a cost increase is a decrease in the quantity of advertising and 
a reduction in the elasticity of demand for the products of firms that continue to 
advertise after the cost increase.  Due to the elasticity effect, Bagwell explains, 
(remaining) advertisers tend to benefit when the cost of advertising goes up (so long 








Some economists conceive of advertising as having a two-sided nature.  
Comanor and Wilson (1974), for example, describe two different demands, with two 
different sets of prices, in the market for advertising.  Constituting one demand are 
firms that are willing to pay media for access to prospective consumers.  Constituting 
the other demand are consumers who want information about products and typically 
‘pay’ a negative price for the ads they demand.  
Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (2004) describe advertising’s two-sided 
nature in a slightly different way.  In their view, media owners act as the interface 
between two groups of consumers: advertisers, who demand ad space, and media 
consumers, who demand entertainment or information.  Concerning television, the 
authors explain that the “ratios [of programming to advertising] play the same role as 
prices in usual horizontal differentiation models” (657).  By differentiating their 
programming-to-advertising ratios, broadcasters compete for both consumer groups 
(i.e., advertisers and audiences).  Cross-externalities exist, however, because 
advertisers want to increase the size of the audience that receives their ads, while 
television audiences tend to dislike ads and avoid them whenever possible.   
Some economists describe advertising as an example of a “two-sided 
platform,” with media suppliers and media consumers constituting the two sides.  
Evans and Schmalensee (2005), for example, explain that two-sided platforms “cater 
to two or more distinct groups of customers, facilitating value-creating interactions 
between them” (1).  In some cases, the authors note, two-sided platforms charge 




supplied; in other cases, two-sided platforms supply the good for free; and in still 
other cases they actually compensate recipients of the good. 
According to Evans and Schmalensee, television, radio, magazines, 
newspapers, and web portals are examples of ad-supported media that are based on 
the two-sided business model.  In the case of ad-supported media, the media-platform 
either buys or creates non-ad content, which it uses to attract the public, with the 
intention of exposing the public to ads.  The media-platforms attract advertisers by 
offering them access to the segment of the public that their content attracts.  
Also noting the two-sided nature of advertising are Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), 
Wilbur (2004), and Anderson (2005). 
 
Cross-price elasticity of demand for media 
 
The cross-price elasticity of demand for media seems not to have been 
particularly salient to the early students of the economics of advertising.  Toward the 
end of the 20th century, however, researchers began to investigate the extent to which 
one advertising medium substitutes for another.  Busterna (1987), for example, finds 
that the coefficients of the cross-elasticity of demand between newspapers and his 
other sample ad-media (i.e., daytime network television, evening network television, 
national spot television, network radio, national spot radio, consumer magazines, and 
outdoor/billboard) indicate that newspapers reside in a separate product market for 




mass media, and they do not compete with other media for the attention of consumers 
or the dollars of advertisers. 
Seldon and Jung (1993) report that calculated elasticities of substitution 
indicate that various advertising media, such as broadcast, print, and direct mail, are 
“fairly good substitutes” (3).  However, the estimated own-price elasticities suggest to 
the authors that demand for broadcast is the least elastic of any advertising media.  As 
a result, the authors conclude that broadcast is the most effective (and least 
substitutable) of the various advertising media. 
Bush (2002) finds that substitutability of advertising among various forms of 
local media (i.e., newspaper, radio, and television) is weak based on the ordinary 
cross-price elasticities and elasticities of substitution that he estimates.  While his 
results indicate that the demand for advertising time on local television and radio 
stations is inelastic, he finds that the elasticity of demand for retail advertising in local 
newspapers is approximately unity and negative.  According to Bush, between local 
television and radio, the elasticity of substitution is not statistically different from 
zero; rather, the cross-price elasticities indicate that local radio and television 
advertisements are complementary inputs for firms’ sales efforts, as are local 
newspaper and television ads.   
Seldon, Jewell, and O’Brien (2000), examining beer-firm data, find evidence 
that three media categories, television, print, and radio seem to be highly 
substitutable.  
According to Silk, Klein, and Berndt (2002), substitute relationships among 




television, and spot television by national advertisers, although weak, are slightly 
more prevalent than complementary ones. 
Ekelund, Ford, and Jackson (1999) find low substitutability between local 
radio markets and other media.  They conclude that the elasticity of substitution is so 
low, in fact, “that radio advertising is an antitrust market” (239).  The same 
researchers (Ekelund, Ford, and Jackson, 2000) find substantial substitutability in the 
local television market, however.  Specifically, they find that newspaper and radio 
ads are substitutes for television ads.  In a related study of the New Zealand ad 
market, O’Donovan, Rae, and Grimes (2000) report that newspapers and magazines 
seem to be complements for each other but substitutes for television advertising.  
Tackling the impact of a new advertising medium, Silk, Klein, and Berndt 
(2001) note that the adaptability of the Internet enables it to serve a wide array of 
advertisers.  According to the authors, the Internet “looms as a potential substitute or 
complement for all of the major categories of existing media” (129), and “represents a 
major long-run threat to established patterns of intermedia rivalry” (145).  
  
Own-price elasticity of demand for media 
 
How sensitive are advertisers to media price increases?  When prices go up, 
do advertisers demand less media space (or time)?  A number of economists tackle 
these questions by examining the elasticity of demand for media by advertisers. 
According to Simon (1970), whether a firm’s total advertising expenditures 




elasticity of demand for advertising.  Baye (1981) finds that a firm’s price elasticity 
of demand for advertising determines whether its ad expenditures fall or rise when it 
increases (or decreases) the physical number of ads it purchases.  If the firm’s 
demand for advertising is inelastic and the quantity of ads it purchases remains 
constant, its expenditures rise with increases in price.  On the other hand, if its 
demand is elastic, as the price of ads goes up, the quantity of ads the firm purchases 
goes down, and its total advertising expenditures rise or fall, depending on the extent 
of the price increase and the number of ads it purchases.  If the price of ads falls, and 
it falls far enough, then a firm may run more ads than it did before the price reduction 
and still have lower total ad expenditures.  
In a study of media markets in South Africa, Reekie (1986) estimates that the 
elasticity of demand for advertising is well above unity in some cases and in most 
other cases is nearer unity than zero.  Simon (1970) notes that the price elasticity of 
demand for advertising, over all, is far less than the elasticity of demand “for a single 
radio station’s time” (77) or for time or space in any other sort of media outlet.  
Comparing different media, Silk, Klein, and Berndt (2002) find that the aggregate 
demand for direct mail, magazines, newspapers, outdoor, network radio, spot radio, 
network television, and spot television by national advertisers is own-price inelastic.  
Bowman (1976) finds that although the price elasticity of demand for viewers 
of commercial messages is not significantly different from one, the supply of 
television network audiences is highly inelastic.  Bowman writes: “Our elasticity 
estimates imply that small decreases in the number of hours of programming offered 




size (as examples) will not change or will very slightly increase the total revenues of 
the networks” (266). 
Several studies focus on the elasticity of demand for television 
advertisements.  Hendry (1992) finds that the long-term price elasticity for TV 
advertising (in the United Kingdom) is about -2, and is, therefore, quite elastic.  
Masih (1999), however, finds that the price elasticity of demand for television 
advertising (in Sydney, Australia) is near unity in the long term, but substantially less 
in the short term.  While acknowledging that his results differ from Hendry’s findings 
of elastic demand, Masih reports that his estimates are consistent with the results of 
studies by Cave and Swann (1986) and Tavakoli, Swann, and Cave (1989).  And, in a 
study of the New Zealand advertising market, Allen, Eagle, and Rose (2002) find that 
scarcities of both broadcast airtime and potential viewers make the demand for TV 
advertising, in the short run, relatively inelastic.  
According to Seldon and Jung (1993) the estimated own-price elasticities of 
various communications’ media indicate that demand for broadcast is the least elastic 
of all advertising media.  Similarly, Bush (2002) finds that advertisers’ demand for 
time on local radio and television stations to air their commercials is inelastic. 
Due to the short-run inelasticity of demand for television airtime, TV 
broadcasters reap “embarrassingly large profits,” according to Corden (1961).  
Similarly, Anderson and Coate (2005) find that exclusive access to viewers allows 
television broadcasters to exercise market power against advertisers.  Due to this 






Ad subsidies and media independence 
 
If advertising subsidizes media, does it enable media freedom or engender 
media dependence?  Although the early economic literature dealing with this question 
is sparse, Kaldor (1950-1951) notes a dichotomy of opinions.  Doyle (1968) suggests 
that the notion that advertising promotes media independence lacks cogency; rather, 
the subsidy may instill in media a dependence that “opens it to pressures and 
influence from advertisers which threaten the integrity of the editorial comment and 
affect the composition” (591).  As Corden (1961) explains, advertisers can threaten to 
withdraw a subsidy, if a medium they sponsor, in some way, threatens their interests.  
“Apart from direct influence,” he writes, “there could also be some indirect influence 
brought to bear, in so far as papers propounding certain views do not get the amount 
of advertising support that they could expect if their policies changed” (23). 
 
Advertising and media diversity 
 
In defending advertising’s social role, the ad lobby argues that advertising 
subsidizes small and minority media outlets and thereby enables their existence.  The 
economic literature provides scant support for that argument, however.  According to 
Corden (1961), for example, advertising expenditures actually seem to improve the 




A number of reports indicate that advertisers have often discriminated against 
minority broadcasters and programming aimed at minority audiences.  Representative 
Cardiss Collins, for example, notes that the National Association of Black-Owned 
Broadcasters reports that “black-owned radio and television stations, print media, and 
black-owned advertising agencies are subjected to systematic discrimination” from 
advertisers (Congressional Record 1991, E32).  According to a study by the 
Leadership Council on Advertising Issues (Federal Communications Commission 
1994), minority radio stations “are disproportionately affected by changes in 
advertising revenues” and tend to be financially insecure.  Also, Kofi Ofori of the 
Civil Rights Forum reports that ad revenues for minority-targeted broadcast stations 
are lower if the stations are minority-owned than if they are non-minority owned 
(Association of National Advertisers, 1998). 
According to Huntemann (1999), the radio industry in the U.S. “has 
undergone unprecedented merger activity” in the wake of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act; consequently, the industry is now highly concentrated.  
“Advertising dollars and economies of scale rule the bottom line of large radio 
groups,” Huntemann writes.  “As a result, formats attracting high-consumption 
demographics are replacing formats that appeal to working-class, urban, and 
nonwhite audiences” (390).  According to Einstein (2003) this policy change came 
about due to exponential growth in media outlets in the 1980s and early 1990s, which 
stretched advertising dollars thin.  The Federal Communications Commission sought 
changes in communications policy, in part, to promote the viability of diverse media 




stations to achieve economies of scale, and, broadcasters would invest the resulting 
increase in profits in diverse programming.  Instead, Huntemann (1999) finds, 
advertisers have continued to demand large audiences from corporations that, post-
consolidation, control larger audience segments, and the result has been a decline in 
minority programming.  
Siegelman and Waldfogel (2001) find that “market provision of radio 
programming is beset by possible inefficient underprovision of formats appealing to 
small audiences whose social benefit of programming—but not advertising revenue—
exceeds their costs” (n.p.).  While majority-group listeners derive programming 
benefits through “preference externalities” (i.e., their preferences dominate 
popularity-based programming), those externalities are positive only for the majority 
group.  Thus, the authors “expect problems of inefficient underprovision to be more 
likely for small minority populations” (n.p.). 
Although Napoli (2002) finds a negative relationship between minority 
prominence and the value to advertisers of radio station audiences, Brown and 
Cavazos (2003) find that “minority programs do not appear to suffer from any 
advertiser bias” (13).  Nevertheless, Brown and Cavazos (2002) note that “despite the 
absence of bias, the advertiser-supported broadcast market likely produces less than 
the socially optimal amount of African American programming” (227). 
Concerning diversity in television programming, Owen, Beebe, and Manning 
(1974) find that the system of advertiser-supported media tends to supply wasteful 
duplication at the expense of diversity in programming.  Einstein (2003) explains that 




have so few program choices” (vii).  In her view, this reliance affects program content 
by limiting program length, by creating “a ‘lowest common denominator’ mentality,” 
and by restricting controversial or product-denigrating topics.  Lowest-common-
denominator programming fails to serve the needs of “audiences that are not 
attractive to advertisers, specifically older, poorer, and minority audiences,” she 
writes (4). 
While some observers point to the niche programming (e.g., golf, cooking, 
and historical programs) that cable channels offer and argue that diversity in 
television programming is increasing, Einstein disagrees.  As she sees it, the 
appearance of diversity is just that—an appearance.  “Even if programming is geared 
toward a niche market, that market has to be large enough to attract advertisers,” she 
writes (4).  In order to attract a large enough audience to satisfy advertisers, niche 
programs tend to be of the lowest-common-denominator variety.   
According to Einstein, the same pool of producers creates most of the 
programs that are aired on cable and broadcast television.  Thus, TV shows tend to be 
similar, wherever they are aired.  In addition, some media conglomerates own 
multiple cable networks, and some companies that own broadcast networks also own 
cable networks.  Summing up, Einstein observes that reliance on advertising means 
that popularity determines the content of programs, “because a mass audience [is] the 
product being sold to advertisers” (11). 
Reaching a parallel conclusion, Anderson and Coate (2005) maintain that the 
“market may . . . misallocate resources by providing multiple varieties of popular 




types” (36).  Since broadcasters want to entice advertisers by offering the sorts of 
programs that attract the largest audiences, the market may undersupply socially 
valuable programs.  
Similarly, Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) find that commercial media (television 
stations, for example) tend to offer similar content because they reap higher profits 
when they minimize the amount they differentiate.  According to the authors, their 
model shows “that media have incentives to minimize the extent of differentiation 
between them,” based on advertising’s assumed informative role and its reception by 
audiences “as an ultimate nuisance” (291).  When “media tacitly coordinate . . . in 
order to reduce advertising levels,” and television stations minimize the differences 
between their programs, advertisers choose to reduce the quantity of ads they 
purchase, and the products that they choose to advertise are then displayed in a less-
cluttered showcase (316).  With a lower quantity of ads, stations are able to negotiate 
higher rates for their commercial minutes, and advertisers, the authors maintain, “gain 
higher margins on product sales” (291).   
In a similar vein, Brown and Cavazos (2003) explain that broadcasters supply 
a public good (i.e., non-rival, non-excludable programming) and profit by selling 
advertisers time and access to audiences.  According to the authors, advertisers’ 
preferences generate a market failure by distorting program choice: Advertisers want 
the program content to provide the best possible “frame” for their ads.  This means 
that program content tends to be uncontroversial, light and “unchallenging.” In the 





Beyond entertainment programs, advertisers’ preference for attractive frames 
for their ads extends to news programs.  Thus, the virtually endless string of cable-
news programs (and network-news stories) that have been devoted to murdered-or-
missing, young, beautiful, blonde women, over the past decade or so, might be 
explained by advertisers’ desire for programs that target a prime demographic group 
and provide light and unchallenging frames for their ads.  And, all the while, 
substantive, but challenging, stories remain untold for lack of advertiser support. 
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005) note that demand by advertisers to contact 
potential customers underscores the business model for most media industries.  Since 
the object of program sponsorship is to reach the segment of the public that spends 
the most money on advertised products, media outlets offer content catering to that 
group.  “Competition for viewers of the demographics most desired by advertisers 
implies that programming choices will be biased towards the tastes of those with such 













When pollsters ask people to name something that would improve the quality 
of their lives, most people respond: “money” (Campbell 1981).  Thus, U.S. 
policymakers—believing that economic growth leads to higher personal income and 
equating increased income with increased well-being—design legislation and 
administer programs with economic expansion as their goal.  In pursuing that end, 
they are generally successful; since World War II, annual economic growth has been 
the rule with few exceptions.  Evidence gleaned from numerous studies suggests, 
however, that increased income does not necessarily equate with increased welfare 
(e.g., Brickman et al. 1978; Diener et al. 1993; Diener and Oishi 2000; Easterlin 
1995; Kasser and Ryan 2001; Myers 2000; Ryan et al. 1999; Sheldon and Kasser 
1998).  The literature indicates that once people have enough money to meet their 
essential needs, increased income generally fails to improve their lives significantly.  
In fact, as Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002) note, a number of studies conclude that 
rising income predicts higher divorce rates (Clydesdale, 1997), increased stress 




enjoyment of ordinary activities (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978).  The 
literature provides, in other words, some evidence that increasing income may 
actually be detrimental to welfare.  
According to Diener and Seligman (2004), “income, a good surrogate 
historically when basic needs were unmet, is now a weak surrogate for well-being in 
wealthy nations” (10).  And while domestic policymakers continue to focus on the 
economic consequences of their policies, the economic indicators on which they rely 
“omit, and even mislead about what society values” (1).  Meanwhile, quality-of-life 
studies, spanning across behavioral- and social-science disciplines (e.g., economics, 
psychology, neuroscience, political science, anthropology, and sociology), point to 
various factors that actually make substantial contributions to individual and societal 
well-being.   
Among those factors, good relationships seem to top every list (Layard 2005; 
Ryff 2005), and family relationships are the most important of all (Easterlin 2003; 
Helliwell 2003; Juster 1985; Kasser 2002; Lane 1993, 2000; Layard 2005).  Some 
studies find a positive relationship between marriage and well-being (Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1999; Graham and Pettinato 2002a; Helliwell 2003); others find a strong 
positive relationship between family breakup and unhappiness (Easterlin 2003; 
Helliwell 2003; Lane 2000; Layard 2005).   
Ranking high among contributors to well-being are friendship (Diener et al 
1999; Juster 1985; Lane 2000; Layard 2005; Scitovsky 1977) and participation in 





Whereas rising income, as noted above, is a poor predictor of well-being in 
wealthy nations like the United States, satisfaction with income is positively 
associated with well-being (Blanchflower and Oswald 1999; Diener et al. 1999; 
Graham and Pettinato 2002a; Lane 1993; Layard 2005).  Studies show that having a 
satisfying job contributes greatly to happiness (Andrews and Withey 1976; Diener 
and Seligman 2004; Juster 1985; Lane 2000; Layard 2005; Scitovsky 1977) and, not 
surprisingly, that unemployment is a major cause of unhappiness (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1999; Clark and Oswald 1994; Di Tella et al. 2001; Diener and Seligman 
2004; Frey and Stutzer 2002; Graham and Pettinato 2002a; Helliwell 2003; Layard 
2005; Kposowa 2001; Viinamaeki et al. 1996).  And while employment is clearly a 
factor, research shows that leisure is important, as well (Csikszentmihalyi 1999; 
Diener 2000). 
Additional studies find that having a purpose in life (Helliwell 2003; Ryff 
2005), an upbeat attitude (Diener et al. 1999; Ryff 2005), and an even temperament 
(Diener et al. 1999) increase well-being.  Moreover, studies link well-being with 
experiencing: autonomy (Lane 1993, 2000; Layard 2005; Ryff 2005), personal 
growth (Csikszentmihalyi 1999; Diener et al. 1999; Helliwell 2003; Lane 2000; 
Layard 2005; Ryff 2005; Scitovsky 1976; Van Boven and Gilovich 2003), security 
(Kasser 2002; Layard 2005), and health and longevity (Diener and Seligman 2004; 
Easterlin 2003; Helliwell 2003; Layard 2005).   
The preceding factors are only some of the contributors to happiness that 
appear in the literature; nevertheless, they are among the most often discussed and 




among the major factors contributing to well-being.  On the flip side, numerous 
studies (e.g., Diener and Biswas-Diener 2002; Kasser 2002; Kasser and Ryan 1993; 
Richins and Dawson 1992; Sirgy 1997) conclude that materialistic values are a major 
contributor to unhappiness.  As we shall see, advertising contributes to the adoption 





Chapter 7: Advertising’s Impact on the Individual and Society  
 
Advertising at its best is making people feel that without their product, you’re a loser. 
Nancy Shalek, president of the Shalek Agency  
 
 
Linking advertising to materialism 
 
Researchers have confirmed what the candid, ad-agency president, Nancy 
Shalek, implied: Advertisements are often designed to make the people who observe 
them feel inferior—like losers (Halliwell and Dittmar 2004; Richins 1991).  A 
number of studies report that people often rely on advertisements to provide measures 
of social comparison (Groesz et al. 2002; Martin and Kennedy 1993; Shaw and 
Waller 1995).  As Kasser et al. (2004) note, ads often “show idealized versions of life 
within the context of the advertisement” and engender feelings of inferiority by 
engaging exceptionally attractive people to “display products amidst a level of wealth 
that is unattainable by the average consumer” (16-17).  Between the fade in and fade 
out of a typical commercial, an actor discovers that a vexing problem (“ring around 
the collar,” perhaps) can be solved by using the advertised product.  The ad then 
leaves viewers to compare themselves to the actor they have seen and to deduce what 
they must do to be transformed—in one way, at least—into a winner.   
But if advertisers are, in fact, trying to make people feel inferior, what 




implied, to make people feel miserable so that they can then convince the poor 
wretches that the advertised product—and only the advertised product—will make 
them feel better?  If that is their aim, advertisers generally miss their mark (Brack and 
Cowling 1983).  Few people (with the exception of very young children) are 
consistently gullible.   On the other hand, as Kasser et al. (2004) explain, if the 
comparisons that people make between their own attributes and those of the idealized 
people they see in ads “heighten feelings of personal insecurity,” the ads “may then 
activate compensatory mechanisms designed to alleviate negative feelings.”  
Although people can choose among a variety of compensatory methods in response to 
those negative feelings, “the likelihood of [their] choosing a materialistic or 
consumption-oriented method is increased by the fact that the ads themselves always 
present a very clear option for feeling better. . . .”  And that option is, of course, to 
“buy the product!” (Kasser et al. 2004, 17). 
As Schudson (1984) explains: 
Advertising might be said to lead people to a belief in something.  
Advertising may make people believe they are inadequate without 
Product X and that Product X will satisfactorily manage their 
inadequacies.  More likely, it may remind them of inadequacies they 
have already felt and may lead them, once at least, to try a new product 
that just might help, even though they are well aware that it probably 
will not.  Alternatively, advertising may lead people to believe 




all sorts of ills, medical or social or political, even if a given ad fails to 
persuade that a given product is efficacious (224). 
Moreover, advertising may inculcate “the view that products and their acquisition are 
the basis for determining one’s personal worth” (Kunkel et al. 2001).  It may, in other 
words, make people materialistic. 
Buijzen and Valkenburg (2003b) propose two reasons to explain why 
advertising enhances materialism: (1) “[Advertising] is designed to arouse desires for 
products that would not otherwise be salient”; and (2) advertising “propagates the 
ideology that possessions are important and that desirable qualities—such as beauty, 
success, and happiness—can be obtained only by material possessions” (485).  
Television seems to be particularly effective in propagating that ideology, as 
indicated by a number of studies that report a positive relationship between time spent 
watching television commercials and adherence to materialistic values.  Studies 
drawing on samples across different age groups (e.g., Adler et al. 1980; Greenberg 
and Brand 1993; Kasser and Ryan 2001; Rahtz, Sirgy, and Meadow 1988, 1989; 
Sheldon and Kasser 1995) and from various countries (Cheung and Chan, 1996; 
Khanna and Kasser, 2001) find positive correlations between TV viewing and 
materialistic values.  Reviewing the literature, Buijzen and Valkenburg (2003b) note 
positive correlations between advertising exposure and materialism in studies by 
Atkin (1975a,b), Churchill and Moschis (1979), Moschis and Churchill (1978), 
Moschis and Moore (1982), and Ward and Wackman (1971).  While some 
researchers (e.g., Kasser et al., 2004) accept the validity of that correlation, they 







Because people in developed, capitalistic countries have generally been 
exposed to ads throughout their lives, researchers find disentangling the direction of 
causation between ad-exposure and materialism problematic when their studies 
employ adults or adolescents as experimental subjects.  In a longitudinal study of 
adolescents, for example, Moschis and Moore (1982) find that “increased advertising 
exposure seems . . . to contribute to the development of materialistic values among 
those who have not yet developed such predispositions” (285; italics in the original).  
Does advertising make people who have already developed such predispositions 
more materialistic?  Or is the positive correlation between ad exposure and 
materialism explained by some intervening variable?  Are materialistic people 
somehow attracted to advertising?  Put another way, do materialistic people expose 
themselves to ads more frequently than non-materialistic people, and is that the 
reason for the positive relationship between advertising and materialism?  Studies that 
merely find correlations between ad-exposure and materialistic values are unable to 
answer those questions. 
If the correlation between advertising and materialism can be entirely 
explained by a demonstrated tendency of materialistic people to gravitate toward 
advertising, then the supposed relationship between exposure to ads and the adoption 
of materialistic values by non-materialistic people may be spurious.  Although 
disentangling these potential causes for the correlation is crucial to understanding the 




materialistic people are drawn to advertising can be set to one side.  For the purposes 
of this study, it is only necessary to determine whether or not exposure to advertising 
leads to the adoption and development of materialistic values.  
Ideally, in order to disentangle the hypothetical causes, researchers would 
expose non-materialistic experimental subjects to ads for the first time.  If, following 
sufficient exposure, researchers found materialistic values in formerly non-
materialistic subjects, then the researchers could reasonably conclude that advertising 
is a cause of materialism.   
Unfortunately, the ideal subjects for such a controlled experiment probably do 
not exist.  Virtually everyone on the planet has had some exposure to advertising.  
Nevertheless, researchers have been able to approximate controlled experiments by 
studying two groups of low-ad-exposure subjects: (1) citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China and (2) children from various Western countries. 
 
Ad-induced materialism in children 
 
In one early experimental study, Goldberg and Gorn (1978) showed a 
treatment group of preschool children ads for toys, and showed a control group of 
preschool children no ads for toys.  After the children in the treatment group watched 
the ads, they chose to play with the toys they had seen in the ads more often than they 
chose to play with other children.  The children in the control group, on the other 
hand, chose to play with other children more often than they chose to play with the 




commercials apparently leads children “to select material objects over more socially-
oriented alternatives” (22).   
Examining British children’s letters to “Father Christmas,” Pine and Nash 
(2002) conclude: The more television commercials children watch, the more items 
they request, in general, and the more branded items they request, in particular.  
Comparing the British children, who frequently view commercials, to a matched 
group of Swedish children, who live in a country where advertising to children is 
prohibited, the researchers note that requests for items among British children are 
significantly higher than among Swedish children.  Pine and Nash suggest that 
television commercials may socialize British children “to become consumers from a 
very early age” (529).   
In a similar study, Buijzen and Valkenburg (2000) compare the Christmas 
wish-lists of 250 children to television commercials being aired during the pre-
Christmas shopping season.  Their results indicate that the wish-lists of two-thirds of 
the 7- and 8-year-olds, about half of the 9- and 10-year-olds, and two-fifths of the 11- 
and 12-year-olds include at least one advertised product.  Analyzing the intended and 
unintended effects of advertising, Buijzen and Valkenburg conclude: “advertising is 
positively and directly related to children’s purchase requests and materialism” (483).    
In a report for the American Psychological Association, Kunkel et al. (2001) 
note the positive correlation between children’s exposure to advertising and their 
acceptance of materialistic values.  Similarly, Moschis and Moore (1982) and 
Greenberg and Brand (1993) find a direct relationship between ad exposure and 




(1980) find a positive association between television viewing and materialistic values 
among children in grades four through seven. 
Thus, the results of a number of studies suggest not only that a positive 
relationship exists between advertising and materialistic values but also that 
advertising can lead to the adoption of those values—at least in children and 
adolescents.  But what about adults?  Can exposure to advertising make them 
materialistic?  If they are already materialistic, can it make them more so? 
 
Ad-induced materialism in adults 
 
Studies of Chinese adults may suggest an answer.  China is particularly useful 
for research into the impact of advertising on the adoption and intensification of 
materialistic values, because widespread materialism is a relatively new phenomenon 
in China.  Traditionally, the dominant, Chinese value systems—both Confucian and 
communist—eschewed materialism (Paek and Pan 2004).  Perhaps more relevant, the 
Chinese government, under Chairman Mao, banned advertising at the start of the 
Cultural Revolution, and the ban remained in place until 1979, when Deng Xiaoping 
enacted the “Four Modernizations” (Zhou et al. 2002).  As Tse, Belk, and Zhao 
(1989) note, “the changes in the country’s economic policies have created an 
unprecedented field experiment involving one billion subjects . . . in which the 
learning of modern consumption can be investigated” (458).  
Kasser et al. (2004) cite Ryan et al. (1999) and Sen (1999) in positing that 
advertising encourages the spread of free-market economies to economically 




Furthermore, the authors note, anthropological literature (e.g., O’Barr 1994) makes 
clear that advertisers purposefully aim to promote materialistic values in developing 
countries.  Advertising and the media it sponsors flood potential consumers with 
messages implying that the road to happiness is paved with material goods and that 
happiness itself is attained by owning the right products (Mander 1991).  “Inevitably, 
these messages are internalized to some degree and have the net effect of promoting 
materialism” (Kasser et al. 2004, 18). 
Following China’s economic liberalization, advertising began to be deemed 
“an essential tool of economic development” (Zhou et al. 2002, 74).  One top Chinese 
legislator told the World Advertising Conference that by 1987 advertising was an 
“indispensable element in the promotion of economic prosperity” (qtd. in Zhou et al., 
74).  During the 1990s, advertising in China grew more than 40 percent per year.   
Wei Ran (1997) finds that, among Chinese, opinions about advertising vary 
by generation.  Older people tend to disapprove of advertising and attempt to 
maintain traditional Chinese ways, whereas young people seem to “view advertising 
positively, spend freely and favor a Western lifestyle” (261).  As Lin (2001) notes, 
young people in China have begun to spend significant proportions of the family 
income on brand-name (i.e., advertised) clothing. 
According to Paek and Pan (2004), advertisements “play a significant role in 
shaping consumerist orientations among China’s urban residents” (491).  Other 
researchers report similar findings.  Numerous content analyses of ads appearing in 
China confirm the conclusion that advertising attempts to promote materialistic 




Zhao 1989).  In an empirical study of Chinese consumers, Wei and Pan (1999) find a 
relationship between exposure to advertising and materialism in China, noting, more 
specifically, a relationship between advertising and the acceptance of “conspicuous 
consumption, self-fulfillment, individual indulgence, and worshipping of Western 
lifestyles” (Paek and Pan 2004, 495).  Field studies by Davis (2000) and Wu (1999) 
suggest that the Chinese people devote an increasing amount of time and energy to 
consumption, as their exposure to advertising increases.  Similarly, Paek and Pan 
conclude that their “study shows significant linkages between positive attitudes 
toward advertising and the acceptance of consumerist values” (508). 
In sum, the results of numerous empirical studies involving children, 
adolescents, and Chinese adults provide evidence that exposure to advertising can 
lead people of all ages to adopt materialistic values. 
 
The impact of materialistic values on well-being 
 
According to Kasser (2002), “existing scientific research on the value of 
materialism yields clear and consistent findings.  People who are highly focused on 
materialistic values have lower personal well-being and psychological health than 
those who believe that materialistic pursuits are relatively unimportant” (22).  
Although evidence from numerous studies indicates that achieving materialistic 
goals—obtaining wealth, status, and possessions—fails to increase human happiness 
or well-being over the long run (Kasser 2002), advertising (and the consumer culture 




self-esteem and loveworthiness” (Ryan 2002, xi).  At the same time, ads engender 
insecurity by implying that we are unworthy and unlovable unless we use the 
advertised product.  Thus, we attempt to alleviate our insecurity through 
consumption, but our insecurity remains, because the purchased product fails to 
change our lives and the messages urging us to consume never end.  As B. Schwartz 
(1994) explains, the “disappointment we feel with consumption induces us to 
consume more and more and different things in the elusive pursuit of pleasure” (162). 
Empirical studies have consistently found that “people who strongly value the 
pursuit of wealth and possessions report lower psychological well-being than those 
who are less concerned with such aims” (Kasser 2002, 5).  According to a number of 
studies, materialistic people tend to be less satisfied—even dissatisfied with their 
lives (Ahuvia and Wong 1995; Belk 1985; Dawson 1988; Dawson and Bamossy 
1991; Kasser 1994; Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996; Richins and Dawson 1992; Sirgy et 
al. 1995).  Compared to their less materialistic peers, materialists tend to feel less 
vital (Kasser 1994; Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996), are less self-actualized (Ahuvia and 
Wong 1995; Kasser and Ryan 1996; Mick 1996), and feel less positive affect 
(Solberg, Diener, and Robinson 2004).   
While much of the research involves American researchers and subjects, a 
number of studies investigate the impact of materialism in other nations.  A study of 
over 7,000 college students from 41 countries, for example, found negative 
associations between materialistic values and life satisfaction (Diener and Oishi 
2000).  Individual studies of college students in Australia (Saunders and Munro 




Germany (Schmuck et al. 2000), India (Khanna and Kasser 2001), Romania (Frost 
1998), Russia (Ryan et al. 1999), and South Korea (Kim et al. 2003); studies of adults 
in Germany (Schmuck 2001), China, Turkey, Australia, and Canada (Sirgy et al. 
1998); and studies of business students in Singapore (Kasser and Ahuvia 2002) all 
confirm the results of research done in the United States.  Apparently, holding 
materialistic values reduces the well-being of individuals who live anywhere in the 
world.   
Not only do researchers report a negative relationship between materialism 
and well-being across nations but also across study participants’ ages, genders, and 
income ranges (e.g., Ahuvia and Wong 1995; Kasser 2002; Mick 1996; Sheldon and 
Kasser 2001).  Summing up the results of a series of thirteen experiments, Solberg, 
Diener, and Robinson (2004) conclude: “The results of our studies suggest that 
materialism appears to be toxic to [subjective well-being] and that this relation is 
multidetermined” (45).  Similarly, Richins and Dawson (1992) find a negative 
relationship between materialism and satisfaction in “all aspects of life measured” 
(313). 
According to Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002), however, wealthy materialists 
may be an exception to the rule. “People who prize material goals more than other 
values tend to be substantially less happy, unless they are rich,” they write (119).  
Nevertheless, Solberg, Diener, and Robinson (2004) note that even rich materialists 
are generally less happy, because they tend to be highly status conscious.  Since no 
one—not even the richest person alive—can own everything, materialists who feel 




be satisfied.  In Kasser’s words, “even the successful pursuit of materialistic ideals 
typically turns out to be empty and unsatisfying” (2002, 43).   
According to some observers, materialists are less happy than non-materialists 
because they devote their time and energy to things rather than people (e.g., Durning 
1992; Kasser 2002).  Materialists tend to work harder and longer in order to earn the 
wherewithal to purchase what they can from the endless list of things they desire.  
After purchase, materialists expend effort maintaining, storing, replacing, upgrading, 
and managing the things that they buy.  What little time they find for leisure is often 
spent consuming ad-filled media, which urge them to keep investing in things.  
“Thus,” Ryan (2002) suggests, “in the journey of life, materialists end up carrying an 
ever-heavier load, one that expends the energy necessary for living, loving, and 
learning—the really satisfying aspects of that journey,” (xi). 
In sum, the literature seems to indicate that materialists suffer reduced well-
being, in part, because the time and energy they devote to things prevents them from 
developing good relationships.  Lacking good relationships, they feel insecure, and, 
feeling insecure, they turn to things.  The things that they turn to prove ultimately 
unsatisfying, however, and the time and energy materialists devote to those things 
prevent them from developing good relationships.  Thus, lacking good relationships, 
materialists feel insecure, and, feeling insecure, they turn to things, and the cycle 










For the most part, advertising’s impact on health is indirect, affecting mental 
health by inculcating materialistic values.  Advertising can directly impact physical 
health, however, in positive and negative ways.  On the upside, advertising can spread 
information about health-promoting products and services.  Arrow et al. (1990) note, 
for example, the wave of consumers who switched to high-fiber cereals as soon as 
advertisers began to publicize the health benefits of whole grains.  On the downside, 
however, advertising can persuade people to engage in harmful activities (e.g., 
overeating, compulsive shopping, and addictive gambling) or indulge in consumption 
of harmful products (e.g., tobacco), potentially harmful products, (e.g., alcohol and 
junk food), and products that, over time, are found to be harmful (e.g., the 
prescription arthritis drugs, Vioxx and Celebrex, which were found to increase 




By and large, however, advertising affects health indirectly, by inundating and 
overwhelming the human mind with materialistic messages.  According to Kasser 
(2002), numerous studies, utilizing various methods and measures, find “a clear 
pattern of psychological (and physical) difficulties associated with holding wealth, 




values are indeed crucial and that they are in fact achievable for any consumer who 
purchases advertised products.  
The literature reveals an association between materialism and an array of 
psychiatric problems, including narcissism, personality disorders, depression, anxiety, 
and addiction (Kasser 2002; Kasser et al. 2004).  In addition, some authors find a 
relationship between materialistic values and stress, noting that stress is a major 
contributor to a number of physiological and psychological maladies (De Graaf et al. 
2002; Lane 2000; Linder 1970).  
 
Ad-induced materialism and self-esteem 
 
Some studies find an association between low self-esteem and materialistic 
values. Kasser and Ryan (1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992) speculate that such 
values reflect feelings of “‘contingent worth’ predicated on having rather than being,” 
which are corrosive to self-esteem.  “When people believe that their worth depends 
on external signifiers such as money and status, they are much more easily buffeted 
by the whims of fate than when they have a secure, stable, and deep sense of esteem 
that is not dependent on such accomplishments” (Kasser 2002, 50). 
According to Kasser (2002), most psychologists believe that people gain self-
esteem by pursuing and attaining goals.  The pursuit of an unattainable goal, however, 
reduces self-esteem.  Since achieving materialistic goals fails again and again to bring 







According to Richins and Dawson (1992), materialists have an abnormal 
preoccupation with themselves.  Given their narcissism, they tend to have fewer 
social skills than people with less materialistic values.  Kasser (2002) explains that 
materialists and narcissists share a desire for external validation and notes the view, 
common among some psychologists and social critics (e.g., Barber 2007; Lane 2000; 
Lasch 1979), that the “Have-It-Your-Way” consumer culture promoted in 
advertisements “breeds a narcissistic personality by focusing individuals on the 
glorification of consumption” (Kasser 2002, 12).   
 
Depression and anxiety 
 
Advertising is linked to depression and anxiety via materialism.  According to 
Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996), people with strongly held materialistic values suffer 
“significantly higher levels of depression and anxiety” than people with less 
materialistic values (7-8).  Wachtel and Blatt (1990) find that individuals with high 
scores in the constructs of materialism are more likely to be depressed, and Schroeder 
and Dugal (1995) find that high scorers are more likely to suffer from social anxiety. 
Rates of depression are on the rise throughout wealthy nations.  According to 
Myers (2000), depression is listed as the second most prevalent disease among 
residents of high-income nations in a table of world diseases.  The Harvard Mental 
Health Letter (1994) reports that a dozen independent studies, involving 43,000 





What worries some observers is the correspondence between rising rates of 
depression and income (Layard 2005; Moore and Simon 2000).  As Diekstra (1995) 
notes, the evidence suggests that the rise is largely confined to the white populations 
of North America and Northern Europe, because studies employing an identical 
design on other populations fail to confirm this finding (Canino et al. 1987; Karno et 
al. 1987).  Within the United States, the depression rate among the dogmatically non-
materialistic Old Order Amish is approximately one-tenth of their non-Amish 
neighbors (McKibben 2007).  Seligman maintains that the evidence explaining the 
rise in depression “points to a purely environmental effect,” rather than a gene-
environment interaction (qtd. in Lane 2000, 348), and McKibben speculates that the 
surge in depression is due to “some dramatic change in human circumstance in recent 
decades” (111-112).  As Lane (2000) explains, “the idea that it is the advanced and 
not the less-developed countries or the collectivist countries of Asia that bear the 
brunt of this epidemic has been fairly well established” (348).  
In the U.S., clinical depression affects approximately one-quarter of the 
population sometime in life (Lane 2000).  According to Kessler et al. (1994), 
approximately one-half of the U.S. population has been unable to function normally 
due to severe depression for a period of at least two weeks during their lifetimes, and 
about one-fifth of the population meets the criteria for a lifetime diagnosis of 
dysthymia or major depression. 
As a number of studies reveal (e.g., Hagnell et al. 1982; Robins, Locke, and 
Regier 1991; Weissman et al. 1991) and the graph in Figure 7.1 illustrates, successive 




their lifetimes.  Notice, for example, that at age thirty-four, people born between 1945 
and 1954 were more than ten times more likely to experience major depression than 
people born between 1905 and 1914.  According to Diekstra (1995), the increasing 
rates of depression are partially explained by a falling age of onset.  Seligman (1990) 
agrees, noting that depression “strikes a full decade earlier in life on average than it 
did a generation ago” (10).  
 




Source: The Epidemiologic Area Catchment Study NIMH, adapted from Weissman et al. 1991, as 
found in Diekstra 1995. 
 
In addition to inflicting misery on its victims, depression exacts high 
economic and social costs.  For one thing, the depressed tend to have poor 




2000; Schwartz 2004).  For another, depressed people tend to be less productive at 
school and on the job (Lane 2000).  Depressed people seem to get sick more often.  
Studies show that mildly depressed Americans take one and a half times as many sick 
days as their non-depressed peers and that severely depressed Americans take five 
times more sick days than do mildly depressed Americans (Lane 2000; Schwartz 
2004).  In addition, on average, the depressed die at a younger age than the non-
depressed, due not only to illness but also to violence—most notably to suicide. 
In an otherwise sanguine appraisal of modern conditions, Moore and Simon 
(2000) find one sour note: America’s increasing suicide rate. “It is troubling . . . to 
report,” they write, “that despite all of the material progress of the past 50 to 100 
years, a larger percentage of Americans take their lives today than was true in 1900.  
Teen suicide has risen at an especially disheartening rate” (19).  Discussing the 
dimensions of the tragedy, Martin Seligman notes: “We are in the midst of an 
epidemic of depression, one with consequences that, through suicide, takes as many 
lives as the AIDS epidemic” (qtd. in Lane 2000, 21).  
In sum, rates of depression and suicide have been increasing over the past 
century.  Although correlation does not prove causation, it is worth at least noting that 




The connection between ads and addiction is, for the most part, indirect: Ads 




depressed, and depression leads people to self-medicate with addictive substances or 
behaviors.  In some cases, as noted above, advertising can provide a direct route to 
addiction, by encouraging people to consume addictive products (e.g., tobacco) and 
potentially addictive products (e.g., alcohol) or to participate in potentially addictive 
activities (e.g., gambling), by making those products or activities appear to be 
satisfying and glamorous. 
Regardless of the means to addiction, the brain reacts to a lack of addictive 
stimulus with a change in brain chemistry.  According to Klein (2006), whenever 
humans have a basic need that remains unfulfilled, their brains release a 
discomforting opioid, dynorphin, which signals a deficiency.  Spurred on by the 
restlessness and irritability associated with dynorphin, the brain triggers an impulse to 
act and “look[s] for a signal to compensate for the deficiency” (113).  At the instant 
people satisfy the basic need, however, their brains release dopamine, as a pleasant 
reward.  Thus, when people need food, they feel hungry; when they eat, they feel 
pleasure with the very first bite.  
Addictions involve the same processes, but greatly amplified.  According to 
Klein, “the brain links the sight of the [addictive substance or activity] and the desire 
of it irradicably.  An addicted brain that recognizes a cigarette immediately orders 
‘Light it!’ or, stimulated by a ‘bottle,’ gives the order to drink” (123).  
Advertising can encourage addictions by implying that an addictive substance 
or activity satisfies a genuine need (e.g., for food, drink, love, respect, or relief from 
suffering), and it can discourage abstinence by flaunting the addictive product or 




advertising, “cigarette sales rose from 332,345 million in 1945 to 506,127 million in 
1960.”  As Cross (2000) explains, this is “a powerful, if negative, tribute to the 
impact of advertising” (88).  To what extent advertising has contributed to tobacco or 
any other addiction is beyond precise determination.  Nonetheless, the synthesis of 
Cross’s statistics with findings in neuroscience suggests the possibility of a direct link 
between advertising and addiction.   
Often, however, the link between advertising and addiction is less direct.  
According to numerous authors, advertising inculcates materialistic values, which 
equate success with having things that other people admire, such as beauty, status, 
and wealth (Barber 2007; Kasser et al. 2004; Lane 2000; Schudson 1984).  By 
definition, people who adopt materialistic values seek satisfaction from outside 
themselves through the pursuit of things, rather than through the pursuit of intrinsic, 
intangible goals (Kasser 2002; Kilbourne 2004; B. Schwartz 1994).  Consuming 
material things, however, satisfies only certain needs and even then, only up to the 
point of diminishing returns.  When materialistic people try to satisfy an intangible 
need for, say, romantic love or companionship, with a tangible, advertised thing, such 
as a bottle of perfume or a can of beer, they fail: The intangible need remains unfilled.  
Although materialists (and others) generally do experience pleasure for a time after a 
purchase, that pleasure passes as they adapt to having what they once believed would 
provide satisfaction (Diener 2000).  Then, with the underlying, intangible need still 
unmet, they once again feel restless and irritable, in the way neuroscience writer 
Klein (2006) describes.  Being persuaded—in part by advertising—that consumption 




yet another purchase.  Even if it fails to satisfy over the long run, each purchase 
provides some immediate gratification; and even if it does nothing to satisfy the 
underlying, intangible need, perpetual consumption provides perpetual (short-term) 
gratification.  Thus, some materialistic people become compulsive consumers—or 
“shopaholics.”  As economics professor Herman Daly puts it: “Consuming becomes 
pathological because its importance grows larger and larger in direct proportion to our 
decreasing satisfaction” (qtd. in De Graaf et al. 2002). 
Advertising can fuel compulsive consumption by appealing to materialists’ 
desire for status.  Given their need for validation by others, materialistic people try to 
own items that send “the right signal” to the people they hope to impress.  “The 
problem is that the world’s signals keep changing, so addicts [i.e., shopaholics] never 
reach a point of having enough” (De Graaf et al. 2002, 105).  And advertisers ensure 
that the signals keep changing. 
As noted above, materialistic values can be a cause of depression, and, as 
Lane (2000) explains, “depression has been found to be a contributing causal factor” 
in alcoholism and drug dependency (329).  Thus, on one pathway, advertising leads to 
materialism, materialism leads to depression, and depression completes the journey to 
addiction. 
The results of a number of empirical studies (e.g., Cohen and Cohen 1996; 
Kasser and Ryan 2001; Williams et al. 2000) indicate that people with a strong 
materialistic value orientation are “highly likely” to use tobacco, alcohol, and drugs 
frequently.  While the extent to which ad-induced materialism is a factor in addiction 




beyond question.  According to De Graaf et al. (2002), approximately sixty million 
Americans are addicted to tobacco, fourteen million use illegal drugs, twelve million 
are alcoholics, ten million are compulsive shoppers, and five million are addicted to 
gambling.  In addition, more than sixty-six percent of adult Americans are either 
overweight or obese (National Center for Health Statistics 2008).  
According to Lane (2000), advertising can be detrimental to individuals’ 
capacity for deferred gratification.  Experimental studies show that “deferred 
gratification is impeded by the visibility of the rewards to be earned.”  The “function 
of advertisements [is] to make visible and urgent the appeal of some attractive 
object,” Lane explains.  Thus, ads make “self-control a special problem for a 
consumer culture” (182). 
Complicating that problem is the fact that one popular mechanism for 
delivering advertising can itself be addictive.  According to Rutgers University 
psychologist Robert Kubey, millions of Americans’ dependence on TV “fit[s] the 
criteria for substance abuse as defined in the official psychiatric manual” (Herr 2008).  
 
Advertising and physical perfectionism 
 
By inculcating values that emphasize outer appearance, rather than inner 
substance, ads can affect physical as well as mental health.  Kasser and Ryan (1996), 
for example, find that people holding materialistic values—regardless of age, wealth, 
or gender—suffer more headaches, sore muscles, backaches, and other physical 




The materialistic values that ads promote can also be implicated in illnesses 
that clearly involve both mind and body.  According to Kilbourne (2004), for 
instance, ads that promote an ultra-thin ideal for women, “contribute to the body-
hatred so many young women feel and to some of the resulting eating problems, 
which range from bulimia to compulsive overeating to simply being obsessed with 
controlling one’s appetite” (257).   
Schwartz (2004) explains that eating-disorder rates are much higher in 
cultures where ultra-thin is the ideal form for a woman’s body than where it is not.  
Furthermore, women who live in cultures where slenderness is idealized are twice as 
likely as men to be depressed.  In Schwartz’s “admittedly speculative” view, women 
become depressed because they believe that they should be able to control their 
weight.  When they fail to achieve the ultra-thin goal, they “not only have to face the 
daily disappointment of looking in the mirror, they also must face the causal 
explanation that this failure to look perfect is their fault” (214).  Advertising plays a 
role, because ads attempt to engender the belief that looking perfect is possible and 
within a woman’s control—if only she buys this gym membership, that shampoo, this 
low-calorie cookie, that lipstick, these blue jeans, etc. 
  
Advertising and the well-being of children 
 
Estimates of recent, annual expenditures for advertising directed at children 
vary by source, from more than $5 billion (McNeal 1999) to $12 billion (Rice 2001) 




dedicated to inducing kids’ demand for advertised goods are substantial.  As one 
marketing executive explained, corporations attempt to expose kids “to their brand in 
as many different places as possible throughout the course of the day or the week, or 
almost anywhere they turn in the course of their daily rituals” (Kjos 2002).  
Television, alone, exposes children to an average of 40,000 commercials every year 
(Kunkel 2001).  
According to Levin and Linn (2004), advertising agencies and their corporate 
clients “routinely hire child psychologists” and other social scientists to discover ever 
more potent ways to motivate children to demand products (224).  The Saatchi and 
Saatchi advertising agency, for example, hired a team of anthropologists and 
psychologists to conduct an “exhaustive” study of two hundred children in their 
homes.  The sole purpose of this 1999 study was, in fact, “to help corporations market 
to children more effectively” (224).   
Although advertising agencies and their corporate clients generally withhold 
the results of their research from public scrutiny, academic studies show that young 
children lack the cognitive skills to recognize the persuasive intent of advertisements 
(Levin and Linn 2004).  According to the American Psychological Association, 
evidence from a large body of studies indicates that young children are “uniquely 
susceptible to advertising influence” (Kunkel 2001, 1).  Thus, advertisers seek to 
establish brand loyalty as early in a child’s life as possible.  As Joan Chiaramonte, a 
market researcher, notes: “If you wait to reach children with your product until 
they’re eighteen years of age, you probably won’t capture them” (qtd. in De Graaf et 




Anecdotal evidence suggests that marketers are capturing children quite early.  
One advertising executive explains: “What parents are telling us is that kids are 
requesting brands and are brand-aware almost as soon as their verbal skills set in” 
(Hood 2000, 15).  According to the Center for the New American Dream, “by the 
time children head off to school most can recognize hundreds of brand logos” (Media 
Awareness Network, 2008). 
The Internet enables advertisers to exploit a lucrative new category of 
consumers: “cybertots.”   According to one ad man, the Internet’s ability to capture 
children’s attention is unprecedented “precisely because when kids go online, they 
enter the ‘flow state.’”  As Csikzentmihalyi (1990) explains, when people enter the 
flow state they become totally immersed in an activity.  Thus, Eric Gruen explains, 
“there is nothing else that exists like [the Internet] for advertisers to build 
relationships with kids” (qtd. in Barber 2007, 97). 
In the view of the American Psychological Association, advertising directed at 
young children is “fundamentally unfair” (Kunkel et al. 2004, 23).  The American 
Academy of Pediatrics (1995) concurs.  “Advertising directed toward children is 
inherently deceptive and exploits children under [eight] years of age” (American 
Academy of Pediatrics 1995; qtd. in Levin and Linn 2004, 218-219).  
 
The Influence of Advertising on Adolescents 
 
As numerous studies cited in a previous section indicate, advertising 




ages.  Teenagers may be particularly susceptible.  According to Kilbourne (2004), 
people are “more vulnerable to the seductive power of advertising” during 
adolescence than at any other time, because teens are acutely sensitive to peer 
pressure.  Understanding that they have the ability to generate and shape peer 
pressure, advertisers “do not hesitate to take advantage of the insecurities and 
anxieties of young people, usually in the guise of offering solutions” (252).  A 
number of different types of studies indicate that people tend to focus on materialistic 
desires and values when they feel insecure (Maslow 1954; Fromm 1976; Rogers 
1964; Inglehart 1977).  By exploiting teen insecurity, ads offer solutions that 
inculcate materialistic values.  
Moschis and Moore (1982) show that exposure to advertising contributes to 
materialism in adolescents.  Other researchers find that materialistic values negatively 
impact adolescent behavior and well-being.  According to Cohen and Cohen (1996), 
for example, adolescents who covet good looks, wealth, and status or put a priority on 
being rich are significantly more likely to violate individuals’ rights and society’s 
laws and to behave with hostility, defiance, or disobedience toward authorities.  A 
number of studies find that highly materialistic teens are more likely than their less 
materialistic peers to function poorly in school, on the job, and in extracurricular 
activities (Kasser and Ryan 1993); to engage in sexual intercourse (Williams et al. 
2000); to exhibit signs of conduct disorders (e.g., carry weapons, miss school, 
vandalize property) (Kasser and Ryan 1993); to have poor interpersonal skills (e.g., 




Cohen 1996); and to use drugs (Cohen and Cohen 1996; Kasser and Ryan 2001; 
Williams et al. 2000). 
 
The creation and perpetuation of stereotypes 
 
“Stereotypes consist of sets of beliefs about the characteristics of the members 
of social groups that influence attitudes and behaviors toward them” (Miller et al. 
1999, 319).  Cultural critics of advertising argue that ads reflect and reinforce 
stereotypes that tend to reduce well-being.  In some cases, critics say, advertising 
presents stereotypical ideals that few can attain, leaving those who fail to measure up 
with feelings of inferiority; in other cases, advertising lowers self-esteem by 
excluding or under-representing members of certain demographic groups from 
participation in advertisements.  Some observers suggest that underrepresented 
groups may suffer harm to their self-concepts, because they infer from their exclusion 




The proportion of Whites in advertisements, according to almost every study 
going back to the 1970s, has been significantly higher than the actual proportion of 
Whites in the U.S. population (Weigel, Loomis, and Soja 1980; Riffe, Goldson, 





  Until recently, African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asian 
Americans had been underrepresented in ads or excluded from them completely.  
Now, however, both Blacks and Whites are seen in ads in numbers that exceed their 
true proportions, while other races continue to be underrepresented (Larson 2002; Li-
Vollmer 2002).  Furthermore, ads targeting children almost always include at least 
one White child, and many feature White children only.  Virtually none, however, 
feature children of other races exclusively (Larson 2002; Li-Vollmer 2002). 
Whites portray characters at every status level.  According to Li-Vollmer 
(2002), however, when racial minorities appear in ads, they often play people in 
stereotypical, low-status roles.  In a study of nearly 1,500 television commercials 
broadcast during children’s programs, researchers found that Whites were the only 
race to play characters in authoritative or prestigious positions.  According to the 
study, “African Americans serve[d] as the token minorities to give the impression of 
cultural diversity or [were] presented in traditional stereotypes as athletes, dancers, 
and musicians. . . .  Children of other racial minorities [were] scarcely found to be 
worthy of attention at all, especially Native Americans” (Li-Vollmer 2002, 223).  On 
the rare occasions that they were given roles in ads, Asians Americans were often 
stereotyped as high-tech wizards, Hispanic characters were confined to roles as fast-
food-restaurant habitués, and other minorities were generally cast as extras in crowd 
scenes.  “By exposing children to this worldview through stable and repetitive 
images,” the author concludes, “television commercials have the ability to shape 




and attitudes about race according to the racial biases projected by the media 
industry” (Li-Vollmer 2002, 225). 
Featuring a world in which Whites play all sorts of roles, while other races are 
tokenized, stereotyped, or ignored, tends to shape the “definitions and attitudes about 
race” that adults hold as well.   According to Swiger (2002), casting Whites as 
archetypal humans in ads reinforces a notion, prevalent in White culture, which says 
that “Whites are not of a particular race.  They are simply the human race. . . .  For 
those in power in the United States, as long as whiteness is felt to be the human 
condition, then it alone both defines normality and fully inhabits it.  The equation of 




Some studies find that advertising, in particular, or media, in general, can 
undermine stereotypes by spreading positive images of people with disabilities 
(Morrison and Ursprung 1987; J. Nelson 1996; Shapiro 1993).  Several observers 
note that some major advertisers (e.g., Coke, Kmart, McDonald’s, and IBM) 
occasionally feature disabled characters in effective ad campaigns (Bainbridge 1997; 
Fost 1998; Shapiro 1993).  Disputing these conclusions, however, are those who 
argue that advertising contributes to discrimination against disabled people, by 
stereotyping them in some cases and excluding them in others (“Discrimination” 
1991).  According to these critics, some ads create stereotypes by implying that 
disabled people can overcome their limitations through super-human acts.  




paraplegic marathon athletes, for perpetuating the “super crip” stereotype.  Other 
critics argue that ads perpetuate degrading stereotypes of disabled individuals in order 
to raise money for charities  (“Discrimination” 1991).   
According to a number of critics, in most cases ads contribute to a 
discriminatory climate merely by ignoring and excluding the disabled.  Some studies 
support their view.  Farnall and Smith (1999), for example, find a relationship 
between negative stereotyping and infrequent exposure to disabled people.  In a 
content analysis of approximately 3,000 commercials, Ganahl and Arbuckle (2001) 
find that perceptibly disabled people are “virtually excluded in prime time television 
advertising based on a comparison with US Census reports” (34).  And Hardin et al. 
(2001) find not a single photograph of a person with a disability in a content analysis 




A number of studies (e.g., Atkins et al. 1991; Hiemstra et al. 1983; Miller et 
al. 1999; Roy and Harwood 1997; Swayne and Greco 1987) report that elderly people 
are under-represented in advertisements.  In a content analysis of more than 9,000 ads 
appearing in Life and Ebony magazines, for example, Bramlett-Solomon and 
Subramanian (1999) find fewer elderly people portrayed in advertisements of the 
1990s than in ads of the 1980s.  In addition, the elderly that do appear are featured 
almost exclusively in ads for products that are stereotypically associated with old 




elderly in ads “may convey to media consumers that the elderly are not worthy of 
media attention” (571). 
Roy and Harwood find under-representation of the elderly—particularly 
women—in a content analysis of nearly 800 television commercials.  Even worse, the 
authors find that less than one percent of the ads in their sample include African-
American seniors, and none of the ads include elderly members of other races.  
Pollay (1986) cites several critics who complain that ads promulgate negative 
stereotypes of older people.  According to these critics, ads often portray the elderly 
as feeble bumblers.  Miller et al. (1999) find negative stereotypes in only four percent 
of the print ads in their sample, however.  Similarly, Roy and Harwood (1997) report 
that the commercials in their sample present older adults “in a relatively positive 




Although advertising tends to stereotype men, in this individualistic age, ads 
for different products present different images of masculinity.  Alexander (2003) 
notes “a departure from the form of hegemonic masculinity associated with past 
generations” (550). The traditional, stereotypical male role of producer is being 
supplanted in advertisements by multiple stereotypes that reflect patterns of 
consumption.  As Alexander explains:  
What appears to be a popular culture filled with multiple constructs of 
masculinity obscures the structural conditions in which all versions of 




on consumer capitalism, women and men increasingly share the belief 
that constructing one’s gender identity is merely a matter of 
purchasing acceptable brand-name products.  The multiplicity of 
masculine gender displays found in contemporary popular culture is 
exposed as capitalist hegemony in the form of branded masculinities 
purposely constructed by multinational companies for the purpose of 
increasing sales and profits at the expense of any authentic 
understanding of what masculinity really means today” (552). 
Thus, by Alexander’s analysis, the male stereotype that advertising presents today is 




If, as Alexander supposes, stereotypes of men in advertisements depict various 
constructions of branded masculinity, then the same is generally true, mutatis 
mutandis, for stereotypes of mature women in ads (to the extent that mature women 
appear in ads at all).  Stereotypes of adolescent girls and young women, on the other 
hand, generally depict a single, branded, feminine ideal. 
In the subtext of many advertisements depicting girls and women, Kilbourne 
(2004) explains, is the message that “they can and should remake their bodies into 
perfect commodities” (254). The perfect commodity—and thus the perfect girl or 
woman—is thin and beautiful.  Thus, advertising “is one of the most potent 




A number of studies find that girls and women feel worse about themselves 
after exposure to photographs of advertising’s stereotypical women (Field et al. 1999; 
Groesz et al. 2002; Halliwell and Dittmar 2004; Kasser, 2002; Richins 1991; Then, 
1992).  Becker and Burwell (1999) report a relevant natural experiment from the 
island of Fiji.  Subsequent to the introduction of commercial television to the island, 
the number of young women describing themselves as “fat” climbed dramatically, as 
did the number who developed eating disorders.  
 
Advertising, poverty, and crime 
 
In a number of inner cities throughout America, muggings for athletic shoes 
and other items of sportswear have become commonplace.  Some social and 
behavioral scientists have linked these crimes to advertising and materialism.  
According to University of Pennsylvania sociology professor Elijah Andersen, 
“uneducated, inner city kids . . . feel the system is closed off to them.  And yet they’re 
bombarded with the same cultural apparatus that the white middle class is.  They 
don’t have the means to attain the things offered and yet they have the same desire.  
So they value these ‘emblems,’ these symbols of supposed success. . . . Advertising 
fans this whole process by presenting the images that appeal to the kids” (qtd. in 
Telander 1990).  By featuring superstar athletes, who endorse the products in 
multimillion-dollar campaigns, the ads create “status from thin air to feed those who 
are starving for self-esteem.”  In the words of sociology professor Mervin Daniel, 




What is advertised on TV and whatever your peers are doing, you do it too” (qtd. in 
Telander 1990).  According to one man who works with juvenile gang members, 
“these kids don’t feel like their lives would be worth anything unless they have the 
hottest product that’s being sold in the marketplace” (qtd. in De Graaf 2002, 82). 
Disparities in consumption patterns have become blatant to people living in 
poverty, as their exposure to media has increased.  According to Kasser et al. (2004), 
the “salience of these disparities is likely to fuel increased social comparison, which . 
. . is associated with increased materialism” (18).  
According to psychology professors Allen Kanner and Mary Gomes (1995), 
exposure to advertising and other media socializes people living in poverty to identify 
with the values and attitudes of the wealthy.  In the process, poor people learn to fear 
and condemn the poor; that is, they learn to fear and condemn themselves.  This 
“media-induced narcissistic injury” engenders a sense of worthlessness.  Taunted by 
media images of consumption standards that are beyond their means and struggling to 
escape the stigma of poverty, some of the poor turn to criminal activity.  In the view 
of LaPoint and Hambrick-Dixon (2004), “although there are broader contextual 
factors that also play into these offenses, and the assailants themselves must bear 
some responsibility, the role of marketing cannot be ignored” (243). 
Compared to wealthier people, the poor tend to watch more television (Certain 
and Kahn 2002; LaPoint and Hambrick-Dixon 2004; Meyersohn 1968; Singer et al. 
1998), and people who watch a lot of television tend to have more materialistic values 
than people who do not (Adler et al. 1980; Cheung and Chan 1996; Greenberg and 




1982, Rahtz, Sirgy, and Meadow 1988, 1989; Sheldon and Kasser 1995).  Thus, Lane 
(2000) suggests, young adults who live in poverty are “especially likely to emphasize 
attainment of wealth among their values” (149).   
At the same time that ads engender materialistic values, ads for violent 
videogames, movies, and television programs “contribute to a violent media culture 
which increases the likelihood of youngsters’ aggressive behavior and desensitizes 
children to real-world violence” (American Psychological Association 2004b).  
Perhaps violent media help to explain Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s (2007) 
observation that “violence [particularly among children] was the fastest-growing 
value in America from 1993 to 2004” (169).  According to the Federal Trade 
Commission (2000), evidence collected over a span of thirty years, from over one 
thousand studies, “points overwhelmingly to a causal connection between media 
violence and aggressive behavior in some children, as well as increases in aggressive 
attitudes, values, and behavior (Levin and Linn 2004, 221).   
Additional evidence of the impact of violent media on behavior comes from a 
couple of natural experiments.  After television was introduced to parts of Canada and 
the nation of Bhutan, incidents involving aggressive behavior in both places 
increased.  Layard (2005) notes: “Quite soon [after TV came to Bhutan] everyone 
noticed a sharp increase in . . . crime and drug taking.  In schools violence in the 







Impact on values 
 
To what extent does advertising affect human values and how are those ad-
influenced values reflected in the moral character of society?  As previously 
discussed, numerous studies find that exposure to advertising is positively related to 
the adoption of materialistic values and many additional studies find that materialistic 
values lead to a wide assortment of welfare-reducing outcomes.  Concluding that 
advertising has a negative impact on a society’s moral character, therefore, may seem 
appropriate.  If one accepts the argument, however, that advertising spurs economic 
growth and that economic growth promotes values that strengthen a society’s moral 
character, then drawing the opposite conclusion—that advertising has a positive 
impact on a nation’s moral character—would seem reasonable.  
Without specifically commenting on advertising’s impact on growth, 
Benjamin Friedman (2005) maintains that a growing economy improves a society’s 
moral character.  When the economy grows, he explains, the standard of living rises.  
“The value of a rising standard of living lies not just in the concrete improvements it 
brings to how individuals live but in how it shapes the social, political, and ultimately 
the moral character of a people” (4).  Allowing that some consequences of economic 
growth—“like disruption of traditional cultures and damage to the environment”—
can be harmful and “are a proper moral concern that we are right to take into 
account,” Friedman argues that policymakers should also take into consideration the 
moral positives associated with growth (e.g., tolerance, generosity, civility, and 




Friedman’s argument, it has a positive—if indirect—impact on the nation’s moral 
character. 
According to B. Schwartz (1994), however, as “the economic stakes in society 
increase, the economic consequences of acting morally increase.  This increased cost 
forces at least some people to abandon their moral concerns” (180).  Thus, as 
advertising inculcates materialistic values, it tends to raise the economic stakes in 
society and thus motivates some people to behave immorally. 
 
Ad-induced materialism’s influence on relationships 
 
Having good relationships tops virtually every list in studies of factors that 
contribute to human happiness (if survival needs have been satisfied) (Layard 2005; 
Ryff 2005; Schwartz 2004).  According to Myers (2000, 62), a “mountain of data 
reveal that most people are happier when attached than when unattached,” and Lane 
(2000) suggests that relationships with family, friends, and colleagues deliver 
“genuine utility (in the Benthamite sense)” (67).   
Literature from across the social sciences indicates that connecting with others 
is more than just a contributor to happiness: Maintaining connections with others is a 
basic psychological need (Bakan 1966; Baumeister and Leary 1995; Bowlby, 
1969/1982; Buss, 1996; Deci and Ryan 1985, 1991; Epstein, 1990; Erikson, 1959, 
1980; Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Maslow 1954; 
McAdams and Bryant, 1987; Reis and Patrick, 1996; Rogers, 1961).  Kasser 




depends in part on whether we feel close and connected with other people, and on 
whether we can give and receive love, care, and support” (61). 
According to Lane (1993), “most studies agree that a satisfying family life is 
the most important [external] contributor to well-being” (58).  Easterlin (2003), 
Helliwell (2003), Juster (1985), Kasser (2002), and Layard (2005) confirm Lane’s 
assertion.  In line with the results of those studies, participants in a 1981 Gallup 
survey ranked “family activities” first on a list of activities that they said gave them 
“the most personal satisfaction or enjoyment day in and day out” (Lane 1993, 59).  
Twenty-five years later, “staying at home with family” was the most popular response 
when a Gallup poll asked Americans to name their favorite way to spend an evening 
(Gallup 2006b). 
Conversely, a number of studies report a negative relationship between 
divorce and happiness.  As Layard (2005) explains, “Family break-up can occur 
because of internal strains or external assault.  Shortage of time is a major source of 
internal strain” (178).  Perhaps that explains why Europeans, who work less and 
devote more time to their families than Americans, have much lower divorce rates 
than Americans (McKibben 2007).  Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) estimate that 
the dollar value of a lasting marriage is $100,000 per year.  Of particular significance 
to this study, Rindfleisch et al. (1997), find a positive relationship between 
materialistic values and divorce. 
While enjoying satisfying family relationships is generally thought to have the 
greatest impact on happiness, having good friends (Diener et al 1999; Juster 1985; 




to be nearly as important (Diener and Seligman 2004; Helliwell 2003; Lane 2000; 
Layard 2005).  
And just as the literature reveals a positive association between happiness and 
relationships, it also posits a negative association between happiness and 
separateness.  Lane (2000), for one, reports that the “most powerful cause of 
depression is disruption of family and friendship relations” (78).  According to 
Rosenberg (2004), the disruption of these relationships leads to inner emptiness, and 
inner “emptiness makes people more vulnerable to the influences of . . . the 
advertising industry” (114).  Citing Cushman, Rosenberg explains that the “empty 
self needs filling, so it is easy to influence and control.  This is a major mechanism 
encouraging consumption.  Advertisers and major corporations seek to reassure or 
soothe us with products.  Yet, advertising offers an illusory cure.  Advertising cannot 
create a web of meaning like a rich communal, shared culture can” (114).   
Advertising can inculcate materialistic values, however, and materialistic 
values make establishing and maintaining relationships difficult.  According to a 
number of theorists, when people place a high value on materialistic ends, they tend 
to undervalue friends, family, and community.  Highly materialistic people are more 
likely to treat others as if they were things, exploiting them so long as they are useful 
and then discarding them when their usefulness is at an end.  “In the materialist 
mindset, people exist largely to reflect well on ourselves and to be used and 
manipulated to obtain what we want” (Kasser 2002, 68).   
Some social critics, such as Robert D. Putnam and Robert E. Lane, note that 




their interpersonal relationships, leaving little time for family, friends, and 
community (Kasser 2002).  As Barry Schwartz puts it, “being socially connected 
takes time.  First, it takes time to form close connections. . . .  And close attachment, 
not acquaintanceship, is what people most want and need.  Second, when we establish 
these deep connections, we have to devote time to maintaining them” (110). 
Kasser (2002) explains that “materialistic values lead people to ‘invest’ less in 
their relationships and in their communities.”  This lack of investment “is reflected in 
low-quality relationships characterized by little empathy and generosity, and by 
objectification, conflict, and feelings of alienation.”  Under the weight of materialistic 
values, the fibers that otherwise “bind couples, friends, families, and communities 
together” tend to weaken and fray (72). 
Empirical studies involving people of all ages and from nations throughout the 
world confirm a negative association between holding materialistic values and having 
good interpersonal relationships.  According to the literature, materialistic people 
have difficulty forming and maintaining friendships (Kasser and Ryan 2001); their 
romantic liaisons are troubled (Kasser and Ryan 2001; Sheldon and Flanagan 2001); 
and they suffer from a lack of social, cultural, and community relationships (Cohen 
and Cohen 1996; Kasser and Ryan 1993; Keng et al. 2000; Khanna and Kasser 2001; 
McHoskey 1999; Richins and Dawson 1992; Ryan et al. 1999; Schmuck et al. 2000).   
Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) find that materialistic values seem to conflict with 
the values that characterize strong personal relationships (i.e., loyalty, helpfulness, 
and love) as well as concern for the community (i.e., peace, justice, and equality).  




use and manipulate others (S. H. Schwartz 1994; Khanna and Kasser 2001) and 
negative associations between materialism and generosity (Belk 1985; Richins and 
Dawson 1992), empathy (McHoskey 1999), and willingness to consider other 
viewpoints (Sheldon and Kasser 1995).  Such results provide additional explanations 
for the difficulties materialistic people have forming and maintaining relationships.   
Lane recognizes an “infelicitous cycle” in the interaction of materialism, 
unhappiness, and companionship.  People who pursue materialistic goals, he explains, 
suffer disappointment as they fail to find happiness in things; being unhappy, they 
withdraw from and alienate people; being lonely, they become even unhappier.  
But if interpersonal relationships contribute to well-being and materialistic 
pursuits detract, why do people continue to neglect relationships and pursue 
materialistic ends?  Certainly, several factors are at work.  For one thing, social ties, 
“actually decrease freedom, choice, and autonomy” (Schwartz 2004, 107).  Having a 
relationship means allocating—even sacrificing—time and attention to others.  For 
another thing, compared to the goods and services we consume, our relationships are 
unpredictable.  Their impact varies from miserable to ecstatic and everything in 
between.  The things we buy, on the other hand, never break our hearts even if they 
rarely elate us.  Although our satisfaction with things tends to drop as time goes by, 
our disappointment is typically slight.  Generally speaking, we have more control 
over the things we buy than over the people in our lives.  Given the vicissitudes of 
relationships, investing in things may seem (probably at a subconscious level) to be 




us empty over the long run, in the short and medium run—or as far as we tend to 
foresee—investing in things may seem to pose less risk. 
Another factor contributing to materialistic over interpersonal preferences is 
advertising.  According to numerous thinkers across the social and behavioral 
sciences, advertising plays a role by stoking materialistic inclinations and thereby 
skewing preferences away from leisure activities and toward consumption of goods 
and services.  And, more to the point, even though most people realize that 
relationships are more important to their happiness than are the things they buy, 
perpetual bombardment by advertisements linking satisfying relationships to the use 
of advertised products often persuades people that they buy the means to good 
relationships when they buy an advertised product.  
Beyond attempting to convince people that buying products will result in good 
interpersonal relationships, some advertisers attempt to channel “our psychological 
needs and ambitions into consumption behaviors by romanticizing goods” (Pollay 
1986, 450).  Kevin Roberts, worldwide CEO of the advertising firm Saatchi and 
Saatchi, proposes creating brands “with which consumers can be made to fall in love 
and then persuaded to ‘own’ by savvy advertisers” (Barber 2007, 184).  According to 
a Saatchi and Saatchi website, “Kevin is also the originator of Lovemark thinking.  
Lovemarks are brands that inspire loyalty beyond reason.  People love them because 
of what they are, not because of what they do.  Their appeal is emotional.  Companies 
may own brands.  But Lovemarks are owned by the people who love them” (Saatchi 




A 2008 Honda ad portrays a car owner who seems to be loyal beyond reason 
to a branded product.  In the ad, a young man, beaming with pride, uses his cell phone 
to take pictures of a new Honda from a number of different perspectives.  As he 
clicks another shot, a message appears on his cell-phone screen, telling him that he 
will have to delete an already stored picture in order to make room for the new one.  
He presses a button, and a wedding picture of himself—dressed as a groom, standing 
next to a woman in a bridal gown—appears on the screen.  The young man appears to 
be weighing his options for a moment.  Then, after looking briefly guilty, he shrugs, 




Some of the people that Lovemarks aim to capture are very young people.  
According to Gene Del Vecchio (1998), author of Creating Ever-Cool: A Marketer's 
Guide to a Kid's Heart, marketers, with the help of child psychologists, “develop 
brands that [create] a relationship with the child by fulfilling emotional needs” (qtd. 
in Harsch 1999, 566).  Given that young children believe in Santa Claus and the tooth 
fairy, getting them to accept the personification of brands is quite simple.  Marketers 
imbue a personified brand with personality traits that fit “the nature of the brand and 
the emotional needs it satisfies” (Harsch, 565).  As Del Vecchio (1998) explains, “this 
depth of personality is an aura that rises above mere product attributes and creates a 
strong bond between the child and the brand” (123). 
Marketers exploit every opportunity to forge a child-brand bond.  In some 




links between branded characters and television programs, movies, websites, 
computer games, toys, accessories, clothing, food, and other products (Levin and 
Linn 2004, 214).  Although producers pay for traditional advertisements to promote 
all of the associated media and products, each of the products and media also 
promotes all of the rest. A Dora the Explorer doll, for example, serves as an ad for the 
Dora the Explorer television program, which serves as an ad for the Dora the 
Explorer Playhouse, which serves as an ad for the Dora the Explorer backpack, and so 
on and so forth.  As a result of all this cross-marketing, ad and product become 
virtually indistinguishable. 
A study from the 1970s provides some evidence that strong bonds between 
children and television characters have existed for decades.  According to the study, 
most children said that they would take the word of a television character—even a 
cartoon character like Tony the Tiger—over the word of their parents, if the television 
character told them one thing and their parents told them something else (De Graaf et 
al. 2002). 
As previously noted, young children lack the cognitive skills to recognize that 
a trusted TV or movie character who appears in an ad is only trying to sell a product.  
According to Levin and Linn (2004), the “powerful messages from the salient images 
of an advertisement can be more compelling than parents’ arguments against either 
the tactics of the ad or the nature of the product, potentially undermining parental 
authority and increasing stress on parent-child relationships” (218).   
Additional stress on those relationships results from advertising techniques 




a product is a good thing,” one prominent consultant told the attendees of a “Kid 
Power” marketing conference.  According to De Graaf et al. (2002), the consultant 
explained to his audience that “advertisers could best reach children by encouraging 
rude, often aggressive behavior and faux rebellion against the strictures of family 
discipline” (54).  A common strategy among advertisers, according to Levin and Linn 
is to evoke “pester power” or the “nag factor” in children, “without regard for how 
the practice affects parent-child relationships” (224).  
Augmented, in part, by children who invoke the “nag factor,” materialistic 
values prompt parents to work longer hours in order to buy more for their children.  
Then, as Barbara Ehrenreich explains, “the longer hours [parents] work, the more 
stressful [their] lives become; and the greater the tensions at home, the more [they] 
try to escape to work” (qtd. in De Graaf et al. 2002, 48).  Working so many hours and 
feeling guilty about being away from their children so much, parents try to 
compensate by buying the things that their children say they want (Martin 1998).   
Ads feed into this cycle and create another by implying that children can have 
fulfilling relationships with inanimate objects.  Lacking the cognitive skills to 
understand advertisers’ intent, many young children take ads literally.  They nag for 
advertised goods, hoping for emotional fulfillment; and when their (guilt-ridden) 
parents succumb, the children are elated.  Once the thrill of getting something they 
have wanted wears off, however, disappointment sets in.  The products cannot 
respond to children’s genuine needs for intimacy, so children are left with feelings of 
emptiness.  Rather than conclude that things are incapable of satisfying their inner 




advertised.  Even if those things ultimately fail to comfort them, at least they get the 
momentary emotional lift that inheres to achieving a goal (i.e., getting something they 
have wanted).   
According to Karen Shanor, clinical psychologist and author of a book about 
children’s brain development, gift-generated brain stimulation can cause chemical 
changes in the brain, such that the child’s brain requires ever more stimulation.  This 
stimulation-addiction can contribute to the development of attention deficit disorder 
and other mental syndromes (Martin 1998). 
A 1993 survey found that 92 percent of the participants agreed with the 
statement: “TV commercials aimed at children make them too materialistic.”  
Nevertheless, children watch a lot of television.  In fact, as a weekly average, 
American children watch television 1,680 minutes but spend only 3.5 minutes “in 
meaningful conversations” with their parents.  Of course, parents watch a lot of 
television, too.  The average American household has a television turned on nearly 
seven hours a day (Herr 2008).  Nor is the U.S. alone in this regard.  Television 
commercials are affecting parent-child relationships throughout the world.  Following 
the introduction of commercial television in Bhutan in 1999, for example, an impact 
study “showed that a third of parents now preferred watching TV to talking to their 
children” (Layard 2005, 78). 
Kilbourne (2004), Lane (2000), and Schor (1998, 2004), among others, note 
the stress that advertising places on parent-child relationships.  As Lane (2000) 
explains, “children have no direct way of knowing that they live in a society in which 




that devaluation” (161). When ads evoke the “nag factor,” they potentially harm the 
parent-child relationship directly.  When ads inculcate materialistic values, they 
devalue the worth of relationships of all kinds. 
 
Impact on social capital 
 
Beyond the need for intimate connections with family and friends, individuals 
need to be connected to groups.  Layard (2005) expresses a sentiment that is common 
among social and behavioral scientists when he writes: “Humans are deeply social 
beings” (225).  According to Diener and Seligman (2004), “experimental evidence 
indicates that people suffer when they are ostracized from groups or have poor 
relationships within groups” (1).   
Evolutionists, psycho-dynamicists, social psychologists, humanists, and others 
offer theories to explain the human need for connection to others, and empirical 
studies lend support.  Epidemiologists, for example, find that people with strong 
social ties are less susceptible to suffer from ill health or to die prematurely than 
people who are less connected (Cohen 1988; House, Landis, and Umberson 1988; 
Myers 2000).  As Lane (2000) explains, finding companionship “is a genetically 
programmed behavior which we violate at risk of pain and deteriorating functioning: 
the blood chemistry of affiliation and cooperation is congenial to our physiological 
constitution” (84).   
When individuals join groups, they contribute to the social capital of their 




tend to build trust, reciprocity, or information networks . . . ” (Gardner and 
Assadourian 2004, 170).  And, as Helliwell (2003) notes, “societies with high 
averages of social capital, as measured by membership densities, also show higher 
levels of subjective well-being, other things held constant” (343). 
Interestingly, some authors speculate that advertising helps to build social 
cohesion and, thus, social capital.  Simon (1970), for example, notes a common, early 
claim that advertising “substitutes for coercion as a method of social control, and 
hence supports pluralistic society” (255).  According to historian Roland Marchand, 
advertising can act as “integrative propaganda” for a nation comprised mainly of 
immigrants (Cross 2000, 35).  Cross (2000) notes that advertisements provide “scripts 
of social dramas that [help] people cope with modern life by giving goods meaning 
and making them into props that [say] who consumers [are] or [aspire] to be” (35).  
At the same time, ads assert “the right of all to participate in a common material 
culture without necessarily giving up ‘who you really are,’ be it a Jew, an 
Appalachian farmer, or a Midwestern storekeeper” (37). 
Historian Daniel Boorstin posits the existence of “consumption communities,” 
constituted by people who relate to each other through owning a particular brand.  
Apparently, Marshall McLuhan (1953) shares Boorstin’s perspective.  He writes: “To 
use a brand of car, drink, smoke, or food that is nationally advertised gives a man the 
feeling that he belongs to something bigger than himself.  He is part of a process or a 
culture that contains and nourishes him.  And the irrational basis of the appeals made 
to him by the ads reinforces his sense of mystic communion” (qtd. in Pollay 1986, 




two people wear Jordache jeans or drive Harley-Davidson motorcycles “does not 
establish any kind of community a person could put much stock in” (159).  In the 
words of environmental writer Bill McKibben (2007), “if buying Pepsi could make 
[anyone] part of a meaningful human community called the Pepsi Generation—then 
the twentieth century would have worked better than it did” (113). 
A number of psychologists also contradict the theories of historians and others 
who maintain that advertising can promote social cohesion and build social capital.  
Their studies support the view that the individualistic, materialistic values 
promulgated by advertising tend to be antagonistic to the values needed to promote 
the good of the community.  Empirical studies show that people who are highly 
materialistic are more estranged from society than non-materialistic people (Khanna 
and Kasser 2001; McHoskey 1999), they lack social interest and engage in more anti-
social acts (Kasser and Ryan 1993; McHoskey 1999), and they compete more than 
they cooperate (Sheldon and McGregor 2000; Sheldon et al. 2001).  Noting, among 
other things, a negative correlation between materialism and donations to 
environmental organizations, Lane (2000) concludes that “materialists are more self-
interested than others” (145).  
Self-interest can be self-defeating, however.  According to Schwartz (2004), 
“deep commitment and belonging to social groups and institutions” can act as “a 
crucial vaccine against depression” (212).  In order to be an active participant in a 
social group, however, one must, to some extent, subordinate the self.  Thus, an 





According to Kasser et al. (2004), “humans have a fundamental tendency to 
adopt ambient cultural and familial values and behavioral regulations” (16).  But 
when people look to society for guidance about how to be a respected member of the 
group, and society—largely through advertisements—tells them to be individualistic 
and materialistic, people conform by increasing their personal consumption and 
withdrawing from civic engagement. 
According to Putnam (2000), three factors—high rates of television watching, 
time limitations, and residential sprawl—explain approximately one half of the 
decline in civic engagement that has occurred in the U.S. over the past few decades.  
As Gardner et al. (2004) note, all three factors are associated with high consumption, 
and advertising, of course, encourages people to consume more and more. 
“In the consumer society,” Durning (1992) writes, the “need to be valued and 
respected by others is acted out through consumption” (40).  Since taxes subtract 
from the amount that consumers can devote to private goods and private consumption 
defines the individual’s status in society, public goods receive little public support.  
As Galbraith (1998) comments, “we are now more than ever affluent in our private 
consumption; the inadequacy of our schools, libraries, public recreation facilities, 
health care, even law enforcement, is a matter of daily comment” (xi). 
According to Kuntsler, author of The Geography of Nowhere, since the 1930s, 
Americans have “mutated from citizens to consumers.”  The change is harmful 
because “consumers have no duties or responsibilities or obligations to their fellow 




and about the integrity of the town’s environment and history’” (qtd. in De Graaf et 
al. 2002, 60-61). 
 
Freedom redefined as consumerism 
 
On the eve of the new millennium, Time magazine’s managing editor Walter 
Isaacson wrote: “If you had to describe the century’s geopolitics in one sentence, it 
could be a short one: Freedom won.  Free minds and free markets prevailed over 
fascism and communism” (qtd. in Moore and Simon 2000, 1).    
Historian Gary Cross (2000) has a different view.  As he explains it, 
consumerism—not freedom—emerged victorious from the clashing ideologies of the 
twentieth century.  “Visions of a political community of stable, shared values and 
active citizenship [gave] way to a dynamic but seemingly passive society of 
consumption in America, and increasingly across the globe” (1).  “Consumerism 
succeeded where other ideologies failed because it concretely expressed the cardinal 
political ideals of the century—liberty and democracy” (2; italics in the original).  
Rather than being “an abstract right to participate in public discourse or free speech,” 
liberty, under consumerism, “means expressing oneself and realizing personal 
pleasure in and through goods.  Democracy does not mean equal rights under the law 
or common access to the political process but, more concretely, sharing with others in 
personal ownership and use of particular commodities” (3).   
According to Cross, during the 1930s, advertisers were the ones who 




find identity in the choice of goods to buy.”  Ad people claimed to be “the 
mouthpiece of free enterprise” and the guardians of choice “that all too often was 
threatened by government” (134). 
Clearly, consumers’ choices during the Great Depression and throughout 
World War II were limited, and they suffered as a consequence.  Today, however, 
according to a number of psychologists, many Americans have become overwhelmed, 
anxious, stressed, dissatisfied, and even clinically depressed due to the glut of choices 
the market offers.  “At this point,” Schwartz (2004) writes, “choice no longer 
liberates, but debilitates.  It might even be said to tyrannize” (3). 
Barber (2007) agrees.  In his view, maximizing the number of private choices 
we make about the goods that we buy is “faux liberty.”  Such choices are “not really 
crucial to human happiness” and limit “the choices we are able to make in public 
domains that are significant” (141). 
Indeed, a critical distinction between public and private liberty is that 
it is precisely through democratic participation and the ensuing 
government intervention that we regulate private choices to constrain 
their negative sides, and that we focus on the public things that really 
matter to us as members of a civic (and civilized) community. . . .  
Contrary to intuition, by constraining choice in the private sector we 
can actually facilitate the sense of liberty we feel (142).  
Gardner et al. (2004) wonder whether the market offers consumers choices 
that meet their true needs.  In the view of the authors, people might actually have 




alternatives such as walking, cycling, mass transit, and car-sharing than if given a 
choice among hundreds of car models at auto dealerships. 
Conflating private choice with liberty, many Americans are suspicious of 
collective choice, afraid that government decisions will restrict their freedoms.  And, 
in fact, when the government makes a collective choice, the new policy often limits 
the freedom—or constricts the privileges—of those who have been enjoying and 
profiting from the status quo.  To derail a proposed policy change, beneficiaries of the 
status quo sometimes claim that the change will restrict the freedom of all Americans.  
Advertisements help spread their claim. 
Take, for example, the ad campaign that insurance companies ran in 
opposition to the Clinton health-care plan.  In one ad, Harry and Louise sit at a 
kitchen table.  A disembodied voice says: “The government may force us to pick 
from a few health care plans designed by government bureaucrats.”  Louise looks 
disgusted.  “Having choices we don’t like is no choice at all!” she says.  Harry then 
starts a sentence that Louise finishes for him.  “If they choose . . .” begins Harry, “we 
lose,” Louise concludes (YouTube.com 2008).  
By focusing public attention on freedom of individual choice, the Harry-and-
Louise ads diverted Americans’ attention away from the common good and, by slight 
of hand, limited their ability—if not their freedom—to make a collective choice. 
Influence of advertising on human autonomy 
 
When people make choices they assert their autonomy.  Choice is critical to 




social, moral, and political philosophers dating back to Plato have recognized 
autonomy’s importance to the individual’s sense of self. 
Many psychological studies report negative associations between materialistic 
values and feelings of authenticity and autonomy.  According to a number of these 
reports, materialistic individuals are less likely to value freedom and self-direction 
than people who are not materialistic (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 1990; Delle Fave 
and Bassi 2000).  In addition, materialists are more likely to be self-conscious and 
tend to focus on external rewards (Deci 1971; Deci and Ryan 1985, 1991; Deci et al. 
1999; Sheldon et al. 2001).  Rather than focusing on the challenge or pleasure 
inherent in an activity, they tend to focus on its potential for rewards and praise 
(Gibbons 1990; Plant and Ryan 1985; Lepper and Greene 1975; Schroeder and Dugal 
1995).  They are more inclined to overwork, incur debt (Schor 1992, 1998), and, in 
general, pursue activities that make them feel pressured or compelled (Sheldon and 
Kasser 1995, 1998, 2001; Richins 1994; Srivastava et al. 2001).  In sum, the literature 
suggests that having a materialistic orientation undermines the potential for 
experiencing freedom and autonomy.  Rather, “people feel chained, pressured, and 
controlled when they focus on materialistic values” (Kasser 2002, 86).  
 
Advertising and anomie 
 
As some social critics see it, ad-assisted industrialization leads to anomie, 
alienation, and ennui.  Although a number of scholars find that people derive great 




de-individualizes work and consumption in order to reap the benefits of mass 
production.  Thus, “the production of standardized things by persons also demands 
the production of standardized persons,” he writes (qtd. in De Graaf et al. 2002, 75).  
Work that is de-individualized tends to lack interest and meaning. “The 
worker/consumer is vaguely dissatisfied, restless, and bored, and these feelings are 
reinforced and enhanced by advertising, which deliberately attempts to exploit them 
by offering new products as a way out” (De Graaf et al. 2002, 75).  In van den Haag’s 
view, ad-sponsored media and advertised products “drown the shriek of unused 
capacities, of repressed individuality” (qtd. in De Graaf 2002, 75).  Thus, people use 
advertised brands to assert their identities because they lack meaningful work that 
would otherwise help to define them.  An individual may project the identity of a 
Bud-drinking, Camel-smoking, Harley-driving, twenty-something male, or a 
Starbucks-sipping, Gucci wearing, Botox-injected, middle-aged female.  Individuals 
are free to choose the brands that will define their identities; nevertheless, the 
identities that they showcase to others are merely composites of the brands they 
consume, not revelations of their authentic selves.  Such composite individuals have 
“an insatiable longing” for the world to supply events that will fill their emptiness.  
But, as De Graaf et al. note, “what the bored person really craves is a meaningful, 
authentic life.  The ads suggest that such a life comes in products or packaged 
commercial experiences” (76).  Advertising encourages, therefore, the subconscious 
belief that branded things can suffuse an empty life with meaning. 
On the conscious level, however, most people recognize that advertising 




“recognize this tendency of ad language to distort, advertising seems to turn [the 
public] into a community of cynics” (Pollay 1986, 460).  In that way, advertising can 
lead to “the normlessness known as anomie” (461).  
At the same time that ads imbue cynicism, they fill minds with sounds and 
images.  As De Graaf et al. speculate, “it may now be possible for a person to travel 
from one week to the next without thinking an original thought unshaped by 
manipulative messages!  Much of the territory between our ears has now been 
commercially ‘colonized.’  The question is, if we get evicted from our own minds, 
who are we?” (118) 
 
Keeping up with the Joneses 
 
Too many people spend money they haven’t earned to buy things they don’t want, to impress people 
they don’t like. 
—Will Rogers 
 
More than half a century ago, conservative economist Wilhelm Ropke 
lamented those who adhere to a “keeping up with the Joneses” way of life and thus 
“lack the genuine and essentially non-material conditions of simple human 
happiness.”  In Ropke’s view, “Homo sapiens consumens loses sight of everything 
that goes to make up human happiness apart from money income and its 
transformation into goods” (qtd. in De Graaf et al. 2002, 74).   
Happiness researchers now provide results that flesh out Ropke’s intuition.  




with human happiness are more important than money.  Despite the widely 
believed—even if generally disavowed—notion that money buys happiness, 
researchers find a “weak or even nonexistent relation between income and happiness 
in the United States” (Lane 2000, 65).  Argyle (1996) attributes this counterintuitive 
result to the declining marginal utility of money.  Once income exceeds a level 
whereby basic needs are easily supplied, the marginal utility of money declines 
rapidly.  While increasing absolute income translates into greater happiness up to that 
level, beyond it, relative position in the income distribution seems to be what counts.  
As Frey and Stutzer (2002) put it: “It is not the absolute level of income that matters 
most but rather one’s position relative to other individuals” (411).  Thus, as the saying 
goes, a rising tide lifts all boats, but (in wealthy countries) its ability to improve 
overall well-being is debatable.  Although other factors may help to explain the 
apparent failure of higher aggregate income to translate into greater happiness, 
“without doubt, one of the most important” is the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses 
phenomenon (411).  
Even in developing countries, where increases in absolute income contribute 
significantly to the happiness of the multitudes living in poverty, relative income is 
salient (Graham and Pettinato 2002a,b).  Graham and Felton (2005) find, for example, 
that “relative income differences have large and consistent effects on well being in 
[Latin America]” (1). 
According to Durning (1992), compared to the members of lower classes, the 
economic elites in any society seem to be happier.  He notes, however, that the upper 




even though the absolute income of the former may be considerably higher.  In his 
view, to the extent that a relationship between income and happiness exists, it “is 
relative rather than absolute.”  Durning concludes: “Consumption is thus a treadmill, 
with everyone judging their status by who is ahead and who is behind” (39).  With 
well-being the supposed destination, members of the species Homo sapiens 
consumens jockey for position on that treadmill.  Even though they consume more 
and more, they never reach their goal; they just keep consuming and running.  
A study by Stein (1997) offers support for that conclusion.  Using data from 
the 1993 General Social Survey, he finds that middle-class people are no happier if 
their absolute income improves unless their relative status improves, as well.  
Referencing the Stein study, Lane (2000) concludes that higher status—not income—
increases well-being. 
Nevertheless, people continue to believe that more money will make them 
happier.  A 2006 Gallup poll of American workers finds, in fact, that “73% say they 
would be happier if they made more money . . .” (2006c).  Thus, the public seems to 
accept as valid the economists’ formula equating increasing income with increasing 
utility.  The economists’ formula, Lane (2000) writes, is persuasive because “it seems 
to correspond to both experience and common sense” (67).  And clearly, among the 
poor, increases in absolute income do, in fact, improve well-being.  Among the non-
poor, however, increases in absolute income generally fail to affect well-being 
significantly; still, the non-poor want more money.   
As Lane (2000) notes, the economists’ formula traces back at least to Adam 




of mankind” leads people to “pursue riches and avoid poverty,” today most 
Americans pursue riches not to avoid the shame of poverty but to surpass—or at least 
to keep up with—the Joneses. 
Over the past half-century, as Americans have become wealthier, their love of 
money seems to have intensified.  In 1965, just 64% of the workers polled by Gallup 
said that more money would make them happier—compared to 73% in 2006 (2006c).  
According to Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007), “When asked what constituted the 
good life, far more people named material goods in 1995 than did in 1971. . . .  Those 
who said ‘a second car’ went from 30 to 41 percent, ‘a swimming pool’ from 14 to 29 
percent, and ‘a vacation home’ from 19 to 35 percent” (172). 
As Schwartz (2004) explains, even though relative status has mattered to 
people “for as long as they have lived in groups,” today’s higher levels of 
materialism, affluence, and advertising are making status a more vital concern.   
Berger and Luckmann (1964) point to one factor that increases the salience of 
consumption as a measure of status: mobility.   In today’s highly mobile society, they 
write, “conspicuous patterns of consumption take the place of continuous 
interpersonal contacts within an individual’s biography. . . .  Material objects rather 
than human beings must be called upon to testify to the individual’s worth” (qtd. in 
Schudson 1984, 156).  And B. Schwartz (1994) notes that “material wealth is as good 
an index, or proxy, of success as there is” (164).   
But for people who step on the consumption treadmill success is gauged not 
merely by having material wealth but by having more and better.  The problem that 




individual in the world—can own everything.  Thus, the Smiths find that the 
satisfaction associated with getting ahead of the Joneses is soon eclipsed by the 
dissatisfaction associated with being behind the Browns.  
Worse still, when the Smiths increase their status by moving ahead, they 
simultaneously lower the Joneses’ status and well-being.  Although the desire for 
status, as Layard (2005) explains, “is wired into our genes,” it is, nevertheless, 
“totally self-defeating at the level of the society as a whole” (151).  Since Smith’s 
income rises relative to Jones’s only to the exact amount that Jones’s falls relative to 
Smith’s, the “whole process produces no net social gain.”  It may, however, involve 
“sacrifice of private life and time with family and friends,” as Smith works harder and 
longer to get ahead of Jones, and Jones works longer and harder to regain her original 
position (151).  Given that happiness studies show that relationships are vital to well-
being, the whole process would appear to produce a net social loss, and any factor, 
such as advertising, that tends to fuel the race for status would seem to undermine 
social welfare.  
Traditional economics assumes, however, that increasing income—even if a 
race for status motivates it—improves social welfare.  The assumption is that if one 
person’s income rises, society benefits, so long as no one else’s income is thereby 
lowered.  Thus, if both Smith and Jones get raises, but Smith’s is larger than Jones’s, 
and Smith, as a result, surpasses Jones in income, standard economics would view the 
change as a social improvement.  But, “standard economics” misses an “obvious 
piece of psychology” in thinking that “things have improved because no one has 




perhaps than her relatively small raise improves it (Kahneman and Sugden 2005; van 
de Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004; van Stadt et al. 1985).  Status is so important, 
in fact, that a number of studies (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway, 1998) show that people 
“would be willing to accept a significant fall in living standards if they could move up 
compared with other people” (Layard, 42).  
The race for status occurs at every economic level.  As Kanner and Gomes 
(1995) explain, even many Americans earning more than $100,000 a year claim that 
they “can’t make ends meet.”  These “‘poor’ well-to-do Americans” should feel 
financially secure, and yet “their monetary struggles leave them feeling bitter and 
ineffective.”  The authors fault the advertising industry for putting the ‘poor’ rich on 
the consumption treadmill.  “The advertising industry has created false needs so 
potent that the most successful individuals in the richest country in the world 
perennially scramble to increase their ability to consume” (87).  
Also illustrating the plight of the ‘poor’ rich, Gary Rivlin (2007) writes in the 
New York Times of “working-class millionaires” who inhabit California’s Silicon 
Valley.  In the neighborhoods where the digital elite reside, keeping up with the 
Joneses might require owning a Cessna Citation X private jet.  One multi-millionaire 
Rivlin interviewed told him, “You’re nobody here at $10 million.”  Another said: 
“Here, the top one percent chases the top one-tenth of one percent, and the top one-
tenth of one percent chases the top one-one-hundredth of one percent” (n.p.). 
Ads and ad-sponsored media show the bottom ninety-nine-and-ninety-nine-
one-hundredths percent of the population how the richest of the rich live.  Television 




Richard Layard, many Americans now compare themselves not to the Joneses next 
door but to the Joneses they see on television, and they find themselves lacking.  
Although not all of the people portrayed on TV are rich, most are at least upper 
middle class.  Thus, Schor concludes, people who watch a lot of television “have 
highly inflated views of what the average American has” (qtd. in De Graaf 2002, 29).  
According to Layard (2005), there is a positive relationship between the amount of 
television people watch and the amount they overestimate other people’s income as 
well as the amount they underrate their own relative wealth.  One study, which 
Layard cites, finds that people spend an additional $4—on keeping up with the 
Joneses—for every additional hour of television they watch per week. 
According to some psychologists and other observers, advertisers persuade 
people to buy their products by highlighting discrepancies between what the viewer 
has and what the Joneses in the ads have.  The subtext of most ads might read 
something like this: “Like a lot of people, you lack true satisfaction with your life 
because you have a problem.  If you use the advertised product, however, your 
problem will be solved, and you will be just as satisfied as the Joneses in the ad are.”  
But, as Lane (2000) explains, while the role of the market “is to satisfy human wants 
and so to maximize various satisfactions, it is not true that the function of advertising 
is to maximize satisfaction; rather, its function is to increase people’s dissatisfaction 
with any current state of affairs, to create wants, and to exploit the dissatisfactions of 
the present.  Advertising must use dissatisfaction to achieve its purpose” (179).   
“Many psychologists believe that people’s emotional states are largely a 




(Kasser 2002, 51).  As Solberg et al. (2004) explain, people are more satisfied when 
their desires are realistic than when they are out of reach.  Ads undermine emotional 
health by implying that using a product or service will allow consumers to reach out-
of-reach desires and by capitalizing on discrepancies between who people are and 
who they would be if they could be. 
People who hold highly materialistic values (for whatever reason) are 
particularly susceptible to ads that play on such discrepancies.  A number of studies 
report that discrepancies between their own lives and those presented in media 
(including ads) leave materialistic individuals feeling frustrated and dissatisfied 
(Rahtz et al. 1988, 1989; Sirgy et al. 1998; Richins 1991).  In order to overcome such 
unpleasant feelings, materialists are prone to engage in conspicuous consumption, 
buying and flaunting products that ads claim connote high status (Braun and 
Wicklund 1989).  Thus, Cadillac ads stress discrepancies that help persuade the 
Chevy-driving Smiths that they can keep up with the Cadillac-driving Joneses in the 
ad (and have a wonderful life) if they replace their Chevy with a Cadillac.  And when 
the Smiths buy a Cadillac, the Browns next door are persuaded by an ad that they can 
overcome the discrepancy between themselves, as Honda owners, and both the 
Lexus-driving people in the ad and their neighbors, the Cadillac-driving Smiths, if 
only they buy a Lexus.   
According to Kasser (2002), “materialistic people overidealize wealth and 
possessions and therefore experience discrepancies that cause them to feel dissatisfied 
and to want further materialistic means of feeling good about themselves.  But the 




and soon they return to another cycle of dissatisfaction” (57).  The satisfactions are 
only temporary because materialistic people readily adapt to their new circumstances. 
Having achieved a higher standard of living, they make that their baseline and then 
compare themselves to real people and ad people who have even more (Kapteyn and 
Wansbeek 1982). 
 
Productivity, work, and leisure 
 
According to Moore and Simon (2000), productivity gains have been the 
“driving force behind the dramatic rise in [U.S.] living standards” (96).  Between 
1900 and 2000, they maintain, economic output increased approximately ten fold; 
between the middle of the century and the end, the average hourly wage (including 
fringe benefits) increased by more than fifty percent. 
Perhaps Moore and Simon’s use of the average hourly wage explains the 
discrepancy between their conclusions and those of Friedman (2005), who notes that 
in recent decades median household income has gained little beyond inflation and 
who concludes that “most of the fruits of the last three decades of economic growth in 
the United States have accrued to only a small slice of the American population” (6).  
Similarly, Cohen (2004) contradicts Moore and Simon by arguing that although 
productivity gains have been substantial, “those gains have not found their way to 
paychecks” (n.p.).  And Reich (2008) writes: “The income of a man in his 30s is now 




Nonetheless, Moore and Simon trumpet the growth in Americans’ income and 
report that the increase in wages has accompanied an increase in leisure.  Without 
explaining the apparent contradiction, they mention that the average workweek has 
remained a steady forty hours since 1950, while they also argue that the “most 
important change in working conditions over time has been that Americans work 
substantially less and have much more leisure time” (98).  The authors note that a 
study by the Dallas Federal Reserve Board found that Americans have, on average, 
tripled their leisure hours over the past one hundred years.  Analysis of the data 
supplied by Moore and Simon indicates, however, that many (if not most) of those 
additional “leisure” hours can be attributed to years in school and years in retirement.  
Compared to a century ago, children spend more years in school and people live 
longer.  Thus, Americans seem to receive their additional “leisure” in lump sums at 
the beginning and end of their lives.   
According to De Graaf et al. (2002), compared to Americans in 1900, the 
average American today gets twenty percent less sleep.  Rather than resting and 
relaxing, Americans work long hours in order to earn the money that will enable them 
to buy more of what they want.  On average, Americans now work the equivalent of 
an additional month compared to the average annual hours of workers in the late 
1960s (De Graaf).  According to a study by the United Nations’ International Labor 
Organization, Americans put in more hours on the job than workers in any other 
industrialized nation (Anderson 2001).  (Coincidentally, ad spending is higher in the 
United States than in any other industrialized nation.)  Reich (2008) notes that the 




Americans [are] veritable workaholics, putting in 350 more hours a year than the 
average European, more even than the notoriously industrious Japanese.” 
Some authors argue that people in developed countries—particularly people in 
the U.S.—work more now than their distant ancestors worked in centuries past.  
Compared to today, working hours in industrialized nations are higher than they were 
before the Industrial Revolution (Durning 1992), in 13th and 14th century England 
(Schor 1992), and in medieval Europe (Rybczynski 1991). 
Schor (1992) explains that the doubling of U.S. productivity between the late 
1940s and early 1990s gave Americans a choice between stabilizing their standard of 
living at the 1948 level and working less every year thereafter.  “Every time 
productivity increases,” she writes, “we are presented with the possibility of either 
more free time or more money” (qtd. in Durning 1992, 113).  Rather than increasing 
their leisure, however, Americans have chosen to work as much as they did in 1948 
and to earn more money. 
Attempting to explain that choice, Brack and Cowling (1983) note that a 
number of economic studies find a positive relationship between the incidence of 
advertising and the average propensity to consume (e.g., Metwally and Tamaschke 
1981; Peel 1975; Taylor and Weiserbs 1972; Yancey 1958).  “If the failure of hours 
of work to decline is the result of an increase in the marginal valuation of goods in 
general relative to that of leisure, we may search for forces which might have brought 
this result about.  Consequently one might wonder whether advertising can have such 




conclude that advertising intensifies the desire for goods and thereby “tilts the long-
run supply-side decision about work and leisure towards longer hours” (303). 
A study by Fraser and Paton (2003) provides support for the Brack-Cowling 
hypothesis of an advertising-induced shift in workers’ preferences away from leisure 
and toward consumption.  In addition, their results indicate “unidirectional causality, 
for males and females, from advertising to hours worked” (1357). 
According to Lane (2000), the consumer culture has a hidden agenda: “ever 
greater consumption implies longer hours at work and more intensive attention to 
earning, including working second jobs and overtime” (179).  Barber (2007) seems to 
detect a contradiction in a culture that requires consumers who demand copious 
quantities of goods because they have a lot of time on their hands and a culture that 
leaves consumers “little time for anything but consumption and the hard work that 
pays for consumption” (114).  Beyond hours spent working and shopping, Barber 
explains, staying abreast of all the products and services offered by the modern 
marketplace “makes for disciplined work”; and yet if consumers fail, “the market 
economy falters.  No wonder leisure, squeezed between the extended hours of work, 
often feels like a full-time job,” he writes.  But, as studies by Brack and Cowling 
(1983) and Fraser and Paton (2003) show, advertising keeps consumers wanting and 
working. 
 
Over-Consumption, Compulsive Shopping, and Debt 
 







Are people actually addicted to over-consumption?  Some, perhaps, are.  
Research has shown that, depending on the criteria used in diagnosis, between two 
and eight percent of Americans are compulsive shoppers (Harston and Koran 2002).   
According to Kottler et al. (2004), some consumers are affected by a psychological 
disorder, which manifests itself as “the neurotic pursuit of possessions” (151).  
Harston and Koran write: “Whether compulsive shopping is best characterized as an 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, impulse control disorder, or a behavioral reaction to 
major depression or another primary psychiatric disorder remains uncertain” (65).   
The literature on compulsive and impulsive shopping indicates that perceived 
social image and self-identity play a central role in the decision to make a compulsive 
purchase (Kacen and Lee 2002).   According to Roberts and Jones (2001), 
compulsive shoppers have an excessive desire for power and prestige and rely on 
material possessions to signal their status.  Advertisers clearly “understand the strong 
link between the desire for power and prestige and spending” (235).   They use that 
understanding to pull the hair-trigger on a compulsive consumer’s urge to buy and to 
motivate consumption in everyone else.  Their success, in that regard, is considerable. 
Increasing levels of ad-triggered consumption have played a part in creating 
unprecedented rates of consumer debt.  Credit-card companies use ads to urge 
consumers to buy whatever they want now, “since the profits of companies issuing 
the cards depend on having consumers maintain large monthly balances” (Gardner et 
al. 2004, 15).  As of February 2008, outstanding credit in the U.S., excluding 




balance for an American household in 2007 was approximately $8,500—nearly triple 
the $3,000 it had been in 1990 (Money-Zine 2008).  In addition, credit-card and 
mortgage delinquencies are now at or near record highs, and home foreclosure rates 
have never been higher (Rucker 2008). 
Not surprisingly, the number of bankruptcies has grown substantially over the 
past several decades.  In 1960, when the U.S. population was about 179 million, for 
example, there were approximately 110,000 business and non-business bankruptcies 
in the United States.  Compare that to 2005, when the population was approximately 
300 million, and there were about 1.64 million bankruptcies.  Over that 45-year span, 
the population less than doubled (CensusScope.org n.d.), while bankruptcies 
increased about fifteen times.  (See Figure 7.2.)   
As De Graaf et al. (2002) note, lending institutions have responded to the 
bankruptcy crisis by successfully lobbying Congress to make declaring bankruptcy 
more difficult.  At the same time, however, lenders use advertising to encourage the 
public to increase their debt.  In 2004 and 2005 (years with the most recent available 
data), American Express and Citigroup were two of the top 50 ad-spenders.  
Citicorp’s “Live Richly” campaign, “which cost some $1 billion from 2001 to 2006, 
urged people to lighten up about money and helped persuade hundreds of thousands 
of Citi customers to take out home equity loans” (Story 2008).  According to 
Morgenson (2008), “eliminating negative feelings about indebtedness was the idea 











Source: U.S. Courts.  Available online at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/1960-0312-
MonthJune.pdf. 
 
Ads tell us that we can solve our problems by consuming advertised products 
and services.  But if consumption becomes compulsive or leads to debts that are 
overwhelming, what are we to do then?  Should we buy some self-help books or pay 
for hours of psychological counseling?  “What if the consumer culture that generates 
a response to pathological compulsive disorders and the consequences they bring 
(indebtedness and bankruptcy) is itself organized around and even defined by the very 
pathologies its therapies affect to address?” Barber (2007) asks.  If the consumer 
culture offers treatments for compulsive-shopping disorders that require greater 
consumption (i.e., books, counseling, etc.), then, perhaps, “the culture is directly 






Overweight and Obesity 
 
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), obesity in 
the United States has grown to epidemic proportions (San Jose Mercury News 2004).  
As Table 7.1 illustrates, approximately two out of three American adults are now 
either overweight or obese. 
 
Table 7.1: Overweight and Obese American Adults, 2007 
 
 




















































Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  “Statistics Related to Overweight and 
Obesity.”  WIN Weight-control Information Network.  http://win.niddk.nih.gov/statistics/index.htm 
 
While the percentages of overweight adults has remained relatively constant 
since 1960, the percentages of obese adults has more than doubled, growing from 
about 11 percent to 29.5 percent of adult males and 16 percent to 33 percent of adult 




Approximately 300,000 U.S. deaths per year are currently associated with 
obesity (Carmona 2001).  According to the National Institutes of Health, overweight 
and obesity are known risk factors for a number of serious illnesses, including: heart 
disease, type 2 diabetes, cancer (e.g., uterine, colorectal, kidney, gallbladder, and 
breast), stroke, hypertension, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, and sleep apnea.  In 
addition, obesity is associated with elevated cholesterol, pregnancy complications, 
psychological problems (e.g., depression, anxiety, impulse control disorders), surgical 
risks, menstrual irregularities, stress incontinence, and hirsutism (National Institutes 
of Health 2004a).  “Left unabated,” former Surgeon General Richard Carmona 
warned, “overweight and obesity may soon cause as much preventable disease and 
death as cigarette smoking” (Carmona 2001).  
Not only does obesity inflict physical costs on the human body, it also exacts 
an economic toll, and not all of the costs are paid by affected individuals.  Some are 
passed on to taxpayers, obese and otherwise.  According to one recent study, states 
pay 11 percent of their Medicaid expenses for the treatment of obesity and 5 percent 
of their total medical disbursements for weight problems, in general.  Due to the 
national epidemic of overweight and obesity, the general public must pay, in addition, 
higher premiums for health insurance due to the increased risk to insurers of weight-
related claims (Lemov 2004).  
The obesity epidemic is not confined to adults.  “Today, more than 20 percent 
of all preschool children are overweight—more than double the number in 1970—and 
1 in 10 are considered clinically obese” (Markel 2002).  Results from the periodic 




disturbing trend among American elementary, middle, and high school students.  
Between the surveys of the 1960s and the most recent (1999-2004) NHANES, the 
percentage of overweight children (ages 6 to 11) quadrupled, rising from 4 percent to 
16 percent.  Over the same period, the percentage of overweight adolescents (ages 12 
to 19) rose from 5 percent to 16 percent (National Institutes of Health, 2004a).  In 
addition, a study of teenagers in fifteen industrialized nations found that, of all the 
teens surveyed, Americans were the most likely to be overweight (National Institutes 
of Health 2004b).  Given that an estimated 80 percent of overweight teens go on to be 
obese adults (San Jose Mercury News 2004), policymakers have begun to express 
increased concern about the future health of today’s young people.  According to 
former Surgeon General Richard Carmona, “the current generation of children might 
be America’s first to suffer shorter life expectancy than their parents” (McConnell 
2004). With epidemiological studies reporting that the obese face a fifty- to one-
hundred-percent increase in the risk of premature death, his concern seems warranted 
(Carmona 2001). 
 
The ad-weight connection 
 
The dramatic increase in the average weight of children since the 1970s (noted 
above) has coincided with a sharp rise in the average number of television 
commercials that children watch.  According to researchers’ estimates, in the 1970s, 
children saw, on average, about 20,000 TV ads per year.  Today, that number has 
doubled (Kunkel 2001).  A majority of those ads—an estimated 11-per-hour on 




most, in the words of one researcher, “encourage the consumption of potentially 
obesogenic foods” (Lobstein 2003).  Of all the TV commercials targeted at children, 
32 percent are for candy, 31 percent are for cereal, and 9 percent are for fast food 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2004).  Expenditures for those ads—and thus the 
associated tax deductions—run into the billions.  Fast food franchises, for example, 
spend $3 billion annually on television commercials alone (Schlosser 2002). To quote 
a Kaiser Family Foundation report, “Clearly, the conclusion advertisers have drawn is 
that TV ads can influence children’s purchases—and those of their families” (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2004). 
Of course, television is just one medium for introducing the advertised 
message.  Movies, magazines, radio, newspapers, websites, billboards, buses, and 
dozens of other media also promote the joys of consumption to children.  Thus, some 
food advertisers have begun to worry that too many ads are competing for 
youngsters’ attention.  Sensing that children are becoming inured to direct 
commercial messages, advertisers are turning to less overt methods of 
communication.  For instance, advertisers have begun to pay to have their food 
products placed in movies, television programs, videogames, and rap songs.  
McDonald’s, for example, paid a videogame manufacturer millions to create a game 
that would allow players to direct the game’s characters “to eat Big Macs, fries, and 
Quarter Pounders with cheese” (Richtel 2002). 
Does this blizzard of junk-food advertising contribute to overweight and 
obesity in children?  Perhaps.  The American Academy of Pediatrics notes a 




advertised to children, and the growing rate of childhood obesity (Fox 1996, 164).  A 
number of studies, in fact, seem to indicate that children’s food preferences and 
eating habits are significantly affected by advertising.  The results of a few such 
studies are summarized below. 
• Taras et al. (1989) find that hours spent watching television are directly 
related to (a) the number of times children ask their parents to buy advertised 
foods and (b) the number of calories the children consume.  
• Several observers report that the desire to model the behavior of beloved 
television personalities and cartoon characters leads some children to choose 
unhealthy foods and to develop poor eating habits (“Thought for Food” 2003; 
McLellan 2002; McConnell 2004). 
• According to a study by Borzekowski and Robinson (2001), two- to six-year 
olds who watch cartoons containing ads for food choose the advertised foods 
from pairs of similar products at a significantly higher rate than children who 
see the same cartoons without the embedded food ads.  According to 
researchers, the differences in the preferences between the two groups are 
even more significant when products are advertised twice than when they are 
advertised once. 
• Finding that adolescents eat fewer servings of fruits and vegetables with each 
additional hour of television they watch per day, researchers conclude that the 
inverse relationship (between eating healthy food and watching TV) might be 




• Gorn and Goldberg (1982) report that the preferences of a group of 5- to 8-
year-olds for Kool Aid over juice and candy over fruit correspond to the types 
of ads they watch. 
• Two studies, taken five years apart by Signorelli and Staples (1992, 1997), 
find an association between the amount of television that fourth- and fifth-
graders watch and the likelihood of their mistakenly saying that the less 
nutritious of a pair of foods is the more nutritious one (Signorelli and Staples 
1992, 1997). 
• Researchers report that 70 percent of the six- to eight-year-olds in their study 
believe that home-cooked foods are less nutritious than the fast foods they see 
advertised (Donahue and Henke 1978). 
• Children who watch a cartoon on television that contains ads for food make 
more requests for those foods than do children in a control group (Brody et al. 
1981). 
• Researchers find that lean, overweight, and obese children who watch food 
ads consume significantly greater quantities of food, soon thereafter, than does 
a matched group of children who watch ads for non-food products only (p < 
0.001).  The authors conclude: “Exposure to food adverts promotes 
consumption” (Halford et al. 2004, 221). 
• McConnell (2004) reports that three out of four of the items children ask their 
parents to buy at the grocery store are foods they have seen advertised on 
television.  In addition, the number of hours the children watch TV correlates 




• According to a task force of the American Psychological Association (2004b), 
“children under the age of eight are unable to critically comprehend televised 
advertising messages and are prone to accept advertiser messages as truthful, 
accurate and unbiased. . . .  This can lead to unhealthy eating habits as 
evidenced by today’s youth obesity epidemic” (n.p.).  
• Bowman et al. (2004) report that between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, 
consumption of fast foods by American children increased from two percent 
to ten percent of their total caloric intake, on average.  Over nearly the same 
span of years, the number of fast-food restaurants doubled, and the number of 
overweight and obese children grew dramatically.  “These trends,” the 
survey’s authors suggest, “seem to have been driven by massive advertising 
and marketing campaigns aimed at children and their parents” (112). 
 
Advertising and smoking 
 
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966 limits the states 
ability to restrict the place, time, and manner of cigarette ads (American Lung 
Association 2007), so that “commerce and the national economy may be . . . not 
impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising 
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health” (“Federal 
Cigarette” n.d.).  Although the Act was amended in 1971 to ban cigarette advertising 
from radio and television in 1971, cigarette manufacturers still find ways to spend 




largest U.S. cigarette manufacturers spent a combined $13.11 billion on promotions 
and advertising (Federal Trade Commission 2007).  Given all that spending, it is not 
surprising that American youths are exposed, on average, to hundreds of tobacco ads 
each year (American Lung Association 2007).  Unfortunately, as the National Cancer 
Institute reports, the evidence that cigarette ads initiate smoking is seemingly 
“unassailable” (National Cancer Institute 2001). 
As the American Cancer Society (2007) reports, tobacco use causes 
approximately 440,000—or nearly one in five—U.S. deaths annually.  Smokers 
generally live shorter lives.  According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (2002), in the late 1990s, “adult male and female smokers lost an average 
of 13.2 and 14.5 years of life, respectively, because they smoked” (n.p.).  Numerous 
studies show that smoking increases the probability of heart disease; causes cancers 
of the lung, esophagus, mouth, larynx, pharynx, and bladder; contributes to the 
growth of a number of other cancers; and either causes or contributes to a variety of 
lung diseases (e.g., chronic bronchitis, emphysema, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease).  In addition, smoking is implicated in up to five percent of infant deaths.  
  
Summing up advertising’s impact on the individual and society 
 
On balance, the impact of advertising on the individual and society is—in two 
words—not good.  As the previous sections indicate, numerous studies link 





Chapter 8, below, examines the impact of over-consumption, especially ad-










The previous chapter offers strong evidence in support of the claim that 
advertising inculcates materialistic values.  According to the literature, people who 
adopt those values tend to buy all sorts of unneeded products, with the ad-inspired 
belief that the things they buy will improve their lives.  Ultimately they suffer, 
psychologists explain, because the fleeting satisfaction they derive from unnecessary 
consumption masks their underlying feelings and distracts them from attending to 
their true needs.  
When we consume, we deplete life-sustaining resources, generate wastes, and 
emit pollution.  But since we must consume to survive, the benefits of consumption 
exceed the costs—up to a point.  When we over-consume, however, we increase the 
costs more than the benefits, such that, on balance, increasing consumption reduces 
our welfare.  
Currently, wealthy nations are consuming at rates that generally violate 
economist Herman Daly’s rules for sustainable throughput: Renewable resources are 
being consumed faster than they can be regenerated, nonrenewable resources are 
being depleted before renewable substitutes have been developed, and pollutants are 
being released into the environment faster than they can be absorbed by their 
ecosystems. 
As Oskamp (2000) notes, over-consumption of natural resources is a major 




supplies of many useful natural materials are rapidly depleting.  Myers and Kent 
(2004) report a salient fact about the resource-exploitation trend: “Since 1950 the 
United States has used up more natural resources than all people who had lived on 
Earth before then” (125; italics added).  
For many Americans, the relationship between their own consumption and 
environmental degradation is far from obvious.  True, most Americans, according to a 
Merck Family Fund survey, believe that the nation is too materialistic (New 
American Dream 2002).  And a strong majority of Americans (70 percent) think of 
themselves as being either active environmentalists (12 percent) or sympathetic to 
environmental concerns (58 percent) (Harris Poll 2005).  Nevertheless, most 
Americans consume at levels that are environmentally unsustainable.  They miss the 
connection between their own consumption and environmental degradation, in part, 
because most of the harm that over-consumption inflicts on the environment is hidden 
from sight.  This chapter attempts to bring the environmental consequences of over-





As subsequent sections of this chapter show, some technological enthusiasts 
believe that concerns about resource depletion and environmental degradation are 
overblown.  In their view, human ingenuity will forever ensure the availability of 




2000; Scarlett 2000).  Many students of sustainability (e.g., Costanza et al. 1997; 
Daily et al. 1997; Daly, 2005; Daly and Farley 2004; Diamond 2005; Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich 1996; McKibben 2007; Meadows et al. 2004; Myers and Kent 2004; Oskamp 
2000) disagree, however.  They maintain that humans are drawing down natural 
capital at unsustainable rates.  Having inherited a generous bounty of natural 
resources, consumer societies, like profligate heirs, squander vast sums on goods that 
often provide little more than momentary pleasure.  By one estimate, an average of 
more than 120 pounds of natural resources (including farm products, wood, range 
grass, natural gas, oil, coal, minerals, metals, stones, and cement) are devoted to each 
Americans’ daily consumption (Ryan and Durning 1997).  Coupled with those high 
levels of resource exploitation are high levels of waste generation.  According to a 
“rule of thumb,” five tons of manufacturing waste and twenty pounds of extraction-
site waste go into producing every ton of goods that consumers buy, use, and then 
eventually send to the landfill (Meadows et al. 2004).  In some cases, the rule of 
thumb grossly understates the waste associated with resource extraction.  To produce 
one ton of copper, for example, approximately 100 tons of earth must be moved and 
100 tons of ore must be excavated (Oskamp 2000).  Some mining companies remove 
entire mountaintops to extract coal cheaply, externalizing the environmental costs by 
dumping millions of tons of waste on land and streams in the valleys below.  Overall, 
the wasted energy and materials associated with useless material flows of all kinds 





Coping with waste 
 
According to the EPA, the average American discards more than 32 pounds of 
trash per week (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008).  Finding places to put 
all of that trash is becoming increasingly problematic.  Compounding the problem is 
the growing quantity of trash containing toxic components.  Every year, the amount 
of toxic-laden electronic products that are cast into the waste stream grows.  Rather 
than spend the sums required to dispose of all such materials safely at local sites, the 
U.S. ships millions of tons of worn-out high-tech devices to developing countries, 
where environmental standards are lax (Diamond 2005; Flynn 2005).   
Some trash—toxic and otherwise—never reaches its ostensible destination.  
According to Chris Parry of the California Coastal Commission, an island of garbage 
twice the size of Texas, weighing more than three and a half million tons, is floating 
in the eastern Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and San Francisco (United Press 
International 2007).  Bad as that sounds, it is only the half of it, because another 
island of garbage fouls the western Pacific.  Combined, the two islands cover “an area 
twice the size of the continental United States” (Marks and Howden 2008).  Giant 
islands coalesce when ocean currents circulate trash, in giant gyres, from “storm 
water discharges, combined sewer overflows, beach visitors, ships and other vessels, . 
. . landfills, offshore platforms, industrial activities, [and] illegal dumping” (Schwartz 
2008, personal correspondence).  Eventually, some of the trash leaves a gyre and 
drifts back to land.  As Diamond (2005) notes, even the beaches of uninhabited, 
rarely visited Pacific atolls are recipients of sea-borne detritus, having, on average, 




Like the Pacific islands of garbage that few humans ever see (or smell), many 
of the consequences of human consumption occur in remote locations, hidden from 
view.  Resource extraction, processing, and product disposal often take place far from 
where consumers actually use the associated goods.  Not having witnessed the waste 
created and pollution emitted with the transformation of raw materials into consumer 
products or the transformation of consumer products into landfill, most people are 




With less than one-twentieth of the global human population, the United 
States consumes approximately one-quarter of the world’s energy and large shares of 
many other commodities (Ryan and Durning 1997).  Average new American homes 
are two times larger than average European or Japanese homes and twenty-six times 
larger than average African living quarters (Sawin 2004).  Not only are American 
homes bigger than homes in other parts of the world, the size of new American homes 
has been increasing over time.  In 1950, the average American house was 1,000 
square feet (Gardner 2002).  In 2006, the median floor area for new single-family 
homes was 2,248 square feet, up 46 percent from 1975; the average floor area was 
2,469 square feet, up 50 percent from 1975 (U.S. Census Bureau “Median” n.d.).   
At the same time that the average house-size has been expanding, the average 
number of people living in each house has been contracting.  The average American 




to 2.6 in 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).  Thus, even if the U.S. population were 
static, the number of homes would have to increase to accommodate the increasing 
number of households.  (Of course, the U.S. population is not static; it is continuing 
to expand.)  According to Sawin (2004), energy consumption per person grew 
twenty-percent in industrial countries between 1973 and 1992 due to the effect of the 
shrinking number of people per household and the concomitant increase in the 
number of households. 
Why are houses getting bigger while the number of people per household is 
getting smaller?  Why do people need more room?  Perhaps ad-inspired materialism 
is a factor.   
Imagine a typical family of four.  Assume that both parents work fulltime at 
jobs that pay well.  Although their jobs prevent them from spending as much time 
with their children as they would like, the parents are able to compensate themselves 
for their own loss and make amends to their children by indulging everyone’s ad-
stimulated desires for material goods.   
 Soon, the parents’ indulgence leads to overabundance.  With their three-
bedroom house unable to contain all of their possessions, the family packs up and 
moves to a new subdivision in the exurbs, where the houses are larger than 
comparably priced houses in the city or suburbs (primarily because commutes tend to 
be longer).  Their new home has plenty of room for all of their stuff.  In fact, it has 
more than enough room for all of their stuff.  For the first time in years, the 
possessions they have are insufficient to furnish the space they have.  They need 




shower curtains, curtain rods, paintings, and so on.  Even as they fill the rooms with 
furnishings, they continue to buy themselves and their children additional clothing 
and other personal items.  In no time at all, their 3,200-square-foot home in the exurbs 
is barely able to contain all of the family’s possessions.   
As studies cited in the previous chapter indicate, ad-induced materialism is 
associated with numerous psychological, physical, and social disutilities, any of 
which might affect this exurban family.  Setting those disutilities to the side, however, 
one finds that all of the family’s ad-propelled, materialistic over-consumption exacts 
a host of deleterious environmental consequences.  For one thing, the move to the 
exurbs increases the family’s greenhouse-gas emissions, because their commutes are 
longer and their house has more space to heat and cool.   For another, environmental 
externalities inhere to all of the new things that the family buys to furnish the house.  
Pollution and waste accompany every stage in the lifecycle of a product—from the 
extraction of raw materials to the delivery of the finished product to its use and 
ultimate disposal as useless trash.  
Of course, the environmental impact of one exurban family’s consumption is 
relatively small.  But if you add the impact of all of the resources that their 
consumption depletes to the impact of all of the pollution and waste that their 
consumption generates and multiply that sum by the ten-million-plus families who 
have moved to the exurbs (Berube et al. 2006), you find that the environmental 
impact is enormous.  Consider, in addition, that as demand for exurban homes goes 




for subdivisions, factories, roads, stores, schools, golf courses, offices, restaurants, 
and so forth.  
 
Nations of new consumers 
 
An echo of that increase in consumption is occurring in the emerging 
economies of some formerly low-income nations.  While the world’s population is 
growing rapidly, per capita consumption in many parts of the globe is growing faster 
still—as much as eight to twelve times faster—in terms of environmental impact 
(Princen et al. 2002).  According to many researchers’ projections, population growth 
will stabilize by 2050, but consumption will continue to grow (Flavin 2004). 
As residents of developing nations emerge from poverty, they devote 
substantial portions of their growing incomes to nonessential consumer products 
(Myers and Kent 2004).  Currently, about one billion members of the consumer class 
live in developing nations.  To date, none of those nations devours resources at the 
U.S. rate.  If, however, China were to achieve the wherewithal to consume like 
Americans, world consumption rates would double; if India attained the U.S. level, 
they would triple; if every developing country were to consume like Americans, 
global consumption rates would increase eleven-fold, and “it would be as if the world 
population ballooned to 72 billion people (retaining present consumption rates),” 
Diamond (2008) writes. 
Between 1985 and 1997, TV ownership increased by a factor of five in East 




emerging nations (i.e., “new consumers”) owned approximately one-third of the 
world’s personal computers and sixty percent of the world’s television sets (Myers 
and Kent 2004).  Watching television and surfing the Internet expose new consumers 
to a plethora of advertisements that flaunt lavish lifestyles and feed aspirations for all 
the trappings of the Western consumer culture. 
Among those trappings are automobiles.  In 2006, automakers spent $1.9 
billion on ads in China and nearly $600 million in India (Reuters 2007a).  According 
to many of the ads, cars confer power, prestige, and sex appeal to their owners; thus, 
new consumers signal their social ascendancy with cars (Myers and Kent 2004).    
During the 1990s, auto sales in new-consumer nations surged.  In one decade, 
car fleets grew in India and Columbia more than 200 percent, in South Korea more 
than 300 percent, and in China about 400 percent.  Of the 560 million cars on the 
world’s roads in 2000, new consumers owned about 125 million.  Analysts predict 
that by 2010 new consumers will own approximately one-third of the world’s 
projected 800 million cars (Myers and Kent 2004). 
As the number of cars per area increases, more land must be devoted to roads, 
driveways, and parking lots.  A stretch of land equivalent in size to a football field is 
paved with asphalt for every five cars added to the American fleet, for example 
(Myers and Kent 2004).  In India and China, vast expanses of scarce cropland are 
currently being sacrificed to accommodate automobiles (Brown 2001). 
Throughout China, auto dealerships are selling cars at the rate of seven 
million per year.  Every day, approximately one thousand new cars jockey for 




of car ownership would mean that China would add more than a billion vehicles to its 
roads and require fifteen million more barrels of oil than the world now produces.  
Furthermore, China’s cars would emit more carbon dioxide than all of the rest of the 




Throughout the world, as the number of cars increases, environmental 
concerns grow.  Emissions from cars contribute to smog, acid rain, and global 
warming.  Manufacturing cars is extremely energy intensive and produces 
tremendous amounts of pollution and waste.  The construction and maintenance of 
roads, bridges, parking lots, gas stations, auto dealerships, auto parts stores, and other 
auto-related businesses require additional energy and generate additional waste and 
pollution (Sawin 2004).  As a rule of thumb, individual cars put carbon dioxide equal 
to their own weight into the air each year.  Most countries’ transportation sectors emit 
as much of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide as all other sources combined (Myers 
and Kent 2004).  Extracting, refining, and transporting oil also generate pollution and 
waste.  
Beyond a broad array of environmental costs, cars exact a variety of economic 
and social costs.  In the Amazon and the Arctic, oil extraction endangers indigenous 
peoples’ traditional ways of life.  In the U.S., road congestion costs the American 




gasoline (Myers and Kent).  Throughout the world, accidents, traffic jams, and 
outbursts of road rage generate additional car-related costs.   
Advertisements for cars generally focus on the image that the car confers to 
the driver.  In ads, traffic jams pose no problems, because the advertised car is 
typically the only vehicle on the road.  Ads show none of the negative externalities 
inhering to cars or driving, in fact.  
 
Environmental disutilities arising from increasing energy use 
 
Cars consume massive quantities of energy (about 20 million barrels of oil per 
day) and emit more than 333 million tons of greenhouse gases per year 
(Environmental Defense Fund 2007).  As Sawin (2004) notes, however, not just cars 
but “everything we consume or use . . . requires energy to produce and package, to 
distribute to shops or front doors, to operate, and then to get rid of” (25).  Given that 
most of the energy required to do all of those things is derived from fossil fuels, the 
more we consume, the more we emit greenhouse gases. 
According to Dernbach (2008), individual Americans’ activities outside of 
work generate about one-third of U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions.  Worldwide, 
consumers generate about two-thirds of their carbon-dioxide emissions driving cars 
and using household electricity.  New-consumer nations are already making a 
significant contribution to global climate change.  In 2000, their share of carbon-
dioxide emissions reached forty percent, and those emissions have continued to grow 




Of all the new-consumer nations, China contributes the most to global 
warming.  In 2007, China claimed the dubious distinction of being the world’s 
greatest greenhouse-gas emitter, a title formerly held by the United States 
(Knickerbocker 2007).  According to Weber et al. (2008), China’s carbon dioxide 
emissions almost doubled between 2000 and 2005, and “consumption in the 
developed world is [likely] driving this trend.”  In 2005, for example, approximately 
one-third of China’s carbon dioxide emissions were probably due to the production of 
goods for export to wealthy nations. 
Beyond greenhouse gases, fossil-fuel consumption (in China and elsewhere) 
infuses the atmosphere with a number of other pollutants (e.g., lead, mercury, arsenic, 
ozone, and carbon monoxide).  Coal-fired power plants pump sulfur-dioxide and 
nitrogen-oxide molecules into the air, where they combine with water molecules.  
Eventually some of those molecules fall hundreds of miles away as acid rain.  
Particulate matter, emitted by power plants, often travels thousands of miles from 
before being precipitated.  Some particulates that originate in China, for example, 
travel all the way across the Pacific to become components of the air pollution in Los 
Angeles (Kahn and Yardley 2007).   
 
The expanding appliance market 
 
Energy consumption is increasing rapidly throughout the world, in part, 
because people believe that their lives will be better if they purchase a wide 
assortment of machines and appliances that depend on electrical energy to operate.  




acceptance of that belief.  General Electric, the eleventh largest U.S. advertiser in 
2004 and twelfth largest in 2005 (the two most recent years with available data), has 
been equating owning appliances with human progress and well-being for decades.  
Throughout the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, in fact, General Electric told the public: 
“Progress is our most important product,” and then, from 1979 through 2003, GE’s 
ads reiterated the slogan: “We bring good things to life.”   
In a ranking of the fastest growing categories of energy use, appliances take 
second place, behind cars.  Although manufacturers have been building more efficient 
models of many appliances for several decades, those efficiency gains have been 
eclipsed by subsequent demand for larger models and more amenities.  In the U.S. 
between 1972 and 2001, for example, as refrigerators became more efficient, the 
number of refrigerators per capita grew, and their average size increased by ten 
percent (Sawin 2004). 
Since 1990, most of the growth in appliance-related energy demand has 
occurred in the new consumer countries (Sawin 2004).  Motivated by advertisements 
and enabled by rising incomes, the new consumers are buying vast quantities of 
washing machines, clothes dryers, air conditioners, refrigerators, freezers, 
microwaves, personal computers, televisions, cell phones, electric shavers, hairdryers 
and so forth.  As a result, between 1989 and 1999, household electricity consumption 
tripled in China, grew at about the same rate in South Korea and Indonesia, and grew 
at an even higher rate in Thailand and the Philippines (Myers and Kent 2004). 
Although consumers—new and old—clearly believe that all of their energy-




lives, as Sawin (2004) explains, worldwide evidence is mounting “that current 
patterns of energy consumption are actually degrading the quality of life for many 
people—worsening air and water pollution, increasing health problems, raising 
economic and security costs associated with fuel extraction and use, and weakening 





Ad-induced over-consumption is bringing about the rapid depletion of the 
world’s old-growth forests.  In addition to diminishing biodiversity, forest clearing is 
a major contributor to climate change.  According to Ryan and Durning (1997), 
logging is the source of one-quarter of British Columbia’s greenhouse-gas emissions, 
for example.   
While temperate forests in North America are now logged primarily for the 
lumber and pulp they supply, Latin America’s tropical forests are often razed in order 
to provide more land for crops and pasture (as North America’s forests once were).  
The topography, soil, and climate of large areas of the Amazon basin are suitable for 
mechanized agriculture—once extant forests are removed.  For that reason, over 
540,000 hectares of Amazon forest were converted directly to cropland between 2001 
and 2004 (Morton et al. 2006).  Unfortunately, fields planted with crops provide little 
or no carbon offset for the rapid and complete removal of forest biomass.  Neither 




conversion of vast expanses of tropical forestlands to pasturelands for raising cattle.  
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
between twenty and thirty-five million acres of the world’s tropical forests are 
converted to pasture every year, and the conversion process is responsible for 
eighteen percent of the world’s annual carbon emissions (UNFCCC 2006).  
 
Disutilities associated with meat consumption  
 
The world’s growing appetite for beef has been the primary stimulus for the 
conversion of forest to pasture and cropland throughout the tropics.  In the United 
States, most such conversion occurred decades or centuries ago.  According to Ryan 
and Durning (1997), seventy percent of the grain currently grown in the U.S. is fed to 
livestock every year.  Three-fifths of U.S. corn and approximately one-quarter of all 
the corn grown anywhere goes to feed American livestock.  With worldwide demand 
for grain-fed beef soaring, it is worth noting that two-thirds of the world’s total grain 
harvest would be devoted to Chinese meat consumption, if China were to consume 
meat at the American per-capita rate (McKibben 2007).  Demand for grain as an input 
to meat production has already (in 2008) helped raise grain prices beyond the reach of 
many impoverished people.  In Haiti, for example, some poor people have been 
reduced to eating baked mud—with a bit of sugar and fat added for flavor—due to 
out-of-reach grain prices (Lacey 2008).   
Raising cattle and bringing them to market exacts an assortment of 




widely implicated in waterway pollution, toxic algal blooms, and extensive fish kills” 
(Myers and Kent 2004, 40).  According to Ryan and Durning (1997), the production 
of a quarter-pound hamburger requires the use of about a pound-and-a-quarter of 
feed, 1 cup of gasoline (most of it in the form of fertilizer), and hundreds of gallons of 
water.  In addition, producing the quarter-pounder brings about the loss of about one-
and-a-quarter pounds of topsoil and emits greenhouse gases that correspond to those 
released during a six-mile drive in a car (Ryan and Durning).  “The annual beef 
consumption of a typical American family of four requires more than 260 gallons of 
fuel and releases 2.5 tonnes [i.e., about 5,500 pounds] of CO2 into the atmosphere 
(through machinery on farms and through transport from countryside to cities), or as 
much as an average car over six months” (Myers and Kent, 48).   
Beef consumption contributes to greenhouse-gas emissions in another way.  
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2007b), cattle raised in the 
U.S. “emit about 5.5 million metric tons of methane per year into the atmosphere, 
accounting for 20% of U.S. methane emissions” (n.p.).  Unfortunately, “methane is 
over 20 times more effective in trapping heat in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide . 
. . over a 100-year period (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2007a, n.p.). 
In addition to all of the other environmental costs associated with beef 
consumption, raising cattle depletes freshwater stocks.  Irrigated fields that are 
dedicated to growing grain for meat production require vast quantities of freshwater.  
As Ryan and Durning (1997) note, “eating less beef—thereby saving the water used 
to grow cattle feed—would cut deepest of all into the 375 gallons of water consumed 




In many parts of the world, groundwater is being mined at unsustainable rates 
in order to grow grain that is used, in part, to produce feed for cattle.  America’s 
Ogallala Aquifer, formed over twenty million years ago (Guru and Horne 2000), has 
been seriously depleted since farmers, from Texas to South Dakota, began to use the 
aquifer intensively to irrigate their croplands following World War II (Lawrence 
Journal World and News 2003).  According to Lee Allison, director of the Kansas 
Geological Survey, some western portions of the aquifer will only be replenished in 
our lifetimes if rainfall increases “1,000 percent.”  In a number of locations, the 
aquifer has been effectively drained.  In many other spots, only a few decades of 
groundwater remain.  “We’re growing corn in a desert to feed cattle,” remarked 
Sierra Club attorney Charles Benjamin (qtd. in Lawrence Journal 2003).  As Cohen 
(1995) explains, when the grain and “beef fed on grain grown with mined water are 
sold at home or abroad, the price takes no account of the likely replacement cost of 
the water.”  Thus, water is, in effect, given away with the sale of the meat and grain.  
The costs associated with the depletion of the Ogallala and other aquifers “will be 
borne by future Americans, who may not benefit from the current profits or 
consumption of wheat and beef” (384). 
 
Advertising’s role in creating a new market for meat 
 
Speculating that advertising plays a substantial role in creating demand for 
meat seems reasonable.  Year after year, McDonald’s ranks among the top twenty 
U.S. advertisers.  Ads for Tyson Chicken, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Church’s 




Evans Sausage, Oscar Mayer Wieners, Ball Park Franks, etc., etc., abound.  As 
previously noted, the Department of Agriculture has required ranchers to support 
advertising campaigns, from time to time, for some homogeneous meat products, 
which would not otherwise be advertised.  Thus, Americans have been treated to ads 
for beef (“It’s What’s for Dinner”) and pork (“The Other White Meat”).    
To a great extent, however, new consumers are responsible for the recent 
surge in beef demand.  Like having a car to drive, having meat on the table is 
considered a symbol of success for new consumers, and it is one that is within the 
reach of more of them.  Over the 1990s, when meat consumption increased thirty 
percent worldwide, demand for meat in new-consumer countries increased twice as 
much (Myers and Kent 2004).    
As Myers and Kent (2004) explain, many new consumers eat meat “to enjoy 
the good life as represented by what they see as the American dream” (48).  Although 
they might see Americans enjoying meat in movies and on television programs, new 
consumers are more likely to be influenced to eat meat by advertisements that 
associate meat consumption with high status, prosperity, and the good life.  
McDonald’s alone spends several hundred million dollars advertising outside the 
United States every year (“Thoroughly Modern” 2005).  (Visit the video website 
YouTube.com to find links to dozens of McDonald’s, KFC, and Burger King ads that 
have aired in new-consumer countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines, 





The United States Department of Agriculture subsidizes some advertisements 
for meat products overseas.  In 2006, the Market Access Program allocated $18 
million to promote the U.S. Meat Export Federation (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
2007).  The Market Promotion Program (a forerunner to the present program) spent 
nearly half a million dollars in 1991 underwriting McDonald’s overseas ads (Moore 
and Stansel 1995). 
 
Increasing demand and dwindling supply of cropland 
 
As worldwide demand for grains is soaring, the amount of land devoted to 
raising crops is declining.  The world’s grain-growing acreage decreased six percent 
between 1981 and 2000 (Oskamp 2000).  Over the same time span, the global 
population increased by more than 33 percent (U.S. Census).  Adding to the problem 
of a declining cropland-to-population ratio is the fact that soil quality in many parts of 
the world is deteriorating.  According to Diamond (2005), salinization, acidification, 
erosion, alkalinization, and fertility depletion “have resulted in a fraction of the 
world’s farmland variously estimated at between 20% and 80% having become 
severely damaged, during an era in which increasing human population has caused us 
to need more farmland rather than less farmland” (490).   
Lawns deplete the supply of farmland further still.  In the U.S., for example, 
lawns reduce the land available for crops by forty-million acres—an area larger than 
the state of Louisiana.  Turf grass is, in fact, America’s largest irrigated crop (Hayden 




copious amounts of water, most lawns receive applications of fertilizers and 
pesticides, which tend to harm wildlife and to pollute soils, water, and air.   
Ads for a variety of yard and garden products depict a spacious, luxuriant 
lawn as a component of the American dream.  Thus advertising plays an indirect role 
in the loss of cropland.  It plays another indirect role by generating demand for goods 
of all kinds.  Because land devoted to factories and stores tends to offer higher 
returns, commercial development often replaces cropland when demand for goods 
increases.  
For the reasons mentioned, among others, the ratio of cropland to population 
in the U.S. is decreasing.  According to some economic cornucopians (e.g., Bailey 
2000; Georgia et al. 2000; Lomborg 2001), however, that loss is being more than 
offset by technological progress.  Technological solutions, they maintain, allow us to 
reap larger quantities of food from smaller plots of land.  Unfortunately, some of the 
technological solutions that the cornucopians tout—such as increasing the amount of 
available cropland by irrigating arid land or increasing crop yields through liberal 
applications of fertilizers and pesticides—are unsustainable due to the detrimental 
environmental impacts associated with their use.  In addition, cornucopians’ 
predictions of expanded agricultural production seem to depend on the use of 
petroleum-fueled farm equipment, which is growing increasingly infeasible.  
Dwindling supplies and high prices will force farmers to reduce fossil-fuel 
consumption.  Perhaps human ingenuity will provide solutions for today’s shortages 




appear—tend to have unintended consequences, dismissing the diminishing supply of 
cropland as unimportant seems to be imprudent.   
 
Outsized ecological footprints 
 
Having fewer acres of farmland with more mouths to feed is one indication 
that humans are now straining against ecological limits.  But there are many other 
indications of that strain.  According to the organization Redefining Progress, 
humanity “would need to have over one third more than the present [2008] 
biocapacity of Earth to maintain the same level of prosperity for future generations” 
(Redefining Progress 2008).  What is more, if everyone on the planet were to attain 
the consumption level of today’s average American, between five and six Earths 
would be required to support that consumption, which is another way of saying that 
the average American’s ecological footprint is currently five-to-six times larger than 
the planet can sustain, ceteris paribus (Creslog and Graesser 2001; Hoppe and 
Creslog 2002). 
The “ecological footprint,” a concept created by Rees and Wackernagel, is 
defined by Meadows et al. (2004) as “the total impact of humanity on nature: the sum 
of all effects of resource extraction, pollution emission, energy use, biodiversity 
destruction, urbanization, and the other consequences of physical growth” (56).  The 
smaller the average ecological footprint, the more people the planet can 
accommodate.  In order to reduce its ecological footprint, a nation can (1) decrease 




resource efficiency through technological innovation.  According to Meadows et al., 
taken together, decreasing all three “could reduce the human impact on the planet by 
a factor of several hundred or more” (127; italics in the original).  
For one reason or another, however, most nations’ ecological footprints are 
expanding, not contracting.  In low-income nations, ecological footprints are 
expanding because population growth rates tend to be high, even though individual 
consumption levels are typically very low.  In new-consumer nations, although 
population growth rates are generally lower than in low-income countries, 
consumption levels are higher and are growing dramatically.  In wealthy nations, 
populations are stable, growing slowly, or even shrinking slightly; nevertheless, 
ecological footprints are enlarging because average consumption levels are very high 
and still expanding.  Technological innovations could reduce footprints by allowing 
consumers and producers to use resources more efficiently; however, as Jevons first 
explained in 1865, reduced production costs associated with resource efficiency tend 
to drive down product prices, and when prices fall, consumers often devote their 
savings to the purchase of more products.  As a result, technological improvements 
have failed to reduce the ecological impact of growing human populations and 
increasing per-capita consumption. 
 
Beyond carrying capacity? 
 
 According to Meadows et al. (2004), the planet risks a series of collapses—




technology.  “There is pervasive and convincing evidence that the global society is 
now above its carrying capacity,” they write (138; italics in the original).  Simon 
(1990, 1996) and Wattenberg (2005), however, disagree.  As they see it, carrying 
capacity grows along with population, because children confer benefits that outweigh 
any costs they might impose.  For his part, Cohen (1995) doubts that carrying 
capacity is even a useful concept, because, in his view, humans can do a lot to 
influence the number of people that the Earth can support.  Nevertheless, he notes that 
the global population is within the range that a substantial fraction of scholars 
believes is the outer bound for sustainability, and explains that if the population were 
to continue to increase at its 1995 rate, it would reach fifty billion within a mere 150 
years (and reach five trillion in 436 years).  The addition of that many people in so 
short a time would obviously be unsustainable, Cohen maintains.   
As it has turned out, the human population in 2008 is increasing at a rate that 
is about four-tenths of a percent lower than it was when Cohen wrote in 1995 (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2008).  If the world’s population continues to grow at the 2008 
rate, it will take about 200 years for the population to increase ten-fold.  Clearly, the 
lower rate of population growth suggests a move in the right direction.  But even if 
population growth were to come to a complete halt, carrying capacity—that is, the 
number of people the Earth can support—would remain a concern so long as human 
consumption continues to grow unchecked.  As Myers and Kent (2004) note, “in 
many parts of the world, the factor of per-capita growth in consumption is expanding 




As Meadow et al. (2004) see it, “compulsive worship at the altar of 
consumption has brought humanity right to the edge of an environmental abyss—
depleting resources, spreading dangerous pollutants, undermining ecosystems, and 
threatening to unhinge the planet’s climate balance” (97).  Put another way, human 
consumption has grown so large it has begun to impair the ecosystem services (i.e., 
flows of energy, materials, and information from natural-capital stocks) upon which 
all earthly life depends (Costanza et al. 1997).   
 
The impact of over-consumption on ecosystem services 
 
Natural ecosystems supply the materials and energy on which the human 
economy is based.  Just as important, they provide a number of fundamental life-
support services, such as climate regulation, air and water purification, genetic 
diversification, waste decomposition and detoxification, sediment retention, soil-
fertility regeneration, and plant pollination, to name just a few.  These essential 
services depend upon “a complex interplay of natural cycles powered by solar energy 
and operating across a wide range of space and time scales” (Daily et al. 1997).  Their 
intricacy, complexity, and enormity rule out substituting current (or foreseeable) 
technologies for most of the services that natural ecosystems provide for free. 
Although the value of such irreplaceable services “is infinite in total,” 
researchers have estimated the monetary impact of changes in the quality and quantity 
of a number of ecosystem goods and services.  Costanza et al. (1997) estimated that 
seventeen ecosystem services had an annual economic value of $16 to $54 trillion 




approximately $18 trillion.  But since most such services carry no price tags to signal 
changes in quantity or quality, they are often exploited in situations where long-term 
costs far exceed short-term benefits (Costanza et al. 1997; Daily et al. 1997; Oskamp 
2000).  “If ecosystem services were actually paid for, in terms of their value 
contribution to the global economy, the global price system would be very different 
from what it is today” (Costanza 1997, 259).  Some early attempts to include the 
monetary values of ecosystem services in national economic accounts indicate “a 
leveling of welfare since about 1970 while GNP has continued to increase” (259). 
Lack of awareness of the role that ecosystem services play in producing the 
goods that are traded in markets “helps drive the conversion of natural ecosystems to 
human-dominated systems (e.g., wheatlands or oil palm fields), whose economic 
value can be expressed, at least in part, in standard currency” (Daily et al. 1997, 3).  
 
Over-consumption and biodiversity  
 
As Cohen (1995) sees it, “human ignorance is so extensive that people know 
only a few of the right questions to ask when trying to balance the costs and benefits 
of preserving biological diversity” (340).  Obviously, the market cannot establish an 
equilibrium price for unrecognized goods.  The Pacific yew tree, for example, had 
little if any monetary value until researchers found that it supplies an effective cancer 
treatment.  If the forests where Pacific yews grow had been cleared before the trees’ 
pharmacological value was discovered, the harm to human well-being would have 
been unknown but, nevertheless, real.  “Given the present primitive state of 




the market mechanisms could be relied on at present to govern species conservation 
seems preposterous” (340). 
To a great extent, however, markets do govern species conservation, and 
biodiversity is paying a price.  Estimates of the total number of species vary wildly, 
from two million to one-hundred million, with a “best estimate” of approximately ten 
million (Answerbag.com 2008).  Estimates of the rate of species extinctions vary, as 
well.  According to statistician Bjorn Lomborg, author of The Skeptical 
Environmentalist (2001), the extinction rate is 0.014 percent per year.  Lomborg, 
however, seems to have misinterpreted the research on which he bases his estimate 
(Fisher 2002; Lawton et al. 1998; Stork, 1997).  According to biologist E. O. Wilson 
(2001), Lomborg’s estimate “is an order of magnitude smaller than the most 
conservative species extinction rates by authorities in the field.”  For the most part, 
Wilson explains, extinction-rate estimates hover around 0.1 percent per year, which is 
approximately 1,000 times the pre-human extinction rate. 
Not since the collision between a giant meteor and the Earth darkened skies 
and altered climates, sixty-five million years ago, has the loss of biodiversity been as 
great as it is currently (Wilson 1998).  Habitat destruction is the primary cause of 
species extinctions (Cohen 1995; Oskamp 2000; Wilson 1998), and “today’s global 
economic juggernaut” is the primary cause of habitat destruction (Friedman 2007).  
Economic incentives motivate investors to convert wild habitat, which provides 
unpriced ecosystem services, into real estate, which supplies obvious, tangible 
benefits that are easily priced.  Consequently, the houses, malls, factories, farms, 




manmade habitats, as they destroy the old, wild ones.  Creating reservoirs for 
hydroelectric-power generation, recreation, and water supplies, for example, 
inundates habitats and drowns wildlife; diverting water for human uses deprives 
myriad aquatic species of the habitat they depend on to survive (Oskamp 2000); 
introducing aggressive exotic species—along with the diseases they carry—
sometimes leads to the eradication of indigenous species (Wilson 1998); burning 
fossil fuels contributes to climate change, which undermines the survival of countless 
species of plants and animals.  Effluents from household consumption, industry, 
agriculture, and mining decimate aquatic species by warming and polluting streams, 
contaminating coasts, and causing the eutrophication or acidification of ponds, lakes, 
bays, and gulfs (Cohen 1995). 
“Biological diversity,” Wilson (1998) writes, “is in trouble.  Mass extinctions 
are commonplace, especially in tropical regions where most of the biodiversity 
occurs” (292).  Extinction rates are high even in the temperate zones of modern, 
industrialized nations, however.  The United States, for example, has the highest 
percentage and greatest number of plant species in danger of extinction of any nation 
in the world (Oskamp 2000).  According to Wilson (1998), thirty-two percent of all 
U.S. species are now imperiled, and one percent has already been extinguished.  







Over-consumption, toxic pollution, and human health  
 
While the species Homo sapiens is hardly in danger of extinction, some 
human activities that increase extinction rates in other species impair human health, 
as well.  When chemists design and consumers use pesticides, fungicides, herbicides, 
and insecticides, for example, they intend for the poisons to work on other species; 
nevertheless, the poisons may affect human health in known and (yet) unknown ways.  
Even ordinary production and consumption processes (i.e., ones not designed to kill 
other species) often generate toxins.  Fossil-fuel combustion, for example, releases a 
variety of toxic molecules (e.g., carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen 
oxides) and toxic elements (e.g., mercury and arsenic) into the atmosphere.  In some 
cases, sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxides combine with water vapor and other 
molecules in the atmosphere to form acids that can later fall as rain, snow, or 
particulates and then contact surfaces on the ground.  Although soils bind with and 
sequester toxic metals at normal levels of acidity, acid precipitation can break those 
bonds (Meadows et al. 2004).  Subsequently, toxic metals are free to percolate down 
to groundwater and flow into streams, where they can enter the food chain and make 
their way up the chain to human beings.  
Many toxic chemicals break down slowly—if at all.  Unfortunately, human 
activities are degrading or eliminating ecosystems that break down toxins and purify 
water.  For example, millions of acres of wetlands, which “act as filters to cleanse 
water of impurities,” have already been destroyed by human activities (U.S. 




caused the loss of approximately 53 percent of the original wetlands in the forty-eight 
conterminous states (Dahl n.d.). 
When production or consumption processes release toxins into the air, soil, 
and water, they become available for people and other living things to swallow, 
breathe, or absorb.  A toxin’s impact depends on the particular substance, the level of 
exposure, and the susceptibility of the individual.   
Few people have been tested to determine which toxic chemical compounds 
reside within their bodies.  Few are aware that they carry any at all.  Nevertheless, 
according to Dr. Rick Smith, executive director of Canada’s Environmental Defence 
[sic], “If you can walk, talk and breathe, you’re contaminated” (qtd. in Environmental 
News Service 2005).   
Journalist Bill Moyers’ blood and urine were analyzed for toxic industrial 
chemicals as part of a study of human pollutant loads by New York’s Mount Sinai 
School of Medicine (PBS n.d.).  Among the toxic chemicals residing in Moyers’ body 
were two organophosphate pesticide metabolites, two heavy metals (lead and 
methylmercury), three organochlorine pesticides, four phthalates, thirteen dioxins and 
furans, twenty-nine semivolatile organic compounds, and thirty-one PCBs.  Although 
little is known about the effects of low-level human exposures, studies of laboratory 
animals and workers exposed to high levels link the toxins in Moyer’s blood and 
urine to a variety of health problems.  Among the chemicals found in Moyers’ body 
were toxicants that affect the brain and nervous system (25 chemicals), blood or 
cardiovascular system (17 chemicals), developmental system (52 chemicals), 




immune system (17 chemicals), kidneys (16 chemicals), reproductive system (20 
chemicals), respiratory system (21 chemicals), and skin and sense organs (21 
chemicals).  The tests also revealed forty-eight separate carcinogens in Moyers’ blood 
and urine.  No one knows how interactions among these chemicals affect human 
health.  
Another study tested the blood of eleven people from across Canada for 
eighty-eight toxic chemicals (Environmental News Service 2005).  All together, the 
group’s blood contained sixty different toxicants, including flame retardants, stain 
repellants, PCBs, DDT, lead, and mercury.  The average number of chemicals per 
subject was forty-four.  In addition to cancer, the health problems associated with the 
chemicals found in the Canadian study include respiratory, reproductive, 
developmental, and endocrine disorders.  Of all the participants, the blood of Chief 
David Masty of the Whapmagoostui First Nation of northern Quebec contained the 
highest levels of persistent organic pollutants (e.g., PCBs) and mercury. 
The evidence of pollutants in Chief Masty’s blood contradicts conventional 
wisdom.  For example, Benjamin Friedman (2005), author of The Moral 
Consequences of Economic Growth, writes: “The least polluted areas of the globe are, 
of course, those where there is no industrial activity and little or no human 
settlement” (380).  But, as Diamond (2005) notes: 
the highest blood levels of toxic industrial chemicals and pesticides 
reported for any people in the world are for Eastern Greenland’s and 
Siberia’s Inuit people (Eskimos), who are also among the most remote 




levels are nevertheless in the range associated with acute mercury 
poisoning, while the levels of toxic PCBs . . . in Inuit mother’s breast 
milk fall in a range high enough to classify the milk as ‘hazardous 
waste’ (518). 
 
Costs of environmental degradation 
 
In many cases, Friedman’s point is valid, however.  The people who are most 
affected by pollution are those who live or work close to its source.  In China, where 
officials often turn a blind eye to sources of toxic emissions in the name of economic 
growth, pollution has become a major cause of death and infirmity.  According to a 
study by the World Bank, air pollution causes 350- to 400-thousand deaths per year in 
China.  Diseases associated with water pollution kill an additional 60 thousand 
Chinese people annually.  In the United States, pollution is regulated to a greater 
extent than in China.  Nevertheless, deaths attributed to air pollution “are 
conservatively estimated at over 130,000 per year” (Diamond 2005, 492).   
Taken all together, the economic costs associated with environmental 
degradation, including pollution-related health costs, pollution abatement costs, and 
lost ecosystem-service costs, are astronomical.  But as Diamond (2005) explains, 
environmental problems can also exact serious social costs.  In his study of societal 
collapses, he finds that environmental degradation led to the collapses of the Anasazi, 
Easter Island, Greenland Viking, and Mayan civilizations.  Modern industrial 




(498).  Problems such as toxic pollution, habitat destruction, species extinction, 
marine-fishery over-exploitation, soil degradation, fossil-fuel depletion, and 
ecosystem-service reduction “are like time bombs with fuses of less than 50 years” 
(498).  Diamond continues: 
Thus, because we are rapidly advancing along this non-sustainable 
course, the world’s environmental problems will get resolved, in one 
way or another within the lifetimes of the children and young adults 
alive today.  The only question is whether they will become resolved 
in pleasant ways of our own choice, or in unpleasant ways not of our 
choice, such as warfare, genocide, starvation, disease epidemics, and 
collapses of societies.  While all of those grim phenomena have been 
endemic to humanity throughout our history, their frequency increases 
with environmental degradation, population pressure, and the resulting 
poverty and political instability (498). 
Agreeing with Diamond that current production and consumption processes 
are unsustainable, Meadows et al. (2004) report that in thousands of runs of their 
complex computer model of the world, “overshoot and collapse” was “by far the most 
frequent” outcome.  An overshoot occurs, they explain, when signals about the 
impending exhaustion of a once plentiful resource are delayed.  In the authors’ words, 
“If the signal or response from the limit is delayed and if the environment is 
irreversibly eroded when overstressed, then the growing economy will overshoot its 




original).  If, on the other hand, environmental signals are heeded and depleting 
resources are protected, collapse can be avoided. 
 
The role of technologies and markets 
 
Technologies that monitor the environment and facilitate communication 
about its health can help prevent collapse.  According to some economists, market 
forces can lead to the development of such technologies.  Ignoring the fact that prices 
cannot signal the scarcity of a multitude of priceless environmental amenities, some 
market enthusiasts claim that market forces are adequate to solve problems of 
resource conservation.  As they see it, if a resource is in short supply, price signals 
will stimulate the development of technologies that all allow the resource to be used 
more efficiently or technologies that provide a substitute to perform the function of 
the depleted resource.  For such reasons, Simon and Kahn (1984) disagree with 
pessimistic assessments that warn of overshoot and collapse.  They conclude instead 
that “environmental, resource, and population stresses are diminishing, and with the 
passage of time will have less influence than now upon the quality of human life on 
our planet” (45). 
According to Simon, Kahn, and a number of other economists, markets play a 
central role in resource preservation.  Benjamin Friedman (2005) explains: “When 
markets for resources are allowed to function normally, so that increasing demand 
relative to supply creates higher prices, the result is not only to signal the resulting 




it” (376).  Higher prices discourage producers and consumers from using a scarce 
resource even as they encourage the development of innovative technologies that 
increase resource-use efficiency.  When oil prices soared in the 1970s, for example, 
producers and consumers began to take measures to reduce their use of petroleum 
products.  As a consequence of their actions in response to higher prices, “energy 
consumption [fell] sharply compared to economic output and . . . even declined on a 
per capita basis despite the continued advance in American living standards” (376).  
Thus, in Friedman’s view, the market worked. 
Many observers join Friedman in claiming that the market forces worked to 
conserve energy.  As they see it, Americans began to cut back on their energy use in 
response to the energy shortages of the 1970s, and, as a result, U.S. per-capita energy 
use has been falling for several decades.  But others question that claim.  In today’s 
globalized economy, Sawin (2004) explains, “many manufactured goods cross 
borders and oceans to reach us, where the energy required to make and move them is 
omitted from national accounts.  As a result, some experts argue that energy intensity 
is actually increasing in some nations, because they effectively import energy inputs 
from overseas” (36).  Much of China’s spectacular growth has depended on energy-
intensive industries, for instance.  When the U.S. imports goods from China, it 
consequently imports energy that national accounts fail to reflect.  Unless that energy 
is factored in, the claim that per capita energy consumption is falling is suspect.  
Nevertheless, the claim is made and is accepted as conventional wisdom. 
According to Scarlett (2000), not just energy use but resource consumption, in 




costs by “dematerializing” more and more products.  As a result of dematerialization, 
“a defined level of consumption is occurring with less resource use, less 
accompanying waste, and a ‘lighter’ footprint on the earth” (42).  Thus, Scarlett 
explains, Malthusian concerns about scarce resources are unwarranted.  She writes: 
“Because people seek particular attributes, not specific resources to satisfy their needs 
and desires, the production and consumption process holds near-endless opportunities 
for invention, exploration, substitution, and conserving technologies that, in effect, 
expand the potential resource base” (44).   
Following a similar line of thought, economist Robert Solow (1993) notes: 
“There is no reason for us to feel guilty about using up aluminum as long as we leave 
behind a capacity to perform the same or analogous functions using other kinds of 
materials” (181).  As he sees it, we are under no obligation to leave the next 
generation the world just as we inherited it.  So long as we leave them the ability to 
live at least as comfortably as we live, we should modify the natural environment to 
extract more wealth and comfort for ourselves now.  Future generations will profit 
from the intellectual and physical capital our generation creates and leaves behind.    
Ausubel (1996) agrees.  In his view, humans have always modified the natural 
environment to suit their needs.  He notes, as an example, that the forests of the 
eastern Mediterranean region were cleared by the time of Alexander the Great, in the 
fourth century, B.C.  Augmenting Ausubel’s point, Scarlett notes that horses in New 
York City deposited approximately 200 hundred tons of excrement daily onto city 




environmental impacts are not a consequence of modernization and industrialization,” 
she writes (46). 
If Scarlett means that humans have always generated waste and residuals and 
had other impacts on the environment, her assertion is obviously true.  But even if 
environmental degradation is not purely a consequence of modernization and 
industrialization, the double-Texas-sized island of garbage that drifts around the 
eastern Pacific and its western-Pacific twin (mentioned above) certainly are.   
The issue is one of scale.  Consider that for most of human history, the total 
human population was small and so was its environmental impact.  Given an 
abundant stock of resources and so few people to exploit them, the benefits of 
modernization and industrialization far exceeded their costs.  When cornucopian 
economists look to history as their guide for future action, they assume, along with 
Dwight Lee, that the “relevant resource base is defined by knowledge, rather than by 
physical deposits of existing resources” (qtd. in Bailey 2000, 14).  And a strong case 
can be made that until recently attaining wealth and comfort depended more on 
knowing how to use a resource than on its physical supply.  As Bailey (2000) 
explains, “even the richest deposit of copper ore is just a bunch of rocks without the 
know-how to mine, mill, refine, shape, ship, and market it” (14).  But while that 
assertion is true, it fails to recognize that the environmental impact of consumption 
and production involves something more than merely finding resources and having 
the know-how to use them.   Extracting copper, for example, often contaminates 




costs associated with copper mining would certainly be much higher and might even 
exceed the benefits.   
In many instances, the scale of humanity’s ability to exploit resources seems 
to be outstripping the ability of ecosystems to cope.  The technology that enables 
mountaintop mining, for example, is much more efficient than a pick and shovel at 
extracting coal.  But comparing the environmental impact of the two is analogous to 
comparing the size and capabilities of an aircraft carrier to a rubber ducky or an 
intercontinental missile to a paper airplane.  Looking backward in time, cornucopians 
seem to focus on the benefits of advancing technology and miss the enormity of the 
destruction wrought by current technologies as compared to those of the past.   
As Daly and Farley (2004) explain, so long as the economic subsystem was 
tiny relative to the entire ecosystem, as it was throughout most of human history, the 
benefits of economic expansion were large and the opportunity costs were 
insignificant; thus, modernization and industrialization improved human welfare.  A 
number of environmental signals now indicate, however, that the opportunity cost of 
further economic expansion exceeds the benefit. 
Cornucopian economists counter that those who envision limits to growth 
underestimate “the power of technological advance, and [ignore] altogether the role 
of initially higher prices both in encouraging substitution by users and in stimulating 
new supplies” (Friedman 2005, 377).  Scarlett (2000) maintains that the “relatively 
high cost of materials processing—from mining and harvesting through final 




productive” (62) and “for closed-loop opportunities to recycle on-site plant wastes . . 
.” (45).  
As they describe in their book, Cradle to Cradle, architect William 
McDonough and chemist Michael Braungart offer manufacturers such closed-loop 
opportunities for recycling.  Challenging the notion that human industry inevitably 
degrades nature, McDonough and Braungart design products so that when they wear 
out they provide either “biological nutrients” for soil and water or “technical 
nutrients” that circulate in closed-loop cycles as valuable industrial materials. 
As McDonough and Braungart (2002) explain, side effects inhere to virtually 
every process.  “But they can be deliberate and sustaining instead of unintended and 
pernicious.”  Using nature’s activity as a pattern, humans can “ design some positive 
side effects to our own enterprises instead of focusing exclusively on a single end” 
(81).   
Traditional recycling only slows the rate of environmental degradation, the 
authors explain.  With each cycle, the quality of recycled materials deteriorates.  
Some forms of dematerialization make isolating recyclable materials in waste streams 
problematic.  Worse still, recycling itself sometimes increases pollution significantly.  
The process of recycling secondary steel in electric-arc furnaces, for example, 
contributes a substantial proportion of the world’s dioxin emissions.  McDonough and 
Braungart explain: “Just because a material is recycled does not automatically make it 
ecologically benign, especially if it was not designed specifically for recycling.  
Blindly adopting superficial environmental approaches without fully understanding 




Likewise, relying blindly on market forces to provide incentives for more 
efficient resource use can lead to greater environmental degradation.  Markets spur 
industries to dematerialize, for example, in order to cut costs and increase 
productivity.  Fulfilling environmental goals—should that occur—is generally a 
fortuitous side effect; thus, if making each unit of material more productive increases 
environmental degradation but cuts costs, manufacturers will likely dematerialize 
regardless of the detrimental environmental consequences.  
Take, for example, the semiconductor chips that are used in computers and 
other electronic devices.  Although semiconductors appear to be the epitome of 
dematerialization, as Sarin (2004) explains, their manufacture actually requires more 
intensive use of materials than most ordinary, non-high-tech goods.  “The total mass 
of secondary materials used to produce [a] 2-gram chip is 630 times that of the final 
product” (44).  The total mass of secondary materials used to build a car, on the other 
hand, is only about twice its finished weight in resources.   
Not only is semiconductor production relatively material-intensive, it also 
generates massive amounts of toxic waste.  Many semiconductor production facilities 
have contaminated nearby aquifers with their chemical effluent.  In fact, no county in 
the United States is the home to more toxic waste sites than California’s Santa Clara 
County, which is where the semiconductor industry began (Sarin 2004).   
Semiconductors are also associated with the generation of mountains of solid 
waste, because the useful lives of electronic devices that utilize semiconductors (e.g., 
computers, cell phones, I-pods, etc.) tend to be short.  On average, Americans discard 




Thus, the number of unusable cell phones is mounting.  By one estimate, consumers 
had amassed 500 million such phones by 2005.  Most of those phones “are likely to 
end up in landfills, where they could leach some 312,000 pounds of lead” (120).  
According to Sarin (2004), approximately “70 percent of the heavy metals found in 
U.S. landfills comes from e-waste” (45).  If the toxics leach into the groundwater or 
soil, they can put people in danger of suffering from organ and central-nervous-
system damage, endocrine disruption, cancer, and other health problems.  If, instead 
of being buried in a landfill, discarded electronic devices are incinerated, some of 
their components will emit toxic dioxins and furans in the incineration process. 
Sixty years ago, rudimentary computers (with fewer capabilities than 
inexpensive pocket calculators have today) performed their calculations using glass-
and-metal vacuum tubes, not semiconductors.  Those early computers were so large 
they filled entire rooms.  ENIAC, the first vacuum-tube computer, used thousands of 
tubes and emitted so much heat it required “gigantic air conditioners” to keep it from 
overheating (“Computer Chronicles” 1998).    
When technological optimists compare an early computer with a computer of 
today, they can boast honestly about the difference in the amount of resources 
devoted to each specific unit.  Thus, some optimists (e.g., Scarlett 2000) use such 
comparisons to trumpet the resource-conserving properties of dematerialization.  
What such optimists ignore, however, is that few—if any—individuals owned 
computers when they were made from vacuum tubes.  The cost of the ENIAC and 
other computers of its ilk restricted ownership to the U.S. government and other large 




is rarely a barrier to ownership.  According to the Encyclopedia Britannica Online 
(n.d.), as of 2004, there were 741 personal computers for every 1,000 people (i.e., 
more than 200 million computers) in the United States.   
Compared to the mass of each computer in the 1940s and 50s, the mass of 
each dematerialized computer is many orders of magnitude smaller; nevertheless, the 
total number of computers is many orders of magnitude greater.  Dematerialization 
may mean, as Scarlett (2000) claims, that “a defined level of consumption is 
occurring with less resource use, less accompanying waste, and a ‘lighter’ footprint 
on the earth” (47).  The trouble with that analysis is that it fails to recognize that 
dematerialization also means that armies of feet are free to trample the ground (and 
the footprints left by twelve size-one shoes cover more ground than the footprint left 
by one size-twelve boot.)  So while there may be good reasons to celebrate the 
changes dematerialization has brought about, resource conservation in the aggregate 
is not one of them—not, at least, as a general rule.  
This result is hardly surprising.  The underlying motivation for 
dematerialization, after all, is to increase profits, not to conserve the environment.  So 
long as welfare is equated with money, market forces can be relied upon to work with 
an invisible hand to maximize the welfare of traders.  Many environmental benefits 
are difficult or impossible to trade, however.  Without taxes or regulations that take 
account of environmental externalities, the profit incentive will tend to override 
environmental concerns.  Generally speaking, purely market-driven dematerialization 







Dematerialization and recycling are two responses to price increases caused 
by resource scarcity.  Substitution is another.  According to many mainstream 
economists and technological optimists, the ability to substitute one material for 
another alleviates concerns about the depletion or ultimate exhaustion of any 
particular resource.  As Gale Johnson puts it, “no exhaustible resource is essential or 
irreplaceable” (qtd. in Bailey 2000, 14).  When Solow (1993) contends (as noted 
above) that exhausting a resource, such as aluminum, should occasion no remorse so 
long as substitutes are at hand to “perform the same or analogous functions,” he has a 
point, of course—or he would if performing a particular function were the only 
consideration.  Unfortunately, other considerations are often at issue.  Oskamp (2000) 
indicates two potential considerations: the availability of the substitute and its 
environmental impact.  Is the substitute in plentiful supply?  Something cannot be 
made from nothing, after all.  If we exhaust the substitute, will we find another?  If 
so, will its use be deleterious to the environment?   
As we run through dwindling supplies of a resource with the optimistic belief 
that human ingenuity will provide substitutes in response to market signals, can we 
safely assume that the substitutes will be available when we need them?  Aren’t we a 
bit like someone who plays the lottery with his last few dollars, anticipating that he 
will be able to pay his bills with his winnings?  Even if we have already discovered 
an abundant substitute that has few if any negative environmental affects, how can we 
be certain that we already know all of the functions the original resource is capable of 




squander could have performed a crucial function for them if only they had enough of 
it.   
In Diamond’s (2005) view, optimists, who claim that “we can always switch 
to some other resource meeting the same need” if we exhaust a particular resource, 
“ignore the unforeseen difficulties and long transition times regularly involved” 
(506).  In some cases, the resources that are required for making the substitute also 
become scarce.  As Oskamp (2000) notes, manufacturers often substitute synthetic 
materials for natural ones.  Use of synthetics is problematic, because they “are mostly 
made from petroleum, further decreasing oil reserves, and organic chlorine products 
[such as plastics] have been shown to have many dangerous ecological and health 
effects” (n.p.).  Nonetheless, Mankiw (2004) chooses plastic to illustrate his claim 
that dwindling resources (e.g., tin and copper) should present no limits to growth 
because “technological progress often yields ways to avoid these limits” (248).  
 
Market-driven technologies and overexploitation  
 
Markets often fail to recognize signs of resource overexploitation, and 
technologies sometimes exacerbate it.  Marine fisheries, for example, are being 
rapidly depleted.  As supplies dwindle, fishermen look to technology for help.  But, 
according to Meadows et al. (2004), “rather than protecting fish or enhancing fish 
stocks, the kind of technology being employed seeks to catch every last fish” (232). 
“The market gives no corrective feedback to keep competitors from overexploiting a 
common resource such as marine fish.  Quite the contrary, it actively rewards those 




Market-driven technologies sometimes lead to overexploitation of resources, 
as in the case of marine fisheries, and environmental destruction, as in the case of 
mountaintop mining for coal.  However, technological optimists (e.g., Bailey 2000; 
Moore and Simon 2000; Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007; and Scarlett 2000) 
maintain that possibilities for technological solutions to problems of resource 
overexploitation and environmental destruction are limitless.   
Some observers, such as the authors of Limits to Growth, though far less 
sanguine about the dependability of technological solutions, agree with the optimists 
that “it is [not] possible to bring about a sufficient, equitable, sustainable world 
without technical creativity and entrepreneurship and a relatively free market” 
(Meadows et al. 2004, 228).  But since technologies and markets are merely tools, the 
“results they produce in the world depend upon who uses them and for what 
purposes” (228).  Thus, if our purpose is to maximize efficiency and profits without 
regard to environmental consequences, then we can take a laissez-faire approach and 
the market will provide incentives for entrepreneurs to design and manufacture 
efficient—but potentially devastating—technologies.  If, on the other hand, our 
purpose is to conserve resources and improve the environment, then we must exert 
the political will to ensure that market incentives focus not simply on efficiency but 
also incorporate environmental concerns. 
As Meadows et al. see it, we cannot rely on an “invisible hand” to solve 
problems of resource depletion and environmental degradation, because technologies 
and markets “operate through feedback loops with information distortion and delays.”  




oscillation, and instability” (225).  The market for oil, for example, has exhibited 
instability since the oil shocks of 1973.  The subsequent undershoots and overshoots 
in the price of oil “were a consequence of inevitable response delays in the oil market. 
. . .  None of these rises and falls in price was related to the actual underground 
quantity of oil.”  Nor were they related “to the environmental effects of drilling for, 
transporting, refining, and burning oil.  The market’s price signal mainly provided 
information about the relative scarcity or surplus of available oil” (227).  
 
Over-reliance on technology 
 
For some observers, relying on technology to solve environmental problems 
seems imprudent.  Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, for instance, notes that 
although “technology has generally been able to come up with solutions to human 
dilemmas, there is no guarantee that ingenuity will always rise to the task” (qtd. in 
Cohen 1995, 267).  Jared Diamond (2005) goes further, arguing that the “rapid 
advances in technology during the 20th century have been creating difficult new 
problems faster than they have been solving old problems.”  Why should anyone 
think, he wonders, that beginning today, “for the first time in human history, 
technology will miraculously stop causing new unanticipated problems while it just 
solves the problems that it previously produced?” (505).  
Some observers believe that our heavy reliance on technology is alienating us 
from the natural world in ways that are ultimately dangerous.  In some cases, 




To take a stark example, the Moken people of the Andaman Sea managed to survive 
the great tsunami of December 26, 2004, in which hundreds of thousands of people 
died, because they were able to read signals that the sea and wildlife were supplying.  
The Mokens had no modern technological devices of any kind to aid them, and yet 
they were able to accomplish something that scientists with sophisticated 
technological instruments were unable to do (i.e., interpret natural signals and warn of 
the need to take preventive action). 
Rather than reestablishing connections to nature, most of humanity seems to 
be alienating itself further.  People in industrialized and rapidly industrializing nations 
are becoming increasingly dependent on technological devices, investing more and 
more of their time and attention to such devices with each passing year.  Some people 
claim to be addicted to communications technology.  When BlackBerry service failed 
for ten hours in April 2007, for example, some users (perhaps tongue-in-cheek, 
perhaps not) described feelings of isolation and “severe longing, not unlike drug 
withdrawal.”  One woman told a New York Times reporter, “I quit smoking 28 years 
ago, and that was easier than being without my BlackBerry” (Stone 2007a).   
In an editorial for The American Psychiatric Journal, Jerald Block (2008) 
argues that “Internet addiction appears to be a common disorder that merits inclusion 
in DSM-V” (i.e., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) (306).  
And, as previously noted, Kubey maintains that millions of Americans are essentially 





Advertising and faith in technology 
 
According to psychologists Kanner and Gomes (1995), “modern advertising . 
. . promotes an almost religious belief among Americans in the ultimate good of all 
technological progress, through its claim that there is a product to solve each of life’s 
problems” (84).  In some cases advertised products solve problems but, in doing so, 
mask the underlying causes of those problems. 
Take, for example, cholesterol-lowering drugs.  On December 12, 2007, the 
three major networks’ evening-news programs (all three sponsored by pharmaceutical 
companies) reported that the average cholesterol level for American adults was in the 
ideal range for the first time since 1960.  Katie Couric, on CBS Evening News, 
announced: “We’re starting to win the battle against cholesterol.”  NBC Nightly News 
credited “the widespread use of cholesterol-lowering medications” for the 
improvement.  And on ABC World News, Dr. Timothy Johnson said, “these drugs are 
absolutely remarkable. . . .  I, I almost would dare use the word ‘miracle drug’ to 
describe what they can do for people.”  
If asked, many proponents of advertising would surely trumpet these results as 
evidence of the important role advertising plays in informing the public about 
useful—even lifesaving—products.  They would just as surely fail to mention that 
advertising also encourages people to eat too much and often promotes consumption 
of foods that are high in cholesterol.  They would, no doubt, also deride the notion 
that by sponsoring television programs, advertising indirectly promotes a sedentary 
(“couch-potato”) lifestyle.  In other words, advertisers would probably deny that 




developing the blood-cholesterol levels that the drugs they promote are designed to 
treat. 
Some dispassionate analysts might note that advertising contributes to the 
creation of a problem (hypercholesterolemia) and then offers a solution (cholesterol-
lowering drugs).  But a number of psychologists are more critical, arguing that ads (or 
their subtexts) encourage people to eat foods in order to assuage unmet emotional 
needs.  While some people have a genetic predisposition for developing high 
cholesterol, “in most cases . . . elevated cholesterol levels are associated with an 
overly fatty diet coupled with an inactive lifestyle” (“Hypercholesterolemia”).  Thus, 
the vast majority of people who buy cholesterol-lowering drugs spend hard-earned 
money to solve a problem that need never have occurred had they only eaten sensibly 
and exercised.  And even after the drugs lower their cholesterol, many people are left 
with an assortment of other health problems that are associated with obesity.  
Meanwhile, massive quantities of resources are wasted (and pollution generated) in 
the process of producing, packaging, transporting, distributing, and consuming the 
foods that create the high-cholesterol problem and the drugs that resolve it.  
Additional sums are devoted to transporting and disposing (or recycling) all of the 
associated packaging and other waste.  
Do these drugs improve human welfare?  Clearly, they improve the welfare of 
the people who need them.  But taking a step back to gain a broader perspective, the 
drugs seem to be helping to mask a dysfunctional, welfare-reducing system.  It is a 
wasteful system in which many people’s (partially) ad-driven appetites lead them to 





Economic growth and welfare 
 
From another perspective, however, widespread spending on cholesterol-
lowering drugs might improve social welfare not only by providing health benefits 
but also by increasing the gross domestic product, and, for this, advertising would 
deserve some of the credit.  Adhering to the production, packaging, transportation, 
distribution, and consumption of food and medicine are jobs, profits, and the many 
other benefits of a growing economy. 
Economic growth is widely touted as being the solution to many social ills.  
Moore and Simon (2000), for example, credit economic growth for “more 
improvement in the human condition in the past 100 years than in all of the previous 
centuries combined since man first appeared on the earth” (1).  As a consequence of 
growth, they explain, “almost every measure of material human welfare—ranging 
from health, wealth, nutrition, education, speed of transportation and 
communications, leisure time, gains for women, minorities, and children to the 
proliferation of computers and the Internet—has shown wondrous gains for 
Americans” (1).  The U.S. poverty rate, the authors report, dropped from 
approximately one-half of the population in the early nineteenth century to about 
fifteen percent at the start of the twenty-first, and “real per capita living standards” 
quadrupled “in just 100 years” (8).  Whereas fewer than 20 percent of Americans had 
running water, vacuum cleaners, or flush toilets in 1900, or had dishwashers, dryers, 




conveniences” today (9).  In addition, Americans now have “nonessentials that make 
life fun and entertaining,” and they have the time to enjoy those nonessentials.  In 
fact, Moore and Simon note, Americans “have [three] times more leisure time over 
the course of their lifetimes than their great-grandparents did” (9). 
As Moore and Simon see it, economic growth has begun to improve lives 
everywhere.  They predict “that within the next 50 years most people in the world 
will attain an income level similar to that of the middle class in the United States 
today . . . [and] material deprivation will be a thing of the past” (18).  Bailey (2000) 
agrees, and Lomborg (2001) maintains that human welfare is improving in every 
important, measurable way.   
According to Friedman (2005), economic growth not only raises living 
standards but also tends to improve a people’s moral character.  He writes: 
“Economic growth—meaning a rising standard of living for the clear majority of 
citizens—more often than not fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, 
social mobility, commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy.  Ever since the 
Enlightenment,” he continues, “Western thinking has regarded each of these 
tendencies positively, and in explicitly moral terms” (4).  Stagnating or declining 
living standards, on the other hand, tend to retard, halt, or even reverse moral growth.  
The authors of Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the 
Politics of Possibility, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2007), make a 
similar argument.  As they see it, prosperity tends to educe the best aspects of human 
nature—poverty and collapse, the worst.  Authoritarian values, they explain, are 




their basic needs; however, such values strengthen even during economic downturns 
in otherwise strong economies.  
Friedman (2005) and Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007) agree that market 
forces acting alone systematically undersupply growth, because markets ignore some 
unpriced social benefits that inhere to economic growth, such as greater tolerance, 
openness, and generosity.  Believing that those positive externalities outweigh any 
unpriced harm, the authors maintain that the optimal rate of economic growth exceeds 
the purely market-determined rate.  Thus, they conclude, governments should foster 
higher rates of economic growth.  According to advertising’s proponents, one way for 
governments to foster economic growth is by providing a deduction for businesses’ 
advertising expenditures. 
Using advertising to spur economic growth may, however, be 
counterproductive to the goal of improving society’s moral character if advertising 
intervenes in the relationship between economic growth and those improvements.  
Given that wages have continued to grow (albeit relatively slowly) even as the moral 
values that Friedman, Nordhaus, and Shellenberger celebrate have ostensibly 
retreated over recent decades, the relationship between growth and moral 
improvement seems to be specious.  Perhaps being perpetually reminded by ads about 
goods they “need” makes people feel perpetually needy.  Although most Americans 
consume more than enough to survive in comfort, advertising makes them feel 
deprived, and feeling deprived makes them less tolerant, open, and generous.  Thus, 
no amount of economic growth will facilitate moral growth so long as advertising 




Some psychological research indirectly supports the contention that economic 
growth may improve social values, however.  According to Kasser et al. (2002) a 
number of psychological studies reveal a positive relationship between materialistic 
values and economic deprivation.  “Poverty alone may not lead to the adoption of 
materialistic goals,” they write, “however, poverty may work in combination with 
social modeling to produce a strong [materialistic value orientation]” (15).  Implied 
by the psychological research is the notion that increasing economic growth—or 
lifting people out of poverty and increasing economic equality, at least—improves 
moral character, because people who feel less deprived tend to be less materialistic, 
and people who are less materialistic tend to have better social values.  Sociological 
research indicates, however, that Americans’ perceptions of deprivation have little to 
do with their absolute income.  As sociologist Dalton Conley (2008) explains, 
because “inequality rises exponentially the higher you climb the economic ladder, the 
better off you are in absolute terms, the more relatively deprived you may feel.  In 
fact, a poll of New Yorkers found that those who earned more than $200,000 a year 
were the most likely of any income group to agree that ‘seeing other people with 
money’ makes them feel poor” (n.p.).  Thus, increased income may reduce 
materialism among the poor, but may aggravate it among the wealthy. 
Nevertheless, some proponents of economic growth claim that high rates of 
growth lead to improved social values.  In addition, many growth enthusiasts contend 
that an expanding economy provides the wealth that enables the development of 
innovative technologies for discovering and conserving resources.  Noting that copper 




(2000) maintain, for example, that “natural resources have become more available 
rather than scarcer,” by “any measure,” due to growth-enabled technological 
innovations (10).  The authors fail to address the environmental costs associated with 
the extraction of all that copper, however, even though, according to geologists, 
“mineral extraction [is] the single most damaging environmental process undertaken 
by mankind” (University of Wisconsin n.d.). 
Ignoring (or downplaying) the environmental consequences of over-
consumption, some proponents of high rates of economic growth insist that prosperity 
is a prerequisite to environmental concern.  According to Bailey (2000), Friedman 
(2005), Lomborg (2001), Moore and Simon (2000), and Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
(2007), among others, public demand for environmental protection only emerges 
when economic growth raises living standards well beyond subsistence.  In 
Friedman’s words, “societies where living standards are high can afford to bear some 
cost for limiting pollution, and most choose to do so” (382; italics in the original).  
Americans, for example, “started to care more about problems such as air and water 
pollution and the protection of the wilderness and open space” as they “became 
increasingly wealthy, secure, and optimistic” (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2007, 6).  
That concern led to environmental regulations and pollution-abatement technologies 
that have improved U.S. air and water quality over the past few decades.  Compared 
to the 1960s, Moore and Simon (2000) explain, smog levels have declined 
approximately 40 percent, airborne lead has fallen by more than 90 percent, and 




improving the authors note that whereas a century ago tainted drinking water caused 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans, today such deaths are rare. 
Many observers join Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007) in positing the 
existence of  “a very strong association between prosperity and environmental issues” 
in nations around the world (28).  This association is often likened to one that 
Kuznets hypothesized between economic development and inequality.  Like Kuznets’ 
original curve, the environmental Kuznets curve can be graphed in the shape of an 
inverted U.  According to Friedman (2005), empirical studies of industrializing 
nations generally find that economic growth creates and exacerbates environmental 
problems until a nation becomes moderately prosperous and then, if economic growth 
continues, it allows the nation to limit and even reverse the environmental damage. 
From the cornucopian point of view, environmentalists who believe that limits 
to economic growth exist are unduly pessimistic and even self-defeating.  Given that 
humans have “a nearly infinite capacity” to conjure up innovative technologies—
including technologies that conserve resources and reduce pollution—and given that 
economic growth fosters the development and implementation of new technologies, 
“economic growth leads to less pollution, not more,” Bailey (2000) writes (17).  
Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2007) go further, insisting that those who advocate 
limits to growth for the sake of the environment are actually undermining the cause 
they profess to advocate.  “Few things have hampered environmentalism more than 
its longstanding position that limits to growth are the remedy for ecological crises,” 
they write.  Rather than limits, what is required is “an explicitly pro-growth agenda 




and to overcome ecological crises” (15).  Echoing Marxists who maintain that 
material overabundance is requisite to the emergence of the altruistic socialist man, 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger explain that “ecological concern is a postmaterialist 
value that becomes widespread and strongly felt—and thus politically actionable—
only in postscarcity societies” (52). 
Friedman (2005) offers an additional explanation for the environmental 
improvements that accompany prosperity.  As he sees it, when industrialized 
countries become wealthy, they often move away from manufacturing goods and 
toward providing services.  Since service industries typically require fewer resources, 
an economy dominated by such industries tends to reduce its throughput of materials 
and wastes.  Thus, advanced economies can be self-limiting, in terms of throughput, 
even as they grow economically. 
Moore and Simon (2000) join other cornucopians in denying any limits to 
growth.  As they see it, “there apparently is no fixed limit on our resources in the 
future.  There are limits at any moment, but the limits continually expand, and 
constrain us less with each passing generation” (16-17). 
We now stand on the shoulders of our ancestors and are able to draw 
upon the accumulated knowledge and know-how of the past two 
centuries.  This knowledge is our communal wealth.  Much more than 
the power to enjoy gadgets, our wealth represents the power to 
mobilize nature to our advantage, rather than to just accept the random 
fates of nature.  There is no turning back the clock, only boundless 





Reasons for skepticism 
 
Such technological optimism is far from universal, however.  A number of 
observers are dubious that humans are able to “mobilize nature to our advantage” and 
create unlimited opportunities for future advancement without also generating 
harmful, unintended consequences.  According to Meadows, Randers, and Meadows 
(2004), “growth can solve some problems, but it creates others” (8).  Scholars find, 
for example, that growth is associated with greater socioeconomic inequality (e.g., 
Daly 2005; Friedman 2005; McKibben 2007; Meadows et al. 2004).  “Growth, at 
least as we now create it,” McKibben writes, “is producing more inequality than 
prosperity, more insecurity than progress” (11).  Similarly, Meadows et al. note that a 
“century of economic growth has left the world with enormous disparities between 
the rich and poor” (43).    
Whereas Bailey claims that economic growth has made “the world safer, more 
comfortable, and more pleasant for both larger numbers of people as well as for a 
larger proportion of the world’s people” (13), according to the World Bank (2000), an 
estimated 1.2 billion people exist on an average of less than $1 per day, and nearly 
three billion get by on less than $2 per day.  It seems quite unlikely that more people 
have ever lived in poverty at one time, since the human population was only 1.7 
billion in 1900 (U.S. Census Bureau 1998).  As Meadows et al. maintain, economic 
growth in the current system “generally takes place in the already rich countries and 




Ultimately, limits to growth must exist, Meadows (2004) and her colleagues 
explain, because the Earth is finite.  Rather than being restricted directly by “the 
number of people, cars, houses, or factories” that the Earth can support, growth is 
physically limited by “the rate at which humanity can extract resources . . . and emit 
wastes . . . without exceeding the productive or absorptive capacities of the world” 
(8).   
Currently, economic growth depends on the combustion of fossil fuels to 
provide energy.  Some stocks of fossil fuel are nearing exhaustion, but even if those 
stocks were infinitely abundant, the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb the carbon 
dioxide that results from fossil-fuel combustion without affecting the global climate is 
finite.  According to the vast majority of the world’s climate scientists, that capacity 
has, in fact, already been surpassed.     
According to Scottish economist Malcom Slesser, the growth process itself 
appropriates approximately 55 percent of all the energy people use.  That figure 
seems hyperbolic, until one considers that the creation of growth’s central 
components—new buildings, machines, roads, etc.—requires “lots of steel and 
aluminum and cement, all of which are wildly energy intensive” (McKibben 2007, 
230).  
Economic growth also entails reconfiguring the environment in ways that tend 
to provide short-term economic benefits to humans, but inflict long-term costs on all 
species, including Homo sapiens.  “The prosperity that the First World enjoys at 
present,” Diamond (2005) writes, “is based on spending down its environmental 




forests, etc.).  Spending capital should not be misrepresented as making money.  It 
makes no sense to be content with our present comfort when it is clear that we are 
currently on a non-sustainable course” (509). 
When measures of economic growth fail to account for the environmental 
costs of growth, as is generally the case, the benefits of growth tend to be overstated.  
China’s economy, for example, is widely heralded for producing double-digit growth 
rates several times during this decade.  But the environmental costs have been 
staggering.  According to estimates by the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization, for example, the pollution that has accompanied that growth is 
responsible for 750,000 deaths per year.  President Hu Jintao, in response to the 
pollution-caused deaths, as well as “thousands of episodes of social unrest,” launched 
an effort, known as Green GDP, to recalculate China’s gross domestic product in 
order to reflect pollution costs.  The “early results were so sobering—in some 
provinces the pollution-adjusted growth rates were reduced almost to zero—that the 
project was banished to China’s ivory tower . . . and stripped of official influence” 
(Kahn and Yardley 2007).  Similarly, during the last decade-and-a-half, Indonesia has 
experienced an annual growth rate that appears to be about seven percent when 
calculated in the standard way; however “when the World Resources Institute 
recalculated the figures to subtract the value of the extracted oil and logged trees from 
the country’s stock of assets, that growth was halved” (McKibben 2007, 190). 
Of course, China and Indonesia are in the early stages of economic 
development, and as Kahn and Yardley (2007) note, “no country in history has 




damage that can take decades and big dollops of public wealth to undo” (n.p.).  For 
those who believe in the validity of an environmental Kuznets curve (i.e., a curve 
showing that environmental degradation rises with per-capita income until a nation is 
relatively prosperous and then declines as per-capita income continues to rise), the 
environmental degradation that has accompanied economic growth in those nations is 
to be expected.  As growth optimists see it, when China and Indonesia become 
sufficiently wealthy, they will take measures to reduce pollution and improve the 
environment. 
According to a number of observers, however, even if China and Indonesia do 
take those measures, the global environment may continue to deteriorate.  Suri and 
Chapman (1998), for example, explain that wealthy countries tend to reduce 
pollution, in part, by importing the most pollution-intensive manufactured goods, or, 
to put it another way, they improve their own environmental quality by exporting the 
processes that generate the most pollution.  If so, the improvement illustrated by 
environmental Kuznets curves may reflect the outsourcing of pollution from wealthy 
countries to poor ones. 
For their part, Stern (2003) and Perman and Stern (2003) claim that the 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) is, in fact, invalid. “The EKC idea rose to 
prominence because few paid sufficient attention to econometric diagnostic 
statistics,” Stern (2003) writes.  Taking those statistics into account reveals that the 
hypothesized, inverted-U-shaped relationship between per-capita income and 
indicators of environmental degradation is spurious.  Instead, Stern explains, most 




national income level.  “In rapidly growing middle income countries the scale effect, 
which increases pollution and other degradation, overwhelms the time effect.  In 
wealthy countries, growth is slower, and pollution reduction efforts can overcome the 
scale effect.  This is the origin of the apparent EKC effect” (n.p.).   
An environmental-performance ranking of 149 nations, conducted by 
researchers from Columbia and Yale Universities, provides additional evidence that 
the relationship between prosperity and environmental quality is much weaker than 
many observers suppose.  According to the Environmental Performance Index (Esty 
et al. 2008), the United States ranks 39th among all 149 nations and last among the 
Group of Eight (where France is #10, Canada is #12, Germany is #13, United 
Kingdom is #14, Japan is #21, Italy is #24, and Russia is #28).   
Many countries with higher environmental performance rankings have much 
lower incomes than the United States, as Table 8.1 below indicates.  The per-capita 
gross domestic product of the U.S. is almost seven times that of Colombia, for 
example, even though the U.S. ranks thirty places below Colombia in environmental 
performance.  If environmental quality depends upon income, as growth enthusiasts 
contend, then the environmental performance of the United States, which has a per-
capita GDP of nearly $46,000, should rank well above the environmental 
performance of Georgia (the former Soviet Republic), which has a per-capita GDP of 
less than $5,000.  In fact, the U.S. ranks below Georgia. 
The Environmental Performance Index evaluates more than twenty measures, 
including air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, sanitation, and agricultural 




ranking reflects its “bottom-tier” scores on regional smog and greenhouse-gas 
emissions.  In general, the study finds positive correlations between GDP per capita 
and performance on indicators such as indoor air quality, sanitation, and success in 
combating diseases—but negative correlations between GDP and performance on 
such measures as agricultural policies and greenhouse-gas emissions. Although doing 
so was not its intended purpose, the Environmental Performance Index also provides 
evidence that GDP is a poor indicator of overall well-being. 
 















Costa Rica 5 $10,300 100 
Latvia 8 $17,400 67 
Colombia 9 $6,700 123 
Slovenia 15 $27,200 45 
Lithuania 16 $17,700 65 
Slovakia 17 $20,300 58 
Portugal 18 $21,700 56 
Estonia 19 $21,100 57 
Croatia 20 $15,500 72 
Ecuador 22 $7,200 118 
Albania 25 $6,300 125 
Malaysia 27 $13,300 81 
Russia 28 $14,700 75 
Chile 29 $13,900 78 
Spain 30 $30,100 40 
Panama 32 $10,300 101 
Dominican Republic 33 $7,000 121 
Brazil 34 $9,700 105 
Uruguay 36 $11,600 88 
Georgia 37 $4,700 143 
Argentina 38 $13,300 80 
United States 39 $45,800 10 
 
Source for GDP information: CIA, “Rank Order—GDP—per capita (PPP).” All figures are 2007 





As Daly (2005) explains, the gross domestic product (“defined as the annual 
market value of final goods and services purchased in a nation, plus all exports net of 
imports”) is simply a measure of economic activity in the aggregate—“not a measure 
of well-being or even of income” (105).  Gardner and Assadourian (2004) agree.  
They write: “At the national level, the standard tool used to measure societal health, 
GDP, is much too narrow to serve as a yardstick of well-being because it sums all 
economic transactions, regardless of their contributions to quality of life” (172).  
Among its other flaws, GDP fails to account for depreciating man-made 
capital (e.g., bridges and buildings) or for depleting natural capital (e.g., forests and 
fish) or for long-term harm to the environment (e.g., changing the global climate and 
depleting stratospheric ozone); it ignores non-market activities that add significantly 
to well-being (e.g., home cooking, housework, and parenting), and it includes utility-
reducing expenditures that arise as unintended consequences of production and 
consumption (e.g., costs of pollution abatement) (Daly 2005).  Cohen (1995) offers 
this example: “If a country spends millions to clean up pollutants from consumers . . . 
or from factories, and residues from mining, these defensive expenditures are counted 
positively in national income, rather than deducted from the economic production 
available for a people’s use” (383).  In addition, Cohen explains, “GDP omits positive 
indicators of human development and well-being such as a rising life expectancy and 
an increasing rate of literacy as well as negative indicators such as rates of homicide, 
suicide and addiction to drugs” (383). 




By the curious standard of the GDP, the nation’s economic hero is a 
terminal cancer patient who is going through a costly divorce.  The 
happiest event is an earthquake or a hurricane.  The most desirable 
habitat is a multibillion-dollar Superfund site.  All these add to the 
GDP, because they cause money to change hands.  It is as if a business 
kept a balance sheet by merely adding up all transactions, without 
distinguishing between income and expenses” (qtd. in Barnes 2001, 
86). 
Predicted GDP expansion following Hurricane Katrina bolsters the critics’ 
point.  According to the Congressional Budget Office (House of Representatives 
2005), recovery-related construction activities following Hurricane Katrina were 
expected “to increase both real GDP growth and employment above previous [2006] 
forecasts” (1).  As Kogan and Aron-Dine (2005) explain, experts predicted “a 
relatively modest downward effect on national economic growth” at the end of 2005 
due to Hurricane Katrina, followed by “faster economic growth in 2006 than would 
have occurred without the hurricane, because of the significant economic activity that 
[would] be created by the extensive rebuilding effort that [would] ensue” (n.p.).    
GDP is a poor measure of well-being because, as Daly (2005) explains, it 
conflates quantitative increase with qualitative improvement.  Nevertheless, “most 
governments make ongoing increases in gross domestic product . . . a chief priority of 
domestic policy, under the assumption that wealth secured is well-being delivered” 
(Gardner and Assadourian 2004, 164).  Evidence is mounting, however, that when the 




consumption (e.g., through advertising), they reap diminishing returns.  That 
conclusion is becoming increasingly salient as evidence of anthropogenically 
induced, global climate change becomes ever more apparent.  Even growth-enthusiast 
Benjamin Friedman (2005) allows that “the one major environmental contaminant for 
which no study has ever found any indication of improvement as living standards rise 
is carbon dioxide” (385).  Nevertheless, policymakers fail to perceive climate change 
as anything “that would call into question the doctrine of endless economic 
expansion.  Alert to every sniffle of our constantly monitored economy, they seem 
entirely oblivious to the scale of the physical challenge—to the idea that civilization 
may be at stake” (McKibben 2007, 24).  
According to Daly (2005), the costs associated with growth in the United 
States have recently been increasing faster than the benefits.  Having reached the 
“futility limit,” the economy no longer increases human well-being as it grows.  The 
economy must make a transition from one that makes a fetish of growth to “one that 
takes heed of the inherent biophysical limits of the global ecosystem . . . or we may 
be cursed not just with uneconomic growth but with an ecological catastrophe that 









Should advertising remain a tax-deductible business expense?  The previous 
chapters attempt to inform an answer to that question by addressing some legal 
controversies involving the deduction and by examining some of advertising’s 
economic, psychological, sociological, and ecological effects.  This chapter will offer 
a few rough estimates of advertising’s monetary costs and benefits, discuss some of 
the potential consequences of reducing or eliminating the deduction, consider some 
obstacles to changing advertising’s tax status, and provide a few policy 
recommendations, including a recommendation concerning advertising’s tax status.   
 
Attempting to estimate costs and benefits  
 
Due to a large assortment of variables—some obvious, some not—attempting 
to calculate anything approaching the exact costs and benefits of advertising’s impact 
is bound to be an exercise in futility.  Nevertheless, acknowledging the existence of 
costs and benefits and offering a suggestion about their size seems a worthwhile 
exercise so long as the monetary values proffered are known to be nothing more than 





Unmediated Costs Associated with Advertising 
 
Advertising’s critics offer a variety of reasons to support their contention that 
the costs associated with advertising outweigh the benefits.  In many cases, the 
connection between advertising and the costs that the critics cite is indirect, with 




In one case, at least, the connection between advertising and costs to the 
American public is direct.  According to DeGraaf et al. (2002), advertising adds at 
least $690 per person (converted to constant 2007 dollars from the 2002 value of 
$600) per year to the cost of the products that Americans buy.  All together, therefore, 
with a population of more than 305 million, Americans now pay more than $210 
billion annually for the advertising that “complements” their purchases.    
 
Opportunity of cost of advertisements 
 
The average American is exposed to 3,000 ads per day, according to the 
Union of Concerned Scientists (n.d.).  If individuals pay attention to each ad for only 
one second, then they each devote 50 minutes to ads per day.  Taking 218 million as 
the number of adults in the U.S. (Bernstein 2007), and using the average hourly 
earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers on nonfarm payrolls in August 
2008 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008a) to estimate the opportunity cost of one hour 




cost of ad exposure is more than $3.3 billion per day (i.e., $0.30 per minute times 50 
minutes times 218 million adults = $3.3 billion).  Yearly, using the same figures (and 
multiplying by 365), the aggregate cost is about $1.2 trillion. 
 
Costs associated with ad-induced materialistic values 
 
As detailed in Chapter 7, advertising contributes to the adoption and 
development of materialistic values, and materialistic values are positively related to 
a variety of psychological and social disutilities, including:   
 




• Addiction  
• Psychosomatic ailments 
• Body hatred and eating disorders (e.g., anorexia nervosa, bulimia) 
• Overweight and obesity 
• Adolescent behavioral problems 
• Self-hatred among the poor 
• Criminality 
• Poor relationships with friends, family, and community 




• Low saving rates 
• Consumer debt 
• Bankruptcy 
• Home foreclosure 
 
Although holding advertising entirely responsible for the social and psychological ills 
listed above is clearly wrong, the literature shows, nevertheless, that ad-induced 
materialism is a contributing factor.  Thus, holding advertising responsible for a 
portion of the costs seems reasonable.  The following sections examine some of the 
monetary costs associated with materialism. 
 
Mental health disorders 
 
Dozens of recent psychological studies find positive relationships between 
materialistic values and a number of mental health disorders (e.g., narcissism, 
anxiety, depression, suicide, addiction).  While mental illnesses impose a high toll on 
well-being, they also inflict substantial monetary costs.  The American Psychological 
Association (2004a) reports, for example, that “untreated mental health disorders cost 
American businesses $79 billion [in 1999 dollars, or $98 billion in constant 2007 
dollars] in lost productivity per year” (n.p.).  In addition, the APA notes that 
expenditures for direct mental health treatments exceeded $99 billion in 1996 (or 
$131 billion in 2007 dollars).   
Antidepressant sales provide another indication of the costs associated with 




antidepressants.  According to the National Institute of Health Care Management 





Hawkins, Wang, and Rupnow (2008) estimate that the direct costs of migraine 
to the U.S. economy (i.e., outpatient, inpatient, and emergency-room care, plus 
prescription drugs) are more than $11 billion per year.  Hu et al. (1999), on the other 
hand, find that the direct costs are much lower, just $1 billion per year, but that the 
indirect cost of migraine headaches (i.e., missed workdays and impaired work 
function) “cost American employers about $13 billion a year” (813). 
  
Overweight and obesity 
 
Not only does obesity inflict a physical toll on the body and a psychological 
toll on the mind, it also exacts economic costs on individuals and society.  In 1998, 
for example, Americans paid approximately $93 billion in direct costs for weight-
related health-care services, and the nation lost nearly as many billions due to work 
absences and other indirect expenses associated with excess weight (National 
Institutes of Health, 2004a).  By 2004, the annual cost of obesity-related illnesses had 
risen to $120 billion, and Americans were devoting an additional $33 billion to 







According to Devon Herrick (2005) of the National Center for Policy 
Analysis, cholesterol-lowering drugs cost Americans approximately $14 billion per 
year.  Beyond the cost of prescriptions, diagnostic tests and visits to doctors cost 




As of 2007, 17.5 million Americans had been diagnosed with diabetes.  Costs 
associated with the disease included $116 billion in direct medical expenditures and 
$58 billion due to reduced productivity, for a total of about $174 billion (“Economic 




According to the American Lung Association (2007), the advertising 
expenditures of the five largest cigarette makers in 2005 (the most recent year for 
which data is available) were more than $35 million per day.  Given that the National 
Cancer Institute considers “unassailable” the evidence that cigarette advertisements 
cause people to take up smoking (National Cancer Institute 2001), it seems 
reasonable to link some portion of the health costs associated with tobacco to 
advertising.   
The costs associated with smoking include medical costs ($75.5 billion in 




1997-2001).  According to the American Cancer Society (2007), “for each pack of 
cigarettes sold in 1999, $3.45 was spent on medical care caused by smoking, and 
$3.73 lost in productivity, for a total cost to society of $7.18 per pack” (n.p.).   
Additional disutilities associated with smoking include lost years of life: on 
average, 13.2 for men and 14.5 for women (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2002).  While the value of those lost years is truly incalculable, for the 
purpose of making medical-allocation decisions, the average figure used 
internationally to represent the cost of giving a person “an additional ‘quality-of-life-
adjusted’ year is $129,000 (Stanford News Service 2008).  Thus, the average value of 
lost years can be computed to be about $1.7 million for each male smoker and $1.9 
million for each female smoker.  But calculated another way, using the value of a 
statistical life, the cost of a smoking death is even higher.  According to one estimate 
(Kniesner et al. 2007), the value of a statistical life is between $5.5 and $7.5 million.  
Given the estimated 438,000 premature tobacco-caused deaths per year (American 
Lung Association 2007), using this measure, the annual cost of tobacco-related deaths 




Addictions drain the U.S. economy of hundreds of billions of dollars each 
year.  Setting aside the costs that individual addicts incur to support their habits, 
addictions to illegal drugs, alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and food cost taxpayers 
approximately $590 billion per year (Van Riper, 2006).  Taken separately, alcohol 




Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism), and illicit drug use costs about $181 
billion (Executive Office of the President 2001).  Some of the costs associated with 
addiction represent “the loss of potential productivity from disability, death and 
withdrawal from the legitimate workforce” (Executive Office 2001, vi).  Other 
expenses include funds that must be devoted to coping with the health and criminal 




 A comprehensive econometric study (Anderson 1999) finds that crime 
costs Americans $1.7 trillion annually (in 1997 dollars; $2.2 trillion in 2007 dollars), 
including expenses associated with crime-related injuries, private-security measures, 
police services, criminal corrections, and stolen items.  According to the study, 
criminals steal assets worth more than $600 billion ($775 billion in 2007 dollars) and 




While all of the costs that damaged relationships inflict are probably 
impossible to quantify, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) provide one illustrative 
estimate: Being in a lasting marriage is worth $100,000 per person per year compared 





Keeping up with the Joneses and the 2008 economic crisis 
 
According to conventional wisdom, the gap in income between the haves and 
have-nots in America has been widening over the past decade.  Less commonly 
known, however, is that even though the average income of the top fifth of American 
households is fifteen times that of the lowest fifth, the average consumption of the top 
fifth is only four times more than the bottom fifth (Cox and Alm 2008).  Certainly, 
part of the reason that the consumption ratio is four to one, and not fifteen-to-one, is 
that wealthy people spend a smaller proportion of their incomes on consumption.  
Another important reason, as Reich (2008) explains, is that non-rich Americans have 
been able to step up their consumption over the past few decades by working more 
hours, borrowing more money (e.g., taking out home-equity loans), and spending 
beyond their means.  Now, however, American “consumers have run out of ways to 
keep the spending binge going” (n.p.).  Reich’s solution is to give the non-rich more 
buying power by reducing income inequality in America.  He argues that his 
proposed measures for reaching that goal “are necessary to give Americans enough 
buying power to keep the American economy going.” 
Arguably, however, in addition to income inequality, ad-induced materialism 
is a central cause of the 2008 economic crisis.  Ads have continued to urge people to 
consume more even though many Americans have been spending beyond their means 
for years.  The massive debt Americans have accrued has contributed significantly to 
the current credit crisis.  While Reich’s solution of increasing the incomes of the non-




do nothing to change the underlying values that have led people to incur so much 
debt.    
 On October 3, 2008, the President signed a bill into law that provides 
$700 billion to financial markets.  Although the precise extent to which ad-induced 
materialism undermined the financial markets and contributed to the economic crisis 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the conclusion that advertising bears some of 
the responsibility seems warranted, given the positive relationships between (1) 
advertising and individuals’ adoption of materialistic values, (2) advertising and low 
rates of saving, and (3) ad campaigns that encourage debt and rising consumer 
indebtedness. 
 
Some environmental costs associated with over-consumption  
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, a number of economists and other observers insist 
that economic growth is central to environmental concern.  In their view, so long as 
people are struggling to survive, they will overlook the environmental impact of their 
activities; but once they have satisfied their basic needs, they will turn their attention 
to fulfilling their postmaterial needs, including their need for a healthy environment.   
Advertising, however, intervenes.  Although the survival needs of most 
Americans have been more than satisfied for a number of decades, Americans tend to 
believe that they need to add to their stocks of goods in perpetuity.  In part, their 
neediness follows from their bombardment by the message that they must have 




health of the environment and use their surplus wealth for environmental restoration, 
Americans tend to focus on consuming goods—particularly advertised goods—that 
add little or nothing to the quality of their lives but do add to humanity’s rapidly 
accumulating environmental debt.  Even though Americans have demanded pollution 
abatement in the past when pollution has captured their attention by assaulting their 
senses, for the most part, the public has remained passive about any environmental 
damage that their senses have failed to perceive.  
 As Galbraith (1998) explains, “in the absence of the massive and artful 
persuasion [i.e., the advertising] that accompanies the management of demand, 
increasing abundance might well have reduced the interest of people in acquiring 
more goods” (219).  Once people have enough to live comfortably, they are unlikely 
to devote much time to gaining the wherewithal to consume more goods than they 
need—unless they are goaded into believing that they need more goods continuously.  
As capitalism has evolved, businesses have used advertising to do the goading. 
It is true that consumption is essential for existence.  It is also true that human 
activities inevitably affect the environment to some extent.  Nonetheless, much of 
what Americans now consume detracts from or adds little or nothing to their well-
being.  Worse still, their over-consumption greatly increases the environmental costs 
of their activities.  Over-consumption augments the production of environmental 
bads, including: 
 





• Acid-rain precursors 
• Climate-changing greenhouse gases 
• Stratospheric ozone depleting chemicals 
• Toxic-chemical pollution 
• Particulate matter in the air 
• Toxic algal blooms 
 




• Plant and animal species 
• Habitat  
• Groundwater  
• Topsoil  
• Cropland  
• Non-renewable materials (e.g., minerals)  
• Ecosystem services 
• Natural amenities (e.g., starry skies) 
 
What are the total costs of over-consumption?  What is the value of the last 
sip of clean water to a thirsty man?  How much is a haze-free view of the Grand 




economists have attempted to estimate the monetary costs of some of them.  
Examples of those estimates follow. 
 
Deaths due to air pollution 
 
The more that Americans consume, the more air pollution the processes 
associated with production, consumption, and waste disposal create.  According to 
Diamond (2005), “conservatively estimated,” air pollution is the cause of 130,000 
U.S. deaths per year.  Taking that number and multiplying it by $5.5 million and $7.5 
million (monetary estimates of a statistical life, as given in 2007 by Kniesner et al.) 
produces values of $715 billion and $975 billion.   
According to other analysts, Diamond’s conservative estimate is not 
conservative enough.  They put the number of U.S. air-pollution deaths at something 
closer to 75,000 (Medscape Medical News 2000).  Taking Diamond’s number and the 
lower estimate as the boundaries of a range, a rough estimate of the monetary cost of 
deaths related to air-pollution (using the arguably unethical value of a statistical life) 
is between $412 billion and $975 billion. 
 
Expenditures for pollution abatement 
 
   Attempts to abate air, water, and solid-waste pollution are costly.  
According to a 2005 U.S. Census Bureau survey of businesses with 20 or more 
employees, capital expenditures for pollution abatement were approximately $5.9 




in 2005.  If there were less production and consumption, then, ceteris paribus, there 




Inhering to the consumption of greater quantities of goods is the greater 
consumption of oil; and the more oil consumed, the higher the odds of an oil spill.  
According to estimates by government scientists, when the Exxon Valdez ran 
aground, in addition to shellfish and other species living in the local, intertidal 
communities, “approximately 250,000 marine birds died from direct exposure to the 
oil, along with approximately 2,800 sea otters and numerous harbor seals” (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2006).   
Aside from the costs associated with slain and injured wildlife, spoiled 
habitat, and lost tourism, the cost to clean up oil spills is substantial.  The initial 
cleanup expenses associated with the Exxon Valdez spill were more than $2.1 billion 
(ExploreNorth 1999).  Generically speaking, cleaning up oil spilled offshore costs an 
average of $7,350 per (metric) tonne (in 1991 dollars, or $11,000 per tonne in 2007 
dollars).  Shoreline remediation is much more expensive, costing between $147,000 
and $294,000 ($224,000 and $447,000 in constant 2007 dollars) per tonne (Etkin 
1999).  
Of the estimated average of 706 million gallons of waste oil that enter the 
world’s oceans each year, only about 56 million gallons (eight percent) are the result 
of leaks or spills from ships and tankers or from offshore drilling and production 




million spilled gallons were cleaned up offshore.  Converting from gallons to tonnes, 
fifty-six million gallons equals 182 kilotonnes of spilled oil (Answerbag.com n.d.).  
With an offshore cleanup cost of $11,000 per tonne (in 2007 dollars), the total 
cleanup cost would be about $2 billion per year.  If all 182 kilotonnes of spilled oil 
were cleaned up along the shoreline, then the total cleanup cost would be between 
$41 billion and $81 billion per year.  Cleaning up the entire 706 million gallons that 
enter the oceans from all sources annually would cost more than $25 billion if cleaned 
up offshore and between $515 billion and $1 trillion if cleaned up along the shoreline. 
 
Storing nuclear waste 
 
The U.S. Department of Energy (2008) estimates that storing nuclear waste in 
the Yucca Mountain repository over its 150-year expected lifecycle will cost $96 
billion (in 2007 dollars)—if the repository ever opens.  
Currently, the U.S. is storing about 56,000 tons of high-level radioactive 
waste at more than 100 locations, scattered across 39 states.  By statute, Yucca 
Mountain is constrained to a 70,000-ton capacity.  While the Department of Energy 
maintains that Yucca Mountain could actually hold 120,000 tons of nuclear waste, 
even that increased storage would be insufficient if the U.S. were to build more 
reactors.  At a 1.8 percent growth rate for nuclear waste after 2010, “the U.S. would 
fill a 120,000-ton Yucca by 2030 [and] would need nine Yucca Mountains by the end 
of the 21st century” (Spencer and Loris 2008).  At $96 billion each, ten Yucca 







Congress established Superfund “to reduce and eliminate threats to human 
health and the environment that result from releases or potential releases of hazardous 
substances, pollutants, and contaminants from abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous 
waste sites” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2008).  Between 1993 and 2003, 
total Superfund expenditures, in constant 2003 dollars, were approximately $17 
billion (Stephenson 2004).  
 
Wasted Energy and Materials 
 
According to Myers and Kent, in 2004, wasted materials (e.g., soil, metals, 
water, wood, and fiber) and energy, plus transportation of wasted materials, cost the 




As Americans increasingly exploit leaf blowers, lawn edgers, snowmobiles, 
motorized scooters, and other motorized outdoor equipment, noise-pollution levels 
rise.  Taking jet skis as an example and basing their estimates on people’s willingness 
to pay for peace and quiet, Komanoff and Shaw (2000) find that “jet skis in the 
United States impose approximately $900 million of noise costs on U.S. beachgoers 







Excessive nutrients, particularly phosphorus from fertilizer runoff, increase 
the growth of algae and plants in bodies of water.  Over time, the algae dominate, and 
the large plants die.  Bacteria that decompose the dead plants multiply rapidly and 
consume greater and greater shares of the water’s dissolved oxygen.  At some point, 
the amount of dissolved oxygen is insufficient to support fish and aquatic insects.  As 
a result, the water becomes incapable of supporting life. One such “dead zone,” in the 
Gulf of Mexico at the base of the Mississippi River, “may well be as large as 
Massachusetts” (“Death,” 2008). 
According to Anderson et al. (2000), the estimated annual economic impact 
from harmful algal blooms in the U.S. is about $22.2 million in public health costs, 
$18.4 million in losses to commercial fisheries, $6.6 million in recreation and tourism 
losses, and $2.1 million in monitoring and management expenses, or a total of $49.3 
million (in 2000 dollars). 
  
Global warming cost estimates 
 
In 2006, Nicholas Stern predicted that stabilizing carbon dioxide at about 
twice the pre-industrial concentration (of about 275 parts per million) would cost 
approximately one percent of global GDP by 2050.  In 2008, however, Stern revised 
his estimate.  Saying that climate change is occurring faster than expected, he argued 
that more should be done to lower emissions.  To reduce concentrations below 500 




climate change could cost more than five percent—and perhaps even more than 
twenty percent—of world GDP (Jowit and Wintour 2008).   
The average, annual, global, economic-growth rate between 1961 and 2005 
was about 3.64 percent (World Resources Institute).  According to the World Bank 
and the CIA World Factbook, global GDP in 2007 was between $54 and $55 trillion 
(U.S.) dollars.  If global growth were to continue at the 44-year average rate of 3.64 
percent, then in 2050 the global GDP would be approximately $260 trillion (in 2007 
dollars).  Thus, if Stern is correct in asserting that stabilizing atmospheric carbon 
dioxide at about 500 ppm would cost one or two percent of global GDP per year by 
2050, then in 2050 (given growth at 3.64 percent per year) coping with climate 
change would cost between $2.6 trillion and $5.2 trillion.  Dedicating one percent of 
global GDP in 2007 would cost about $550 billion; two percent would cost about 
$1.1 trillion.  In the years between now and 2050, if at least one percent of GDP were 
devoted to carbon stabilization, the amount spent would increase along with global 
GDP, but it would likely (barring an extended, worldwide depression) be between 
one-half and several trillion dollars annually. 
 
Endangered and extinct species 
 
Housing subdivisions, shopping malls, six-lane highways, international 
airports, NASCAR racetracks, suburban industrial parks, and other forms of human 
sprawl reduce the land available for wildlife communities.  As a result, species that 
were once in the foreground of the local landscape are, in some cases, disappearing 




Although the actual worth of any species’ existence is beyond measure, the 
brief boost that the ivory-billed woodpecker gave to Monroe County, Arkansas, offers 
a trivial example of that value.  
In 2005, after a research team spotted an “extinct” species of woodpecker in 
an Arkansas bayou, the local economy boomed as birdwatchers, scientists, and 
journalists from around the world flocked to the area.  Within six months, one local 
entrepreneur’s Ivory-Billed-Woodpecker-T-shirt sales topped $20,000, and the 
federal Fish and Wildlife Service recommended appropriating $27 million for 
woodpecker recovery efforts.  Before the sighting, Farrar (2008) reports, no one ever 
“imagined such a creature would emerge from the darkness of extinction and become 




Overgrazing, excessive soil cultivation, deforestation, groundwater mining, 
global climate change, and increased soil salinity contribute to the desertification of 
formerly fertile lands.  Although analysts estimate that desertification costs the global 
economy $42 million per year, they suggest that the human cost is even higher.  
Desertification “has been the catalyst for a number of conflicts in arid lands in recent 
years and the situation is set to get worse . . .” (United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification 2006).  According to the United Nations, desertification threatens to 







Costanza et al. (1997) estimate that in 1997, when the global GNP was 
approximately $18 trillion, the value of seventeen ecosystem services was about $16 
to $54 trillion ($21 to $70 trillion in 2007 dollars).  Over-consumption degrades those 
services, and the cost of that degradation is certainly well above $0.  Even if the 
precise dollar amounts are unknown, the existence of costs associated with degraded 
ecosystem services should be considered.   
 
Additional costs associated with ad-induced over-consumption 
 
Because advertising fuels over-consumption and over-consumption has many 
welfare-reducing, unintended consequences, the examples given above describe only 
some of the monetary costs that are directly linked to over-consumption and 
indirectly (for the most part) linked to advertising.  Advertising’s precise share of all 
associated costs is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it is clearly—as a gross 
understatement—well above zero. 
 
Estimated Benefits Associated with Advertising 
 
The ad lobby justifies deductibility by claiming not only that advertising is an 
ordinary and necessary expense but also that it supplies a number of benefits to 
individual consumers and to society at large.  Previous chapters of this dissertation 
examine ad supporters’ claims, along with counterarguments from ad critics, in some 






















Fuels consumption  X   
Stabilizes the business cycle  X  
Increases advertisers’ profits   X 
Is a self-correcting market mechanism  X  
Promotes competition   X 
Facilitate the entry of new firms   X 
Lowers prices   X 
Promotes economies of scale   X 
Provides valuable market information   X 
Lowers search costs   X 
Lowers selling costs   X 
Improves product quality   X 
Promotes innovation   X 
Expands consumer choice   X 
Enables social cohesion  X  
Increases employment   X 
Is entertaining  X  
Subsidizes media & lowers media prices X   
Supports small and minority media   X 
Increases media diversity   X 
Enables media freedom   X 
 
As Table 9.1 indicates, the literature seems to validate only some of the 
benefits claimed by the ad lobby.  In a number of cases, the results of different studies 
are contradictory.  Some studies find that advertising tends to lower prices; others 
find that it tends to raise prices.  Some studies find that advertising promotes 
innovation; others find that it has the opposite effect.  In some cases, endogenous 
variables create confusion and lead to ambiguous results.  Individual firms believe, 




businesses base their future ad expenditures on their previous sales, the firms are 
unable to assess the extent to which advertising actually does boost their revenues.   
Although everyone seems to agree that advertising supplies information, many 
economists and other observers question how much that information benefits 
consumers.  Some argue that the information in most ads is too biased to be useful.  
Others maintain that advertising supplies a torrent of information; thus, trying to get 
useful information from advertising “is like trying to take a sip of water from a 
firehose” (DeGraaf et al. 2002, 160).  In addition, a number of psychologists contend 
that advertising tells people that there is a product or service to solve every problem.  
As a result, the information that advertising supplies tends to inculcate materialistic 
values, which reduce individual and societal welfare. 
 
Economic benefits associated with economic growth 
 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the economic literature provides equivocal results 
concerning the impact of advertising on demand.  Some studies show that advertising 
fuels demand, others find that demand fuels advertising, and still others indicate that 
each fuels the other.  Incontrovertible, however, are government and ad-industry 
statistics showing that businesses’ constant-dollar ad expenditures have been growing 
dramatically over the years.  And along with those expenditures, the public’s ad 
exposure has been growing dramatically, too.  Since psychologists find that increased 
exposure to advertising leads to the inculcation of materialistic values and that having 
materialistic values drives people to over-consume, whether or not economic studies 




consumption to advertising) is ultimately not important: Psychological studies supply 
the missing information that explains how advertising leads to over-consumption. 
Over-consumption, however, leads to economic expansion, and of all the 
supposed benefits of advertising, probably the most influential and frequently cited is 
advertising’s association with economic growth.  With a GDP of approximately $14 
trillion (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008), annual economic growth at 3.16 percent 
(the 1970-to-2004 average) adds more than $440 billion to the U.S. economy.  To the 
extent that growth in GDP indicates an improvement in Americans’ well-being (a 
highly debatable point), advertising (which fuels consumption by inculcating 
materialistic values), deserves some of the credit. 
Although the precise value of any particular benefit associated with economic 
growth is incalculable, it is safe to assume that the associated dollar amount is clearly 
above zero and could be in the billions—or even the hundreds-of-billions of dollars.  
Similarly, determining the exact value of advertising’s contribution to economic 
growth and to employment is highly problematical.  Nevertheless, an ad-industry-
sponsored study, entitled “The Comprehensive Economic Impact of Advertising 
Expenditures,” predicted that advertising would “generate $5.2 trillion in direct and 
indirect spending” and would account for 21,117,903 American jobs in 2005 
(O’Malley 2004).  Although the study’s degree of mathematical precision and its 
sponsorship by the ad lobby render its results suspect, advertising’s contribution to 
growth in consumption—and thus to economic growth—can be assumed to be 




The extent to which a reduction in advertising would lead to a reduction in 
jobs is unknown, but clearly the monetary costs associated with unemployment are 
high.  For one thing, as the unemployed reduce their consumption in response to their 
reduced income, the revenues of businesses with which they had previously traded 
tend to fall.  Thus, the local economy can go into a downward spiral when area 
unemployment is high.  Although unemployment insurance can mitigate this 
“multiplier effect,” most of the unemployed receive no benefits and the payments to 
those who do collect unemployment insurance (approximately 35 percent of the 
unemployed) are substantially less than their salaries had been (House of Reps. 2007).   
Taking 2003 as an example, seven-to-eight million people collected 
unemployment insurance benefits of, on average, $262 per week for 16.4 weeks.  
Thus, $30-to-$34 billion is a rough estimate of unemployment-insurance benefits paid 
in 2003 (Economic Policy Institute 2004).  If the 20-to-23 million other unemployed 
workers had collected the average weekly benefit of $262 over the average number of 
weeks (16.4), then total payments to those who received no benefits would have been 
between $86 billion and $99 billion, and the total benefits for all unemployed 
workers—covered and uncovered—would have been between $116 billion and $133 
billion (in 2003 dollars).  Of course, those figures give no hint of the extent to which 
a reduction in advertising would have affected the level of unemployment in 2003.  
They only indicate one of the costs associated with unemployment in 2003 and show 
that it was substantial.  
In addition to unemployment’s economic impact (only hinted at above), 




study by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), males would require approximately 
$60,000 (per man) per year to be compensated for the unhappiness—not the lost 
income—associated with being unemployed.  A number of psychological studies find 
a positive relationship between unemployment and depression, suicide, and substance 
abuse (Dooley et al. 1994; Kessler 1997; Norström 1995).   
In 1996, Americans’ expenditures for direct treatment of mental health 
disorders exceeded $99 billion (more than $130 billion in constant 2007 dollars).  
Unemployment’s share of those expenditures is a matter of speculation.  But, just for 
the sake of producing a rough idea of the magnitude of those costs, one could 
multiply the ratio of unemployed workers to total American adults (30 million 
divided by 218 million) by $130 billion (an estimate of expenditures for mental health 
disorders in 2007) and get approximately $18 billion, which would be a very rough 
estimate of unemployed workers’ mental health expenditures.  That result depends on 
two assumptions, of course: (1) that the unemployed are equally likely to suffer from 
mental health disorders as are the employed and (2) that unemployment is the cause 
of unemployed workers’ mental health problems.  It is quite unlikely, however, that 
either assumption is true.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the mental health expenditures 
associated with unemployment are considerable. 
 
Economic benefits associated with lowering search costs 
 
The monetary value associated with lowered search costs depends on the 
opportunity cost of the span of time that is devoted to a search.  Thus, as Mehta, 




costs” (79).  To get a rough idea of the value of advertising in lowering search costs, 
however, imagine that $18 per hour (approximately the average hourly earnings of 
nonfarm, production and nonsupervisory American workers in August 2008) is the 
average opportunity cost associated with an hour of search for each adult.  Then 
imagine that advertising saves each adult consumer one-half hour of search per week.  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there are approximately 218 million adults in 
the U.S. (Bernstein 2007).  Given this scenario, advertising would reduce aggregate 
search costs by about $2 billion per week (i.e., 218 million people times 0.5 hour per 
week times $18 per hour), or about $100 billion per year, as an extremely rough 
estimate. 
 
Benefits associated with advertising’s subsidies to media 
 
According to Polinsky (1993), approximately 80 percent of newspapers’ gross 
revenues are derived from advertising.  Evans and Schmalensee (2005) report that 
newspaper and magazine readers pay only the marginal costs of printing and 
distribution—if that; and consumers of some media (e.g., broadcast television, 
broadcast radio, certain newspapers, and most web portals) make no direct payments; 
rather, consumers’ access is entirely subsidized by advertising.  How much would 
businesses reduce their advertising if the deduction were eliminated?  Would 
consumers be willing to pay more for ad-free media?  In the absence of the indirect 
subsidy that the government supplies media via the tax deduction for advertising, 
might government offer direct subsidies to media?  Such questions make assigning 




Nevertheless, the values listed in Table 9.2 (below) offer a sense of the extent to 
which advertising subsidizes some informative and entertainment media.  Elimination 
of the deduction would lead to less advertising and affect media subsidies, at least in 
the short run, to some extent.   
 










    
   Magazines 
   Sunday magazines  
   Local magazines  
   National newspapers 
   Local newspapers  
   Network TV 
   Spot TV 
   Syndicated TV 
   Cable TV network 
   Network radio 
   National spot radio 
   Local radio 
   Internet 
   ___________________ 
    
   Estimated Total 
 
 
   $23.2 billion 
   $1.7 billion 
   $0.5 billion 
   $3.5 billion 
   $25.5 billion 
   $26.7 billion 
   $17.1 billion 
   $4.2 billion 
   $16.5 billion 
   $1.0 billion 
   $2.6 billion 
   $7.4 billion 
   $8.3 billion 
   ______________     
 
   $138 billion 
 




Certainly, the ad lobby can supply anecdotal evidence in support of each of 




derive additional benefits from advertising in specific instances.  Ads entertain some 
people some of the time, for example, even though they annoy most people most of 
the time.  Other benefits of advertising may be apparent to the reader.  Although the 
literature supports only a few of the ad lobby’s claims, the economic value of those 
few benefits is certainly substantial, and those benefits are worthy of consideration. 
 
Potential benefits of reducing or eliminating the deduction 
 
Reducing the psychological, social, and environmental costs associated with 
advertising—including, but not limited to those mentioned above—is the fundamental 
benefit of changing the tax status of advertising.  The sections below discuss some of 




Although the U.S. has a high corporate tax rate, the taxes that corporations 
actually pay as a share of total tax revenues are quite low.  Eliminating the deduction 
for advertising would raise tax revenues substantially, particularly in the short run.  If, 
for example, advertisers had been required to pay taxes at the 35-percent corporate 
rate on the $290 billion dollars that they deducted in 2007, federal tax revenues would 
have been more than $100 billion higher (ceteris paribus).   
Merely requiring businesses to amortize a portion of their advertising 
expenses would boost tax revenues considerably, as well.  In fact, policymakers have 




1986, for example, the Treasury Department suggested a change that would have 
required businesses to amortize 20 percent of their ad expenditures over five years 
and allowed them an immediate deduction for the other 80 percent.  The government 
estimated that the change would have raised tax revenues by $20 billion ($38 billion 




 Reducing or eliminating the deduction would tend to make the tax code more 
equitable.  As it stands, the burden of funding government falls more heavily on 
individual taxpayers than on corporations, in part, because corporations are able to 
deduct advertising.  Addressing the issue of tax fairness in 2000, Senator John 
McCain proposed reducing the ad deduction to raise revenues and eliminate one of 
“the numerous inequitable and unnecessary corporate loopholes, subsidies, and set-




As the previous chapters have shown, advertising inculcates materialistic 
values, and materialistic values reduce psychological, social, and environmental well-
being in a variety of ways.  If there were less advertising, there would be fewer 
messages promoting materialism.   
Although other forces, such as church, government, and school, influence 




objections [apply] to [advertising] that do not apply to some of the other forces. . . .  
There are ways for a community to exercise some control over its school system or 
over government policy,” Schudson writes, “but there is scarcely any effective way to 
regulate the messages that come into the community from the mass media, especially 
the broadcast media.”  When, as happens so often, exposure to an ad “is largely 
unavoidable,” advertising is a “literally unaccountable influence” (242). 
Many Americans believe that they, and especially their children, are exposed 
to decadent values by advertisements and ad-subsidized media but feel powerless to 
prevent that exposure (Harwood Group 1995).  Few Americans realize, however, that 
the tax code allows businesses to deduct their ad expenditures regardless of the values 
that the ads (and ad-subsidized media) promote.  Although the Constitution provides 
some protection for commercial speech, the First Amendment does not entitle 
advertisers to a tax deduction (see below).  If the deduction were eliminated, 





When one is seriously dehydrated, getting something to drink is more 
important than worrying about whether a pollutant in the water might cause cancer 
twenty years hence.  When one is starving and fatty meat is the only food available, 
eating that meat is more important than worrying about one’s cholesterol level.  
Because satisfying immediate needs can be essential to survival, a primitive brain 




Although people do, of course, use their reason sometimes to think of their long-term 
well-being, advertising perpetually conditions them to focus on short-term desires.  
If not directly, then by implication, ads tell people that if they use an 
advertised product, they will feel better immediately.  “Pleasure now!” is the 
message, but, of course, the reality is: “Pleasure now.  Pay later.”  Not surprisingly, 
ads and ad-supported media leave out the “pay-later” part.  If people were subjected 
to fewer such messages, they might allocate their limited resources in ways that 
would improve their welfare to a greater extent over the long run. 
 
Preferences for private consumption 
 
 Advertising advocates private consumption.  Ads tell consumers off-and-on, 
all day, everyday, that they need private goods.  When people focus their attention on 
consuming private goods, provision and maintenance of public goods tend to be 
forgotten.  Infrastructure crumbles (sometimes unlucky people get killed) and yet the 
public insists on lower taxes, because they want to increase their consumption of 
private—often advertised—goods. 
 The bottled-water phenomenon provides a particularly direct example of an 
ad-induced preference that is undermining the provision of a public good.  In 2006, 
the bottled-water industry spent $163 million on advertising in the U.S.  The 
industry’s efforts were successful.  In 2007, Americans spent almost $12 billion on 
bottled water (Gies 2008), even though researchers say tap water is often just as good 
(Owen 2006).  And bottled water is much costlier to the environment.  The process of 




stores, homes, and vending machines.  Meanwhile, the nation’s drinking-water 
systems are in desperate need of maintenance.  According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the nation’s drinking-water systems need more than $277 billion 
in repairs and improvements.  The EPA’s estimate is low in the view of many water-
industry engineers, however.  They claim that the drinking-water infrastructure needs 
$480 billion of repairs and improvements (Long 2008).  
Some see in this skewing of preferences for private consumption a subversion 
of democracy.  “Marketers are not interested in people’s desires if they cannot be met 
by commercially profitable commodities,” Schudson (1984) writes.  “A desire for 
urban public space is not considered but a demand for a new high-rise condominium 
is. . . .  An interest in leaving a nontoxic environment to our children receives less 
attention than desires for consumer goods whose manufacture produces a by-product 
of toxic waste” (31).  As Schudson sees it, “marketers do not actually seek to discover 
what consumers ‘want’ but what consumers want from among commercially viable 
choices” (235; italics in the original).  Barber (2007) elaborates: “The powerful are 
those who set the agenda, not those who choose from the alternatives it offers.  We 
select menu items privately, but we can assure meaningful menu choices only through 
public decision making” (139).  By constantly stressing consumption, advertising 
preempts individuals’ attention and channels their thoughts to private goods rather 
than the common good.  
 If the deduction were reduced or eliminated, the quantity of messages 









A number of analysts argue that advertisers exert too much influence over 
media content.  According to De Graaf et al. (2002), “some advertisers issue policy 
statements to editors and news directors, requesting advance notice on stories that 
may put their products in an unfavorable light.  Phone calls from CEOs of advertiser 
companies are like delete buttons on editors’ computers” (163).  Furthermore, some 
ad critics maintain, anti-consumerist messages in media are virtually taboo for fear of 
reprisals from advertisers.  Kalle Lasn, the founder of the anti-consumerist quarterly 
Ad Busters, explains that the major networks have refused to air almost all of his 
organizations’ “uncommercials.”  When he tried to buy time to broadcast an anti-
beauty-industry ad on a CNN fashion show, for example, a network executive told 
him that he thought CNN should be airing such ads.  But, the executive said, “on an 
official level I can tell you right now, we will never air that spot because we would 
have Revlon and Maybelline and Calvin Klein coming down our throats the very next 
day, and that’s where our bread and butter is” (qtd. in De Graaf et al., 211). 
Baker (1992) recommends taxing a medium’s advertising revenue and 
providing a subsidy to media consumers.  “The immediate result,” he writes, “would 
be to reduce [media’s] incentive to respond to advertisers’ wishes concerning 
editorial content and to encourage [media] to provide a product for which readers 







Given the negative relationship between savings and advertising (see Chapter 
5), reducing the amount of advertising should lead to higher rates of saving.  The ad 
deduction encourages businesses to advertise, and advertisements encourage people 
to over-consume rather than save.  Extremely low—even negative—saving rates have 
contributed to the current credit crisis.  In light of the relationship between advertising 





 By allowing advertising to be deducted, “our current tax policies . . . 
encourage wasteful, destructive consumption” (Hymel 2000, 356).  According to a 
consensus among economists, reducing or eliminating the deduction for advertising 
would reduce the quantity of advertising (see below).  Since advertising encourages 
people to buy ever more products, fewer such messages should ease the cultural 
pressure to consume.  Hymel puts it this way: “Eliminating preferential tax treatment 
of advertising would increase its after-tax cost. As a result, both advertising and over-
consumption should decline. Predicting how much of a decline in either would be 




Difficult or not, Godshaw and Pancoast (1987) estimate “that an increase in 
the price of advertising of one percent reduces the share of disposable income spent 
on consumption by 0.0345 percentage points” (5). 
 
Reducing consumption: a dilemma for environmental policy 
 
Over-consumption is a central cause of environmental degradation.  Dealing 
with over-consumption is problematic, however, because people insist on the right to 
buy virtually anything they want, anytime they want, and in any amount they want, so 
long as they have the money—or can borrow the money—to get it.  Thus, proposals 
to cut consumption by raising taxes substantially or putting quotas on purchases of 
products that are particularly harmful to the environment (e.g., a quota on gasoline 
per person) would certainly meet strong public resistance.  
Typically, environmental organizations have tried to motivate collective 
action by confronting the public with dire warnings, like: “The polar icecap is 
melting!  Polar bears are drowning!”  To a certain extent, those warnings have had 
their intended effect: Surveys show that most people are aware of environmental 
problems and are frightened by them (Dunlap et al. 1993; Harwood 1995; Immerwahr 
1999).  Unfortunately, however, environmentalists’ exhortations generally fail to 
motivate people to reduce the amount they consume—even though the warnings often 
connect ecological problems to human over-consumption.   
Theoretical and empirical studies indicate that presenting scary scenarios with 
the hope that they will motivate people to reduce their consumption is likely to be 




afraid, or anxious, they generally become more materialistic—not less (Inglehart and 
Abrahamson 1994; Kanner and Gomes 1995; Kasser and Sheldon 2000; Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger 2007).  Frightened people often comfort themselves by consuming 
more.  (An illustration of the fear-materialism nexus likely occurred at the 2008 
Republican Convention.  The assembled delegates, having been recently exposed to 
numerous reports about skyrocketing energy prices, rising unemployment, and falling 
home prices, voiced their support for exploiting offshore oil—despite the 
environmental consequences—by chanting loudly and repeatedly: “Drill, baby, 
drill!”) 
Polls show that people do, in fact, link over-consumption to environmental 
degradation.  In response to a 1995 survey question about the underlying causes of 
environmental problems, 93 percent of the participants agreed that “the way we live 
produces too much waste,” 91 percent said that “we focus too much on getting what 
we want now and not enough on future generations,” and 88 percent said that 
“protecting the environment will require most of us to make major changes in the way 
we live”  (Harwood Group 1995).  While “89 percent agreed that buying and 
consuming is ‘the American way’” and an overwhelming majority of Americans (95 
percent) characterized their fellow citizens as materialistic, only 51 percent thought 
that their “own buying habits [were having] a negative effect on the environment” 
(n.p.).  
An “obstacle to change is rooted in the very strong American belief in 
freedom and choice; people are strongly opposed to impinging upon the freedom of 




show that people want a healthy environment, believe that over-consumption is 
harming the environment, but insist on the freedom to consume at will.  At the same 
time, “four out of five Americans find they often consume more than they need” 
(Myers and Kent 2004, 124).  Advertising is a plausible cause of this cognitive 
dissonance.  While people ignore most of the ads they encounter, the overarching 
message, nevertheless, takes hold: “You need something!  You need something!  You 
need something!”  
Offered a list of policy proposals for lowering the level of materialism and 
improving the environment, 80 percent of survey respondents said they thought 
curbing the quantity of ads on prime-time television would be a good idea, and 52 
percent thought doing so would be helpful (Harwood Group 1995).   
Currently, the government’s policies concerning over-consumption are 
somewhat schizophrenic.  On the one hand, they recognize the need for conservation, 
and, on the other, they encourage consumption.  Reducing the public’s ad exposure 
would automatically reduce the number of consumption-urging messages people 
absorb.  Alone, such a reduction would be insufficient to transform a consumerist 
culture into a nation of ascetics—even if that were desirable.  Nevertheless, reducing 
ad exposure would be one way to mitigate the intense, ad-abetted, societal pressure to 
consume.   
An analogy might be useful, here.  Suppose you are driving a car.  If you want 
to slow down, first you reduce the pressure your foot is putting on the accelerator.  If 
you want to stop the car, you will probably need to take other measures, such as 




accelerating.  Advertising is an accelerator for consumption.  Discouraging 
advertising by reducing or eliminating the deduction is like easing up on a car’s gas 
peddle.  
 
Potential costs of reducing or eliminating the deduction 
  
 As noted above, empirical research casts doubts on most of the ad lobby’s 
claims concerning advertising’s contributions to the common good.  Moreover, the 
benefits associated with the claims that do, on balance, stand up to scrutiny are hardly 
unalloyed.   
 
Growth and employment 
 
 Advertising does motivate consumption, and when consumption increases, 
GDP grows (ceteris paribus), but the costs associated with much of that ad-induced 
growth seem to outweigh the benefits.  Advertising may increase employment in 
some instances, but, as Kaldor (1950-1951) explains, generating employment by 
using ads to increase consumption of unnecessary goods is a questionable use of 
finite resources.  Moreover, in some cases, advertising might actually reduce 
employment.  Advertising can take the place of sales jobs, for example.  Furthermore, 
ad-induced materialism has shifted the work-leisure balance in favor of work.  Thus, 
many Americans are working longer hours than necessary in order to increase their 




individual over-workers decreased their hours, those hours would be available to 




 Advertising may lower search costs for particular items, but ads also 
encourage people to buy more than they would otherwise.  Thus, even though an ad 
might reduce the amount of time people spend searching for one item, it might 
increase the amount of time people spend searching cumulatively for goods.  
Generally speaking, advertising costs people much more time than it saves, since 
most people buy only a fraction of all the items they see advertised, and, as noted 
above, opportunity costs inhere to ad exposure.  
 
Media viability  
 
Although most media currently depend on advertising for revenue, Simon 
(1970) maintains that advertising’s support for media fails to justify advertising 
because there are “many other possible economic arrangements . . . that would be no 
more costly to society in the long run” (276).  For example, if direct government 
subsidies replaced the indirect subsidies that the tax deduction for advertising 
provides, media dependence on advertisers could be reduced or eliminated.  
Alternatively, media could increase their prices.  Under the present system, as Corden 




match supply; thus, the quantity of media supplied likely represents a less than 
optimal allocation of resources.   
Given that many people currently pay a fee for commercial-free television 
channels, such as HBO and Showtime, experience shows that some media can survive 
by increasing their prices and improving their quality.  Some of the world’s most 
creative people work for ad agencies.  If the deduction were eliminated, a lot of 
creative talent might be available to improve media content.  If content were 
improved and ads were eliminated, the public might be willing to pay more for access 
to media. 
 
Classified ads and public service announcements 
 
Some ad supporters and critics note that two types of advertising—classified 
ads and public service announcements—supply useful information without imparting 
materialistic values; thus, the social costs associated with denying deductibility for 
such ads might exceed the benefits.  As a general rule, however, expenditures for 
these types of ads are not deducted as business expenses.  Public service 
announcements, for example, promote no business’s product or service.  In fact, 
public service announcements sometimes attempt to persuade people not to buy a 
product (e.g., anti-smoking ads).  In the case of classifieds, although some employers 
might deduct the cost of help-wanted ads, compared to other forms of advertising, 
such expenditures are negligible.  Thus, whether or not help-wanted ads are 
deductible would seem to make little difference either to a business’s tax obligation 





Obstacles to changing advertising’s tax status 
 
On balance, the benefits of reducing or eliminating the deduction appear to 
outweigh the costs, and a change in the tax code seems to be warranted.  
Nevertheless, some potential obstacles to changing the tax status of advertising 
should be considered. 
 
Defining advertising: An administrative nightmare? 
 
A number of economic analysts contend that any proposal to change the tax 
status of advertising would require coming up with a definition for “advertising” and 
that doing so is infeasible.  Analysts at the Congressional Budget Office (1997), for 
example, warn that reducing the deduction “would require complex rules to 
distinguish advertising costs from other ordinary business costs” (377).  Doyle (1968) 
explains that if the new law failed to frame advertising with care, firms would be 
tempted to switch to alternative marketing methods to avoid tax liability.  If that were 
to happen, the result might be worse than if nothing had been done, in his view, 
because those methods might be as harmful to society as advertising, and they might 
be more expensive.   
Arrow et al. (1990) also flag the difficulty of distinguishing precisely what 
constitutes advertising. “Is it advertising,” they ask, “when a firm places a coupon in 
the newspaper . . . [or] sponsors a sporting event with the proceeds going to charity?  




As the authors see it, delineating the sorts of expenditures affected by a change in the 
tax code would be essential, however.  A narrow definition would encourage firms to 
switch to other selling and promotion methods in order to avoid the tax.  A broad 
definition, on the other hand, would discourage forms of advertising, such as retail 
promotions and manufacturers’ coupons that benefit consumers immediately and 
directly by reducing prices.  “In short,” they conclude, “whatever one thinks of the 
theoretical merits of the proposed change, in practice it is likely to be an 
administrative nightmare” (9).  
Writing in Tax Notes, Polinsky (1993) also anticipates problems defining 
advertising for the purpose of a tax-status change.  As he sees it, “any amortization 
proposal would add complexity to the tax law and require the [Internal Revenue] 
Service to promulgate regulations distinguishing the tax treatment of particular 
marketing activities” (1665).  Law professor Hymel (2000) agrees that defining 
advertising would be problematic (450). 
On the other hand, can advertising truly be so hard to define?  Businesses 
seem to have no trouble defining advertising when they calculate their tax obligations 
every year and claim ad expenditures as deductions.  And certainly, businesses define 
advertising broadly, because the broader the definition, the lower the tax bill.  
Moreover, experience seems to support the conclusion that advertising is definable.  
Reekie (1986) finds, for example, that an across-the-board tax on advertising in South 
Africa was easy to collect and reduced aggregate advertising expenditures. 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) imply that defining advertising is relatively 




economics of advertising on “advertising expenditures gathered from tax returns. . . .  
What is reported as advertising expenditures,” they write, “is therefore what the 
individual firms consider to be such expenditures.  The definition may vary from firm 
to firm, but it seems likely that most use roughly comparable definitions which 
include primarily payments made to the information media for messages distributed 
via those media” (5).  
Corden (1961) offers a practical suggestion.  “Perhaps,” he writes, “the 
necessary Act would include a simple definition of advertising, and a fairly 
comprehensive list of items held to be covered by the term, [which] would then be 
supplemented by case law” (35).  
 
A distinction between informative and persuasive advertising? 
 
According to Corden (1961), the ideal tax would selectively exempt 
advertising that is entirely factual and informative.  As he sees it, even if the effects of 
persuasive advertising are pernicious, informative advertising helps facilitate market 
transactions and should be deductible.  Corden concludes, however, that no 
distinction between informative and persuasive advertising can be effectively drawn.  
“There was a time when economists made a distinction between ‘informative’ and 
‘persuasive’ advertising,” he writes, “but it has been realized that all advertising 
contains a little information, if only the name of the product, while even the most 





Should the change in tax status apply to ads in every medium? 
 
If the deduction were eliminated for all forms of advertising, no particular 
medium would be disadvantaged.  If, on the other hand, only broadcast and print 
media were denied a deduction, newspaper advertisers might shift to other forms of 
marketing (e.g., billboards, direct mail, the Internet, and point-of-purchase 
promotions), which would privilege certain media without necessarily reducing 
consumers’ advertising exposure.  Disallowing the deduction for all forms of 




Over the years, advertising’s allies in business, media, and government have 
helped the industry defeat attempts to regulate or tax advertising on numerous 
occasions.  During the 1970s, for example, when the Federal Trade Commission 
proposed a ban on advertising that targets children, advertising’s friends in Congress 
not only overruled the ban but also punished the FTC by restricting its powers (Steyer 
2002).  
A review of attempts that have been made over the past few decades to change 
the tax status of advertising illustrate some of the political obstacles that proposals to 
reduce or eliminate the deduction might face in the future.   
According to some reports, the first (post World War II) proposal to trim the 
advertising deduction was sent to the Senate Finance Committee in 1986 by the 
Treasury Department, as one entry in a list of revenue-raising options (House of 




denied that the proposal originated in the Treasury Department, however.  He 
insisted, instead, that it “was the brainchild of the Senate Finance Committee staff 
and was rejected by the administration as bad fiscal policy” (Colford 1986b).  Also 
denying responsibility for the controversial measure was the chief counsel for the 
Finance Committee, William Diefenderfer, who told a reporter for Advertising Age 
that the proposal was “never seriously considered,” because it lacked the support of 
committee members and business.  Apparently, after the ad industry launched “an 
unprecedented lobbying effort” to kill the proposal, no one wanted to claim 
authorship (Colford 1986b).     
The proposal faced an additional political obstacle.  At the time, President 
Reagan was trying to get support for major tax-reform legislation.  Some of his 
strongest supporters in the business community, corporations such as Procter & 
Gamble, IBM, and General Motors, were also major advertisers.  “If they were going 
to go out on a limb and support tax reform,” one corporate executive asked, “would 
the administration want to then go against them?” (Colford 1986b.) 
Despite the fierce opposition to the first deduction-limiting proposal, a few 
months after its ignominious abandonment, the House Ways and Means Committee 
considered a similar proposal to increase government revenues by requiring 
businesses to capitalize and amortize a percentage of their advertising expenditures.  
Daniel Rostenkowski, chairman of the committee, acknowledged that advertising 
often yields “a return over a period far longer than the tax year.”  But, he said, 
determining “exactly how the expense and income streams should be matched” is 




Over the summer of 1987, the Senate Finance Committee and the House 
Ways and Means Committee listened to testimony from “a parade of advertising 
interests” (Hymel 2000).  Representatives of the National Association of 
Broadcasters, the Association of National Advertisers, The American Advertising 
Federation, and the American Association of Advertising Agencies (among others) 
testified that changing the tax status of advertising would fail to raise revenues, 
because it would reduce sales (Vettel 1987b).  Only one witness offered testimony in 
support of the proposal to amortize some advertising expenditures.  Given the 
underwhelming support, the proposal was eliminated from the legislative agenda. 
Just to be on the safe side, however, the ad industry prepared a “grim 
forecast,” supported by economic analyses, to educate Congress about the unintended 
consequences of forcing businesses to amortize their ad expenditures (Gordon and 
Colford 1988).  According to that forecast, denial of full deductibility would lead to 
less advertising, higher prices for consumer goods, and fewer jobs, among other 
things. 
After his inauguration in 1989, President George H. W. Bush allayed ad-
industry fears that his administration would attempt to reduce the deduction by 
appointing William Diefenderfer to be second in command at the Office of 
Management and Budget.  As chief counsel to the Senate Finance Committee in 
1986, Diefenderfer opposed the first proposal to reduce the deduction.  After that (but 
before his appointment by Bush), he was employed by the Leadership Council on 
Advertising Issues to formulate a strategy for countering any proposals by the White 




In defending the deduction, the ad industry and its supporters frequently frame 
the debate as being a battle between free speech and government control.  
Representative Michael Andrews of Texas, for example, told a congressional hearing: 
“Without advertising, media would become a State-run enterprise with all the 
constraints and burdens that entails.  Advertising is, however, constantly under attack 
by one force we all know too well: the tax collector” (House of Representatives 
1992). 
Andrew’s “tax collector” soon waged another attack on advertising.  In 
September of 1993, the House Ways and Means Select Revenue Measures 
Subcommittee held a hearing on a proposal requiring advertisers to amortize a portion 
of their ad expenses.  Although a “long line formed outside the meeting room ahead 
of the proceedings,” it was entirely comprised of lobbyists and other ad supporters.  
According to a reporter for ADWEEK, “the industry’s witnesses were persuasive, the 
room was packed and the television cameras were rolling.  The only problem was 
that, throughout the testimony, there was almost nobody from the subcommittee 
present to hear it” (Crawford 1993).  Of the three congressmen who addressed the 
proposal, one had been a vice president at an ad agency before his election to the 
House, and the wife of another was a principal at an advertising firm at that time.  All 
three congressmen denied that advertising creates goodwill and brand loyalty, and 
they all opposed the proposed change (Hymel 2000).  One witness after another 
claimed that reducing the deduction would reduce the amount of advertising and that 
less advertising would mean lower corporate profits.  With lower corporate profits, 




“This form of taxation,” the president of the Association of National Advertisers, 
DeWitt Helm, testified, “could prove to be counterproductive” (qtd. in Crawford 
1993).  
Some observers of the proceedings wondered how the proposal ever found its 
way onto the hearing’s agenda, given that no one was even willing to have his name 
attached as its sponsor.  “Often no one steps forward to claim authorship of an 
unpopular item, which is the case here,” a Capitol Hill “insider” explained to a 
reporter (Furchgott 1993). 
“This is one proposal with no identifiable political support and clearly 
identifiable and powerful political opposition,” Polinsky (1993) explained in Tax 
Notes.  “The representative or senator who supports the concept faces an 
overwhelming barrage of opposition from nearly every economic interest in his or her 
district or state.”  In Polinsky’s view, regardless of its merits, “it is extremely unlikely 
that such a proposal will become law any time soon.  And the reason has nothing to 
do with tax accounting practices and everything to do with practical politics” (n.p.). 
Practical politicians rely on the old adage: Never pick a fight with people who 
buy ink by the barrel.  During the 1993 hearing, as before, no elected official wanted 
to antagonize the media over a proposal that was being cast as “taxing advertising.”  
Nor did they want to take on manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, “and every 
large and small retail establishment in America” (Polinsky 1993, n.p.). 
In 1993, although Congress changed the tax code to require the amortization 
of other forms of intangible capital, it specifically exempted advertising.  House 




persons have questioned whether this bill was intended to open the door for 
reconsidering tax deductions for advertising expenses.  Let me be clear.  The answer 
is no” (qtd. in Bokinsky 1994, n.p.).  Nevertheless, Johns (1984) writes, “the tax 
treatment of these internally developed intangible assets is bewildering” to most tax 
practitioners and academics (n.p.).  
Since 1993, academics, practitioners, and others have continued to propose 
reducing the deduction from time to time.  A few days before Clinton’s 1995 State of 
the Union address, for example, rumors circulated that the president was considering 
mentioning advertising in his speech as an example of corporate welfare that needs to 
be cut.  That rumor triggered an immediate response from ad lobbyists, ad agencies, 
trade associations, small businesses, and major corporations.  In an interview about 
the events, a Treasury official said that his agency and the White House had been 
swamped by protests from advertisers and the ad lobby on the day before the address.  
“We even had inquiries from congressmen who had been contacted by AAF [the 
American Advertising Federation] and the ANA [the Association of National 
Advertisers], the Treasury official said (Mundy 1995, n.p.). 
In the fall of 1995, when the House Ways and Means Committee “passed a 
$30-million corporate-welfare bill with teeth [that bit] just about everybody,” the 
committee, nevertheless, spared advertising.  A report in ADWEEK credited the 
chairman of Ways and Means, Bill Archer, for advertising’s exclusion.  According to 





Meanwhile, policymakers from both political parties have spoken over the 
years about the need to reduce corporate subsidies.  In the Senate, Republican John 
McCain and Democrat Edward Kennedy proposed creating a Corporate Subsidy 
Reform Commission.  As a member of Clinton’s Cabinet, Labor Secretary Robert 
Reich got the support of the Republican House and Senate Budget Committee 
chairmen, along with President Clinton, when he called for reducing “corporate 
welfare” (Hemphill 1997).  Outside government, the libertarian Cato Institute issued a 
paper, by Stephen Moore and Dean Stansel (1995), entitled: “Ending Corporate 
Welfare as We Know It.”  From the left side of the political spectrum, the Progressive 
Policy Institute called for corporate-welfare cuts and proposed the amortization of 
some ad expenses.  But as Robert Shapiro (1995) of PPI explained, “cutting industry 
subsidies seems to be a politically irresistible proposition in the abstract and a 
politically intolerable course in its particulars.”  
According to Hemphill (1997), whenever policymakers target a particular 
corporate subsidy, the associated lobby mobilizes to counter the threat.  “Agency 
officials . . . highlight the economic benefits accruing to constituents in specific 
congressional districts and states.  Business lobbyists . . . confirm the importance of 
these programs to the future economic success of companies in a legislator’s domain” 
(n.p.).  Elected officials also face “the omnipresent threat of . . . losing [campaign] 
contributions from disgruntled corporate and industry sources.”  In addition to those 
concerns, if advertising is the targeted industry, politicians confront the additional 
worry that ad-subsidized media will retaliate by running editorials and advertisements 




In 2004, the Advertising Coalition claimed to have defeated “six separate 
proposals” voted on by the Senate “that would have adversely affected advertising” 
(Advertising Coalition 2004).  According to the Coalition, it defeated those measures 
“by adhering to the wisdom of former House Speaker Tip O’Neill, who said: ‘All 
politics is local.’”  In order to stress the importance of advertising to the economy of 
the legislator’s state or district, the Coalition brought members of relevant House and 
Senate committees together with advertising and media executives.  In addition, as 
noted in Chapter 5, the ad-lobby paid for a study that purported to detail the impact of 
ad expenditures on economic activity and employment in every state and 
congressional district.   
Clearly, any new proposal to reduce or eliminate the advertising deduction 
would face intense opposition.  Advertising affects the earnings of many businesses.  
As difficult as it is to challenge the subsidy of one industry, taking on corporations, 
ad-supported media, ad agencies, manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers and others 
who benefit from the status quo would clearly require a Herculean effort. 
Policymakers have justified previous attempts to reduce the deduction by 
arguing that the amortization of ad expenditures would increase government 
revenues.  The ad lobby defeated those proposals easily by claiming that government 
revenues would actually drop if the deduction were reduced.  According to the ad 
lobby, the loss of full deductibility would mean that businesses would advertise less, 
which would lead to depressed sales, which would lead to lower tax payments.   
“Despite ample support under existing tax law and policy to change 




powerful advertising industry” Hymel (2000) writes.  If the rationale for the change is 
characterized as merely a way to gain revenue for projects that the public may or may 
not support, it will have little chance of withstanding the opposition.  Reducing or 
eliminating the deduction for advertising expenditures will require the firm backing 
of the American people, because powerful interests opposing the change will push 
back forcefully. 
 
First Amendment Issues 
 
Would reducing or eliminating the deduction violate the First Amendment’s 
protection of commercial speech?  According to some advocates for the ad industry, it 
would.  As they see it, eliminating the deduction “is tantamount to imposing taxes on 
political speeches, protest demonstrations or parades” (Geier 1987).  Nevertheless, 
the answer from the Supreme Court appears to be “no.”  In 1959, for example, the 
Court ruled that the Internal Revenue Service could deny deductions to alcoholic-
beverage dealers for advertising that was intended to defeat “dry-law” proposals in 
two states.  “The Court based its decision upon the freedom-of-speech concept, and 
ruled that there was no interference with freedom of speech so long as anyone is free 
to use advertising for lobbying by paying full price for the advertisements, rather than 
by claiming a deduction as a business expense” (Wedding 1960, 17).   
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation (1983), the Court upheld the denial 
of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups that lobby Congress—even though First 




(2000) writes: “Denying a business expense deduction does not infringe on any First 
Amendment rights or regulate any First Amendment activity.  Congress has simply 
chosen not to pay for that expense.”  If Congress can deny a tax deduction to 
lobbying, “which is fully protected speech, then it should not be required to subsidize 
advertising, which is not fully protected speech,” Hymel argues (463). 
The ad lobby might seem to be on firmer ground, however, when it claims that 
eliminating the deduction for a particular product would violate the First Amendment.  
When several U.S. Senators proposed legislation to eliminate a deduction for tobacco 
advertising, for example, the president of the American Advertising Federation 
maintained that such a change would be “unconstitutional because you are only 
taking away the right for one speaker” (qtd. in Teinowitz and Sachs 1995, n.p.).  
Nevertheless, a number of legal analysts have concluded that, in the case of tobacco, 
even denying the deduction to a particular “speaker” can pass constitutional muster.  
They base that conclusion on the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commissioner (1980).  In that case, the Court 
established a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of any proposed 
regulation of commercial speech.  According to Virelli, (2000), the “test stated that 
regulation of (1) non-misleading, legal, commercial speech requires (2) a substantial 
government interest; if such an interest exists, the regulation must (3) directly 
advance that government interest, and (4) be no more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest” (541).  A proposal to eliminate the tax deduction for tobacco 
advertising “is permissible because it both materially advances an important 




Cohen (1998) takes a similar position.  He writes: “As advertising is 
commercial speech, it is not entitled to the same level of First Amendment protection 
as other speech, and to make it more expensive by limiting its tax deductibility would 
apparently not violate the Central Hudson test that the Supreme Court applies in 
determining whether governmental restrictions on commercial speech are 
constitutional” (1).  Furthermore, the “Supreme Court has held that Congress is not 
required to subsidize First Amendment rights through a tax deduction” (1). 
Addressing the issue of First Amendment rights for commercial speech, Daly 
and Farley (2004) note: “The right to free speech . . . does not include . . . the right to 
amplification by a powerful megaphone.  For example, no one is allowed to shout 
‘fire!’ in a crowded theater if there is no fire, because it threatens the well-being of 
others.  Shouting ‘fire!’ may not be fundamentally different from encouraging people 
to consume when such consumption threatens the wellbeing of future generations” 
(414). 
In sum, the argument that limiting or eliminating the tax deduction for 
advertising would violate the First Amendment seems to have no basis in law. 
 
Impact of the elimination of the deduction on ad exposure 
 
If reducing individuals’ ad exposure is the goal, would eliminating the 
deduction be effective?  If advertising were no longer deductible, would advertisers 
respond to higher prices by reducing their ad expenditures or would ad-carrying 




maintain their revenue?  Is it conceivable that reducing or eliminating the deduction 
might actually result in more advertising—not less?  Eliminating the deduction might 
lead to more advertising if the marginal cost of supplying media time/space were low, 
because, if it were, media could lower their prices, increase the amount of time/space 
they dedicate to advertising, and still make a profit.  
But is the marginal cost of supplying media space/time low?  The literature 
indicates that for most media, it is not.  Allen, Eagle, and Rose (2002) find that the 
“supply side of the market for TV advertising is represented by a steep, upward 
sloping marginal-cost curve . . . caused by the scarcity of the two major ‘resources’ 
used in TV advertising: broadcasting time and potential audience” (9).  For the same 
reason, the marginal cost of radio advertising should be high.  In the case of print 
media, the marginal cost is also considerable.  According to Corden (1961), newsprint 
and ink account for nearly half of a newspaper’s expenses.  Speculating that the 
marginal cost of billboards is also high (without confirming research) seems safe.  
Even when the marginal cost of additional ad space or time is low, as it is in the case 
of Internet “e-zines” (Dupont 1997), the public’s tolerance for advertising is limited.  
Numerous studies and surveys find that people dislike being exposed to most ads 
(e.g., Harwood Group 1995).  Thus, the media are constrained in the amount of 
advertising they can carry, because consumers will abandon media that contain too 
many ads. 
Generally speaking, limiting the quantity of advertising serves the interest of 
both advertisers and the media.  Individual advertisers prefer limitations on (other 




showcase their products in a less cluttered environment.  As Bagwell (2003) explains, 
a reduction in the elasticity of demand for advertisers’ goods accompanies a 
restriction in the quantity of advertising that a medium supplies.  Where inelasticity of 
demand for ad time/space is high, media gain more from inframarginal units when 
they restrict quantity than they gain from increased sales when they increase the 
supply of ad time/space.  In fact, until 1982 the National Association of Broadcasters 
set a limit for the number of commercial minutes per hour an affiliated television 
station was permitted to broadcast.  In that year, however, the Justice Department 
claimed that the NAB’s rules violated three antitrust laws by seeking to limit the 
supply of advertising minutes artificially in order to increase profits.  Following the 
refusal of the court to dismiss two of the charges and its ruling that one of NAB’s 
standards was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, the NAB agreed to stop 
disseminating and enforcing the ad limit (Cohen 1982; Owen and Wildman 1992). 
Clearly, the ad industry believes that reducing the deduction would lead to a 
reduction in advertising.  Otherwise, why would the industry oppose the change?  If 
the change would mean more business, the industry should be all for it.  In fact, 
however, in article after article, trade magazines reveal that the industry is 
vehemently opposed to any change in the tax status of advertising.  
A number of economists seem to agree that reducing the deduction would lead 
to a reduction in advertising.  Arrow et al. (1990) put it this way: “The result of 
[reducing the deduction] is obvious: an increase in the cost of advertising and a 
corresponding decrease in the amount of advertising” (1; italics in the original).  In a 




reducing the deduction “would increase the after-tax cost of advertising and 
discourage its use” (377).  A 1981 article by Baye “implies that the elimination of the 
tax deductibility of advertising expenses would reduce firms’ demand for advertising” 
(Baye 2007, personal communication). 
According to a number of studies, when the price of advertising increases, the 
quantity of advertising decreases.  Godshaw and Pancoast (1987), for example, 
estimate that when the price of advertising increases one percent the amount 
demanded falls by 0.7 percent.  Masih (1999) finds that the demand for advertising, in 
the long run, drops approximately 1 percent for every percentage point of increase in 
price.  Bagwell (2003) simply maintains that the effect on advertising of a cost 
increase is a decrease in the quantity of advertising.  Reekie (1986) and Corden 
(1961) concur with Bagwell.  
Perhaps businesses would continue to advertise without the deduction if media 
lowered their prices more than the tax change increased businesses’ ad expenses.  It 
seems unlikely, however, that media could lower their prices enough to make up for 
the elimination of the deduction at the 35-percent corporate-tax rate.  
 
Should Advertising Remain a Deductible Business Expense? 
 
 
On balance, the costs associated with advertising now seem to far outweigh 
the benefits.  Advertising instills materialistic values that make people want to 
consume.  Given the individual, social, and environmental costs associated with 




increasing levels undermine overall well-being.  Thus, advertising should not remain 
a fully deductible business expense. 
But should the deduction be entirely eliminated? 
University of Arizona law professor Mona Hymel (2000) says no.  In her 
view, advertising would be “significantly disadvantaged as compared to other 
economically similar investments,” if the deduction were completely eliminated.  
Moreover, “complete elimination would . . . create perverse incentives to characterize 
advertising as some more tax-favored asset” (450). 
Hymel believes, nonetheless, that the “current tax treatment of advertising 
costs raises efficiency, fairness, adequacy, and administrability concerns. . . .  Thus 
the tax treatment of such costs should be changed in a manner consistent with other . . 
. investments” that create intangible capital (453).  “Rather than completely deny any 
deduction for advertising costs,” Hymel argues, “capitalization with amortization of 
some or all of the costs provides a stronger basis in tax policy, and is likely to be 
more politically feasible” than denying the entire deduction (459). 
 Perhaps, she is right.  On the other hand, Knox College professor of 
psychology Tim Kasser (2002) thinks that it might be a good idea to “consider 
advertisements as a form of pollution” and “assess a tax on advertisers who spew 
materialistic messages” (109-110).  Given all of the negative externalities that inhere 
to advertising, treating it like a pollutant seems reasonable.  Although a number of 
economists have made a case for amortization based solely on tax equity 
considerations, if the psychological, societal, and environmental costs are taken into 




The ad lobby is likely to wage a fierce battle to retain the deduction whatever 
the proposed change.  Thus, the policy that has the highest probability of maximizing 












Over the past hundred years, economic conditions in the United States have 
changed dramatically, but, as Galbraith (1998) notes, “the total alteration in 
underlying circumstances has not been squarely faced.  As a result, we are guided, in 
part, by ideas that are relevant to another world; and as a further result, we do many 
things that are unnecessary, some that are unwise, and a few that are insane.  Some 
are a threat to affluence itself” (2).   
Continuing to depend on the Gross Domestic Product to measure human 
welfare is, perhaps, an example of our failure to change with the times.  Although 
GDP (and GNP) correlated positively with improvements in human welfare for most 
of the twentieth century, over the past few decades, measures of well-being have 
shown a slight decline, even though the GDP has grown substantially (Daly and Cobb 
1994; Myers 2000).   
As previously noted, economic bads (e.g., expenditures for disaster 
mitigation) are included with economic goods in GDP accounts.  To reflect changes 
in welfare more accurately, such expenditures should be subtracted—not added.  So 




GDP is an inaccurate indicator of welfare.  Thus, consideration should be given to 
reformulating GDP accounts or replacing GDP altogether with a new measure. 
In the fall of 2008, as global financial markets plunged, economists, 
politicians, and others proposed restoring the status quo ante by stimulating GDP 
growth.  Given that GDP is an obsolete, faulty, or—at best—incomplete measure of 
societal well-being in wealthy countries like the U.S., charting a new course seems to 
be in order.  If maximizing well-being is the ultimate goal, then prosperity should be 
redefined in a way that “abandon[s] the outdated assumption that quantitative growth 
is unconditionally desirable and embrac[es] instead the notion of qualitative growth” 
(Renner 2004, 116). 
Over the past few years, social scientists from around the world and across the 
political spectrum have suggested giving consideration to replacing GDP by some 
new measure, perhaps Gross National Happiness (Brooks 2008; Daly 2005; Graham 
and Chattopadhyay 2008).  Motivating the interest in reevaluating GDP as a measure 
of well-being is the insight that money can buy only part of what people want and 
need.   
Noting the results of happiness research, Gardner and Assadourian (2004) 
write: “Again and again, studies suggest that happy people tend to have strong, 
supportive relationships, a sense of control over their lives, good health, and fulfilling 
work.  These factors are increasingly under stress in fast-paced, industrial societies, 
where people often attempt to use consumption as a substitute for genuine sources of 
happiness” (166).  Perhaps people’s inability to satisfy their underlying needs for 




themselves to acquire the means to consume—explains why pollsters find, again and 
again, that a majority of Americans believe that America is “on the wrong track” 
(PollingReport.com 2008). 
 
Reduce the quantity of messages that promote materialistic values 
 
With quantitative growth the goal, policymakers tend to favor methods, such 
as advertising, that are thought to increase the Gross Domestic Product.  Advertising, 
however, instills materialistic values, which tend to undermine psychological, social, 
and environmental well-being.  In the words of religious historian Robert Bellah: 
“That happiness is to be attained through limitless material acquisition is denied by 
every religion and philosophy known to humankind, but is preached incessantly by 
every American television set” (qtd. in Durning 1992, 147).  With happiness the goal, 
public policy would discourage—not give favorable treatment to—messages that 
promote materialism and over-consumption. 
 
Stop exporting materialistic values through advertising 
 
 
Clearly, as a nation develops, economic growth improves well-being up to the 
point at which the people of that nation are able to satisfy their basic needs.  Given 
the association between growth in consumption and growth in GDP, promulgating 
materialistic values in developing nations through advertising might seem to be 




well-being of the rich and the poor.  Thus, exporting materialism through advertising 
undermines efforts to improve the well-being of people in developing nations. 
 
Make satiety the goal 
 
 
As Galbraith (1998) notes, the “concept of satiation has very little standing in 
economics” (117).  But just as eating too little leads to malnutrition and eating too 
much leads to corpulence, consuming too few or too many goods lowers overall well-
being.  For the good of the individual, the society, and the environment, the goal of 
public policy should be to facilitate consumption just to the point of satiety. 
To be clear, dictating to people what they can consume and how much they 
can consume is not what is being suggested here.  Rather, the recommendation is for 
policies that enable people to reach a level of satiety but encourage them to stop there.  
Policies that encourage Americans to work hard so that they can become rich enough 
to buy whatever they want whenever they want it—that is, to over-consume at will—
are counterproductive to the well-being of the environment, the society, and the 
individual.  
 
Provide public service announcements 
 
According to a 1995 Harwood Group poll (mentioned above), Americans 
from “all backgrounds . . . believe materialism, greed, and selfishness increasingly 
dominate American life, crowding out a more meaningful set of values centered on 




pollster causes them to think about it, individual Americans reach the same 
conclusions about what maximizes well-being as do the social scientists who spend 
years studying the elements of happiness.  Bombarded by advertising, however, 
Americans spend far less time contemplating values than they spend thinking about 
the things that they want to consume.  Thus, Gardner and Assadourian (2004) 
conclude: “Consumption education . . . may be a necessary corrective to advertising’s 
incessant proclamations of the desirability of consumption” (177). 
Public service announcements, placed in various media, could help bring 
about a societal shift from an emphasis on consumption to an emphasis on well-being.  
PSAs could inform the public, in creative ways, about the results of happiness 
research (e.g., that people will generally improve their lives more by strengthening 
their relationships than by increasing their incomes); PSAs could explain 
environmental issues in entertaining, informative, and easy-to-comprehend ways, and 
they could provide effective anti-consumption messages.  
  
Use happiness research to inform policy 
 
 
Happiness research indicates that policies aimed at promoting good health 
(e.g., universal health care, the Clean Air Act), strong relationships (e.g., the Family 
and Medical Leave Act), basic security (e.g., “COPS,” the Clinton administration’s 
police hiring program), and personal development (e.g., Pell Grants), while also 
providing an effective safety net to ensure that people can satisfy their basic survival 




increase the well-being of the American people in the 21st century than do policies 
aimed at maximizing economic growth.  Recent experience shows that well-being can 
decline even while the economy grows substantially.  Making the rich richer may 
increase GDP, but if the increased wealth fails to trickle down to the rest of the 
population, national welfare goes down, not up. 
Unemployment is toxic to well-being.  But in the U.S. today, the ultimate 
consequence of promoting advertising, in order to stimulate consumption, in order to 
boost economic growth, in order to increase employment, is diminished welfare, 
caused by the many negative externalities that inhere to advertising and over-
consumption.  Compared to increasing employment by stimulating growth, reducing 
the workweek from 40 to, say, 32 hours seems more likely to increase well-being.  A 
32-hour workweek would trade consumption for leisure.  As a result, it would tend to 
reduce stress, reduce consumption (with all the aforementioned benefits of 
consumption reduction), and allow more time for personal growth and relationships.  
It would also tend to increase employment.  (Cutting four employees’ 40-hour 
workweek by eight hours could make one 32-hour-per-week job available for one 
additional employee, ceteris paribus.)  While it is true that personal income might fall 
with a shorter workweek, complementary policies could nevertheless increase social 
welfare.  If programs that facilitate well-being (such as universal health care, etc.) 
were in place, advertising were reduced such that people would be exposed to fewer 
materialism-inducing messages, and the conclusions of happiness research were more 
broadly promulgated, Americans might eventually conclude, along with Thoreau, that 




indispensable, but positive hindrances to the elevation of mankind” (qtd. in De Graaf 
et al. 2002, 132).  
The government could reduce unemployment directly by hiring private 
contractors to rebuild the nation’s deteriorating infrastructure and hiring advertising 
agencies to produce consumption-reducing messages.  Although free-market 
advocates have subjected such investments in public goods to intense negative 
scrutiny over the past several decades, as Galbraith (1998) notes, “private goods have 
had no such attention.  On the contrary their virtues have been extolled by the massed 
drums of modern advertising.”  In his view, the “social consequences of this 
discrimination—this tendency to accord a superior prestige to private goods and an 
inferior role to public production—are considerable and even grave” (112).  Public 
policies that favor private transportation over public transportation have, for example, 
produced serious environmental consequences.  As Renner (2004) notes, “forward-
looking government policies—improved land use planning, environment-oriented 
norms and standards, and the creation of a reinvigorated public infrastructure that 
allows for greater social provision of certain goods and services—will help ensure 






Afterword: A Note about the Current Economic Crisis 
  
 
Consumer spending rose every quarter between 1991 and the third quarter of 
2008, when it dropped at a 3.1-percent annual rate—the steepest decline since 1980 
(Krugman 2008).  Expecting consumer spending to continue to fall in the foreseeable 
future, some economists fear that the U.S. economy may be descending into a 
deflationary spiral (Goodman 2008).  
The ad industry has already been hit by the economic downturn.  To cite a few 
examples, during the third quarter of 2008, net income from advertising at the 
Internet portal Yahoo dropped 64 percent (Harrison 2008), advertising pages in 
consumer magazines dropped 12.9 percent (Fell 2008), and local-television-stations’ 
ad revenues—excluding sales of political advertisements—dropped three percent 
(MarketWatch.com 2008).  Nevertheless, advertisements remain ubiquitous.  With 
hard financial times constraining consumer spending, continued exposure to present 
levels of materialism-inducing, pro-consumption advertising will, in all likelihood, 
only make frustrated consumers feel worse.  Anti-consumption uncommercials that 
focus on the true sources of happiness could mitigate the disappointment that many 
people are likely to feel when economic conditions force them to consume less. 
In past economic downturns, policymakers have sought to spur economic 
growth by stimulating consumption.  Advertising stimulates consumption; thus, 
eliminating the deduction when the economy is contracting may seem 




materialistic values are always harmful.  In addition, the over-consumption that 
accompanies materialism is clearly deleterious to the ecological health of the planet.  
Ironically, materialistic values may even be harmful to the economy itself, because 
they tend to induce greed, and greed, as the economic crisis of 2008 has shown, can 
be a major contributor to the conditions that lead to financial collapse.    
As we have seen, numerous studies link advertising to materialism and 
materialism to a number of disutilities, including environmental degradation.  
Continuing to rely on ever-expanding consumption to promote well-being will 
exacerbate and add complexity to environmental problems in coming decades.  For 














Aaker, David A., James M. Carman, and Robert Jacobson.  1982.  “Modeling 
Advertising-Sales Relationships Involving Feedback: A Time Series Analysis of Six 
Cereal Brands.”  Journal of Marketing Research XIX, February: 116-125. 
 
ABC World News with Charles Gibson. 2007.  “Best Ever?  Healthy Nation.”  
December 12,  2007.   http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed December 13, 2007). 
 
Abramson, P. R., and R. Inglehart.  1995.  Value Change in Global Perspective.  Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Ackerman, Frank, and Lisa Heinzerling.  2004.  Priceless: On Knowing the Price of 
Everything and the Value of Nothing.  New York: New Press. 
 
Adams, T. S.  1918.  “Principles of Excess Profits Taxation.”  Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 75 (January): 147-158. 
 
Adler, R. P., G. S. Lesser, L. Merengoff, T. S. Robertson, J. R. Rossiter, and S. Ward.  
1980.  Research on the Effects of Television Advertising on Children.  Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books. 
 





_______.  1988.  “Viewpoint; The New Assault on Advertising.”  Editorial.  June 13, 
1988: 16. 
 
_______.  1990a.  “Coming Tax Battles.”  Editorial.  July 9, 1990: 22. 
 
_______.  1990b.  “No Time to Hobble Advertising.”  Editorial.  August 20 1990: 46. 
 
_______.  1993a.  “The Looming Tax Battle.”  Editorial.  March 22, 1993: 21. 
 
_______.  1993b.  “Tax Subsidy Nonsense.”  1993b.  Editorial.  March 29, 1993: 20. 
 
_______.  1995a.  “Ad Tax Vigilance.”  Editorial.  January 30, 1995: 17. 
 
_______.  1995b.  “Tax Fight Not Yet Won.”  Editorial.  May 22, 1995: 18. 
 
_______.  1997.  “Ad Tax Season.”  Opinion.  February 10, 1997: 20. 
 
_______.  1998.  “Capitol Hill Tax Nonsense.”  Editorial.  June 22, 1998: 21. 
 
_______.  2003.  “This Is No Time for Ad Paralysis.”  Editorial.  March 24, 2003: 26. 
 
_______.  2006.  “100 Leading National Advertisers: Profiles of the Top 100 U.S. 





Advertising Coalition.  2004.  http://www.theadvertisingcoalition.com/tac_about.html 
(accessed September 18, 2007). 
 
Association of National Advertisers.  2004.  “Advertising Industry Projected to 
Provide $5.2 Trillion Boost to the U.S. Economy in 2005, Study Reveals.”  
November 22, 2004.  http://www.ana.net/news/2004/11_22_04.cfm (accessed May 9, 
2005).  
 
Advertising Media Internet Center.  2002.  Google Answers: American Advertising in 
the Media.  http//answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=56750 (accessed 
September 26, 2007). 
 
Ahuvia, Aaron C.  2002.  “Individualism/Collectivism and Cultures of Happiness: A 
Theoretical Conjecture on the Relationship Between Consumption, Culture and 
Subjective Well-Being at the National Level.”  Journal of Happiness Studies 3:23-36. 
 
Ahuvia, A. C., and N. Wong.  1995.  “Materialism: Origins and Implications for 
Personal Well-Being.”  In European Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 2, ed. F. 
Hansen.  Copenhagen, Denmark: Association for Consumer Research. 
 
Albiniak, Paige.  2000.  “Ad Deductions Threatened.”  Broadcasting and Cable 130 





Alemson, M. A.  1970.  “Advertising and the Nature of Competition in Oligopoly 
over Time: A Case Study.”  The Economic Journal 80:282-306. 
 
Alexander, Susan M.  2003.  “Stylish Hard Bodies: Branded Masculinity in Men’s 
Health Magazine.”  Sociological Perspectives 46, no. 4:535-554. 
 
Allen, Larissa N., Lynne C. Eagle, and Lawrence C. Rose.  2002.  “Tax on 
Advertising: A Legitimate Revenue Generator or a Punitive Measure?”  Department 
of Commerce: Massey University, Auckland.  Working Paper Series, no. 01.02. 
 
Amadi, Confidence W.  2004.  “An Investigation of the Long-Run Impact of 
Advertising Expenditures on Sales.”  Allied Academies International Conference: 
Proceedings of the Academy of Family Business 2, no. 1:5-11. 
 
American Academy of Pediatrics.  1995.  “Position Statement: Children, Adolescents, 
and Advertising.”  Pediatrics 95, no. 2:295-297. 
 
American Cancer Society.  2007 (revised).  “Questions About Smoking, Tobacco, 
and Health.”    
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/PED/content/PED_10_2x_Questions_About_Smoking






American Lung Association.  2007.  “Tobacco Product Advertising and Promotion 
Fact Sheet.”  http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLUK9O0E&b=44462 
(accessed April 22, 2008). 
 
American Psychological Association.  2004a.  “APA Help Center: Facts and 
Statistics.” http://www.apahelpcenter.org/articles/topic.php?id=6 (accessed August 
18, 2008). 
 
_______.  2004b.  “Television Advertising Leads to Unhealthy Habits in Children; 
Says APA Task Force: Research Says that Children Are Unable to Critically Interpret 
Advertising Messages.”  Press Release, February 23, 2004.  APAonline.  
http://www.apa.org/releases/childrenads.html (accessed June 15, 2005). 
 
Anderson, David A.  1999.  “The Aggregate Burden of Crime.”  Journal of Law and 
Economics 42, no. 2:611-642. 
 
Anderson, Donald M., Porter Hoagland, Yoshi Kaoru, and Alan W. White.  2000.  
“Estimated Annual Economic Impacts from Harmful Algal Blooms (HABs) in the 
United States.”  WHOI-2000-11.  (September).  Department of Biology, Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution. 
http://www.floridashealth.com/Environment/community/aquatic/pdfs/WHOI_RedTid





Anderson, Porter.  2001.  “U.S. Employees Put in Most Hours.”  CNN. 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/CAREER/trends/08/30/ilo.study/ (accessed September 
10, 2008). 
 
Anderson, Simon P.  2005.  “Regulation of Television Advertising.”  Unpublished 
manuscript.  http://www.virginia.edu/economics/papers/anderson/tvadreg081705.pdf 
(accessed November 1, 2006). 
 
Anderson, Simon P., and Stephen Coate.  2005.  “Market Provision of Broadcasting: 
A Welfare Analysis.”  Review of Economic Studies 72, no. 4:947-972. 
 
Anderson, Simon P., and Jean J. Gabszewicz.  2005.  “The Media and Advertising: A 
Tale of Two-Sided Markets.”  CORE Discussion Paper 2005/88 (December) 
http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp05/dp2005_88.pdf (accessed October 16, 
2006). 
 
Andras, Trina Larsen, and Srini S. Srinivasan.  2003.  “Advertising Intensity and 
R&D Intensity: Differences across Industries and Their Impact on Firm’s 
Performance.”  International Journal of Business and Economics 2, no. 2:81-90. 
 
Andrews, F.M. and S.B. Withey: 1976, Social Indicators of Well-being: America’s  





Answerbag.com.  n.d.  “How Many Gallons in a Metric Ton of Petroleum?” 
http://www.answerbag.com/q_view/322746 (accessed October 4, 2008). 
 
Argyle, Michael.  1996.  “Causes and Correlates of Happiness.”  In Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology: Scientific Perspectives on Enjoyment and Suffering, ed. Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwartz.  New York: Russell Sage. 
 






&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA1,M1 (accessed December 3, 2008). 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J., George J. Stigler, Elisabeth M. Landes, and Andrew M. 
Rosenfeld.  1990.  Economic Analysis of Proposed Changes in the Tax Treatment of 
Advertising Expenditures.  Chicago: Lexecon, Inc. 
 
Ashdown, Simon.  2003.  “Insert Your Kids Brand Here!  Youth Marketers Stake out 





Ashley, R., C. W. J. Granger, and R. Schmalensee.  1980.  “Advertising and 
Aggregate Consumption: An Analysis of Causality.”  Econometrica 48, no. 5 (July): 
1149-1167. 
 
Aspan, Maria.  2007.  “Promotion Is Not Just Another Brick in the Wall.”  New York 
Times.  July 13, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed July 13, 2007). 
 
Assmus, Gert, John U. Farley, and Donald R. Lehmann.  1984.  “How Advertising 
Affects Sales: Meta-Analysis of Econometric Results.”  Journal of Marketing 
Research XXI (February): 65-74. 
 
Association of National Advertisers.  1998.  “Advertising in Minority Media.” 
http://www.ana.net/govt/activities/1998/98minor.cfm (accessed May 9, 2006). 
 
Atkin, C. K.  1975a.  “Survey of Pre-Adolescent’s Responses to Television 
Commercials.”  In The Effects of Television Advertising on Children (Report No. 6).  
East Lansing: Michigan State University. 
 
Atkin, C. K.  1975b.  “Survey of Children’s and Mother’s Responses to Television 
Commercials.”  In The Effects of Television Advertising on Children (Report No. 8).  





Atkins, T. V., M. C. Jenkins, and M. H. Perkins.  1991.  “Portrayal of Persons in 
Television Commercials Age 50 and Older.”  Psychology, A Journal of Human 
Behavior 28: 30-37. 
 
Ausubel, Jesse.  1996.  “Can Technology Spare the Earth.”  American Scientist 84, 
no. 2 (March/April): 166-178. 
 
Ayanian, R.  1983.  “The Advertising Capital Controversy.”  Journal of Business 56: 
349-364. 
 
Backman, J.  1967.  Advertising and Competition.  New York: New York University 
Press. 
 
Bagwell, Kyle.  2003.  “The Economics of Advertising.”  Mimeo.  Columbia 
University. 
 
Bagwell, Kyle.  2005.  “The Economic Analysis of Advertising.”  
DigitalCommons@Columbia. 
http://digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&cont
ext=econ_dp (accessed May 27, 2006). 
 
Bagwell, Kyle, and Garey Ramey.  1988.  “Advertising and Limit Pricing.”  Rand 





Bagwell, Kyle, and Garey Ramey.  1994.  “Coordination Economies, Advertising, 
Search Behavior in Retail Markets.”  American Economic Review 84: 498-517. 
 
Bailey, Ronald.  2002.  “The Progress Explosion: Permanently Escaping the 
Malthusian Trap.”  In Earth Report 2000, ed. Ronald Bailey.  New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
 
Bain, Joe S.  1956.  Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences 
in Manufacturing Industries.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 





December 16, 2008). 
 
Bakan, D.  1966.  The Duality of Human Existence: Isolation and Communion in 
Western Man.  Boston: Beacon. 
 
Baker, Edwin C.  1992.  “Advertising and a Democratic Press.”  University of 





“Bankruptcies.”  http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#june (accessed 
April 11, 2008). 
 
“Barack Obama Interview.”  2008.  Closing Bell, CNBC.  Transcript.  March 27, 
2008.  http://www.cnbc.com/id/23832520 (accessed November 16, 2008). 
 
Barber, Benjamin R.  2007.  Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize 
Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole.  New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Bardsley, Peter, and Nilss Olekalns.  1999.  “Cigarette and Tobacco Consumption: 
Have Anti-Smoking Policies Made a Difference?”  Economic Record 75, no. 230 
(September): 225-240. 
 
Bargh, John A.  2002.  “Losing Consciousness: Automatic Influences on Consumer 
Judgment, Behavior, and Motivation.”  Journal of Consumer Research 29:280-285. 
 
Barnes, Peter.  2001.  Who Owns the Sky?  Our Common Assets and the Future of 
Capitalism.   Washington: Island Press. 
 
Barnett, Harold J., Hyman H. Goldin, and Peter O. Steiner.  1966.  “Discussion.”  





Bass, F. M.  1969.  “A Simultaneous Equation Regression Study of Advertising and 
Sales of Cigarettes.”  Journal of Marketing Research 6:291-300. 
 
Baumeister, R., and M. R. Leary.  1995.  “The Need to Belong: Desire for 
Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation.  Psychological 
Bulletin 117:497-529. 
 
Baye, Michael R.  2007.  Personal e-mail correspondence.  June 21, 2007. 
 
Baye, Michael R.  1981.  “Optimal Adjustments to Changes in the Price of 
Advertising.”  Journal of Industrial Economics 30, no. 1:95-103. 
 
Baye, Michael R., Dennis W. Jansen, and Jae-Woo Lee.  1992.  “Advertising Effects 
in Complete Demand Systems.”  Applied Economics 24:1087-1096. 
 
Becker, A. E., and R. A. Burwell.  1999.   Acculturation and Disordered Eating in 
Fiji.  Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, 
Washington, D. C.  (Cited by Kilbourne, 2004.)   
 
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy.  1993.  “A Simple Theory of Advertising as 





Belk, R. W.  1985.  “Materialism: Trait Aspects of Living in the Material World.”  
Journal of Consumer Research 12:265-280. 
 
Belk, Russell W., and Richard W. Pollay.  1985.  “Images of Ourselves: The Good 
Life in Twentieth Century Advertising.”  Journal of Consumer Research 11, no. 4 
(March): 887-897. 
 
Belluck, Pam.  2007.  “Suspicious Devices in Boston Turn Out to Be Ad Campaign 
for Cartoon.”  New York Times.  January 31, 2007: A21. 
 
Benham, Lee.  1972.  “The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses.”  The 
Journal of Law and Economics 15, no. 2:337-352. 
 
Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann.  1964.  “Social Mobility and Personal 
Identity.”  Archives Européennes de Sociologies 5:331-343. 
 
Bernstein, Robert.  2007.  “Census Bureau Estimates: Number of Adults, Older 
People and School-Age Children in States.”  U. S. Census Bureau News.  
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/001703.html 
(accessed September 26, 2008). 
 





Berridge, Kent C., and Piotr Winkielman.  2003.  “What Is an Unconscious Emotion?  
The Case for Unconscious ‘Liking.’”  Cognition and Emotion 17, no. 2: 181-211. 
 
Berube, Alan, Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and William H. Frey.  2006.  “Finding 
Exurbia: America’s Fast-Growing Communities at the Metropolitan Fringe.”  The 
Brookings Institution: Living Cities Census Series, (October): 1-48.  
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20061017_exurbia.pdf (accessed July 24, 
2008). 
 
Bezlova, Antoaneta.  2007.  “China Battles Auto Addiction.”     
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HJ05Cb01.html (accessed December 
30, 2007). 
 
Birchall, Jonathan, and Joshua Chaffin.  2007.  “Advertisers Risk Waves on Radio 
Media.”  Financial Times: London Edition.  April 12, 2007. 
 
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H., and Alan S. Murray.  1987.  Showdown at Gucci Gulch: 
Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform.  New York: 
Random House. 
 
Blakelock, Edwin.  1960.  “A New Look at the New Leisure.”  Administrative 





Blanchflower, David G., and Andrew J. Oswald.  1999.  “Well-Being, Insecurity and 
the Decline of American Job Satisfaction.”  National Bureau of Economic Research.   
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/oswald/blanchflower.pdf 
(accessed November 28, 2008). 
 
Blanchflower, David G., and Andrew J. Oswald.  2004.  “Well-Being Over Time in 
Britain and the USA.”  Journal of Public Economics 88 (July): 1359-1387. 
 
Blank, David M.  1962.  “Cyclical Behavior of National Advertising.”  Journal of 
Business 35, no.1 (January): 14-27. 
 
Bloch, Harry.  1974.  “Advertising and Profitability: A Reappraisal.”  Journal of 
Political Economy 82, no. 2:267-286.   
 
Block, Jerald J.  2008.  “Issues for DSM-V: Internet Addiction.”  American Journal 
of Psychiatry 165:306-307. 
 
Bokinsky, Amy J.  1994.  “Note: Section 197: Taxpayer Relief and Questions of 









Bond, Paul.  2004.  “Nielsen Tracks Jeep Brand in Video Game Road Test.”  Shoot 
Magazine.  October 29, 2004. http://www.allbusiness.com/services/motion-
pictures/4908754-1.html (accessed December 16, 2008). 
 
Bonner, George R., Jr.  1986.  “Ad Agencies Cringe at Tax-Deduction Plan.”  
Christian Science Monitor.  March 10, 1986: 24. 
 
Borden, Neil H.  1942.  The Economic Effects of Advertising.  Chicago: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc. 
 
Borzekowski, D. and T. Robinson.  2001.  “The 30-Second Effect: An Experiment 
Revealing the Impact of Television Commercials on Food Preferences of 
Preschoolers.”  Journal of the American Dietetic Association 101, no. 1 (January): 
42-46. 
 
Bowlby, J.  1982.  Attachment (2nd ed.).  New York: Basic Books.  
 
Bowman, Gary W.  1976.  “Demand and Supply of Network Television Advertising.”  
Bell Journal of Economics 7, no. 4:258-267. 
 
Bowman, Shanthy A., Steven L. Gortmaker, Cara B. Ebbeling, Mark A. Pereira, and 




Diet Quality Among Children in a National Household Survey.”  Pediatrics 13, no. 
1:112-118. 
 
Boyd, Roy., and Barry. J. Seldon.  1990.  “The Fleeting Effect of Advertising: 
Empirical Evidence from a Case Study.”  Economics Letters 34, no. 4:375-379.   
 
Boynton-Jarrett, R., T. Thomas, K. Peterson, J. Wiecha, A. Sobol, and S. Gortmaker.  
2003.  “Impact of Television Viewing Patterns on Fruit and Vegetable Consumption 
among Adolescents.”  Pediatrics 112, no. 6:1321-1326. 
 
Brack, John and Keith Cowling.  1983.  “Advertising and Labour Supply: Workweek 
and Workyear in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1919-1976.”  Kyklos 36, no. 2:285-
303. 
 
Braithwaite, Dorothea.  1928.  “The Economic Effects of Advertisement.”  The 
Economic Journal 38, no. 149 (March): 16-37. 
 
Bramlett-Solomon, Sharon, and Gonga Subramanian.  1999.  “Nowhere Near Picture 
Perfect: Images of the Elderly in Life and Ebony Magazine Ads, 1990-1997.”  
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 76, no. 3:565-572. 
 
Braun, O. L., and R. A. Wicklund.  1989.  “Psychological Antecedents of 





Brickman, P., D. Coates, R. Janoff-Bulman.  1978.  “Lottery Winners and Accident 
Victims: Is Happiness Relative?”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36: 
917-927. 
 
Broadbent, Simon.  1989.  “Point of View: What is ‘Small’ Advertising Elasticity?”  
Journal of Advertising Research (August/September): 37-39. 
 
Broadbent, Simon.  2001.  “If the Question Is Ad Effects, the Answer Is ‘Not 
Elasticities.’”  Journal of Advertising Research, March-April: 7-11. 
 
Brody, Gene H., Zolinda Stoneman, T. Scott Lane, and Alice K. Sanders.  1981.  
“Television Food Commercials Aimed at Children, Family Grocery Shopping, and 
Mother-Child Interactions.”  Family Relations 30, no. 3: 435-439.   
 
Brooks, Arthur.  2008.  Gross National Happiness: Why Happiness Matters for 
America—and How We Can Get More of It.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
Brown, Allan.  2000.  “Commercial Free-to-Air Television with Unrestricted Channel 
Numbers.”  Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy. 





Brown, Keith S., and Roberto J. Cavazos.  2002.  “Network Revenues and African 
American Broadcast Television Programs.”  Journal of Media Economics 15, no. 
4:227-239. 
 
Brown, Keith S., and Roberto J. Cavazos.  2003.  “Empirical Aspects of Advertiser 
Preferences and Program Content of Network Television.”  Federal Communications 
Commission.  Media Bureau Staff Research Paper (December). 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-241968A1.pdf (accessed 
September 10, 2005). 
 
Brown, L. R.  2001.  Paving the Planet: Cars, and Crops Competing for Land.  
Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute. 
 
Browning, Lynnley.  2008.  “Study Tallies Corporations Not Paying Income Tax.”  
New York Times.  August 13, 2008.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/business/13tax.html?th&emc=th (accessed 
August 13, 2008). 
 
Bublitz, Bruce, and Michael Ettredge.  1989.  “The Information in Discretionary 






Buijzen, Moniek, and Patti M. Valkenburg.  2003a.  “The Effects of Television 
Advertising on Materialism, Parent-Child Conflict, and Unhappiness: A Review of 
Research.”  Applied Developmental Psychology 24:437-456. 
 
Buijzen, Moniek, and Patti M. Valkenburg.  2000.  “The Impact of Television 
Advertising on Children’s Christmas Wishes.”  Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic 
Media (Summer): 456-470. 
 
Buijzen, Moniek, and Patti M. Valkenburg.  2003b.  “The Unintended Effects of 
Television Advertising: A Parent-Child Survey.”  Communication Research 30, no. 5 
(October): 483-503. 
 
Bunch, David S., and Robert Smiley.  1992.  “Who Deters Entry?  Evidence on the 
Use of Strategic Entry Deterrents.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 74, no. 
3:509-521. 
 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  2004.  http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/gdplev.xls 
(accessed January 2, 2005). 
 
_______. 2005.  http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp#Mid (accessed 





_______.  2007.  “GDP and Other Major NIPA Series, 1929-2007:II.” 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2007/08%20August/0807_gdp_series.pdf (accessed 
August 1, 2008). 
 
_______.  2008.  “Gross Domestic Product: Second Quarter 2008 (Final): Corporate 
Profits: Second Quarter 2008 (Final).  September 26, 2008.  
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm (accessed 
September 27, 2008). 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  2008a.  “Economics News Release: Average Hourly and 
Weekly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Workers.” 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t16.htm (accessed September 14, 2008). 
 
_______.  2008b.  “Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment 
Statistics Survey (National).”  http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet 
(accessed September 14, 2008). 
 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  1998.  “Table 5.2: Average Household Size: 
1970-1998.” 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/the_changing_face_of_transportation/html/table_05_





Bush, C. Anthony.  2002.  “On the Substitutability of Local Newspaper, Radio, and 
Television Advertising in Local Business Sales.”  Federal Communications 
Commission: Media Bureau Staff Research Paper: Media Ownership Working 
Group. http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-
released/substitutability090002.pdf (accessed December 16, 2008). 
 
Business Wire.  2006.  “KFC Creates World’s First Brand Visible from Space as 
Colonel Sanders Takes One Small Step for Humankind but One Giant Leap for Fried 
Chicken.” 
http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&
newsId=20061114005428&newsLang=en (accessed August 7, 2007). 
 
Buss, D. M.  “The Evolutionary Psychology of Human Social Strategies.”  In Social 
Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, ed. E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski.  
New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Busterna, John C.  1987.  “The Cross-Elasticity of Demand for National Newspaper 
Advertising.”  Journalism Quarterly 64, nos. 2 & 3:346-351. 
 
C. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. Commissioner, (United States Board of Tax Appeals 





Calfee, John.  1993.  “Here We Go Again; Ads Under Fire; Attitude from 
Washington Seems to Be That Advertising Is Expendable.”  Advertising Age.  March 
15, 1993: 24. 
 
“Campaign Day.” Online NewsHour, PBS, October 26, 2004. 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/campaign_10-26.html 
(accessed November 3, 2004). 
 
Campbell, Angus.  1981.  The Sense of Well-Being in America.  New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
 
Canino, G.J., Bird, H.R., Shrout, P.E., Rubio-Stipec, M., Bravo, M., Martinez, R.. 
Sesman, M., & Guevara, L.M.  1987.  “The Prevalence of Specific Psychiatric 
Disorders in Puerto Rico.”  Archives of General Psychiatry 44:727-35.   
 
Capps, Brooke, and Nat Ives.  2007.  “U.S. Ad-Spending Growth Slows Way Down.”  
27 June 2007.  Advertising Age.  
http://adage.com/mediaworks/article?article_id=118852 
(accessed July 31, 2008). 
 
Carmona, Richard.  2001.  “The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent and 





(accessed December 16, 2008). 
 
Carpenter, Gregory S.  1987.  “Modeling Competitive Marketing Strategies: The 
Impact of Marketing-Mix Relationships and Industry Structure.”  Marketing Science 
6, no. 2 (Spring): 208-221. 
 
Casswell, Sally, and Jia-Fang Zhang.  1998.  “Impact of Liking for Advertising and 
Brand Allegiance on Drinking and Alcohol-Related Aggression: A Longitudinal 
Study.”  Addiction 93, no. 8:1209-1217. 
 
Cave, M., and P. Swann.  1986.  “The Effects of Advertising Revenues of Allowing 
Advertising on BBC Television.”  Report of the Committee of Financing the BBC.  
HMSO, London: 178-186. 
 
Caves, Richard.  1974.  Foreword to Advertising and Market Power, by William S. 
Comanor and Thomas A. Wilson.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
  
Caves, Richard E., and David P. Greene.  1996.  “Brands’ Quality Levels, Prices, and 
Advertising Outlays: Empirical Evidence on Signals and Information Costs.”  





CBS Evening News.  “Average Adult Cholesterol Level Within Normal Range.”  
December 12, 2007.  http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed December 13, 2007). 
 
CensusScope.org.  n.d.  “United States Population Growth.”  
http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_popl.html (accessed April 11, 2008). 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  2002.  “Annual Smoking—
Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs—United 
States, 1995-1999. MMWR. 2002; 51, no. 14:300-303. 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr//preview/mmwrhtml/mm5114a2.htm (accessed October 9, 
2007). 
 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissioner of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 
Central Intelligence Agency.  2008.  “World Factbook.”  Updated 15 May.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html (accessed 
May 20, 2008). 
 
Certain, Laura K., and Robert S. Kahn.  2002.  “Prevalence, Correlates, and 






Chamberlin, Edward Hastings.  1933.  The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A 
Re-orientation of the Theory of Value.  Seventh edition: 1956.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Chan, K. and H. Cheng.  2002.  “One Country, Two Systems.”  Gazette 64:385-400. 
 
Chan, R., and C. Joseph.  2000.  “Dimensions of Personality, Domains of Aspiration, 
and Subjective Well-Being.”  Personality and Individual Differences 28:347-354. 
 
Chang, Byeng-Hee, and Sylvia M. Chan-Olmsted.  2005.  “Relative Constancy of 
Advertising Spending.”  Gazette 67, no. 4:339-357. 
 
National Cancer Institute.  2001.  “Changing Adolescent Smoking Prevalence, 
Smoking and Tobacco Control.”  Monograph No. 14.  NIH Pub. No. 02-5086 
(November). http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/tcrb/monographs/14/m14.pdf (accessed 
December 16, 2008). 
 
Cheng. H., and J. C. Schweitzer.  1996.  “Cultural Values Reflected in Chinese and 
U.S. Television Commercials.  Journal of Advertising Research 6, no. 3:27-44.  
 
Cheung, C., and C. Chan.  1996.  “Television Viewing and Mean World Value in 





Chowdhury, Abdur R.  1994.  “Advertising Expenditures and the Macro-Economy: 
Some New Evidence.”  International Journal of Advertising 13:1-14. 
 
Churchill, G. A., and G. P. Moschis.  1979.  “Television and Interpersonal Influences 
on Adolescent Consumer Learning.”  Journal of Consumer Research 6:23-35. 
 
Citizens for Tax Justice.  “Bush Policies Drive Surge in Corporate Tax Freeloading: 
82 Big U.S. Corporations Paid No Tax in One or More Bush Years.”  September 22, 
2004.  http://www.ctj.org/corpfed04pr.pdf (accessed July 30, 2007). 
 
City Ice Delivery Co. v. United States, 176 F. (2d) 347 (1949). 
 
Clark, A. E., Y. Georgellis, and P. Sanfey.  2001.  “Scarring: The Psychological 
Impact of Past Unemployment.”  Economica 68:221-241. 
 
Clark, A. E., and A. J. Oswald.  1994.  “Unhappiness and Unemployment.”  
Economic Journal 104:648-659. 
 
Clarke, D. G.  1976.  “Econometric Measurement of the Duration of Advertising 
Effect on Sales.”  Journal of Marketing Research 13:345-357. 
 





New American Dream.  2002.  “CNAD asks America: ‘How much is enough?’” 
http://www.newdream.org/newsletter/kickoff.php (accessed July 26, 2008). 
 
Coen, Robert J.  1999.  “Spending Spree.”  The Advertising Century: Advertising Age 
Special Issue.  
 
_______.  2006.  “Domestic Advertising Spending Totals.”  Advertising Age: Special 
Report: 100 Leading National Advertisers Supplement.  June 26, 2006. 
 
Cohan, John Alan.  2003.  “Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-
Food Companies.”  Widener Law Journal 12. http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T5399443395 
(accessed December 16, 2008). 
 
Cohen, Adam.  2004.  “What Studs Terkel’s ‘Working’ Says About Worker Malaise 
Today.”  New York Times.  May 31.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 31, 
2004). 
 
Cohen, Dorothy.  1982.  “Legal Developments in Marketing.”  Journal of Marketing 





Cohen, Henry.  1998.  Tobacco Advertising: The Constitutionality of Limiting Its Tax 
Deductibility.  CRS Report for Congress.  Congressional Research Service; The 
Library of Congress.  March 4, 1998. 
 
Cohen, Joel E.  1995.  How Many People Can the Earth Support?  New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
 
Cohen, P., and J. Cohen.  1996.  Life Values and Adolescent Mental Health.  
Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum.   
 
Cohen, S.  1988.  Psychosocial Models of the Role of Social Support in the Etiology 
of Physical Disease.  Health Psychology 7:269-297. 
 
Colford, Steven W.  1986a.  “Deduction Change Could Hurt Issue Ads; Is It Tax or 
First Amendment Issue?”  Advertising Age.  March 3, 1986: 70. 
 
_______.  1986b.  “U.S. Scraps $20 Billion Ad-Tax Threat.  Advertising Age.  March 
17, 1986: 1. 
 
_______.  1988.  “Duke's Advisers May Be Bad News for Ad Industry.”  Advertising 





_______.  1989.  “OMB Pick Pleases Admen.”  Advertising Age.  January 30, 1989: 
85. 
 
_______.  “Ad Industry Arms for New Tax Battle: Deductibility Likely to Become 
Issue Again.”  Advertising Age.   July 2, 1990: 1. 
 
_______.  1993a.  “Congress Likely to Examine Deductible Ad Issue.”  Advertising 
Age.  February 1, 1993: 3. 
 
_______.  1993b.  “New Ad Tax Bill Zeros in on Tobacco Biz.”  Advertising Age.  
March 22, 1993: 1. 
 
_______.  1993c.  “Ad Tax Surprise as Congress Deductibility Hearings Take 
Unexpected Turn.”  Advertising Age.  August 23, 1993: 3. 
 
_______.  1994a.  “Clintonites Eye Ad Deductibility.”  Advertising Age.  January 31, 
1994: 4. 
 
_______.  1994b.  “Ad Industry Rating: Gibbons Benign.”  Advertising Age.  June 13, 
1994: 58. 
 
Colonial Ice Cream, Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (United States Board 





Comanor, William S., and Thomas A. Wilson.  1967.  “Advertising, Market Structure 
and Performance.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 49:423-440. 
 
Comanor, William S., and Thomas A. Wilson.  1974.  Advertising and Market Power.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 
345, 352 (1971). 
 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Million Co., 
417 U.S. 134 (1974). 
 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tellier et Ux, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1965). 
 
“Computer Chronicles.”  1998.  
http://www.crews.org/curriculum/ex/compsci/articles/generations.htm (accessed June 
4, 2008). 
 
Commonwealth Fund.  2005.  “‘Lost Labor Time’ Costs U.S. $260 Billion Each 
Year.”    
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/newsroom/newsroom_show.htm?doc_id=294188 





“Computer Chronicles.”  1998. 
http://www.crews.org/curriculum/ex/compsci/articles/generations.htm (accessed June 
4, 2008). 
 
Congressional Budget Office.  1997.  Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue 
Options.  http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6&sequence=0 (accessed May 9, 
2005).  
 
_______.  2000.   Causes and Consequences of the Trade Deficit: An Overview.  
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=1897&sequence=0 (accessed November 13, 
2006). 
 
Conley, Dalton.  “Rich Man’s Burden.”  New York Times.  September 2, 2008.   
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/02/opinion/02conley.html?th&emc=th (accessed 
September 2, 2008). 
 
Consumer Reports Website.  Google Answers: American Advertising in the Media.  
http//answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=56750 (accessed September 26. 
2007). 
 
Cook, A. J.  2004.  “Clothes Can Be Tax Deductible, but at the Discretion of the 




http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/stories/2004/11/22/smallb3.html (accessed July 
9, 2007). 
 
Cooper, Helene.  2004.  “Getting the Government out of the Madison Avenue Ad 
Business.”  New York Times.  December 7, 2004.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed 
May 26, 2005).   
 
Corden, W. M.  1961.  “A Tax on Advertising?”  Fabian Society, Research Series 
222: 1-40. 
 
Corrado, Carol, Charles Hulten, and Daniel Sichel.  2006.  “Intangible Capital and 
Economic Growth.”  Federal Reserve Board.  Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series: 2006-24 Screen Reader Version. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200624/200624pap.pdf (accessed 
September 8, 2008). 
 
Costanza, Robert, Ralph d’Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farberk, Monica Grasso, 
Bruce Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. O’Neill, Jose Paruelo, 
Robert G. Raskin, Paul Sutton, and Marjan van den Belt.  1997.  “The Value of the 






Courard-Hauri, David.  2005.  “Using Monte Carlo to Investigate the Relationship 
Between Overconsumption and Uncertain Access to One’s Personal Utility 
Function.”  Mimeo. 
 
Cox, W. Michael, and Richard Alm.  “You Are What You Spend.”  New York Times.  
10 February 2008.    
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/opinion/10cox.html?_r=1&ref=opinion&oref=sl
ogin (accessed February 10, 2008). 
 
Crawford, Alan Pell.  1993.  “Hollow Victory.” ADWEEK.  September 20, 1993. 
http://www/adweek.com (accessed December 17, 2008). 
  
Creslog, Craig, and Janet Graeser.  2001.  “New Web-Based Ecological Footprint 
Quiz Allows Individuals to Measure Their Impact on the Planet.”  Redefining 
Progress.  Press Release.  18 December 2001. 
http://www.rprogress.org/press/releases/011218_efoot.htm (accessed April 25, 2008). 
 
Cross, Gary.  2000.  An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in 
Modern America.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly.  1990.  Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience.  





_______.  1999.  “If We Are So Rich, Why Aren’t We Happy?  American 
Psychologist 54:821-827. 
 
Dahl, Thomas E.  2006.  “Wetland Losses in the United States: 1780’s to 1980’s.”  
U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Services, Washington D.C. 
http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/wetlands/wetloss/ (accessed December 16, 
2008). 
 
Daily, Gretchen C., Susan Alexander, Paul R. Ehrlich, Larry Goulder, Jane 
Lubchenco, Pamela A. Matson, Harold A. Mooney, Sandra Postel, Stephen H. 
Schneider, David Tilman, and George M. Woodwell.  1997.  “Ecosystem Services: 
Benefits Supplied to Human Societies by Natural Ecosystems.”  Issues in Ecology 1, 
no. 2:1-18.  
 
Daly, John Charles.  1976.  Advertising and the Public Interest.  Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute. 
 
Daly, Herman E.  1993.  “Introduction to Essays Toward a Steady-State Economy.”  
In Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, and Ethics, ed. Herman E, Daly and 





_______.  2005.  “Economics in a Full World.”  Scientific American.  September: 
100-107.  http://www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/faculty/daly/sciam-
Daly5%20copy%201.pdf 
(accessed July 10, 2008). 
 
_______.  2008.  Opinion Special: Beyond Growth.  New Scientist.  October 18, 
2008.  http://global.factiva.com (accessed November 7, 2008). 
 
Daly, Herman E. , and John B. Cobb, Jr.  1994.  For the Common Good: Redirecting 
the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed.  
Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Daly, Herman E., and Joshua Farley.  2004.  Ecological Economics: Principles and 
Applications.  Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Danaher, Peter J.  1995.  “What Happens to Television Ratings During Commercial 
Breaks?”  Journal of Advertising Research (January/February): 37-47. 
 
Danziger, Pamela N.  2004.  Why People Buy Things They Don’t Need: 






“Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject.”  2008.  Bureau of Labor Statistics.   
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost (accessed September 28, 2008). 
 
Davidson, Jim.  Telephone interview.  May 31, 2005 (~2:00 to 2:30 p.m.). 
 
Davis. D. S. (Ed.).  2000.  The Consumer Revolution in Urban China.  Berkeley, CA: 
California University Press. 
 
Dawson, S.  1988.  “Trait Materialism: Improved Measures and an Extension to 
Multiple Domains of Life Satisfaction.”  In AMA Winter Educators Conference 
Proceedings, ed. S. Shapiro and A.H. Walle.  Chicago: American Marketing 
Association. 
 
Dawson, S., and G. Bamossy.  1991.  “If We Are What We Have, What Are We 
When We Don’t Have?”  Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 6:363-384. 
 
Dean, Joel.  1951.  “Cyclical Policy on the Advertising Appropriation.”  Journal of 
Marketing XV, no. 3 (January): 265-273. 
 
“Death in the Gulf of Mexico.”  2008.  New York Times.  August 4, 2008.     
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/opinion/04mon4.html?ref=opinion (accessed 





Deci, E. L.  1971.  “Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation.”  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18:105-115. 
 
Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan.  1985.  Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in 
Human Behavior.  New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan.  1991.  “A Motivational Approach to Self: Integration in 
Personality.”  In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol. 38, Perspectives on 
Motivation, ed. R. Dienstbier.  Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
 
Deci, E. L., R. Koestner, and R. M. Ryan.  1999.  “A Meta-Analytical Review of 
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation.”  
Psychological Bulletin 125:627-668. 
 
De Graaf, John, David Wann, and Thomas H. Naylor.  2002.  Affluenza: The All-
Consuming Epidemic.  San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. 
 
Del Vecchio, Gene.  1998.  Creating Ever-Cool: A Marketer’s Guide to a Kid’s 
Heart.  Gretna, LA: Pelican. 
 
Deleersnyder, Barbara.  2003.  “Marketing in Turbulent Times.”  Ph.D. dissertation, 





Delle Fave, A., and M. Bassi.  2000.  “The Quality of Experience in Adolescents’ 
Daily Life: Developmental Perspectives.”  Genetic, Social, and General Psychology 
Monographs 126:347-367. 
 
Demsetz, Harold.  1968.  “The Technostructure: Forty-Six Years Later.”  Yale Law 
Journal 77, no. 4:802-817.  
 
Demsetz, Harold.  1979.  “Accounting for Advertising as a Barrier to Entry.”  Journal 
of Business 52, no. 3:345-360. 
 
Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940). 
 
Dernbach, John C.  2008.  “Harnessing Individual Behavior to Address Climate 
Change: Options for Congress.”  Virginia Environmental Law Journal 26:107-160. 
 
Dhalla, Nariman K.  1978.  “Assessing the Long-Term Value of Advertising: Media 
Costs Should Be Considered as Capital Investments.”  Harvard Business Review 
(January-February): 87-95. 
 
Di Tella, R., R. MacCulloch, and A. Oswald.  2001.  “Preferences over Inflation and 






Diamond, Jared.  2005.  Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.  New 
York: Viking. 
 
_______.  2008.  “What’s Your Consumption Factor?”  New York Times.  January 2, 
2008.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed January 2, 2008). 
 
Didow, Nicholas M., Jr., and George R. Franke.  1984.  “Measurement Issues in 
Time-Series Research: Reliability and Validity Assessment in Modeling the 
Macroeconomic Effects of Advertising.”  Journal of Marketing Research XXI 
(February): 12-19. 
 
Diekstra, Rene F.W.  1995.  “Depression and Suicidal Behaviors in Adolescence: 
Sociocultural and Time Trends.”  In Psychosocial Disturbances in Young People, ed. 
Michael Rutter.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Diener, Edward.  2000.  “Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a 
Proposal for a National Index.”  American Psychologist 55:34-43. 
 
Diener, Ed, and Robert Biswas-Diener.  2002.  “Will Money Increase Subjective 
Well-Being?  A Literature Review and Guide to Needed Research.”  Social 





Diener, E., and S. Oishi.  2000.  “Money and Happiness: Income and Subjective 
Well-Being Across Nations.  In Subjective Well-Being Across Cultures, ed. E. Diener 
and E. M. Suh.  Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Diener, E., E. Sandvik, L. Seidlitz, and M. Diener.  1993.  “The Relationship Between 
Income and Subjective Well-Being: Relative or Absolute?”  Social Indicators 
Research 28:195-223. 
 
Diener, Ed, and Martin E. P. Seligman.  2004.  “Beyond Money: Toward an Economy 
of Well-Being.”  Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5, no. 1: 1-31. 
 
Diener, Ed, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas, and Heidi L. Smith.  1999.  
“Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress.”  Psychological Bulletin 125, 
no. 2:276-302. 
 
“Discrimination: Disabled People and the Media.”  1991.  Contact 70 (Winter): 45-
48.  http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Barnes/Media.pdf (accessed 
November 30, 2008). 
 
Dixit, A., and V. Norman.  1978.  “Advertising and Welfare.”  Bell Journal of 





Donadio, Stephen.  1992.  The New York Public Library: Book of Twentieth-Century 
American Quotations.  New York: Stonesong Press. 
 
Donahue, T., and L. Henke.  1978.  “Black and White Children: Perceptions of 
Television Commercials.”  Journal of Marketing 42:34-40. 
 
Dooley, David, Ralph Catalano, and Georjeanna Wilson.  1994.  “Depression and 
Unemployment: Panel Findings from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study.”  
American Journal of Community Psychology 22, no. 6:745-765. 
 
Dorfman, Robert, and Peter O. Steiner.  1954.  “Optimal Advertising and Optimal 
Quality.”  American Economic Review 44 (December): 826-836. 
 
Doyle, Peter.  1968.  “Economic Aspects of Advertising: A Survey.”  The Economic 
Journal 78, no. 311 (September): 570-602. 
 
Dregne, H.E., and Nan-Ting Chou.  1992.  “Global Desertification Dimensions and 
Costs.”  In Degradation and Restoration of Arid Lands.  Lubbock: Texas Tech. 
University. 
 
Dunlap, Riley E., George H. Gallup, Jr., and Alec M. Gallup.  1993.  “Of Global 
Concern: Results of the Health of the Planet Survey.”  Environment 35, no. 9, 





Dupont, Pete.  1997.  “E-Zines.”  National Review 49, no. 14:34-36. 
 
Durning, Alan.  1992.  How Much Is Enough?  The Consumer Society and the Future 
of the Earth.  New York: W. W. Norton. 
 
Easterlin, R.  1995.  “Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?”  
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27:35-47. 
 
Easterlin, Richard A.  2003.  “Explaining Happiness.”  PNAS 100, no. 19:11176-
11183. http://www.pnas.org/content/100/19/11176.full.pdf (accessed November 28, 
2007). 
 
Eckard, E. W., Jr.  1988.  “Advertising, Concentration Changes, and Consumer 
Welfare.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 70, no. 2:340-343. 
 
_______.  1991.  “Competition and the Cigarette TV Advertising Ban.”  Economic 
Inquiry 29, no. 1:119-133.   
 
“Economic Costs of Diabetes in the U.S. in 2007.”  2008.  Diabetes Care 31, no. 






Economic Policy Institute.  2004.  “Unemployment Insurance.”  
http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/issueguides_unemployment_index (accessed 
September 28, 2008). 
 
Economist.  2001.  “Pro Logo: Why Brands Are Good for You.”  September 8-14:26-
28. 
 
Economists Advisory Group.  1967.  The Economics of Advertising.  London: 
Advertising Association. 
 
Edwards, Jim.  2004.  “Uncle Sam Ups Ante for Recruiting Effort.”  Adweek.com.  
November 29, 2004.  http://www/adweek.com (accessed November 1, 2008). 
 
Ehrlich, Paul, and Anne Ehrlich.  1996.  Betrayal of Science and Reason: How Anti-
Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our Future.  Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Einstein, Mara.  2003.  Media Diversity: Economics, Ownership, and the FCC.  
Mahway, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rrihdVvEO8MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&s
ig=s4pchCN6ycuJXwLuEJvcu5pMZSo&dq=mara+einstein+media+diversity 





Ekelund, R. and W. P. Gramm.  1969.  “A Reconsideration of Advertising 
Expenditures, Aggregate Demand, and Economic Stabilization.”  Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Business 9:71-77. 
 
Ekelund, Robert B., Jr., George S. Ford, and John D. Jackson.  1999.  “Is Radio 
Advertising a Distinct Local Market?  An Empirical Analysis.”  Review of Industrial 
Organization 14:239-256. 
 
Ekelund, Robert B., Jr., George S. Ford, and John D. Jackson.  2000.  “Are Local TV 
Markets Separate Markets?”  International Journal of the Economics of Business 7, 
no. 1: 79-97. 
 
Elliott, Stuart.  2002.  “Pharmaceutical Makers and Ad Agencies Fight to Preserve 
Campaigns for Prescription Drugs.”  New York Times.  July 12, 2002.  
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 6, 2005). 
 
_______.  2005.  “How Effective Is This Ad, in Real Numbers? Beats Me.”  New 
York Times.  July 20, 2005: C5. 
 
_______.  2007.  “MySpace Mini-Episodes, Courtesy of Honda.”  New York Times.  





Embrey, Joan and Ed Lucaire.  1983. “Number of Ants in the World.”   In Collection 
of Amazing Animal Facts.  
http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2003/AlisonOngvorapong.shtml 
(accessed May 31, 2008). 
 
Encyclopedia Britannica Online.     http://www.britannica.com/eb/question-
616563/38/pc-per-1000-United-States (accessed June 4, 2008). 
 
Environmental Defense Fund.  “Time to Cut Pollution from America’s Autos.”  2007.  
http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=1135 (accessed August 19, 2008).   
 
Environmental News Service.  2005.  “Lab Tests Find 60 Toxic Chemicals in 
Canadians’ Blood.”  November 15, 2005.  http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/nov2005/2005-11-15-05.asp (accessed December 28, 2007). 
 
Erickson, Gary, and Robert Jacobson.  1992.  “Gaining Comparative Advantage 
Through Discretionary Expenditures: The Returns to R&D and Advertising.”  
Management Science 38, no. 9:1264-1279. 
 
Epstein, S.  1990.  “Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory.”  In L.A. Pervin (Ed.), 
Handbook in Personality: Theory and Research.  New York: Guilford Press. 
 





Esty, Daniel C., M.A. Levy, C.H. Kim, A. de Sherbinin, T. Srebotnjak, and V. Mara. 
2008.  2008 Environmental Performance Index. New Haven: Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy. 
 
Etkin, Dagmar.  1999.  “Estimating Cleanup Costs for Oil Spills.”  #168, 1999 
International Oil Spill Conference.  http://www.environmental-
research.com/erc_papers/ERC_paper_1.pdf (accessed September 10, 2008). 
 
Ewen, Stuart.  1976.  Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of 
the Consumer Culture.  New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
Evans, David S., and Richard Schmalensee.  2005.  “The Industrial Organization of 
Markets with Two-Sided Platforms.”  NBER Working Paper No. 11603 (September): 
1-36. 
 
Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy.  “The 
Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-1998.”  Washington D.C.  
September 2001.  
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/economic_costs/e_summary.pdf 





ExploreNorth.  1999.  “Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Disaster.”  
http://explorenorth.com/library/weekly/aa032499.htm (accessed September 28, 2008). 
 
Faber, Peter.  1994.  “Indopco: The Still Unresolved Riddle.”  Tax Lawyer 47 
(Spring): 607-641.   
 
Farhi, Paul.  2003.  “For Broadcast Media, Patriotism Pays; Consultants Tell Radio, 
TV Clients That Protest Coverage Drives off Viewers.”  Washington Post.  March 28, 
2003: C01. 
 
Farnall, O. and K. A. Smith.  1999.  “Reactions to People with Disabilities: Personal  
Contact Versus Viewing of Specific Media Portrayals.”  Journalism and Mass  
Communication Quarterly 76, no. 4:659-672.  
 
Farrar, Lara.  “Without Proof, an Ivory-Billed Boom Goes Bust.”  New York Times.  
January 23, 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/us/23woodpecker.html 
(accessed January 23, 2008). 
 
Farris, P. W., and R. B. Buzzell.  1979.  “Why Advertising and Promotional Costs 





Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.  15 U.S. Code §§ 1331 to 1341.   
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sup_01_15_10_36.html. 
(accessed April 27, 2007).                 
 
Federal Communications Commission.  “Interim Report of the Federal 
Communications Commission Small Business Advisory Committee for FY 1993.”  
April 21, 1994.  http://bulk.resource.org/fcc/pub/Reports/rpts4001.txt (accessed May 
26, 2005). 
 
Federal Trade Commission.  “FTC Releases Report on Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco.”  April 26, 2007.  http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/cigaretterpt.shtm 
(accessed April 21, 2008). 
 
Fell, Jason.  2008.  “Magazine Ad Pages Fall 12.9 Percent in Q3.”   
http://www.foliomag.com/2008/magazine-ad-pages-fall-12-9-percent-during-third-
quarter (accessed November 2, 2008). 
 
Ferguson, J. M.  1967.  “Advertising and Liquor.”  Journal of Business 40:414-434. 
 
Field, A. E., L. Cheung, A. M. Wolf, D. B. Herzog, S. L. Gortmaker, and G. A. 






Financial Times (London).  2001.  “Survey—Creative Business: Viral Marketing 
Campaigns.”  February 13, 2001: 14. 
 
Finkelstein E. A., I. C. Fiebelkorn, and G. Wang.  2003.  “National Medical Spending 
Attributable to Overweight and Obesity: How Much, and Who’s Paying?”  Health 
Affairs Web Exclusive.  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.219v1/DC1 (accessed 
December 16, 2004). 
 
Fisher, Christy.  “Latest Ad Tax Plan Meets Speedy Death.”  Advertising Age.  
August 29, 1994: 41. 
 
Fisher, Richard M.  2002.  “Skeptical About The Skeptical Environmentalist.”  
http://www.csicop.org/si/2002-11/environment.html (accessed April 26, 2008). 
 
Fitzgerald, Nora.  1995.  “Don’t Sound the All-Clear Yet, But So Far Congress Has 
Spared Advertising.”  ADWEEK 36, no. 40 (October 2, 1995):28.  
http://www.adweek.com (accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Flavin, Christopher.  2004.  Preface to State of the World 2004, ed. Linda Starke.  





Flynn, Laurie J.  “Poor Nations Are Littered with Old PCs, Report says.”  New York 
Times.  October 24, 2005.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/24/technology/24junk.html (accessed May 13, 
2008). 
 
Fogg-Meade, Emily.  1901.  “The Place of Advertising in Modern Business.”  
Journal of Political Economy 9, no. 2:218-242. 
 
Fost, D.  1998. The Fun Factor: Marketing Recreation to the Disabled.  American  
Demographics 20, no. 2:54-58.  
 
Fox, Roy F.  1996.  Harvesting Minds: How TV Commercials Control Kids.  
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Fox, Stephen.  1997.  The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising and Its 
Creators.  Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Fraser, Stuart, and David Paton.  2003.  “Does Advertising Increase Labour Supply?  
Time Series Evidence from the UK.”  Applied Economics 35:1357-1368. 
 
Frey, Bruno S., and Alois Stutzer.  2002.  “What Can Economists Learn from 





Friedman, Benjamin M.  2005.  The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth.  New 
York: Knopf. 
 
Friedman, Joel.  “The Decline of Corporate Income Tax Revenues.”  Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities.  October 24, 2003.  http://www.cbpp.org/10-16-
03tax.pdf (accessed July 6, 2007). 
 
Friedman, Thomas L.  2007.  “In the Age of Noah.”  New York Times.  December 23, 
2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed December 23, 2007). 
 
Fromm, E.  1976.  To Have or to Be?  New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Frost, K. M.  1998.  A Cross-Cultural Study of Major Life Aspirations and 
Psychological Well-Being.  Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Frye, Northrup.  1967.  The Modern Century.  Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
 
Furchgott, Roy.  1993.  “Congressional Subcommittee Kayos Proposal to End Ad Tax 
Deductions.”  ADWEEK.  September 20, 1993.  http://www.adweek.com (accessed 





Gabszewicz, Jean J., Didier Laussel, and Nathalie Sonnac.  2004.  “Programming and 
Advertising Competition in the Broadcasting Industry.”  Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy 13, no. 4 (Winter): 657-669. 
 
Galbraith, John Kenneth.  1998.  The Affluent Society.  Boston, MA: Houghton-
Mifflin.  (Originally published in 1958). 
 
_______.  1967.  The New Industrial State.  Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin. 
 
Gallet, Craig A., and Patricia J. Euzent.  1998.  “The Effects of Demand Fluctuations 
and Advertising on Competition in the U.S. Brewing Industry.”  Mimeo. 
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/wp/content/archives/9806_p.pdf (accessed March 19, 2006). 
 
Gallup.  2006a.  “American Workers Would Be Happier in Same Job With Higher 
Pay.”  Gallup poll conducted July 24-27, 2006.  
http://www.gallup.com/video/24025/Price-Happiness.aspx (accessed April 16, 2008). 
 
_______.  2006b.  “Family Time Eclipses TV as Favorite Way to Spend an Evening.”  
March 10, 2006.  http://www.gallup.com/poll/21856/Family-Time-Eclipses-Favorite-
Way-Spend-Evening.aspx (accessed July 19, 2008). 
 
_______.  2006c.  “Price of Happiness.”  Gallup poll released August 7, 2006. 





Gal-Or, Esther, and Anthony Dukes.  2003.  “Minimum Differentiation in 
Commercial Media Markets.”  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 12, 
no. 3 (Fall): 291-325. 
 
Ganahl, Dennis J., and Mark Arbuckle.  2001.  “The Exclusion of Persons with 
Physical Disabilities from Prime Time Television Advertising: A Two-Year 
Quantitative Analysis.”  Disability Studies Quarterly 21, no. 2: 34-42.   
http://www.dsq-sds-archives.org/_issues_pdf/dsq_2001_Spring.pdf (accessed July 18, 
2008). 
 
Gardner, Gary, and Erik Assadourian.  2004.  “Rethinking the Good Life.”  In State of 
the World 2004, ed. Linda Starke.  New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Gardner, Gary, Erik Assadourian, and Radhika Sarin.  2004.  “The State of 
Consumption Today.”  In State of the World 2004, ed. Linda Starke.  New York: 
W.W. Norton. 
 
Gardner, Marilyn.  2002.  “What’s Happening to the American Home?”  Christian 
Science Monitor.  July 24, 2002.  http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0724/p15s02-





Gasmi, F., J. J. Laffont, and Q. Vuong.  1992.  “Econometric Analysis of Collusive 
Behavior in a Soft-Drink Market.”  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 
1: 277-311. 
 
Geier, Philip.  1987.  “Taxes and Free Speech.”  Advertising Age.  September 28, 
1987: 20. 
 
Georgia, Paul, Indur Goklany, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute Staff.  
“Benchmarks: The Global Trends That Are Shaping Our World.”  In Earth Report 
2000, ed. Ronald Bailey.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Gibbons, F.X.  1990.  “Self-Attention and Behavior: A Review and Theoretical 
Update.”  In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 23, ed. M. P. Sanna.  San 
Diego: Academic Press. 
 
Gies, Erica.  2008.  “Rising Sales of Bottled Water Trigger Strong Reaction from 
U.S. Conservationists.”  International Herald Tribune.  March 19, 2008. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/19/technology/rbogbottle.php (accessed October 
7, 2008). 
 
Gilbert, Daniel.  2007.  “Compassionate Commercialism.”  New York Times.  March 





Godshaw, Gerald, and Russell Pancoast.  1987.  The Economic Impact of Florida’s 
Sales Tax on Advertising.  Philadelphia: Wharton Econometrics. 
 
Goldberg, Marvin E., and Gerald J. Gorn.  1978.  “Some Unintended Consequences 
of TV Advertising to Children.”  The Journal of Consumer Research 5, no. 1. (June): 
22-29. 
 
Gomes, L. J.  1986.  “The Competitive and Anticompetitive Theories of Advertising: 
An Empirical Analysis.”  Applied Economics 18:599-613. 
 
Gongloff, M.  2004.  “Are We too Deep in Debt?”  CNNMoney.com.  April 7, 2004. 
http://money.cnn.com (accessed May 11, 2004). 
 
Goodman, Peter S.  2008.  “Fear of Deflation Lurks as Global Demand Drops.”  New 
York Times.  November 1, 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed November 1, 
2008). 
 
Gordon, Richard L., and Steven W. Colford.  1988.  “Industry Tax War; Ad Groups 
Ready to Fight Congress.”  Advertising Age.  November 21, 1988: 58. 
 
Gorn, G., and M. Goldberg.  1982.  “Behavioral Evidence of the Effects of Televised 





Graham, Carol.  2005.  “The Economics of Happiness: Insights on Globalization from 
a Novel Approach.”  World Economics 6, no. 3:41-55. 
 
Graham, Carol, and Soumya Chattopadhyay.  2008.  “Gross National Happiness and 
the Economy.”  Globalist.  October 24, 2008.  
http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=7312 (accessed November 7, 
2008). 
 
Graham, Carol, and Andrew Felton.  2005.  “Does Inequality Matter to Individual 
Welfare?  An Initial Exploration Based on Happiness Surveys from Latin America.”  
Brookings Institution and Johns Hopkins University Center on Social and Economic 
Dynamics.  CSED Working Paper No. 38 (January). 
 
Graham, Carol, and Stefano Pettinato.  2002a.  Happiness and Hardship: Opportunity 
and Insecurity in New Market Economies.  Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
 
_______.  2002b.  “Frustrated Achievers: Winners, Losers, and Subjective Well 
Being in New Market Economies.”  Journal of Development Studies 38: 100-140. 
 
Gravelle, Jane G., and Jack Taylor.  1991.  “Taxing Intangibles: An Economic 




Notes Today (October 24, 1991): 219-31.  Available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT 
File.  (Quoted in Bokinsky, 1994.) 
 
Greenberg, B. S., and J. E. Brand.  1993.  “Television News and Advertising in 
Schools: The ‘Channel One’ Controversy.”  Journal of Communication 43, no. 1:143-
151. 
 
Greenberg, J. R., and S. A. Mitchell.  1983.  Object Relations in Psychoanalytic 
Theory.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Groesz, Lisa M., Michael P. Levine, and Sarah K. Murnen.  2002.  “The Effect of 
Experimental Presentation of Thin Media Images on Body Satisfaction: A Meta-
Analytic Review.  International Journal of Eating Disorders 31, no. 1: 1-16. 
 
Guru, Manjula V., and James E. Horne.  2000.  “The Ogallala Aquifer.”  Poteau, OK: 
Kerr Center.  http://www.kerrcenter.com/publications/ogallala_aquifer.pdf (accessed 
May 18, 2008). 
 
Hagnell, O., Lanke, J., Rorsman, B., & Ojesjo, L. (1982).  “Are We Entering an Age 
of Melancholy?  Depressive Illnesses in a Prospective Epidemiological Study over 25 





Halford, Jason C. G., Jane Gillespie, Victoria Brown, Eleanor E. Pontin, Terence M. 
Dovey.  2004.  “Effect of Television Advertisements for Foods on Food Consumption 
in Children.”  Appetite 42:221-225. 
 
Halliwell, E. and H. Dittmar.  2004.  “Does Size Matter?  The Impact of Model’s 
Body Size on Women’s Body-Focused Anxiety and Advertising Effectiveness.”  
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 23, no. 1 (February): 104-122. 
 
Hamada, Fumimasa.  1999.  “Unemployment, Advertisement and Consumer 
Demand: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.”  Economic & Financial Modeling 
6, no. 2:53-70. 
 
Hardin, Brent, Marie Hardin, Susan Lynn, and Kristi Walsdorf.  2001.  “Missing in 
Action?  Images of Disability in Sports Illustrated for Kids.”  Disability Studies 
Quarterly 21, no. 2:1-11.  http://www.dsq-sds-
archives.org/_articles_html/2001/Spring/dsq_2001_Spring_04.asp (accessed 
November 30, 2008). 
 
Harris Poll.  2005.  “Environment.”  PollingReport.com. 





Harrison, Crayton.  2008.  “Yahoo Reports Profit Drop, Plans to Cut 10% of Jobs.” 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aZuey3Ga
XYlk (accessed December 14, 2008). 
 
Harsch, Bradley A.  1999.  “Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past 
Consumer Culture.”  Ecology Law Quarterly, 26: 543-553.  
 
Hartston, H. J., and L. M. Koran.  2002.  “Impulsive Behavior in a Consumer 
Culture.”  International Journal of Psychiatry in Clinical Practice 6:65-68. 
 
Harvard Medical School.  1994. “Update on Mood Disorders: Part I.”  Harvard 
Mental Health Letter 11: 1-4. 
 
Harwood Group.  1995.  “Yearning for Balance: Views on Consumption, Materialism 
& the Environment.” http://www.iisd.ca/consume/harwood.html (accessed December 
16, 2008).     
 
Hawkins, Kevin, Sara Wang, and Marcia Rupnow.  2008.  “Direct Cost Burden 
Among Insured U.S. Employees with Migraine.”  Medscape Today. 





Hayden, Thomas.  “Could the Grass Be Greener?”  US News and World Report.  May 
8, 2005. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/050516/16lawn.htm 
(accessed May 20, 2008). 
 
Hazan, C. and P. Shaver.  1987.  “Romantic Love Conceptualized as an Attachment 
Process.”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52:511-524. 
 
Hebert, H. Josef.  2008.  “Report: Nuclear Wasted Disposal Will Cost US $96B.”  
Associated Press.  
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5ikxSLwXCpx4eChE4KVDfqlt3qD3wD92CCF
Q80 
(accessed August 31, 2008). 
 
Helliwell, John F.  2003.  “How’s Life?  Combining Individual and National 
Variables to Explain Subjective Well-Being.  Economic Modeling 20, no. 2: 331-360. 
 
Hemphill, Thomas A.  1997.  “Confronting Corporate Welfare.”  Business Horizons. 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1038/is_n6_v40/ai_20149723/print 
(accessed May 2, 2005). 
 
Hendee, John C.  1971.  “Sociology and Applied Leisure Research.”  The Pacific 





Hendry, David F.  1992.  “An Econometric Analysis of TV Advertising Expenditure 
in the United Kingdom.”  Journal of Policy Modeling 14, no. 3:281-311. 
 
Herr, Norman.  2008.  “Television Statistics.”  The Sourcebook for Teaching Science: 
Television & Health.  http://www.csun.edu/science/health/docs/tv&health.html 
(accessed July 19, 2008). 
 
Herrick, Devon M.  “Patient Power: Access to Drugs: Brief Analysis, No. 500.”  
National Center for Policy Analysis.  February 10, 2005. 
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba500/ (accessed December 16, 2008). 
 
Hiemstra, R., M. Goodman, M. A. Middlemiss, R. Vosco, and N. Ziegler.  1983.  
“How Older Persons Are Portrayed in Television Advertising: Implications for 
Educators.”  Educational Gerentology 9:111-122. 
 
Hillig, Terry.  “Residents Protest Plans for Wal-Mart Supercenter.”  St. Louis Post-
Dispatch.  March 26, 2007: C1. 
 
Hilke, J. C., and P. B.  Nelson.  1984.  “Noisy Advertising and the Predation Rule in 






Hirschey, Mark.  1981.  “The Effect of Advertising on Industrial Mobility, 1947-72.”  
Journal of Business 54, no. 2:329-339. 
 
Hirschey, Mark.  1982.  “Intangible Capital Aspects of Advertising and R&D 
Expenditures.”  Journal of Industrial Economics 34:375-390. 
 
Hirschey, Mark and Jerry J. Weygandt.  1985.  “Amortization Policy for Advertising 
and Research and Development Expenditures.”  Journal of Accounting Research 23, 
no. 1: 326-335.   
 
Hirschman, E. C.  1992.  “The Consciousness of Addiction: Toward a General 
Theory of Compulsive Consumption.”  Journal of Consumer Research 19:155-179. 
 
Hoch, Stephen J., and Young-Won Ha.  1986.  “Consumer Learning: Advertising and 
the Ambiguity of Product Experience.”  Journal of Consumer Research 13 
(September): 221-233. 
 
Hood, D.  2000.  “Is Advertisng to Kids Wrong?  Marketers Respond.”  Kidscreen.  
(November): 15-18. 
 
Hoofnagle, William S.  1965.  “Experimental Designs in Measuring the Effectiveness 





Hoppe, Richard, and Craig Creslog.  2002.  “Online Quiz Measures Human 
‘Footprint’ on Earth’s Resources.”  Redefining Progress.  Press Release.  April 10, 
2002.     
http://www.rprogress.org/press/releases/020410_efoot.htm (accessed April 25, 2008). 
 
Horstmann, Ignatius J., and Glenn M. McDonald.  1994.  “When Is Advertising a 
Signal of Quality?”  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 3:561-584. 
 
House, J. S., K. R. Landis, and D. Umberson.  1988.  “Social Relationships and 
Health.  Science 241 (July): 540-545. 
 
“How Many Species Are There?”  World Resources Institute. 
http://archive.wri.org/item_detail.cfm?id=535&section=ecosystems&page=pubs_cont
ent_text&z=? (accessed May 24, 2008). 
 
Hoyer, Wayne D., and Steven P. Brown.  1990.  “Effects of Brand Awareness on 
Choice for a Common, Repeat-Purchase Product.”  Journal of Consumer Research 
17, September: 141-148. 
 
Hu, Henry X., Leona E. Markson, Richard B. Lipton, Walter F. Stewart, and Marc L. 
Berger.  1999.  “Burden of Migraine in the United States: Disability and Economic 
Costs.”  Archives of Internal Medicine 159:813-818.  http://www.archinternmed.com  





Huntemann, Nina.  1999.  “Corporate Interference: The Commercialization and 
Concentration of Radio Post the 1996 Telecommunications Act.”  Journal of 
Communication Inquiry 23, no. 4:390-407. 
http://jci.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/23/4/390 (accessed March 23, 2007). 
 
Huntley, Helen.  “Personal Savings at Lowest Level Since ‘30s.”  St. Petersburg 
Times (Florida).  February 2, 2007: 1A. 
 
Hymel, Mona L.  2000.  “Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy.”  
Virginia Tax Review 20 (Fall): 347-415. 
 
“Hypercholesterolemia.”  2008.  University of Maryland Medical Center. 
http://www.umm.edu/altmed/articles/hypercholesterolemia-000084.htm (accessed 
June 14, 2008). 
 
Iizuka. Toshiaki, and Ginger Zhe Jin.  2002.  “The Effects of Direct to Consumer 
Advertising in the Prescription Drug Market.”  Mimeo. 
  
Iizuka, Toshiaki.  2004.  “What Explains the Use of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 





Immerwahr, John.  1999.  “Waiting for a Signal: Public Attitudes Toward Global 
Warming, the Environment and Geophysical Research.”  Public Agenda (April 15, 
1999): 1-30. 
 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992). 
 
Inglehart, R.  1971.  “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in 
Post-Industrial Societies.”  American Political Science Review 65:991-1017. 
 
Inglehart, R.  1977.  The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles 
Among Western Publics.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Inglehart, R., and P. R. Abramson.  1994.  “Economic Security and Value Change.”  
American Political Science Review 88:336-354. 
 
Internal Revenue Code.  Section 1.162-1 (a).  Electronic Code of Federal Regulations.  
Title 26: Internal Revenue.  http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=ace14417cb8c8122a7ab022d9f965228&rgn=div8&view=text&node
=26:2.0.1.1.1.0.8.250&idno=26 (accessed May 16, 2005). 
 
Internal Revenue Code.  Section 197.  n.d.  “Amortization of Goodwill and Certain 





tain_other_intangibles (accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Internal Revenue Code.  Section 263A.  1988.  “Capitalization and inclusion in 
inventory costs of certain expenses.”  Tax Almanac.  
http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.php/Sec._263A._Capitalization_and_inclusion_in_i
nventory_costs_of_certain_expenses (accessed September 27, 2007). 
 
Internal Revenue Service.  1992.  Revenue Ruling 92-80.  1992-2 C.B. 57, 1992-39 
I.R.B. 7.  http://www.taxlinks.com/rulings/findinglist/revrulmaster.htm (accessed July 
15, 2008). 
 
_______.  2006.  U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return.  Form 1120.  
http://www.irs.gov (accessed July 7, 2007). 
 
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943). 
 
Jana, Reena.  2001.  “Advertising Goes Guerrilla.”  BusinessWeek.com. 
http://images.businessweek.com/ss/06/08/guerrilla_ads/index_01.htm?campaign_id=
di3 (accessed August 23, 2007). 
 
Ippolito, P. M., and A. D. Mathios.  1990.  “Information, Advertising and Health 





Jacobs, Lawrence R.  2001.  “Manipulattors and Manipulation: Public Opinion in a 
Representative Democracy.”  Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 26, no. 6.  
(December): 1361-1374. 
 
Jacobson, Robert, and Franco M. Nicosia.  1981.  “Advertising and Public Policy: 
The Macroeconomic Effects of Advertising.”  Journal of Marketing Research XIII, 
no. 1, (February): 29-38. 
 
Johns, Timothy E.  1984.  “Note, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed 
Intangible Assets.”  Southern California Law Review 57:767-768. 
 
Johnson, Bradley.  2006.  “It’s Been a Good 5 years—Unless You’re in Media.”  
Advertising Age.  December 11, 2006: 16. 
 
Johnston, David Cay.  “Tax Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone.”  New York 
Times.  July 13, 2007.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/business/13tax.html?th=&adxnnl=1&emc=th&p
agewanted=print&adxnnlx=1184428875-d76F29wTVWXnSUDrCMoiPA (accessed 
July 13, 2007). 
 
Joossens, Luk.  2000.  “The Effectiveness of Banning Advertising for Tobacco 




http://www.ash.org.uk/html/advspo/pdfs/experience.pdf (accessed November 30, 
2008). 
 
Jowit, Juliette, and Patrick Wintour.  “Cost of Tackling Global Climate Change Has 
Doubled, Warns Stern.”  Guardian.  June 26, 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jun/26/climatechange.scienceofclimate
change (accessed September 13, 2008). 
 
Jung, Chulho, and Barry Seldon.  1995.  “The Macroeconomic Relationship Between 
Advertising and Consumption.”  Southern Economic Journal 61, no. 3 (January): 
577-587. 
 
Juster, F.T., 1985.  “Preferences for work and leisure.”  In Time, Goods, and Well-
Being, ed. F.T. Juster and F.P. Stafford.  Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social 
Research. 
 
Kacen, J. J., and J. A. Lee.  2002.  “The Influence of Culture on Consumer Impulsive 
Buying Behavior.”  Journal of Consumer Psychology 12, no. 2:163-176. 
 
Kadiyali, Vrinda.  1996.  “Entry, Its Deterrence, and Its Accommodation: A Study of 
the U.S. Photographic Film Industry.”  Rand Journal of Economics 27, no. 3: 452-





Kahn, Joseph, and Jim Yardley.  2007.  “As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly 
Extremes.”  New York Times.  August 25, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed 
August 25, 2007). 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler.  1991.  “Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.”  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5, no. 1:193-206. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Robert Sugden.  2005.  “Experienced Utility as a Standard of 
Policy Evaluation.”  Environmental & Resource Economics 32:161-181. 
 
Kaiser Family Foundation.  2004.  “The Role of Media in Childhood Obesity.” 
www.kff.org (accessed January 13, 2005). 
 
Kaldor, Nicholas.  1950-1951.  “The Economic Aspects of Advertising.”  Review of 
Economic Studies 18, no. 1:1-27. 
 
Kamber, T.  2002.  “The Brand Manager's Dilemma: Understanding How Advertising 
Expenditures Affect Sales Growth During a Recession.”  Journal of Brand 





Kanner, Allen D., and Mary E. Gomes.  1995. “The All-Consuming Self.”  In 
Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth; Healing the Mind, ed. Theodore Roszak, Mary 
E. Gomes, and Allen D. Kanner.  Berkeley, CA: Sierra Club Books. 
 
Kanner, Allen D., and Renee G. Soule.  2004.  In Psychology and Consumer Culture: 
The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. Tim Kasser and Allen D. 
Kanner.  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Kapteyn, A., and T. J. Wansbeek.  1982.  “Empirical Evidence on Preference 
Formation.”  Journal of Economic Psychology 2:137-154. 
 
Kane, Tim, and Rea Hederman.  2004.  “Past.  Present!  Future?  Economic Growth 
in America.”  Heritage Foundation.  WebMemo #601. 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Economy/wm601.cfm (accessed October 4, 2008). 
 
Karno, M., R. L.  Hough, M. A. Burnam, J. I. Escobar, D. M. Timbers, F. Santana, 
and J. H. Boyd.  1987.   “Lifetime Prevalence of Specific psychiatric Disorders 
among Mexican Americans and Non-Hispanic Whites in Los Angeles.”  Archives of 
General Psychiatry 44: 695-701. 
 
Kasser, Tim.  1994.  “Further Dismantling the American Dream: Differential Well-
Being Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals.”  Ph.D. dissertation, University of 





_______.  2002.  The High Price of Materialism.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Kasser, T., and A. C. Ahuvia.  2002.  “Materialistic Values and Well-Being in 
Business Students.”  European Journal of Social Psychology 32:137-146. 
 
Kasser, Tim, and Allen D. Kanner.  2004.  “Where Is the Psychology of Consumer 
Culture?”  In Psychology and Consumer Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a 
Materialistic World, ed. Tim Kasser and Allen D. Kanner.  Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
 
Kasser, T., and R. M. Ryan.  1993.  “A Dark Side of the American Dream: Correlates 
of Financial Success as a Central Life Aspiration.”  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 65:410-422. 
 
_______.  1996.  “Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals.”  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22:280-
287. 
 
_______.  2001.  “Be Careful What You Wish for: Optimal Functioning and the 
Relative Attainment of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals.”  In Life Goals and Well-Being: 
Towards a Positive Psychology of Human Striving, ed. P. Schmuck and K. M. 





Kasser, Tim, Richard M. Ryan, Charles E. Couchman, and Kennon M. Sheldon.  
2004.  “Materialistic Values: Their Causes and Consequences.”  In Psychology and 
Consumer Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. Tim 
Kasser and Allen D. Kanner.  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Kasser, T., R. M. Ryan, M. Zax, and A. J. Sameroff.  1995.  “The Relations of 
Maternal and Social Environments to Late Adolescents’ Materialistic and Prosocial 
Values.”  Developmental Psychology 31:907-914. 
 
Kasser, T., and K. M. Sheldon.  2000.  “Of Wealth and Death: Materialism, Mortality 
Salience, and Consumption Behavior.”  Psychological Science 11:352-355. 
 
Katz, Michael L. and Harvey S. Rosen.  1998.  Microeconomics, 3rd ed.  Boston: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
 
Kelley, David.  1994.  The Art of Reasoning, 2nd ed.  New York: Norton. 
 
Keng, K.A., K. Jung, T. S. Jivan, and J. Wirtz.  2000.  “The Influence of Materialistic 
Inclination on Values, Life Satisfaction and Aspirations: An Empirical Analysis.”  





Kennedy, John E.  “Reason Why Advertising.”  c. 1910. 
http://www.longlostmarketingsecrets.com/Reason_Why_Advertising.pdf (accessed 
May 9, 2007). 
 
Kessides, I. N.  1986.  “Advertising, Sunk Costs, and Barriers to Entry.”  Review of 
Economics and Statistics 68:84-95. 
 
Kessler, Ronald C.  1997.  “The Effects of Stressful Life Events on Depression.”  
Annual Review of Psychology 48:191-214. 
 
Kessler, R. C., K. A. McGonagle, S. Zhao, C. B. Nelson, M. Hughes, S. Eshleman, H. 
U. Wittchen, and K. S. Kendler.  1994.  “Lifetime and 12-Month Prevalence of DSM-
III-R Psychiatric Disorders in the United States: Results from the National 
Comorbidity Survey.  Archives of General Psychiatry 51:8-19. 
 
Khanna, S., and T. Kasser.  2001.  Materialism, Objectification, and Alienation from 
a Cross-Cultural Perspective.  (Cited in Kasser 2002.) 
 
Kilbourne, Jean.  2004.  “The More You Subtract, the More You Add.”  In 
Psychology and Consumer Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic 






Kim, Y., T. Kasser, and H. Lee.  2003.  “Self-Concept, Aspirations, and Well-Being 
in South Korea and the United States.”  Journal of Social Psychology 143: 277-290. 
 
Kimmel, Stefan, Jochen Kuhn, Wolfgang Harst, and Hermann Stever.  2007.  
“Electromagnetic Radiation: Influences on Honeybees (Apis mellifera).”  
http://agvi.uni-landau.de/material_download/preprint_IAAS_2007.pdf (accessed 
April 16, 2007). 
 
Kjos, T.  2002.  “Marketers Compete Fiercely for Spending on Kids.”  Arizona Daily 
Star.  April 15, 2002: 1. 
 
Klein, Stefan.  2006.  The Science of Happiness: How Our Brains Make Us Happy—
and What We Can Do to Get Happier.  New York: Marlowe. 
 
Kniesner, Thomas J., W. Kip Viscusi, Christopher Woock, and James P. Ziliak.  
“Pinning Down the Value of Statistical Live.”  IZA Discussion Paper No. 3107.  
October 2007. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1029912 (accessed 
May 27, 2008). 
 
Knickerbocker, Brad.  2007.  “China Now World’s Biggest Greenhouse Gas 
Emitter.”  Christian Science Monitor.  June 28, 2007. 





Kogan, Richard, and Aviva Aron-Dine.  2005.  “Another Round of Economic 
Stimulus?  Hurricane Reconstruction and Relief is the Right Medicine.”  Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities.  September 20, 2005.  http://www.cbpp.org/9-20-
05bud.htm (accessed May 27, 2007). 
 
Komanoff, Charles, and Howard Shaw.  2000.  “Drowning in Noise: Noise Costs of 
Jet Skis in America.”  Noise Pollution Clearinghouse.  
http://www.nonoise.org/library/drowning/drowning.htm (accessed September 14, 
2008). 
 
Kottler, Jeffrey, Marilyn Montgomery, and David Shepard.  2004.  “Acquisitive 
Desire: Assessment and Treatment.”  In Psychology and Consumer Culture: The 
Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. Tim Kasser and Allen D. 
Kanner.  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Kposowa, A.  2001.  “Unemployment and Suicide: A Cohort Analysis of Social 
Factors Predicting Suicide in the US National Longitudinal Mortality Study.”  
Psychological Medicine 31:127-138. 
 
Krishnamurthi, L., and S. P. Raj.  1985.  “The Effect of Advertising on Consumer 





Krugman, Paul.  2008.  “When Consumers Capitulate.”  New York Times.  October 
31, 2008. 
 
Kubey, R., and M. Csikszentmihalyi.  1990.  Television and the Quality of Life.  
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Kuenne.  Robert E.  2000.  “On Methodologies in Modern Microeconomics.” In 
Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions, ed. 
Robert Kuenne.  Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Kunkel, D.  2001.  “Children and Television Advertising.  In Handbook of Children 
and the Media, ed. D. Singer and J. Singer.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Kunkel, Dale, Brian L. Wilcox, Joanne Cantor, Edward Palmer, Susan Linn, and 
Peter Dowrick.  2004.  “Report of the APA Task Force on Advertising and Children.”     
http://www.apa.org/releases/childrenads.pdf (accessed July 18, 2008). 
 
Kwoka, Jr., J. E.  1993.  “The Sales and Competitive Effects of Styling and 
Advertising Practices in the U.S. Auto Industry.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 
75:649-656. 
 
Lacey, Marc.  2008.  “Across Globe, Empty Bellies Bring Rising Anger.”  New York 





anted=all (accessed May 8, 2008). 
 
Lambin, Jean Jacques.  1976.  Advertising, Competition and Market Conduct in 
Oligopoly over Time: An Econometric Investigation in Western European Countries.  
Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. 
 
Lane, Robert E.  1993.  “Does Money Buy Happiness?”  Public Interest. 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0377/is_n113/ai_14550832 (accessed 
November 28, 2008). 
 
_______.  2000.  The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies.  New Haven, CT: 
University Press. 
 
Lande, Robert.  “Beware Buyer Power.”  Legal Times 30.  July 12, 2004. 
http://icps.ftc.go.kr/data/master/2004/10/000385/000385_01.doc (accessed July 14, 
2004). 
 
Landes, E. M., and A. M. Rosenfeld.  1994.  “The Durability of Advertising 
Revisited.”  Journal of Industrial Economics 42:263-274. 
 
LaPoint, Velma D., and Priscilla J. Hambrick-Dixon.  2004.  “Commercialism’s 




and Consumer Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. 
Tim Kasser and Allen D. Kanner.  Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
 
Larson, Mary Strom.  2002.  “Race and Interracial Relationships in Children’s 
Television Commercials.”  Howard Journal of Communications 13:223-235. 
 
Lasch, Christopher.  1979.  The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of 
Diminishing Expectations.  New York: Norton. 
 
Lavelle, Marianne.  2008.  “Arctic Drilling Wouldn’t Cool High Oil Prices.”  U.S. 
News and World Report.  May 23, 2008. 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/23/arctic-drilling-wouldnt-
cool-high-oil-prices.html (accessed August 18, 2008). 
 
Lawrence Journal World and News. 2003.  “Aquifer’s Depletion Brings Warning.”  
February 7, 2003.  
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2003/feb/07/aquifers_depletion_brings/ 
(accessed May 25, 2008). 
 
Lawton, J. H., D. E. Bignell, B. Bolton, G. F. Bloemers, P. Eggleston, P. M. 
Hammond, M. Hodda, R. D. Holt, T. B. Larsen, N. A. Mawdsley, N. E. Stork, D. S. 




Effects of Habitat Modification in Tropical Forest.”  Nature 391, January 1, 1998.  
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v391/n6662/full/391072a0.html (accessed 
April 26, 2008). 
 
Layard, Richard.  2005.  Happiness: Lessons from a New Science.  New York: 
Penguin. 
 
Lean, Geoffrey and Harriet Shawcross.  “Are Cell Phones Wiping out Our Bees?”  
Independent.  April 15, 2007. 
http://news.independent.co.uk/environment/wildlife/article2449968.ece (accessed 
April 19, 2007). 
 
Leeflang, Peter S. H., and Jan C. Reuijl.  1985.  “Advertising and Industry Sales: An 
Empirical Study of the West German Cigarette Market.”  Journal of Marketing 49 
(Fall): 92-98. 
 
Leffler, Keith B.  1981.  “Persuasion or Information?  The Economics of Prescription 
Drug Advertising.”  Journal of Law and Economics 24, no. 1:45-74. 
 








si=7579&docNo=2 (accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Leone, R. P.  1995.  “Generalizing What Is Known About Temporal Aggregation and 
Advertising Carryover.”  Marketing Science 14:141-150. 
 
Lepper, M. R., and D. Greene.  1975.  “Turning Play into Work: Effects of Adult 
Surveillance and Extrinsic Rewards on Children’s Intrinsic Motivation.”  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 31:479-486. 
 
Lerner, Abba P.  1972.  “The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty.”  
American Economic Review 62, no. ½:258-266. 
 
Levin, Diane E., and Susan Linn.  2004.  “The Commercialization of Childhood: 
Understanding the Problem and Finding Solutions.”  In Psychology and Consumer 
Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. Tim Kasser and 
Allen D. Kanner.  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Levin, Gary.  1993.  “Ads Show Power to Help Sales; But Ability to Boost Market 





Lewis, Sinclair.  1943.  Quoted in Stephen Donadio. 1992.  The New York Public 
Library: Book of Twentieth-Century American Quotations.  New York: Stonesong 
Press, p. 70. 
 
Li-Vollmer, Meredith.  2002.  “Race Representation in Child-Targeted Television 
Commercials.”  Mass Communication & Society 5, no. 2:207-228. 
 
Liebert, R. M.  1986.  “Effects of Television on Children and Adolescents.”  
Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics 7:43-48. 
 
Lin, Carolyn A.  2001.  “Cultural Values Reflected in Chinese and American 
Television Advertising.”  Journal of Advertising XXX, no. 4:83-94. 
 
“LIN TV Corp. Announces Third Quarter 2008 Results: Operating Income up 39%; 
Net Revenues up 5%.”  2008.  MarketWatch: Weekend Edition. 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/LIN-TV-Corp-Announces-
Third/story.aspx?guid=%7B84A3DBE4-C85D-403B-BFA9-3B1E7E31639C%7D 
(accessed November 2, 2008). 
 
Linder, Staffan.  1970.  The Harried Leisure Class.  New York: Columbia. 
 
Lipowicz, Alice.  “Ad Agencies Lobbying to Save Tax Deduction: Opponents 





Lobstein, Tim.  2003.  “The Regulation of Advertising on Children’s Television.”  
International Journal of Obesity 27.  http://www.nature.com/ijo (accessed May 23, 
2005). 
 
Lodish, Leonard M., Magid M. Abraham, Jeanne Livelsberger, Beth Lubetkin, Bruce 
Richardson, and Mary Ellen Stevens.  1995.  “A Summary of Fifty-Five In-Market 
Experimental Estimates of the Long-Term Effect of TV Advertising.”  Marketing 
Science 14, no. 3 (Summer): G133-G140.  
 
Lomborg, Bjorn.  2001.  The Skeptical Environmentalist.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Long, Colleen.  2008.  “US Water Pipelines Are Breaking.”  April 8, 2008. 
http://www.wichita.gov/NR/rdonlyres/20071326-F214-4DC2-A027-
2662A5DAB912/0/Nationsagingwaterinfrastructure.pdf (accessed October 7, 2008). 
 
Longley, Robert.  “Adults, Older People and Children: Latest Estimates.”  
About.com.: US Government Info. 
http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/latestpopcounts.htm (accessed 





Love, Tim.  “In Times of Challenge, Creativity to the Rescue.”  Advertising Age.  
May 6, 2002: 30. 
 
Lovins, Amory.  2003.  Small Is Profitable.  Snowmass, CO: Rocky Mountain 
Institute. 
 
Lowery, David.  1998.  “Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure.”  Journal 
of Public Administration, Research and Theory: J-PART 8, no. 2:137-172. 
 
Lynk, William J.  1981.  “Information, Advertising, and the Structure of the Market.”  
Journal of Business 54, no. 2:271-303. 
 
Mander, Jerry.  1991.  In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology and 
the Survival of the Indian Nations.  San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. 
 
Mankiw, N. Gregory.  2004.  Principles of Macroeconomics.  Third Edition.  Mason, 
OH: Thomson South-Western. 
 
Manly, Lorne.  2005.  “On Television, Brands Go from Props to Stars.”  New York 
Times. October 2, 2005.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed October 3, 2005). 
 
Maples, Larry, and Melanie Earles.  1999.  “When Should Advertising Be 








ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=bth&AN=1837302 (accessed December 17, 2008). 
Markel, Howard.  2002.  “Diagnosis: Supersize.”  New York Times.  March 24, 2002. 
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed November 12, 2007). 
 
Marks, Kathy, and Daniel Howden.  2008.  “The World’s Rubbish Dump: A Garbage 
Tip That Stretches from Hawaii to Japan.”  The Independent.  February 5, 2008. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/the-worlds-rubbish-dump-a-garbage-tip-
that-stretches-from-hawaii-to-japan-778016.html (accessed September 11, 2008). 
 
Marris, Robin.  1968.  “Galbraith, Solow, and the Truth about Corporations.”  Public 
Interest 11 (Spring): 37-46. 
 
Marshall, A.  1919.  Industry and Trade: A Study of Industrial Technique and 
Business Organization; and of Their Influences on the Conditions of Various Classes 
and Nations.  London: MacMillan and Co. 
 
Martin, Douglas.  1998.  “Giving Till It Hurts; With So Many Presents, There’s Angst 
in Toyland.”  New York Times.  December 13, 1998.  http://www.nytimes.com 





Martin, M. C., and P. F. Kennedy.  1993.  “Advertising and Social Comparison: 
Consequences for Female Preadolescents and Adolescents.  Psychology and 
Marketing 10:513-530.   
 
Masih, Rumi.  1999.  “An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Commercial 
Television Advertising.”  Applied Economics 31, no. 2:149-162. 
 
Maslow, A. H.  1954.  Motivation and Personality.  New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Mattingly, Bryan.  1993.  “Note: Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner: Will the IRS Use a 
Nebulous Supreme Court Decision to Capitalize on Unsuspecting Taxpayers?”  81 
Kentucky Law Journal : 801. http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/journalssubmitForm.do (accessed 
December 17, 2008). 
 
Mayer, Martin.  1991.  Whatever Happened to Madison Avenue?  Advertising in the 
‘90s.  Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co. 
 
McAdams, D. P., ad F. B. Bryant.  1987.  “Intimacy Motivation and Subjective 





McConnell, Bill.  2004.  “One Fat Target: How much Longer Can TV Gorge Itself on 
Children's Advertising?”  Broadcasting and Cable.  March 8, 2004: 41-42. 
http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=108&sid=0e8adffa-78c1-4ccc-a7e9-
34960e2b973d%40sessionmgr108 (accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
McDonald, J. M.  1986.  “Entry and Exit on the Competitive Fringe.”  Southern 
Economic Journal 52:640-652. 
 
McDonough, William, and Michael Braungart.  2002.  Cradle to Cradle: Remaking 
the Way We Make Things.  New York: North Point Press. 
 
McHoskey, J. W.  1999.  “Machiavellianism, Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Goals, and 
Social Interest: A Self-Determination Theory Analysis.”  Motivation and Emotion 
23:267-283. 
 
McIntyre, Robert S.  2005.  “They Make It Up.  You Decide.”  American Prospect.  
(April): 16. 
 
McIntyre, Robert S., and T. D. Coo Nguyen.  2004.  “Corporate Income Taxes in the 
Bush Years.”  Citizens for Tax Justice & the Institute on Taxation and Economic 





McKibben, Bill.  2007.   Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the 
Durable Future.  Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications. 
 
McLellan, Faith.  2002.  “Marketing and Advertising: Harmful to Children’s Health.”  
Lancet 360, no. 9338 (September 28): 1001. 
 
McNeal, James U.  1999.  The Kids’ Market: Myths and Realities.  Ithaca, NY: 
Paramount Market Publishing. 
 
Meadows, Donella, Jorgen Randers, and Dennis Meadows.  2004.  Limits to Growth: 
The 30-Year Update.  White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing. 
 
Media Awareness Network.  2008.  “How Marketers Target Kids.”  
http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/parents/marketing/marketers_target_kids.cfm 
(accessed July 17, 2008). 
 
Medscape Medical News.  “Air Pollution Blamed for 3% of Deaths in the United 
States.”  2000.  http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/412202 (accessed October 3, 
2008). 
 
Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan.  2003.  “Price Uncertainty and Consumer Search.”  








Search&item=1&ttl=97&returnArticleService=showArticleInfo (accessed December 
17, 2008). 
 
Metwally, M. M.  1975.  “Advertising and Competitive Behavior of Selected 
Australian Firms.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 57:417-427. 
 
Metwally, M. M.  1976.  “Profitability of Advertising in Australia: A Case Study.”  
Journal of Industrial Economics 24:221-231. 
 
Metwally, M. M., and H. U. Tamaschke.  1981.  “Advertising and the Propensity to 
Consume.”  Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 43, no. 3:273-285. 
 
Meyersohn, Rolf.  1968.  “Television and the Rest of Leisure.”  Public Opinion 
Quarterly 32, no. 1:102-112. 
 
Michel, Norbert J.  2004.  “Anything but Avoidance: Citizens for Tax Justice’s 
Blundering Corporate Tax Report.”  Heritage Foundation.  WebMemo #586.  October 
13, 2004.  http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/wm586.cfm?renderforprint=1 





Michigan Production Alliance.  2004.  “‘Advertising Economy’ Helps Drive $228 
Billion in Michigan.”  December 13, 2004.  http://www.mpami.org/newspage.htm 
(accessed January 17, 2006). 
 
Mick, D. G.  1996.  “Are Studies of Dark Side Variables Confounded by Socially 
Desirable Responding?  The Case of Materialism.”  Journal of Consumer Research 
23:106-119. 
 
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts.  1986.  “Price and Advertising Signals of Product 
Quality.”  Journal of Political Economy 94:796-821. 
 
Miller, P. N., D. W. Miller, E. M. McKibbin, G. L. Pettys.  1999.  “Stereotypes of the 
Elderly in Magazine Advertisements, 1956-1996.”  International Journal of Aging 
and Human Development 49, no. 4:319-337. 
 
Money-Zine.com.  “Federal Reserve Debt Statistics.” 
http://www.money-zine.com/Financial-Planning/Debt-Consolidation/Credit-Card-
Debt-Statistics/ (accessed April 11, 2008). 
 
Moore, Timothy E.  1982.  “Subliminal Advertising: What You See Is What You 





Moore, Stephen, and Julian Simon.  2000.  It’s Getting Better All the Time: 100 
Greatest Trends of the Last 100 Years.  Washington, DC: Cato Institute. 
 
Moore, Stephen, and Dean Stansel.  1995.  “Ending Corporate Welfare as We Know 
It.” Cato Policy Analysis No. 225. May 12, 1995.  
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa225.html (accessed May 3, 2005). 
 
Moorthy, Sridhar, Brian T. Ratchford, Debabrata Talukdar.  1997.  “Consumer 
Information Search Revisited: Theory and Empirical Analysis.”  Journal of 
Consumer Research 23 (March): 263-275. 
 
Morgenson, Gretchen.  2008.  “Given a Shovel, Americans Dig Deeper into Debt.” 
New York Times.  July 20, 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed July 20, 2008). 
 
Morrison, J. M., & Ursprung, A. W.  1987.  “Children’s Attitudes Toward People  
with Disabilities: A Review of the Literature.”  Journal of Rehabilitation 53:45-49.  
 
Morton, Douglas C., Ruth S. DeFries, Yosio E. Shimabukuro, Liana O. Anderson, 
Egidio Arai, Fernando del Bon Espirito-Santo, Ramon Freitas, and Jeff Morisette.  
2006.  “Cropland Expansion Changes Deforestation Dynamics in the Southern 






Moschis, George P., and  G. A. Churchill.  1978.  “Consumer Socialization: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.”  Journal of Marketing Research 15:599-609. 
 
Moschis, George P., and Roy L. Moore.  1982.  “A Longitudinal Study of Television 
Advertising Effects.”  Journal of Consumer Research 9, no. 3:279-286. 
 
Moskin, Robert J. (Ed.).  1973.  The Case for Advertising: Highlights of the Industry 
Presentation to the Federal Trade Commission.  New York: American Association of 
Advertising Agencies. 
 
MSN Money Staff.  2007.  “The Basics: Most Companies Paid No Taxes During the 
Boom.”  http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes/P80242.asp (accessed July 10, 
2007). 
 
MSNBC.  “Countdown with Keith Olbermann.”  April 12, 2007.  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com  (accessed April 12, 2007).   
 
Multinational Monitor 11, no. 2.  1990.  “Prices of Vices.”  June. 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1990/06/lines.html (accessed June 18, 
2006). 
 
Mundstock, George.  1987a.  “Taxation of Business Intangible Capital.”  University 





Mundstock, George.  1987b.  “Tax Reform for Advertising and Similar Intangibles.”  
Summary of “Taxation of Business Intangible Capital.”   University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review.  Mimeo.  
 
Mundstock, George.  E-mail correspondence.  March 16, 2007. 
 
Mundy, Alicia.  1995.  “On the Block.”  ADWEEK 45, no. 6  (February 6, 1995). 
http://www.adweek.com (accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Myers, David G.  2000.  “The Funds, Friends, and Faith of Happy People.”  American 
Psychologist 55, no. 1:56-67. 
 
Myers, D., and K. Roberts.  1991.  Lion Nathan Annual Report.  Auckland, NZ: Lion 
Nathan. 
 
Myers, Norman, and Jennifer Kent.  2004.  The New Consumers: The Influence of 
Affluence on the Environment.  Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Napoli, P. M.  2002.  “Audience Valuation and Minority Media: An Analysis of the 
Determinants of the Value of Radio Audiences.”  Journal of Broadcasting and 





National Center for Health Statistics.  2008.  “Fast Stats A to Z: Overweight.”  
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.htm (accessed November 29, 2008). 
 
National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.  n.d.  “Estimated Economic 
Costs of Alcohol Abuse in the United States, 1992 and 1998.” 
http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/Resources/DatabaseResources/QuickFacts/EconomicData/c
ost8.htm (accessed September 10, 2008). 
 
National Institutes of Health.  (2004a).  “Statistics Related to Overweight and 
Obesity.”     http://win.niddk.nih.gov/statistics/index.htm (accessed December 17, 
2004).  
 
_______.  (2004b).  “U.S. Teens More Overweight Than Youth in 14 Other 
Countries.”  http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/jan2004/nichd-05.htm (accessed December 
17, 2004). 
 
National Institute of Health Care Management.  2002.  “Prescription Drug 
Expenditures in 2001: Another Year of Escalating Costs.”  May 6, 2002. 






NBC Nightly News.  “Americans’ Cholesterol Levels Now Average in the Ideal 
Range.”  December 12, 2007.  http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed December 13, 
2007). 
 
Neff, Jack.  2000.  “New Model: Ads Pay off Longer than First Year.”  Advertising 
Age 71, no. 9 (February 28): 4-5. 
 
Nelson, J.  1996.  “The Invisible Cultural Group: Images of Disability.”  In Images 
That Injure: Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media, ed. P. Lester (119-125). Westport, 
CT: Praeger.  
 
Nelson, Phillip.  1974.  “Advertising as Information.”  Journal of Political Economy 
(July-August): 729-754. 
 
Nelson, Robert H.  1976.  “The Economics of Honest Trade Practices.”  Journal of 
Industrial Economics XXIV, no. 4 (June): 281-293. 
 
Nelson, Robert.  2001.  Economics as Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and 
Beyond.  University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press. 
 
Nerlove, Marc, and Kenneth J. Arrow.  1962.  “Optimal Advertising Policy Under 





Nerlove, Marc, and F. Waugh.  1961.  “Advertising Without Supply Control: Some 
Implications of a Study of the Advertising of Oranges.”  Journal of Farm Economics 
43:813-837. 
 
Neuborne, Burt.  Letter quoted in Congressional Record: Senate.  1992.  102nd Cong., 
2nd Sess.  138 Cong. Rec. S. 14874.  Vol. 138, No. 132 (September 24, 1992).   
 
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 
 
NewsfromRussia.com.  2005.  “Controversy in U.S. Cities about PlayStation Ads.”  
December 29, 2005.  http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2005/12/29/70701.html 
(accessed November 30, 2008). 
 
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.  2006.  “The Decline of Print.”  PBS.  March 13, 2006.  
Transcript. http://www/pbs.org/newshour/bb/entertainment/jan-
june06/knightridder_3-13.html   
(accessed March 15, 2006). 
 
Newman, Andrew Adam.  2007.  “Your Ad Here, on My S.U.V.?  And You’ll Pay?”  






Ngai, Rachel, and Christopher Pissarides.  2006.  “Trends in Hours and Economic 
Growth.”  CEPR Discussion Papers 5440.  
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cprceprdp/5440.htm (accessed December 17, 
2008). 
 
Nicholls, William H.  1951.  Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry.  Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press.  
 
Nichols, L. M.  1985.  “Advertising and Economic Welfare.”  American Economic 
Review 75: 213-218. 
  
Noggle, Gary, and Lynda Lee Kaid.  2000.  “The Effects of Visual Images in Political 
Ads: Experimental Testing of Distortions and Visual Literacy.”  Social Science 
Quarterly 81, no. 4 (December): 912-927. 
 
Nordhaus, Ted, and Michael Shellenberger.  2007.  Break Through: From the Death 
of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility.  New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Norström, Thor.  1995.  The Impact of Alcohol, Divorce, and Unemployment on 






Norton, Rob.  1994.  “How Uninformative Advertising Tells Consumers Quite a Bit.”  




ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=aph&AN=9412157603 (accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Notta, Ourania and Kostas Oustapassidis.  2001.  “Profitability and Media 
Advertising in Greek Food Manufacturing Industries.”  Review of Industrial 
Organization 18:115-126. 
 
Noyes, Jesse.  “Imus’ Ouster All about Advertisers.”  Boston Herald.  April 12, 2007. 
http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/guide.ch1.html.  Superprofile website. 
http://www.superprofile.com/problems.html.  Newspaper Association of America 
website.  http://www.naa.org/display/retailheadlines/v1no4/pg6.html (accessed April 
12, 2007). 
 
O’Barr, W. M.  1994.  Culture and the Ad.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
O’Donovan, Brendan, David Rae, and Arthur Grimes.  2000.  “Determinants of 
Advertising Expenditures: Aggregate and Cross-Media Evidence.”  International 





O’Dwyer’s PR Services Report.   2004.  “‘Advergaming’ Set to Surge.”  December. 
www.odwyerpr.com/members/jack_odwyers_nl/2004/1117.htm (accessed March 7, 
2005). 
 
Ogilvy, David.  1985.  Ogilvy on Advertising.  New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Olson, Mancur.  1965.  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups.  Sixteenth Printing, 1995.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
O’Malley, Gavin.  2004.  “Ads Fuel a Fifth of Economic Activity, But It’s 
Shrinking.”  Media Daily News.  November 23, 2004.  Advertising Educational 
Foundation. http://www.aef.com/06/news/data/2004/3065/:pf_printable? (accessed 
January 17, 2006). 
 
O’Meara Sheehan, Molly.  2004.  “Behind the Scenes: Cell Phones.”  In State of the 
World 2004.  Linda Starke, ed.  New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Oregon State University.  2007.  “Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors 
1774 to estimated 2018 to Convert to Dollars of 2007.”  






Oskamp, S.  2000.  “A Sustainable Future for Humanity?  How Can Psychology 
Help?”  American Psychologist 55, no.5:496-508. 
 
O’Toole, John.  1981.  The Trouble with Advertising.  New York: Chelsea House. 
 
Owen, Bruce M., and Steven S. Wildman.  1992.  Video Economics.  Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Owen, Bruce M., J. Beebe, and W. Manning.  1974.  Television Economics.  
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
 
Owen, James.  2006.  “Bottled Water Isn’t Healthier Than Tap, Report Reveals.”  
National Geographic News.  February 24, 2006. 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/02/0224_060224_bottled_water.html 
(accessed October 7, 2008). 
 
Ozga, S. A.  1960.  “Imperfect Markets Through Lack of Knowledge.”  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 74:29-52. 
 





Paek, Hye-Jin, and Zhongdang Pan.  2004.  “Spreading Global Consumerism: Effects 
of Mass Media and Advertising on Consumerist Values in China.”  Mass 
Communication & Society 7, no. 4:491-515. 
 
Palda, Kristian S.  1964.  “The Measurement of Cumulative Advertising Effects.”  In 
Ford Foundation Doctoral Series, 1963.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Parsons, Leonard J., Randall L. Schultz, and Thomas L. Pilon.  1979.  “The Impact of 
Advertising on the Aggregate Consumption Function.”  Paper No. 695. Purdue 
University. West Lafayette, IN: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, 
and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Industrial Administration. 
 
Pashigian, Peter, and Brian Bowen.  1994.  “The Rising Cost of Time of Females, the 
Growth of National Brands and the Supply of Retail Services.”  Economic Inquiry 
XXXII, no. 1 (January): 33-65. 
 
PBS.  2007.  Bill Moyers Journal.  “Buying the War.”  PBS.  Transcript.  April 25, 
2007. http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/transcript1.html (accessed May 9, 
2007). 
 
PBS.  n.d.  “Trade Secrets: The Problem: Chemical Body Burden.” 






Pedersen, Isabel.  2002.  “Looking Good on Whose Terms?  Ambiguity in Two 
Kellogg’s Special K® Print Advertisements.”  Social Semiotics 12, no. 2:160-181. 
 
Peebler, Charles D., Jr.  1993.  “Reducing Ad Deductibility Makes No Sense.”  
Advertising Age.  September 27, 1993: 21. 
 
Peel, D.  1975.  “Advertising and Aggregate Consumption.”  In Cowling, K. et al.: 
Advertising and Economic Behaviour.  London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Peles, Y.  1971.  “Rates of Amortization of Advertising Expenditures.”  Journal of 
Political Economy 79:1032-1058. 
 
Pennington, Bill.  2004.  “Reading, Writing and Corporate Sponsorships.”  New York 
Times.  October 18, 2004. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/18/sports/othersports/18sponsor.html?ex=1099116
966&ei=1&en=58d28925b2ff9475 (accessed August 6, 2007). 
 
Perman, R., and D. I. Stern.  2003.  “Evidence from Panel Unit Root and 
Cointegration Tests that the Kuznets Curve Does not Exist.”  Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 47:325-347.  http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=4&hid=116&sid=69449a86-0c82-42ad-





Petrecca, Laura.  2006.  “Product Placement—You Can’t Escape It.”  
USAToday.com.  October 10.  http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/2006-10-
10-ad-nauseum-usat_x.htm (accessed August 29, 2007). 
 
Picard, Robert G.  2001.  “Effects of Recessions on Advertising Expenditures: An 
Exploratory Study of Economic Downturns in Nine Developed Nations.”  Journal of 
Media Economics 14, no. 1:1-14. 
 
Pigou, Arthur C.  1932.  The Economics of Welfare.  Library of Economics and 
Liberty. http://www.econlib.org/library/NPDBooks/Pigou/pgEW1.html (accessed 
February 27, 2006). 
 
Pine, Karen J., and Avril Nash.  2002.  “Dear Santa: The Effects of Television 
Advertising on Young Children.”  International Journal of Behavioral Development 
26, no. 6:529-539. 
 
Plant, R., and R. M. Ryan.  1985.  “Intrinsic Motivation and the Effects of Self-
Consciousness, Self-Awareness and Ego-Involvement: An Investigation of Internally 
Controlling Styles.”  Journal of Personality 53:435-559. 
 
Polinsky, Alexander.  1993.  “News Analysis: Amortizing Advertising Expenses—





Pollay, Richard W.  1986.  “The Distorted Mirror: Reflections on the Unintended 
Consequences of Advertising.  Journal of Marketing 50 (April): 18-36. 
 
PollingReport.com.  “Direction of the Country: Right Track/Wrong Track.”  
http://www.pollingreport.com/right.htm (accessed October 31, 2008). 
 
“Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures: 2005.”  U.S. Census Bureau.  Issued 
April 2008.  http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/ma200-05.pdf (accessed August 
31, 2008). 
 
Porritt, Jonathon.  2007.  Capitalism: As If the World Matters.  London: Earthscan. 
 
Porter, M. E.  1978.  “Optimal Advertising: An Intra-Industry Approach.”  In Issues 
in Advertising: The Economics of Persuasion, ed. D. G. Tuerck.  Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: 91-114. 
 
Prakesh, V.  1992.  “Sex Roles and Advertising Preferences.”  Journal of Advertising 
Research 32 (May/June): 43-52. 
 
Princen, T., M. Maniates, and K. Conca, eds.  2002.  Confronting Consumption.  





Pundit, Sarika.  E-mail correspondence.  June 9, 2005. 
 
Putnam, Robert.  2000.  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community.  New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Quarles, Rebecca Colwell, and Leo W. Jeffres.  1983.  “Advertising and National 
Consumption: A Path Analytic Re-Examination of the Galbraithian Argument.”  
Journal of Advertising 12, no. 2:4-13, 33. 
 
Quart, Alissa.  2003.  Branded: The Buying and Selling of Teenagers.  Cambridge, 
MA: Perseus Publishing. 
 
Rahtz, D. R., M. J. Sirgy, and H. L. Meadow.  1988.  “Elderly Life Satisfaction and 
Television Viewership: An Exploratory Study.  In Advances in Consumer Research 
15, ed. M.J. Houston.  Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research. 
 
Rahtz, D. R., M. J. Sirgy, and H. L. Meadow.  1989.  “The Elderly Audience: 
Correlates of Television Orientation.”  Journal of Advertising 18:9-20. 
 
“Rank Order—GDP—Per Capita (PPP).”  Central Intelligence Agency.  The World 
Factbook.  https://www/cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-





Rauch, Jonathan.  1994.  “Demosclerotic Deal Making.”  U.S. News & World Report 
117, no. 8: 56. 
 
Redefining Progress.  2008.  “About the Ecological Footprint.”     
http://www.rprogress.org/ecological_footprint/about_ecological_footprint.htm 
(accessed April 25, 2008). 
 
Reekie, W. Duncan.  1986.  “Taxation of Advertising: Some Empirical Evidence.”  
International Journal of Advertising 5:325-342. 
 
Reekie, W. Duncan, and D. E. Allen.  1983.  “Hours of Work and Advertising: An 
International Comparison.”  International Journal of Advertising 2:99-107. 
 
Rees, William E.  1992.  “Ecological Footprints and Appropriated Carrying Capacity: 
What Urban Economics Leaves Out.”  Environment and Urbanisation 4, no. 2:121-
130. 
 
Reeves, Rosser.  1986.  Reality in Advertising.  New York: Knopf.  Quoted online: 
“Department of Advertising, the University of Texas at Austin.” 
http://advertising.utexas.edu/research/quotes/Q100.html (accessed August 10, 2007). 
 
Reeves, Terri Bryce.  “Wal-Mart Digs up Trouble with Turtles.”  St. Petersburg 





Regan v. Taxation with Representation. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 
Reich, Robert.  2005.  “Don’t Blame Wal-Mart.”  New York Times.  February 28, 
2005.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 9, 2008). 
 
Reich, Robert.  2008.   “Totally Spent.”  New York Times.  February 13, 2008.  
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 9, 2008). 
 
Reichert, Tom.  2003.  “The Prevalence of Sexual Imagery in Ads Targeted to Young 
Adults.”  “Journal of Consumer Affairs 37, no. 2 (Winter): 403-412. 
 
Reis, H. T., and B. C. Patrick.  1996.  “Attachment and Intimacy: Component 
Processes.  In Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, ed. E. T. Higgins 
and A. Kruglanski.  New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Renner, Michael.  2004.  “Moving Toward a Less Consumptive Economy.”  In State 
of the World 2004, ed. Linda Starke.  New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Reuters.  2007a.  “Car Makers Pour Advertising Dollars into China.”  April 27, 2007.     
http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=UKNOA73336220070427 (accessed 





_______.  2007b.  “Wal-Mart’s Welcome to India Includes Demonstrations.”  New 
York Times.  February 23, 2007: C3. 
 
Reynolds, Mike.  “Advertising Forecast Calls for Mild Gains.”  Multichannel News.  
December 11, 2006.  http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6398559.html 
(accessed July 31, 2008). 
 
Rice, F.  2001.  “Superstars of Spending: Marketers Clamor for Kids.”  Advertising 
Age, February 12, 2001: S1. 
 
Richey, Warren.  2005.  “Court Upholds ‘Beef: It’s What’s for Dinner.’”  Christian 
Science Monitor.  May 24, 2005: 3. 
 
Richins, M.L.  1991.  “Social Comparison and the Idealized Images of Advertising.”  
Journal of Consumer Research 18:71-83. 
 
_______.  1994.  “Special Possessions and the Expression of Material Values.”  
Journal of Consumer Research 21:522-533. 
 
Richins, Marsha L., and Scott Dawson.  1992.  “A Consumer Values Orientation for 






Richtel, Matt.  2002.  “Product Placements Go Interactive in Video Games.” New 
York Times, Sept. 17, 2002.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed January 12, 2005). 
 
Riffe, D., H. Goldson, K. Saxton, and Y. Yu.  1989.  “Females and Minorities in TV 
and in 1987 Saturday Children’s Programs.  Journalism Quarterly 66, no. 1:129-136. 
 
Rindfleisch, A., J. E. Burroughs, and F. Denton.  1997.  “Family Structure, 
Materialism, and Compulsive Consumption.”  Journal of Consumer Research 
23:312-325. 
 
Rivlin, Gary.  2007.  “In Silicon Valley, Millionaires Who Don’t Feel Rich.”  New 
York Times.  August 5, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/technology/05rich.html?ei=5088&emc=rss&en
=003719e2d0560842&ex=1343966400&partner=rssnyt (accessed August 5, 2007). 
 
RJR Nabisco Inc. and Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, (United States Tax 
Court 1998). 
 
Roberts, J. A. and E. Jones.  2001.  “Money Attitudes, Credit Card Use, and 
Compulsive Buying Among American College Students.”  Journal of Consumer 





Roberts, M. J., and L. Samuelson.  1988.  “An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic, 
Nonprice Competition in an Oligopolistic Industry.”  Rand Journal of Economics 
19:200-220. 
 
Robins, L.N., Locke, B.Z., & Regier, D.A.  1991.  “An Overview of Psychiatric 
Disorders in America.”  In Psychiatric Disorders in America: The Epidemiologic 
Catchment Area Study, ed. L.N. Robins & D.A. Regier.  New York: Free Press.       
 
Robinson, Joan.  1933.  Economics of Imperfect Competition.  London: MacMillan 
and Co. 
 
Rogers, C. R.  1961.  On Becoming a Person.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
_______.  1964.  “Toward a Modern Approach to Values: The Valuing Process in the 
Mature Person.”  Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 68:160-167. 
 
Roper Center. 1999.  Question ID: USNBCWSJ.98FB26, RC01F.  Survey Sponsor: 
NBC News/Wall Street Journal.   
 
Rosenbaum, David E.  1986.  “Curb on Ad Write-offs Is Opposed.”  New York Times.  





Rosenberg, Erika, L.  2004.  “Mindfulness and Consumerism.”  In Psychology and 
Consumer Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. Tim 
Kasser and Allen D. Kanner.  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Rosenthal, Meredith B., Ernst R. Berndt, Julie M. Donohue, Arnold M. Epstein, and 
Richard G. Frank.  2002.  “Demand Effects of Recent Changes in Prescription Drug 
Promotion.”  Mimeo. 
 
Rotfeld, H. J., and T. B. Rotzoll.  1976.  “Advertising and Product Quality: Are 
Heavily Advertised Products Better?”  Journal of Consumer Affairs 10:33-47. 
 
Roy, A., and J. Harwood.  1997.  “Underrepresented, Positively Portrayed: Older 
Adults in Television Commercials.”  Journal of Applied Communication Research 
25:39-56. 
 
Rucker, Patrick.  2008.  “U.S. Home Foreclosures Climb to Record.”  Reuters.  
March 6, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/gc03/idUSWAT00907920080306 
(accessed April 19, 2008). 
 






Ryan. R. M., V. I. Chirkov, T. D. Little, K. M. Sheldon, E. Timoshina, and E. L. 
Deci.  1999.  “The American Dream in Russia: Extrinsic Aspirations and Well-Being 
in Two Cultures.”  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25:1509-1524. 
 
Ryan, John C., and Alan Thein Durning.  1997.  Stuff: The Secret Live of Everyday 
Things.  Seattle: Northwest Environment Watch. 
 
Rybczynski, Witold.  1991.  “Waiting for the Weekend.”  Atlantic Monthly 268, no. 
2:35-52. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/91aug/rybczynski-p1.htm (accessed December 17, 
2008). 
 
Ryff, Carol.  2005.  In The Science of Well-Being, ed. F. Huppert et al.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Saatchi and Saatchi.  2008.  “Kevin Roberts.” 
http://www.saatchi.com/worldwide/kevin_roberts.asp (accessed March 30, 2008). 
 
San Jose Mercury News/ Kaiser Family Foundation.  2004.  Survey on Childhood 






Sarin, Radhika. “Behind the Scenes: Computers.”  In State of the World 2004, ed. 
Linda Starke.  New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Sass, T. R., and D. S. Saurman.  1995.  “Advertising Restrictions and Concentration: 
The Case of Malt Beverages.”  The Review of Economics and Statistics 77, no.1 
(February): 66-81. 
 
Saunders, S., and D. Munro.  2000.  “The Construction and Validation of a Consumer 
Orientation Questionnaire (SCOI) Designed to Measure Fromm’s (1955) “Marketing 
Character in Australia.”  Social Behavior and Personality 28:219-240. 
 
Sawin, Janet L.  2004.  “Making Better Energy Choices.”  In State of the World 2004, 
ed. Linda Starke.  New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Scarborough, Keith A.  2005.  Association of National Advertisers, Inc.  Letter.  April 
30, 2003.  http://www.ana.net/govt/what/05_05_03_letter.cfm (accessed May 3, 
2005). 
 
Scarlett, Lynn.  “Doing More with Less: Dematerialization—Unsung Environmental 
Triumph?”  In Earth Report 2000, ed. Ronald Bailey.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Scheelings, Richard, and Joshua D. Wright.  2006.  “‘Sui Generis’?: An Antitrust 






December 17, 2008). 
 
Scitovsky, Tibor.  1976.  The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human 
Satisfaction.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schmalensee, Richard.  1972.  The Economics of Advertising.  Amsterdam: North-
Holland Publishing. 
 
Schmalensee, Richard.  1978.  “A Model of Advertising and Product Quality.”  
Journal of Political Economy 86:485-503. 
 
Schmuck, P.  2001.  “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Life Goals Preferences as Measured via 
Inventories and via Priming Methodologies: Mean Differences and Relations with 
Well-Being.  In Life Goals and Well-Being: Towards a Positive Psychology of 
Human Striving, ed. P. Schmuck and K.M. Sheldon.  Goettingen, Germany: Hogrefe 
& Huber. 
 
Schmuck, P., T. Kasser, and R. M. Ryan.  2000.  “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals: Their 
Structure and Relationship to Well-Being in German and U.S. College Students.”  





Schor, Juliet B.  1992.  The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of 
Leisure.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
_______.  1998.  The Overspent American: Why We Want What We Don’t Need.  
New York: HarperCollins. 
 
_______.  2004.  Born to Buy: The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer 
Culture.  New York: Scribner. 
 
Schlosser, Eric.   2002.  Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal.  
New York: Perennial. 
 
Schroeder, J.E., and S. S. Dugal.  1995.  “Psychological Correlates of the Materialism 
Construct.”  Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 10:243-253. 
 
Schudson, Michael.  1984.  Advertising, the Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious Impact 
on American Society.  New York: Basic Books. 
 
Schultz, Randall L.  1971.  “Market Measurement and Planning with a Simultaneous-
Equation Model.”  Journal of Marketing Research 8, no. 2:153-164.  
 
Schwartz, Barry.  1994.  The Costs of Living: How Market Freedom Erodes the Best 





Schwartz, Barry.  2004.  The Paradox of Choice.  Why More Is Less.  New York: 
HarperCollins. 
 
Schwartz, Eben.  2008.  California Coastal Commision.  Personal e-mail 
correspondence.  August 29, 2008. 
 
Schwartz, S. H.  1992.  “Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: 
Theoretical and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries.”  In Advances in Experimental and 
Social Psychology 25, ed. M. Zanna.  Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
 
Schwartz, S. H.  1994.  “Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of 
Values?”  Journal of Social Issues 50:19-45. 
 
Schwartz, S. H.  1996.  “Values Priorities and Behavior: Applying of Theory of 
Integrated Value Systems.  In The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium 8, 
ed. C. Seligman, J. M. Olson, and M. P. Zanna.  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Schwartz, S. H., and L. Sagiv.  1995.  “Identifying Culture-Specifics in the Content 





Seldon, B. J.,  and K. Doroodian.  1989.  “A Simultaneous Model of Cigarette 
Advertising: Effects of Demand and Industry Response to Public Policy.”  Review of 
Economics and Statistics 71:673-677. 
 
Seldon, Barry J., R. Todd Jewell, and Daniel M. O’Brien.  2000.  “Media Substitution 
and Economies of Scale in Advertising.”  International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 18:1153-1180. 
 
Seldon, Barry J. and Chulho Jung.  1993.  “Derived Demand for Advertising 
Messages and Substitutability Among the Media.”  The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance 33, no. 1 (Spring): 71-88. 
 
Seldon, Barry J., and Chulho Jung.  1995.  “The Length of the Effect of Aggregate 
Advertising on Aggregate Consumption.”  Economics Letters 48:207-211. 
 
Seligman, Martin.  1990.  Learned Optimism.  New York: Pocket Books. 
 
Sen, Amartya.  1999.  Development as Freedom.  Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Sethuraman, Raj, and Catherine Cole.  1999.  “Factors Influencing the Price 
Premiums that Consumers Pay for National Brands over Store Brands.”  Journal of 





Shankland, Stephen.  2008.  “Yahoo Profit Drops; at Least 1,430 to Lose Jobs.”  
CNet.  October 21, 2008.  http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10071637-93.html 
(accessed November 2, 2008). 
 
Shapiro, J.  1993.  No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights  
Movement.  New York: Times Books.   
 
Shapiro, Robert J.  1993.  In Mandate for Change, ed. William Marshall and Marin 
Schram.  New York: Berkley Books: 21-50. 
 
_______. 1995.  “End Corporate Welfare.”  Washington Post.  December 1, 1995: 
A27. http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do (accessed 
December 17, 2008). 
 
Shaw, A. W.  1912.  “Some Problems in Market Distribution.”  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 26:703-765. 
 
Shaw, J. and G. Waller.  1995.  “The Media’s Impact on Body Image: Implications 
for Prevention and Treatment.  Eating Disorders: The Journal of Treatment and 





Sheldon, K. M., A. J. Elliot, Y. Kim, and T. Kasser.  2001.  “What Is Satisfying 
About Satisfying Events?: Testing 10 Candidate Psychological Needs.”  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 80:325-339. 
 
Sheldon, K. M., and M. Flanagan.  2001.  Extrinsic Value Orientation and Dating 
Violence.  Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Sheldon, K. M., and T. Kasser.  1995.  “Coherence and Congruence: Two Aspects of 
Personality Integration.”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68:531-543. 
 
_______.  1998.  “Pursuing Personal Goals: Skills Enable Progress, but not All 
Progress Is Beneficial.”  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24:1319-1331. 
 
_______.  2001.  “‘Getting Older, Getting Better’: Personal Strivings and 
Psychological Maturity Across the Life Span.”  Developmental Psychology 37:491-
501.  
 
Sheldon, K. M., and H. McGregor.  2000.  “Extrinsic Value Orientation and the 
Tragedy of the Commons.”  Journal of Personality 68:383-411. 
 
Sheldon, K. M., M. S. Sheldon, and R. Osbaldiston.  2000.  “Prosocial Values and 





Shum, Matthew.  2004.  “Does Advertising Overcome Brand Loyalty?  Evidence 
from the Breakfast-Cereals Market.”  Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy 13, no. 2:241-272. 
 
Siegelman, Peter, and Joel. Waldfogel.  2001.  Race and Radio: Preference 
Externalities, Minority Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities.  
Philadelphia, PA: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Signorelli, N. and J. Staples.  1997.  “Television and Children’s Conceptions of 
Nutrition.”  Health Communication 9, no. 4:291-301 
 
Signorelli, N. and M. Lears.  1992.  “Television and Children’s Conceptions of 
Nutrition: Unhealthy Messages.”  Health Communication 4, no. 4:245-257.  
 
Silk, A. J., L. R. Klein, and E. R. Berndt.  2001.  “The Emerging Position of the 
Internet as an Advertising Medium.”  Netnomics 3, no. 2:129-148. 
 
Silk, A. J., L. R. Klein, and E. R. Berndt.  2002.  “Intermedia Substitutability and 
Market Demand by National Advertisers.”  Review of Industrial Organization 
20:323-348. 
 






_______.  1990.  Population Matters: People, Resources, Environment, and 
Immigration.  New Brunswick, N.J. / London: Transaction. 
 
_______.  1996.  The Ultimate Resource 2.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Simon, Julian L., and Johan Arndt.  1980.  “The Shape of the Advertising Response 
Function.”  Journal of Advertising Research 20, no. 4 (August): 11-28. 
 
Simon, Julian L. and Herman Kahn. 1984.  The Resourceful Earth: A Response to 
Global 2000.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.   
 
Simpson, James B.  1964.  Contemporary Quotations.  Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou 
Press. 
 
Singer, Mark I., Karen Slovak, Tracey Frierson, and Peter York.  1998.  “Viewing 
Preferences, Symptoms of Psychological Trauma, and Violent Behaviors Among 
Children Who Watch Television.”  Journal of the American Academy of Child & 
Adolescent Psychiatry 37, no. 10: 1041-1048. 
 






Sirgy, M. Joseph.  1998.  “Materialism and Quality of Life.”  Social Indicators 
Research 43:227-60. 
 
Sirgy, M. J., D. Cole, R. Kosenko, H. L. Meadow, D. Rahtz, M. Cicic, G. X. Jin, D. 
Yarsuvat, D. L. Blenkhorn, and N. Nagpal.  1995.  “ A Life Satisfaction Measure: 
Additional Validational Data for the Congruity Life Satisfaction Measure.  Social 
Indicators Research 34:237-259. 
 
Sirgy, M.J., D. Lee, R. Kosenko, H. L. Meadow, D. Rahtz, M. Cicic, G. X. Jin, D. 
Yarsuvat, D. L. Blenkhorn, and N. Wright.  1998.  “Does Television Viewership Play 
a Role in Perception of Quality of Life?”  Journal of Advertising 27:125-142. 
 
Slade, M. E.  1995.  “Product Rivalry with Multiple Strategic Weapons: An Analysis 
of Price and Advertising Competition.”  Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy 4:445-476. 
 
Smiley, R. H.  1988.  “Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence.”  
International Journal of Industrial Organization 6:167-180. 
 
Smith, Adam.  1976.  The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D. D. Rafael and A. L. 





Smith, Hedrick.  2004.  “Is Wal-Mart Good for America?”  Frontline.  PBS.  
November 16, 2004.  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/view/ 
(accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Smith, Kevin B., and Kenneth J. Meier.  1995.  The Case Against School Choice: 
Politics, Markets, and Fools.  Armonk, NY: Sharpe.   
 
Solberg, Emily G., Edward Diener, and Michael D. Robinson.  2004.  “Why Are 
Materialists Less Satisfied?”  In Psychology and Consumer Culture: The Struggle for 
a Good Life in a Materialistic World, ed. Tim Kasser and Allen D. Kanner.  
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Solnick, S., and D. Hemenway.  1998.  “Is More Always Better?  A Survey on 
Positional Concerns.”  Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 37:373-83. 
 
Solow, Robert M.  1967.  “The New Industrial State or Son of Affluence.”  Public 
Interest 9 (Fall): 100-108. 
 
_______.  1968.  “The Truth Further Refined: A Comment on Marris.”  The Public 





_______.  1993.  “Sustainability: An Economist’s Perspective.”  In Economics of the 
Environment: Selected Readings, ed. Robert Dorfman and Nancy S. Dorfman.  New 
York: Norton. 
 
Spencer, Jack, and Nicolas Loris.  2008.  “Yucca Mountain Remains Critical to Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Management.”  The Heritage Foundation.  Backgrounder #2131.  May 
1, 2008. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Energyandenvironment/bg2131.cfm#_ftn6 
(accessed October 4, 2008). 
 
Srivastava, A., E. A. Locke, and K. M. Bortol.  2001.  “Money and Subjective Well-
Being: It’s not the Money, It’s the Motives.”  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 80:959-971. 
 
Stanford News Service.  “Researchers Propose New Standard for Value of Life.”  
June 4, 2008.  http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2008/june4/med-lifeworth-
060408.html 
(accessed September 14, 2008). 
 
Starch, Daniel.  1923.  Principles of Advertising.  Chicago: A.W. Shaw.  
 
Stein, Ben.  n.d.  “Stuff Ben Wrote.”  http://www.benstein.com/010904walmart.html  





Stein, Mark. 1997.  “Money, Class, and Happiness.”  Ph.D. dissertation. Yale 
University. 
 
Steinberg, Brian.  2003.  “Advertising: Forecaster Trims View, Sees Upturn.”  Wall 
Street Journal.  June 18, 2003: B9. 
http://proquest-.umi-.com/pqdweb-?did=348552531-&sid=3-&Fmt=3-&clientId=411
43-&RQT=309-&VName=PQD (accessed December 17, 2008).   
 
Stephenson, John B.  2004.  “Superfund Program: Updated Appropriation and 
Expenditure Data.”  U.S. General Accounting Office.  Letter to Senator James M. 
Jeffords.  February 18, 2004.  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04475r.pdf (accessed 
September 18, 2008). 
 
Stern, David I.  2003.  “The Environmental Kuznets Curve.”  International Society 
for Ecological Economics: Internet Encyclopaedia of Ecological Economics (June). 
www.ecoeco.org/pdf/stern.pdf (accessed June 23, 2008). 
 
Stern, Nicholas.  “Stern Review Executive Summary.”  New Economics Foundation.  
October 30, 2006.  http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern





Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers.  2008.  “Economic growth and Subjective 
Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox.”  National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  NBER Working Paper No. 14282.  
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282.pdf (accessed December 17, 2008).   
 
Steyer, James P.  2002.  The Other Parent.  New York: Atria Books. 
 
Stigler, George J.  1961.  “The Economics of Information.”  Journal of Political 
Economy 69: 213-225. 
 
Stigler, George J.  1958.  “The Economies of Scale.”  Journal of Law and Economics 
1:54-71.   
 
Stigler, George J., and Gary S. Becker.  1977.  “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum.”  
American Economic Review 67, no. 2 (March): 76-90. 
 
Stole, Inger L.  2000.  “Consumer Protection in Historical Perspective: The Five-Year 
Battle over Federal Regulation of Advertising, 1933 to 1938.”  Mass Communication 
& Society 3, no. 4:351-372. 
 
Stole, Inger.  1998.  “Selling Advertising: The U.S. Advertising Industry and Its 






Stone, Brad.  2007a.  “Bereft of BlackBerrys, the Untethered Make Do.”  New York 
Times.  C1.  April 19, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed April 19, 2007). 
 
_______.  2007b.  “MySpace to Discuss Effort to Customize Ads.”  New York Times.  
September 18, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed September 18, 2007). 
 
Stork, Nigel E.  1997. “Measuring Global Biodiversity and Its Decline.”  In 
Biodiversity II: Understanding and Protecting Our Biological Resources, ed. 
Marjorie L. Reaka-Kudla, Don E. Wilson, and Edward O. Wilson.  Washington, DC: 
Joseph Henry Press. 
 
Story, Louise.  2007a.  “Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s Likely to See an Ad.”  New 
York Times.  January 15, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed January 15, 
2007). 
 
_______.  2007b.  “Company Will Monitor Phone Calls to Tailor Ads.”  New York 
Times.  September 24, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed September 24, 
2007). 
 
_______.  2007c.  “It’s an Ad, Ad, Ad, Ad World.”  New York Times.  August 6, 





_______.  2007d.  “Madison Avenue Calling.”  New York Times.  January 20, 2007.  
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed January 20, 2007). 
 
_______.  2007e.  “Marketers Find that Free Ads Come at a High Price.”  New York 
Times.  May 26, 2007.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 26, 2007). 
 
_______.  2008.  “Home Equity Frenzy Was a Bank Ad Come True.”  New York 
Times.  August 15, 2008.  http://www.nytimes.com (accessed August 15, 2008). 
 
Summers, Lawrence.  1987.  “A Few Good Taxes.”  New Republic 197, no. 22:14-16. 
 
_______.  2007.  “Reforming Taxation in the Global Age.”  A Brookings Institution 
Hamilton Project Forum.  Washington, DC: Brookings.  June 12, 2007.  Transcript by 
Anderson Court Reporting.   
 
Suri, Vivek, and Duane Chapman.  1998.  “Economic Growth, Trade and Energy: 
Implications for the Environmental Kuznets Curve.”  Ecological Economics 25, no. 2 
(May): 195-208. 
 
Swayne, L. E., and A. J. Greco.  1987.  “The Portrayal of Older Americans in 
Television Commercials.”  Journal of Advertising 11: 22. 
 




Construction of Whiteness.”  Journal of American & Comparative Cultures 25 
(Spring): 199-208. 
 
Taras, H., J. Sallis, T. Patterson, P. Nader, and J. Nelson.  1989.  “Television’s 
Influence on Children’s Diet and Physical Activity.”  Journal of Developmental and 
Behavioral Pediatrics 10:176-180. 
 
Tavakoli, M., P. Swann, and M. Cave.  1989.  “The Television Advertising Debate: 
Price Elasticities and Substitution Elasticities.”  Mimeo.  Department of Economics, 
Brunei University.    
 
Taylor, C., J. Lee, and B. Stern.  1995.  “Portrayals of African, Hispanic, and Asian 
Americans in Magazine Advertising.”  American Behavioral Scientist 38, no. 4:608-
620. 
 
Taylor, Lester D. and Daniel Weiserbs.  1972.  “Advertising and the Aggregate 
Consumption Function.”  American Economic Review 62, no. 4 (September): 642-
655. 
 
Teinowitz, Ira.  1995.  “Ad Deductibility Is Back in Play; Industry Reps Shudder as 






_______.  2000.  “Ad Groups Blast McCain’s Tax plan; Proposal Targets 
Deductibility of Ad Expense.”  Advertising Age.  January 17, 2000: 6. 
 
Teinowitz, Ira, and Andrea Sachs.  1995.  “3 Senators Light Challenge to Ad 
Deductibility.”  Advertising Age.  March 27, 1995: 31. 
 
Telander, Rick.  1990.  “Your Sneakers or Your Life.”  Sports Illustrated. 
http://www.chucksconnection.com/articles/ConverseArt08.html (accessed October 
29, 2008). 
 
Tellis, Gerard J.  1988a.  “Advertising Exposure, Loyalty, and Brand Purchase: A 
Two-State Model of Choice.”  Journal of Marketing Research 25: 134-144. 
 
_______.  1988b.  “The Price Elasticity of Selective Demand: A Meta-Analysis of 
Sales Response Models.”  Journal of Marketing Research 25, no. 4 (November): 331-
341.   
 
Tellis, Gerard J., and Claes Fornell.  1988.  “The Relationship between Advertising 
and Product Quality over the Product Life Cycle: A Contingency Theory.”  Journal of 
Marketing Research 25, no. 1:64-71. 
 






_______.  1964.  “Advertising and Competition.”  Journal of Political Economy 
LXXII, no. 6 (December): 537-562. 
 
_______.  1966.  “Supply and Demand for Advertising Messages.”  American 
Economic Review 56, no.1/2 (March): 457-466. 
 
_______.  1978.  “Towards a Theory of the Economics of Advertising.”  In Issues in 
Advertising: The Economics of Persuasion, ed. David G. Tuerck.  Washington, DC: 
American Enterprise Institute: 71-89. 
 
Terdiman, Daniel.  2007.  “The Subway Tunnel as Video Billboard.”  News.com.  
April 6, 2007.  http://www.news.com (accessed April 28, 2007). 
 
Tharp, Marye C.  2001.  Marketing and Consumer Identity in Multicultural America.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Then, D.  1992.  Women’s Magazines: Messages They Convey about Looks, Men, and 
Careers.  Paper presented at the 100th Annual Convention of the American 
Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.  (Cited by Kilbourne, 2004.) 
 
Thoits, Peggy, and Michael Hannan.  1979.  “Income and Psychological Distress: The 




Behavior 20, no. 2:120-138.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2136434 (accessed 
November 28, 2008). 
 
Thomas, Louis, Scott Shane, and Keith Weigelt.  1998.  “An Empirical Examination 
of Advertising as a Signal of Product Quality.”  Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 37: 415-430.  
 
Thornton, Joe.  2000.  Pandora’s Poison: Chlorine, Health, and a New 
Environmental Strategy.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
   
“Thoroughly Modern Marketing: McDonald's Updates Advertising to Remain 
‘Forever Young.’”  April 11, 2005.  http://www.sfalliance.org/media/nrn.html 
(accessed May 17, 2008). 
 
“Thought for Food.”  2003.  Lancet 362, no. 9396.  November 15, 2003: 1593.  
 
Thulin, Frederick.  1919.  “Goodwill and Other Nondepreciable and Depreciable 
Intangible Property as ‘Invested Capital.’”  Michigan Law Review 17, no. 4 
(February): 294-309. 
 
“Tobacco Smoke.”  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  





“Total Population of the World by Decade, 1950-2050 (Historical and Projected).”     
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0762181.html (accessed May 31, 2008). 
 
Tremblay, Victor J., and Carlos Martins-Filho.  2001.  “A Model of Vertical 
Differentiation, Brand Loyalty, and Persuasive Advertising.”  Mimeo: Oregon State 
University. 
 
Tse, D. K., R. W. Belk, N. Zhao.  1989.  “Becoming a Consumer Society: A 
Longitudinal and Cross-Cultural Content Analysis of Print Ads from Hong Knog, the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.”  Journal of Consumer Research 15:457-
472. 
 
Twitchell, James B.  1996.  Adcult USA: The Triumph of Advertising in American 
Culture.  New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
UCLA Graduate School of Education and Information Studies: Higher Education 
Research Institute.  2004.  http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/heri/findings.html (accessed 
January 1, 2005).  
 
UNFCCC.  2006.  “Managing U.S. CO2 Emissions Through Carbon Sequestration 
and Long-Term Storage in Tropical Farm Reforestation Projects.”  United Nations 






(accessed May 17, 2008). 
 
Union of Concerned Scientists.  n.d.  Google Answers. “American Advertising in the 
Media.”  http://answers.google.com/answers/threadview?id=56750.  Citing: Union of 
Concerned Scientists website. http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/guide.ch1.html 
(accessed May 2, 2007). 
 
United Press International.  2007.  “Giant Garbage Patch Floating in Pacific.”  
October 19, 2007.  
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Science/2007/10/19/giant_garbage_patch_floating_i
n_pacific_6108/ (accessed May 13, 2008).  
 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.  “UN Marks June 17 World 
Day to Combat Desertification.”  Press Release.  June 14, 2006.  
http://www.unccd.int/publicinfo/pressrel/showpressrel.php?pr=press14_06_06 
(accessed October 5, 2008). 
 
University of Texas at Austin.  Department of Advertising.  “Advertising Quotes.” 





University of Wisconsin.  n.d.  “Environmental Geology: Mineral and Rock 
Resources.” http://www.geology.wisc.edu/~chuck/Geo106/lect26.html (accessed 
December 13, 2008). 
 
U. S. Board of Tax Appeals.  “Appeal of Northwestern Yeast Co.”  Docket No. 1511 
(October 27, 1926).   
 
U. S. Census Bureau.  n.d.  “Corporations—Selected Financial Items: 1990 to 2004.” 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/08s0730.pdf (accessed July 30, 
2008). 
 
_______.  n.d.  “Median Average Square Feet of Floor Area in New One-Family 
Houses Completed by Location.”  
http://www.census.gov/const/C25Ann/sftotalmedavgsqft.pdf  (accessed May 14, 
2008). 
 
_______.  n.d.  Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures: 2005.  U.S. 
Government Printing Office.  Washington DC, 2008.  
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/ma200-05.pdf (accessed September 2, 2008). 
 
_______.  n.d.  “Population: 1790-1990.”  Selected Historical Decennial Census 





August 29, 2008). 
 
_______. 1998.  “World Population Profile: 1998—Highlights.”  
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/wp98001.html (accessed May 8, 2008). 
 




(accessed July 26, 2008). 
 
U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division.  2007.  “U.S. Trade in Goods and 
Services—Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis.”  http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/historical/gands.txt (accessed November 30, 2008). 
 
U.S. Census Bureau: International Data Base.  2008.  “Total Midyear Population for 
the World: 1950-2050.”  http:www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop.html 
(accessed July 28, 2008). 
 
U. S. Congress.  Congressional Record.  House.  102nd Cong.  1st Sess., 1991.  
“Reintroduction of the Non-Discrimination in Advertising Act: Extension of 




http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r102:./temp/~r102OI9CrJ (accessed March 24, 
2007). 
 
_______.  102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1992.  “Deductibility of Advertising: Extension of 
Remarks.”  Remarks by Representative Michael A. Andrews (March 25, 1992).  
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r102:./temp/~r102MEzgan (accessed June 1, 
2006). 
 
_______.  103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1993.  “Extension of Remarks: Introduction of 
Legislation Regarding Billboards in Space,” (July 1, 1993). 
 
_______.  103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1993.  Reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 991, 
and S. REP. NO. 37, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1993). 
 
_______.  105th Cong., 1st Sess.  1997. “The Impact on Individuals and Families of 
Replacing the Federal Income Tax.”  Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means.   105th Cong., 1st Sess., (April 15, 1997). 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ways/hwmw105-15.000/hwmw105-15_0.htm 
(accessed May 2, 2005). 
 
_______.  109th Cong., 1st Sess.  2005. “Economic Consequences of Hurricane 
Katrina.”  Joint Economic Committee.  Research Report #109-15 (September).  





_______.  110th Cong., 1st Sess.  2007.  “Testimony of Maurice Emsellem, National 
Employment Law Project.”  Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Ways 
and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support 
(March 15, 2007).  http://www.nelp.org/document.cfm?documentID=806 (accessed 
September 28, 2008). 
 
U.S. Congress.  Congressional Record.  Senate.  102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1992.  
“Privilege of the Floor.”  Letter from John Lachiusa, Marketing Manager, Fruit of the 
Loom, to Senator Mitch McConnell.  September 24, 1992. 
 
_______.  108th Cong., 1st Sess., 2003.  “Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, or the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,” S. 877. 
 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  2007.  “Fact Sheet: Market Access Program 
(MAP).”  United States Department of Agriculture.  November 2007. 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/mos/programs/mapprog.asp (accessed May 17, 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of Education.  n.d.  “National Assessment of Adult Literacy.”  
Institute of Education Sciences.  http://nces.ed.gov/naal/lit_history.asp#illiteracy 





U.S. Department of Energy.  2008.  “Yucca Mountain Repository.”  Office of 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.  
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/index.shtml 
(accessed September 11, 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  2004.  “Prior HHS Poverty 
Guidelines and Federal Register References.”  http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/figures-
fed-reg.shtml (accessed November 12, 2007). 
 
_______.  2004.  “Statistics Related to Overweight and Obesity.”  WIN Weight-
control Information Network.  http://win.niddk.nih.gov/statistics/index.htm (accessed 
December 17, 2004). 
 
U.S. Department of Justice.  2006.  “Fact Sheet: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Reopener 
Provision.” June 1, 2006. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06_enrd_341..html (accessed October 3, 
2008). 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  2007a.  “Methane.”  http://epa.gov/methane/ 
(accessed September 14, 2008). 
 
_______.  2007b.  “Ruminant Livestock.”  http://www.epa.gov/rlep/faq.html#1 





_______.  2008.  “Municipal Solid Waste: Basic Information.” 
http://www.epa.gov/garbage/facts.htm (accessed July 26, 2008). 
 
_______.  2008.  “Superfund Frequently Asked Questions: General Questions About 
Superfund.”   : 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/faqs/cleanup/superfund/gen-faqs.html 
(accessed October 4, 2008). 
 
U.S. Geological Survey.  n.d.  “Questions and Answers About: Status and Trends in 
the Conterminous United States 1998 to 2004.” 
http://wetlandsfws.er.usgs.gov/status_trends/Technical_Documents/Q&A.pdf 
(accessed June 11, 2008). 
  
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. n.d.  Statistics of Income, Corporation Income Tax 
Returns, Annual.  http://www.census.gov/prod (accessed November 17, 2004.) 
 
Van Boven, Leaf, and Thomas Gilovich.  2003.  “To Do or to Have?: That Is the 
Question.”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85, no. 6. 
 
Van de Praag, B., and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell.  2004.  Happiness Quantified: A 





Van Osselaer, Stijn M. J., and Joseph W. Alba.  2000.  “Consumer Learning and 
Brand Equity.”  Journal of Consumer Research 27:1-16. 
 
Van Riper, Tom.  2006.  “The Most Expensive Addictions.”  Forbes.com. 
http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/10/02/addictions-most-expensive-biz-
cx_tvr_1003addictions.html (accessed October 1, 2008). 
 
Van Stadt, H., A. Kapteyn, and S. van de Geer.  1985.  “The Relativity of Utility: 
Evidence from Panel Data.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 67:179-187. 
 
Verdon, W. A., C. R. McConnell, and T. W. Roesler.  1968.  “Advertising 
Expenditures as an Economic Stabilizer, 1945-1964.”  Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Business 8:7-18. 
 
Verhovek, Sam Howe.  2007.  “Coffee with Sugar, in Seattle.”  Los Angeles Times.  
February 4, 2007: A14. 
 
Vettel, Tim N.  1987a.  “The Week in Review: Advertising Expense Limit Listed as 
Possible Revenue Raiser.”  35 Tax Notes 928.  May 25, 1987. 
 
Vettel, Tim.  1978b.  “The Week in Review: Should Advertising Costs Be 





Viinamaeki, H., K. Koskela; and L. Niskanen.  1996.  “Rapidly Declining Mental 
Well-Being During Unemployment.  European Journal of Psychiatry 10:215-221. 
 
Virelli, Louis J., III.  2000.  “Comment: Permissible Burden or Constitutional 
Violation?  A First Amendment Analysis of Congress’ Proposed Removal of Tax 
Deductibility from Tobacco Advertisements.”  University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2:529-571. 
 
Wackernagel, Mathis.  1994.  Ecological Footprint and Appropriated Carrying 
Capacity: A Tool for Planning Toward Sustainability.  Ph.D. Thesis.  School of 
Community and Regional Planning.  The University of British Columbia.  
Vancouver, Canada. 
 
Wachtel, P.L., and S. J. Blatt.  1990.  “Perceptions of Economic Needs and of 
Anticipated Future Incomes.”  Journal of Economic Psychology 11:403-415. 
 
Ward, S., and D. Wackman.  1971.  “Family and Media Influences on Adolescent 
Consumer Learning.”  American Behavioral Scientist 14:415-427. 
 
Washington Post.  2003.  “Washington Post-ABC News Poll: War Support 
Widespread.”  April 7, 2003.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-





Water Encyclopedia.  n.d.  “Oil Spills: Impact on the Ocean.”    
http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Oc-Po/Oil-Spills-Impact-on-the-Ocean.html 
(accessed October 4, 2008). 
 
Wattenberg, Ben.  2005.  Fewer: How the New Demography of Depopulation Will 
Shape Our Future.  Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 
 
Weber, Christopher L., Glen P. Peters, Dabo Guan, and Klaus Hubacek.  2008.  “The 
Contribution of Chinese Exports to Climate Change.”  Energy Policy.  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V2W-4T1SFRC-
1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_version=1&_urlV
ersion=0&_userid=10&md5=df1d5037dca7de1f18660d435afc60c6 (accessed August 
12, 2008). 
 
Wedding, Nugent.  1960.  “Advertising, Mass Communication, and Tax Deduction.”  
Journal of Marketing 24, no. 4:17-22. 
 
Wei Ran, Alan.  1997.  “Emerging Lifestyles in China and Consequences for 
Perception of Advertising, Buying Behaviour and Consumption Preferences.”  
International Journal of Advertising 16, no. 4:261-275. 
 
Wei. R., and Z. Pan.  1999.  “Mass Media and Consumerist Values in the People's 





Weigel, R., J. Loomis, and M. Soja.  1980.  “Race Relations on Prime Time 
Television.”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39:884-893. 
 
Weissman, M, B. M. Livingston, P. J. Leaf, L. P. Florio, and C. Hozer III.  1991.  
“Affective Disorders.” In Psychiatric Disorders in America: The Epidemiologic 
Catchment Area Study, ed. L.N. Robins & D.A. Regier, pp. 53-80.  New York: Free 
Press.  
 
Welch V. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).  
 
Wells, Melanie.  2003.  “In Search of the Buy Button.”  Forbes.com.  September 1, 
2003.  http://forbes.com/forbes/2003/0901/062_print.html (accessed May 1, 2004). 
 
White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938). 
 
Wilbur, Kenneth C.  2004.  “Modeling the Effects of Advertisement-Avoidance 
Technology on Advertisement-Supported Media.” 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/ModelingTheEffectOfAdAvoidanceTechnology.p





Williams, G. C., E. M. Cos, V. A. Hedberg, and E. L. Deci.  2000.  “Extrinsic Life 
Goals and Health Risk Behaviors in Adolescents.”  Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology 30:1756-1771. 
 
Wilson, Edward O.  1998.  Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge.  New York: Knopf. 
 
Wilson, E. O.  2001. “Vanishing Point: On Bjorn Lomborg and Extinction.”  Dec 12, 
2001. http://www.grist.org/advice/books/2001/12/12/point/ (accessed May 7, 2008). 
 
Wilson, James Q.  1992.  American Government, 5th ed.  Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath 
and Company. 
 
Winkelmann, L. and R. Winkelmann.  1998.  “Why Are the Unemployed So 
Unhappy?  Evidence from Panel Data.”  Economica 65:1-15. 
 
World Bank.  “Global Poverty Report.”  Report for G8 Okinawa Summit, July 2000. 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/G8_poverty2000.pdf. (accessed 
February 5, 2008). 
 
World Resources Institute.  n.d.  “Economics, Business, and the Environment—GDP: 
GDP, Annual Growth Rate.”  http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/economics-





Wosinska, Marta.  2002. “Just What the Patient Ordered?  Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising and the Demand for Pharmaceutical Products.”  Harvard Business School 
Working Paper 02-04.  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=347005 
(accessed December 17, 2008). 
 
Wright, John R.  1996.  Interest Groups & Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and 
Influence.  Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Wu, Y.  1999.  China’s Consumer Revolution: The Emerging Patterns of Wealth and 
Expenditure.  Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.  
 
Yancey, T.  1958.  Some Effects of Quality and Selling Effort in a Dynamic Macro-
Economic Model.  Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois.  
 
Yang, Charles Yneu.  1964.  “Variations in the Cyclical Behavior of Advertising.”  
Journal of Marketing 28:25-30. 
 
Yorke, David A., and Philip J. Kitchen.  1985.  “Channel Flickers and Video 
Speeders.”  Journal of Advertising Research 25, no. 2 (April/May): 21-25. 
 
YouTube.com.  n.d.  “Harry and Louise on Clinton’s Health Plan.”  





Zhao, Hao.  2000.  “Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed 
Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model.”  Marketing Science 19, no. 4:390-396. 
 
Zhou, Dongsheng, Weijiong Zhang, Ilan Vertinsky.  2002.  “Advertising Trends in 
Urban China.”  Journal of Advertising Research (May-June): 73-81. 
 
Zinkhan, G., W. Qualls, and A. Biswas.  1990.  “The Use of Blacks in Magazine and 
Television Advertising: 1946 to 1986.  Journalism Quarterly 67, no. 3:547-553. 
 
Zinkin, Maurice.  1967.   “Galbraith and Consumer Sovereignty.”  Journal of 
Industrial Economics 16, no. 1:1-9. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 610 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 611 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 612 
 
 
